ARTICLE XI

THE last question is: Are the powers of the soul the same as the essence of the soul?

             And it would seem that they are. 1 For Augustine says in IX De Trinitate [IV, 5]: "We are reminded . . . that these things (namely, mind, knowledge, and love) exist in the soul . . . substantially or essentially, not as in a subject, like color or shape in a body or like any other quantity or quality."

             2 Furthermore, in the book De Spiritu et Anima [XIII, PL XL, 789] it is said that "God is all the things that He has, but the soul is some of the things that it has", namely, powers; and is not some of the things that it has, namely, virtues.

             3 Futhermore, substantial differences are not derived from any accidents. But "sensible" and "rational" are substantial differences, and they are derived from sense and reason. Therefore sense and reason are not accidents, and by a parallel argument, neither are the other powers of the soul; and so they seem to belong to the essence of the soul.

             But the objector said that the powers of the soul are not accidents and do not belong to the essence of the soul, but that they are natural or substantial properties; and so they are something intermediate between a subject and an accident. But on the other hand, 4 between an affirmation and a denial there is nothing intermediate. But a substance and an accident are differentiated by way of affirmation and denial: because an accident is that which is in a subject, but a substance is that which is not in a subject. Therefore between the essence of a thing and an accident there is nothing intermediate.

             5 Furthermore, if the powers of the soul are called natural or essential properties, this is either because they are essential parts, or because they are caused by the principles of the essence. If in the first sense, then they pertain to the essence of the soul, because essential parts are of the essence of a thing. If in the second sense, then even accidents can be called essential, because they are caused by the principles of a subject. Therefore it must be the case that the powers of the soul either pertain to the essence of the soul, or else are accidents.

             But the objector said that, although accidents are caused by the principles of a substance, yet not every thing which is caused by the principles of a substance is an accident. But on the other hand, 6 every thing that is intermediate must be distinguished from both extremes. If, then, the powers of the soul are intermediate between an essence and an accident, it must be the case that they are differentiated from an essence as well as from an accident. But nothing can be differentiated from a thing by something that is common to both. Since, then, to flow from the principles of a substance, which is the reason why the powers are said to be essential, is an attribute even of accidents, it would seem that the powers of the soul are not differentiated from accidents; and so it would seem that there is no intermediate between substance and accident.

             But the objector said that they are differentiated from accidents by the fact that a soul can be conceived apart from accidents, but cannot be conceived apart from its own powers. But on the other hand, 7 each individual thing is understood through its own essence, because the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in III De Anima [4, 429b 19]. Whatever there is, then, apart from which a thing cannot be understood, belongs to the essence of that thing.

             If, then, the soul cannot be understood apart from its powers, it follows that the powers belong to the essence of the soul and that they are not something intermediate between essence and accidents.

             8 Furthermore, Augustine says in X De Trinitate [XI, 18] that memory, understanding, and will are "one life, one mind, one substance." And so it would seem that the powers of the soul are its very essence.

             9 Furthermore, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so a part of the soul is to a part of the body. But the whole soul is the substantial form of the body. Therefore a part of the soul, e.g., sight, is the substantial form of a part of the body, namely, of the eye. But the soul by its own essence is the substantial form of the whole body and of every one of its parts. Therefore the power of sight is identical with the essence of the soul; and for the same reason so are all the other powers.

             10 Furthermore, the soul is nobler than an accidental form. But an active accidental form is its own power of action. Therefore, so much the more is the soul its own powers.

             11 Furthermore, Anselm says in his Monologium [LXVII, PL CLVIII, 213] that nothing greater could be given to the soul than remembering, understanding, and willing. But among all the things that belong to the soul, the chief thing is its own essence, which has been given to it by God. Therefore the powers of the soul are identical with its essence.

             12 Furthermore, if the powers of the soul are something other than its essence, it must be the case that they flow from the essence of the soul as from a principle. But this is impossible, because it would follow that a principiate would be more immaterial than its own principle: for the intellect, which is one of the powers, is not an act of any body; whereas the soul by its own essence is the act of the body. Therefore, too, the first statement is incongruous, namely, that the powers of the soul are not its essence.

             13 Furthermore, it is especially proper to a substance to be something that is able to take on contraries. But the powers of the soul are able to take on contraries: thus the will, for instance, is able to take on virtue and vice, and the intellect, knowledge and error. Therefore, the powers of the soul are a substance. But they are not a different substance from the substance of the soul. Therefore they are identical with the very substance of the soul.

             14 Furthermore, the soul is united to the body as its form immediately, and not through the medium of some power. Now inasmuch as it is the form of the body, it gives some act to the body. But not the act of existence, because this act is found even in things that have no soul; and again, it does not give the act of being alive, because this act is found in things wherein there is no rational soul. Therefore, the only remaining alternative is that it gives the act of understanding. But this act is given by the intellectual power. Therefore the intellectual power is identical with the essence of the soul.

             15 Furthermore, the soul is nobler and more perfect than prime matter. But prime matter is identical with its own potency. For it cannot be said that the potency of matter is an accident of it, because in that case an accident would exist prior to a substantial form, since potency in one and the same thing is temporally prior to act, as is said in IX Metaphysica [8, 1049b 19]; and in the second place, neither is it the substantial form, because a form is an act, which is the opposite of a potency; and similarly neither is it a composite substance, because in that case a composite substance would precede a form, which is impossible. And thus the only remaining alternative is that the potency of matter is the very essence of matter. Much more, then, are the powers of the soul its essence.

             16 Furthermore, an accident does not extend beyond its own subject. But the powers of the soul extend beyond the soul itself, because the soul not only understands and wills itself, but also other things. Therefore the powers of the soul are not its accidents. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is that they are the very essence of the soul.

             17 Furthermore, every substance is intellectual by the very fact that it is free from matter, as Avicenna says [VIII Met., 6]. But immaterial actual being is proper to the soul by its own essence: therefore, intellectual actual being is also proper to it. Therefore the intellect is its own essence, and by a parallel argument so are its other powers.

             18 Furthermore, "in those things which are without matter, the intellect and the thing that is understood are the same thing," according to the Philosopher [III De An., 4, 430a 2]. But the very essence of the soul is what is understood. Therefore the very essence of the soul is the understanding intellect; and by a parallel argument the soul is its other powers.

             19 Furthermore, the parts of a thing belong to its substance. But the powers of the soul are said to be its parts. Therefore they pertain to the substance of the soul.

             20 Furthermore, the soul is a simple substance, as was said above; but the powers of the soul are several. If, then, the powers of the soul are not its essence, but are kinds of accidents, it follows that in one simple thing there are several and different accidents, which seems incongruous. Therefore the powers of the soul are not its accidents but its very essence.

             But on the other hand there is i what Dionysius says in the eleventh chapter of De Caelesti Hierarchia [§2, PG I, 283D], that the higher essences are divided into substance, power, and activity. Much more, then, in souls, their essence is one thing and the virtue or power is another.

             ii Furthermore, Augustine says in XV De Trinitate [XXIII, 43] that the soul is called the image of God, as a board is, "because of the picture which is on it." But a picture is not the very essence of the board. Therefore neither are the powers of the soul, by which the image of God is stamped upon the soul, the soul's very substance.

             iii Furthermore, all things that are counted like essences are not one essence. But the three things in view of which the image is considered to be in the soul are counted like essences or substances. Therefore they are not the very essence of the soul, which is one.

             iv Furthermore, a power is something intermediate between a substance and an activity. But an activity differs from the substance of the soul. Therefore a power differs from both; otherwise it would not be something intermediate if it were identical with an extreme.

             v Furthermore, a principal and an instrumental agent are not one thing. But a power of the soul is related to its essence as an instrumental agent is to a principal agent; for Anselm says in his book De Concordia Praescientiae et Liberi Arbitrii [XI, PL 158, 534] that the will, which is a power of the soul, is like an instrument. Therefore the soul is not its own powers.

             vi Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the first chapter of De Memoria et Reminiscentia [in fin.] that memory is a passion or a habit of the sense faculty or of the imaginative faculty. Now a passion and a habit is an accident. Therefore memory is an accident; and for the same reason so are the other powers of the soul.

             ANSWER. It must be said that some have asserted that the powers of the soul are nothing else than its very essence: in such a way that one and the same essence of the soul, according as it is the principle of sense activity, is called the sense; but according as it is the principle of the intellectual activity, it is called intellect; and so of the other faculties. And they seem to have been especially moved toward this position, as Avicenna says [De An., V, 7], because of the simplicity of the soul, as though this simplicity would not permit such great diversity as is apparent in the powers of the soul. But this position is utterly impossible.

             First of all, because it is impossible in the case of any created substance that its own essence should be its own active power. For it is obvious that different acts belong to different things; for an act is always proportioned to the thing whereof it is an act. Now just as actual being itself is a kind of actuality of an essence, so acting is an actuality of an active power or virtue. For on this basis both of these are in act: the essence in regard to actual being, and the power in regard to acting. And hence, since in no creature is its own activity its own actual being, but this is proper to God alone, it follows that the active power of no creature is its essence; but to God alone is it proper that His essence is His power.

             Secondly, this appears impossible for a special reason in the case of the soul, on three counts. First of all, because an essence is one; whereas in regard to powers we must assert manyness because of the diversity of acts and objects. For powers must be diversified on the basis of their acts, since a potency is so called in relation to an act. Secondly, the same thing is apparent as a result of the diversity of powers, whereof certain ones are acts of certain parts of the body, as are all powers of the sensitive and the nutritive part; but certain powers are not acts of any part of the body, as, for instance, the intellect and the will. This could not be the case if the powers of the soul were nothing less than its essence; for it cannot be said that one and the same thing may be an act of the body and yet something separate, except in different respects.

             Thirdly, the same is apparent as a result of the order of the powers of the soul and their relation to one another. For it is found that one power moves another: thus, for instance, reason moves the irascible and the concupiscible power, and the intellect moves the will; and this could not be the case if all the powers were the very essence of the soul, because the same thing does not move itself in the same respect, as the Philosopher proves [VIII Phys., 5]. Therefore the only remaining alternative is that the powers of the soul are not its very essence.

             Some, granting this, say that they are not an accident of the soul either, but are its essential or natural properties. This opinion, in fact, if understood in one sense, can be maintained, but in another sense it is impossible. As evidence of this we must bear in mind that "accident" is taken in two senses by philosophers. In one sense, as that which is the opposite of "substance" and includes under itself nine categories of things. Now taking "accident" in this sense the position is impossible. For between a substance and an accident there cannot be anything intermediate, since substance and accident are divisions of being by way of affirmation and denial: since it is proper to a substance not to be in a subject, but to an accident to be in a subject. And hence, if the powers of the soul are not the very essence of the soul (and it is obvious that they are not other substances), it follows that they are accidents included under one of the nine categories. For they are in the second species of quality, which is called natural power or natural impotence. "Accident" is taken in another sense as being one of the four predicates put down by Aristotle in I Topica [4, 101b 17], and as being one of the five universals put down by Porphyry [Isagoge, IV]. For in this sense an accident does not signify that which is common to the nine categories, but the accidental relationship of a predicate to a subject, or the relationship of a universal to those things which are included under the universal. For if this meaning of accident were the same as the first, since accident in this sense is opposed to genus and species, it would follow that nothing which is in the nine categories could be called either a genus or a species; and it is clear that this is false, since color is the genus of whiteness, and number the genus of "couple". Taking accident in this sense, then, there is something intermediate between substance and accident, that is, between a substantial predicate and an accidental predicate; and this is a property. A property is like a substantial predicate, inasmuch as it is caused by the essential principles of a species; and consequently a property is demonstrated as belonging to a subject through a definition that signifies the essence. But it is like an accidental predicate in this sense, that it is neither the essence of a thing, nor a part of the essence, but something outside of the essence itself. Whereas it differs from an accidental predicate, because an accidental predicate is not caused by the essential principles of a species, but it accrues to an individual thing as a property accrues to a species, yet sometimes separably, and sometimes inseparably. So, then, the powers of the soul are intermediate between the essence of the soul and an accident, as natural or essential properties, that is, as properties that are a natural consequence of the essence of the soul.

             As to the first argument, therefore, it must be said that no matter what be said of the powers of the soul, still no one ever thinks (unless he is crazy) that a habit and an act of the soul are its very essence. Now it is obvious that the knowledge and love of which Augustine speaks in that passage do not designate powers, but acts or habits. And hence Augustine does not mean to say that knowledge and love are the very essence of the soul, but that they are in it, and substantially or essentially. To understand this, we must notice that Augustine in that passage is speaking of the mind according as it knows and loves itself. From this viewpoint, then, knowledge and love can be related to the mind, either as to the mind that loves and knows, or as to the mind that is loved and known. And Augustine is speaking here in this second sense; for the reason why he says that knowledge and love exist substantially or essentially in the mind or in the soul is that the mind loves its essence, or knows its substance. And hence he later adds [De Trin. IX, 4, 7]: "How those three things are not of the same essence I do not see, since the mind loves itself, and itself knows itself."

             As to the second, it must be said that the book De Spiritu et Anima is apocryphal, since its author is unknown; and there are in it many things falsely or inaccurately stated, because he who wrote the book did not understand the sayings of the saints from whom he tried to quote. Yet if the objection has to be met, we must note that there are three kinds of wholes. One is a universal whole, which is present to every part in its whole essence and power; hence it is properly predicated of its parts, as when one says: Man is an animal. But another whole is an integral whole, which is not present to any part of itself, either in its whole essence or its whole power; and consequently there is no way in which it is predicated of a part, as if one were to say: A wall is a house. The third whole is a potential whole, which is intermediate between these two: for it is present to a part of itself in its whole essence, but not in its whole power. And hence it stands in an intermediate position as a predicate: for it is sometimes predicated of its parts, but not properly, and in this sense it is sometimes said that the soul is its own powers, or vice versa.

             As to the third, it must be said that because substantial forms in themselves are unknown but become known to us by their proper accidents, substantial differences are frequently taken from accidents instead of from the substantial forms which become known through such accidents; as, for example, "biped" and "able to walk" and the like; and so also "sensible" and "rational" are put down as substantial differences. Or it may be said that "sensible" and "rational", insofar as they are differences, are not derived from reason and sense according as these are names of powers, but from the rational soul and from the sentient soul.

             As to the fourth, it must be said that that argument is based on "accident" in the sense of what is common to the nine categories; and in this sense there is nothing intermediate between substance and accident; but in another sense, as has been said, there is.

             As to the fifth, it must be said that the powers of the soul can be called essential properties, not because they are essential parts, but because they are caused by the essence; and in this respect they are not differentiated from "accident" that is common to the nine categories; but they are differentiated from "accident" that is an accidental predicate which is not caused by the specific nature.

             And hence the solution to the sixth is clear.

             As to the seventh, it must be said that there are two activities of the intellect, as is said in III De Anima [6, 430a 26]. One whereby it understands what a thing is: and by this sort of activity of the intellect the essence of a thing can be known, both apart from a property and apart from an accident, since neither of these enters into the essence of a thing; and this is the sense on which the argument is based. The other is an activity of the intellect that combines and separates; and in this way a substance can be understood apart from an accidental predicate, even if it is really inseparable: thus, "a crow is white" is intelligible; for there is no repugnance of concepts there, since the opposite of the predicate does not depend on the principles of the species which is designated by the word put down as the subject. But by this activity of the intellect a substance cannot be understood without its property; for it cannot be understood that "man has not the power of laughing", or that "a triangle does not have three angles equal to two right angles"; for here there is repugnance of concepts, because the opposite of the predicate depends upon the nature of the subject. So, then, by the first sort of activity of the intellect the essence of the soul can be understood, in such a way, that is, that its essence is understood apart from its powers; but not by the second kind of activity, i.e., so that it is understood not to have powers.

             As to the eighth, it must be said that those three things are said to be one life, one essence, either on the ground that they are related to the essence as to an object, or in the way in which a potential whole is predicated of its parts.

             As to the ninth, it must be said that the whole soul is the substantial form of the whole body, not by reason of the totality of its powers, but by the very essence of the soul, as was said above [Art. IV]. And hence it does not follow that the power of sight itself is the substantial form of the eye, but that the very essence of the soul is, according as it is the subject or principle of this power.

             As to the tenth, it must be said that an accidental form, which is a principle of action, is itself a power or a virtue of an active substance; but there is no going on to infinity, as though for every virtue there were another virtue.

             As to the eleventh, it must be said that an essence is in a sense a greater gift than a power, just as a cause is more important than an effect. But powers are more important, in a sense, inasmuch as they are nearer to the acts whereby the soul holds fast to its end.

             As to the twelfth, it must be said that the reason why it happens that a power which is not an act of the body flows from the essence of the soul is that the essence of the soul transcends the limitations of the body, as was said above [Art. II; Art. IX, ad 15]. And hence it does not follow that a power is more immaterial than the essence; but from the immaterial nature of the essence there follows the immaterial nature of the power.

             As to the thirteenth, it must be said that among accidents one is nearer than another to a subject; thus quantity is nearer to a substance than quality; and so a substance receives one accident by means of another; thus, for instance, it receives color by means of a surface, and knowledge by means of the intellectual power. In this way, then, a power of the soul is able to take on contraries, as a surface is able to take on white and black, inasmuch, namely, as the substance receives contraries in the way spoken of above.

             As to the fourteenth, it must be said that the soul, insofar as it is the form of the body by its own essence, gives actual being to the body, inasmuch as it is a substantial form; and it gives to it being of a certain sort, i.e., life, inasmuch as it is this kind of form, namely, a soul; and it gives it life of a certain sort, namely, in an intellectual nature, inasmuch as it is this kind of a soul, namely, intellectual. Now "understanding" sometimes means an activity, and in this sense its principle is a power or a habit; but sometimes it means precisely the actual being of an intellectual nature, and in this case the principle of understanding is the very essence of the intellectual soul.

             As to the fifteenth, it must be said that the potency of matter is not a potency for acting, but for substantial being. And consequently the potency of matter can be in the genus "substance", but not the potency of the soul, which is a potency for acting.

             As to the sixteenth, it must be said that, as was said above [ad 1], Augustine relates knowledge and love to the mind inasmuch as the mind is known and is loved; and if, because of this relationship, knowledge and love were in the mind or in the soul as in a subject, it would follow that by a parallel argument they would be in all things that are known and loved as in a subject: and in that case an accident would transcend its own subject, which is impossible. Otherwise, if Augustine were intending to prove that these were the very essence of the soul, his would be no proof. For it is no less true of the essence of a thing that it does not exist outside the thing than it is true of an accident that it does not exist outside its subject.

             As to the seventeenth, it must be said that from the very fact that the soul is free from matter by its own substance, it follows that it has an intellectual power, but not in such a way that its power is its own substance.

             As to the eighteenth, it must be said that the intellect is not only an intellectual power, but much rather a substance because of its power; hence it is understood not only as a power but also as a substance.

             As to the nineteenth, it must be said that the powers of the soul are called parts, not of the essence of the soul, but of its total power; just as if one were to say that the power of a bailiff is a part of the royal power as a whole.

             As to the twentieth, it must be said that many of the powers of the soul are not in the soul as in a subject, but in the composite; and the multiformity of the parts of the body fits in with this multiplicity of powers. But the powers, which are in the substance of the soul alone as in a subject, are the agent intellect and the possible intellect, and the will. And for this multiplicity of powers it is sufficient that in the substance of the soul there is some composition of act and of potency, as was said above [Art. I].

Footnotes

   Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus De Spiritualibus Creaturis (Rome, 1937).

   Hence the derivation of our English word "lecture" and the German vorlesung as a teaching device.

   Cf. P. Mandonnet (Revue Thomiste XXIII (1918) pp. 277-278), where the evidence of the catalogues is assembled.

   Chartularium Univ. Paris. I, p. 646; II, p. 108.

   Bulletin Thomiste (1924) p. 59.

   Cf. De An. VI, ad 13 with De Sp. Cr. II, VIII; De An. VII with De Sp. Cr. I, II, III, V; De An. VIII with De Sp. Cr. II; De An. IX with De Sp. Cr. I; De An. XIX with De Sp. Cr. XI.

    De Sp. Cr., ed. critica (Rome, 1937) pp. xi-xii.

   P. Glorieux, "Les Questions disputées de S. Th. et leur suite "chronologique." Recherches de théol. anc. et médiévale IV (1932) pp. 19-20.

   F. Pelster, "Zur Datierung der Quaestio disputata de Sp. Cr." Gregorianum VI (1925) p. 237.

   P. Mandonnet. "Chronologie des Questions disputées de S. Th. d' Aquin." Revue Thomiste XXIII (1918) pp. 341-371.

   "Wo und wann verfasste Th. von Aquin die Schrift de Sp. Cr.?" Hist. Jahrb. V (1884) p. 145; cf. J. A. Endres in G. von Hertling: Historisches Beiträge (München, 1914) pp. 16-19.

   P. Synave makes a telling point when he insists that the demonstratives hic, hanc, hunc in the Latin of this passage would not have been used had the Seine not been a nearby river (Bulletin Thomiste I, p. 2).

   Op. cit., pp. 284 ff.

   Cod. Balliolensis 47 (of the 13th or 14th century).

   Op. cit. p. 232; cf. Birkenmajer, "Kleinere Thomasfragen." Phil. Jahrb. XXXIV (1921) pp. 31-49, where this author also inclines to Pelster's view.

   Cod. Borghes. 15 (13th or 14th century).

   F I 33, cod. 14 of the University of Basle.

   Einführung in die Summa Theologiae des hl. Thomas von Aquin, p. 23; cf. Die Werke des hl. Thomas, pp. 278-279.

   Bulletin Thomiste I (1924-1926) p. 59.

   Op. cit., pp. 5-33.

   Forschungen über die lateinischen Aristoteles übersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts, p. 148.

   P. Glorieux, op. cit., p. 9.

   Ibid., p. 17.

   Summa Theologica I, q. 89 a. 4; De Malo q. 16 a. 12, ad 1; De Unitate Intellectus 5, §120.

   Bulletin Thomiste (1933) p. 1091.

   Cited by P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie des Questions Disputées de Saint Thomas d' Aquin." Revue Thomiste I (1918) p. 266.

   Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas, p. 275.

   Pace, E. A., "Thomas Aquinas" in Library of the World's Best Literature II, p. 614.

   The titles of the separate series are De Veritate. De Potentia, De Malo, De Unione Verbi Incarnati, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, De Anima, De Virtutibus.

   Cf. De Ente et Essentia 5; In I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 (on the soul); In II Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 (on the angels); d. 17, q. 1, a. 2 (on the soul): In Boethium De Trinitate 5, a. 4, ad 4; In Boeth. De Hebdomadibus lec. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles II, cap. 50, 51; De Potentia VI, 6, ad 4; Quodl. IX, a. 6 (on the angels); Summa Theologica I, q. 50, a. 2 (on the angels); q. 75, a. 5 (on the soul); Q. De Anima* 6; De Subst. Separatis 5-8; Quodl. III, a. 20 (on the soul); De. Sp. Cr. art. 9, ad 9. (Passages marked with an asterisk should be read before the others).

             Avicebron, Fons vitae, tr. 4, and elsewhere passim; Philippus Cancellarius, q. i. De An.; Guilelmus Alvernus, De Universo II, 2, c. 7 et sqq.; De An. III, 1; Joannes de Rupella De An. I, c. 13; Alexander Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 398; S. Bonaventura, II Sent., d. 3, p. 89; Albertus M., II Sent., d. 3, vol. 27, p. 66; Summa Theol. II, tr. 1, q. 3, vol. 32, pp. 33, 38; Summa Philosophiae, tr. 10, cc. 6, 7; Roger Bacon, Communia Natur. IV, 3, c. 4 pp. 291-294.

             On the history of the problem, cf. E. Kleineidam, Das Problem der hylomorphen Zusammensetzung der geistigen Substanzen im 13 Jahrh. behandelt bis zu Th. von Aquin, Liebenthal, 1930; O. Lottin, "La compos. hylemorphique des substances spirituelles." Revue Neo-Scolastique, XXXIV (1932), pp. 21-44. Both writers give texts previously published.

   St. Thomas usually quotes the Arabic version of this statement, in which "ut imaginetur" is given for {noein}; cf. In I Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2.

   On this apocryphal work, see Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Art. "S. Augustin," 2308.

   Boethius makes a distinction between "that which is" (quod est) and "being" (esse); but Gilbert de la Porrée in his commentary introduced the distinction between "that which is" and "that whereby something is" (quo est), which the mediaeval philosophers used to attribute to Boethius himself. Compare the cautious wording in Sum. Theol. I, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4: "And hence (a spirit) is said by some men to be composed of that whereby a thing is and of that which is; for being (esse) itself is that whereby a thing is."

   In the passage cited the Commentator speaks of "a bath" in nature and in the intellect; and he does not bring in the example of the box in that book.

   Cf. Q. De An. 6, resp., where the main argument of the adversaries is expressed as follows: "that in whatever thing the properties of matter are found, matter must be found. And hence, since the properties of matter are found in the soul, which are receiving, being a subject, being in potency, and others of the sort, he thinks it necessary for matter to be in the soul."

   The Scholastics frequently quote this statement as though it were Aristotle's; cf. Met. II, 1, 993b 24; Met. X, 2, 1053b.

   These are the arguments which St. Thomas everywhere emphasizes. In In II Sent., d. 17, the responsio begins as follows: "It must be said that matter does not seem to me to be in the soul or in any spiritual substance in any way . . . although some say otherwise"; in De Pot. VI, 6, ad 4: "Yet I believe rather that the angels are not composed of matter and form." But in the later works he attacks his adversaries more sharply, perhaps because he is more strongly of the opinion that their doctrine takes its origin from Avicebron; cf. the unusual vehemence of Q. De. An. 6: "But this reasoning is frivolous and the position impossible;" "It is obvious that the reasoning mentioned above is frivolous"; "and this is utterly absurd", etc.

   Cf. Aristotle, IX Met., 8, 1049b, with St. Thomas' commentary, lec. 7.

   St. Thomas is less tolerant with such an improper mode of expression in Q. De An. 6, resp.: "And hence matter is not found except in corporeal things in the sense in which philosophers have spoken of matter, unless one wishes to take matter equivocally", but if one does, "he is obviously deceived in consequence of the equivocation". Cf. below, Art. 9, ad 9: "nothing prevents someone else from calling matter what we call act; just as, for instance, what we call stone someone else can call ass."

   Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram I, 1, 2-3.

   In I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, resp., there is the explanation of how "in compounds of matter and form that whereby something is can be said in three senses"; and in Contra Gentiles II, cap. 52-54, the question of "that which is" and "that whereby something is" is discussed at length.

   Cf. G. Théry, "L'augustinisme mediéval et le probl. de l'unité de la forme substantielle," Acta hebdom. Augus. -thom. (Rome, 1931) pp. 140-200; yet in this article the well-known author unduly restricts the problem to the question of the vegetative, the sentient, and the intellectual soul in man.

   Cf. below, Art. 3, resp. In De Ente et Essen. 5 and In II Sent., d. 3 St. Thomas says hesitantly: "The author of this position seems to have been Avicebron;" this doubt later disappears. He often states and refutes the doctrine of that Hebrew philosopher (Salomon ben Gebirol, fl. 1050, whom the mediaeval philosophers believed to be an Arab), especially in De Subst. Separatis, cc. 5-8 and 10.

   Its real author was Dominic Gundisalvus Segoviensis (ca. 1150); see P. Correns, Baeumker Beiträge I, 1, (1891).

   In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; Contra Gentiles II,* cap. 56, 57, 68, 69, 70; Sum. Theol.* I, q. 76, a. 1; Q. De An., 1-2; In II De An., lec. 4 (271-277); In III De An., lec. 7 (689-699); De Unitate Intellectus, c. 3; Compendium Theologiae 80; 87.

             Aristotle, De An. II, cc. 2-3; III, c. 4. Avicenna De An. V, c. 3; VII, 6-7. Averroes, In II De An. comm. 21, 32; III, comm. 4-6. Phil. Cancellarius, De An., q. 10 (xvii). Guil. Alvernus, De An. V, 24. Joan. de Rupella, De An. I, 35-39. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 417. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. II, q. 4, a. 1, vol. 35, pp. 32-38; Summa Theol. II, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 1, vol. 33, p. 68.

   In such passages the editions (after that of Lyons 1569) generally have "But it must be said". The author, however, seems to be referring to an objection actually made by an objector in the disputation itself.

   This saying, so often quoted by St. Thomas, originated with Averroes (In II Physica, comm. 26; 91).

   Cf. Art. 3, ad 6.

   This quotation is frequently cited by the Scholastic philosophers and is constantly referred to III De An; where, however, it is not to be found, except implicitly in c. 4.

   The document in question is to be found in the Decreta Gratiani (c. 12, C. 26 a. 5, vol. I, p. 1030), Richter-Friedburg, Leipzig, 1879. There the reference is to the concilium Anquirense or Ancyrense.

   Cc. 2-3 of Nemesius Emesenus' work De Natura Hominis, which deal with the soul, were in circulation in the Middle Ages under the name of Gregory of Nyssa, and were printed also among Gregory's writings by Migne (PG XLV).

   In almost the same formulas this obscure opinion of Averroes on the intellect's connection with man is elsewhere succinctly expressed; cf. Summa Theol. I, q. 76, a. 1, resp.; Q. De An. 2; De Unit. Intell., c. 3, §63. "This connection," says Scotus In IV Sent., d. 43, q. 2, 5), "neither himself (the Commentator) nor any of his followers could explain, nor could he by that connection save the thesis that man understands."

   Cf. Q. De An., 2, resp.: "as sensible things to the sense and colors to the sight", for the Philosopher says {oion aisthemata}; but the expression "as colors to the sight" has been taken from 430a 15, where it is used of the agent intellect.

   "Aliarum intellecta" ("things understood of other . . ."), as found in the manuscripts, cannot be let stand. The sense is clear from the parallel passage in De Unit. Intell. c. 3, §66: "From this it would follow that man would not understand, but that his phantasms would be understood by the possible intellect."

   As he says in De Unit. Intell., c. 3, §65, the species in the phantasm and in the intellect cannot effect the connection of these, because the species is not numerically the same in both. This argument of Aquinas is unacceptable to Aegidius Romanus (De Pluralitate Intellectus), because he thinks the species is the same, but that it exists in both in a different way.

   The text of Nemesius Emesenus is given in De Unit. Intell. (c. 3, §76): Plato "does not mean that man is made up of body and soul, but that he is a soul using a body and, as it were, clothed with a body."

   Cf. De Unit. Intell., c. 1, §27: "just as the magnet has the power to attract iron, and the sapphire to stop bleeding."

   This is certainly the Aristotelian explanation of the "flight from sensible things," but it does not reproduce the full meaning of such statements in the works of the Platonists.

   De Natura Materiae, cc. 8-9 (a work that is probably genuine); Contra Gentiles II, cap. 71; Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 3, 4, 6, 7; Q. De Anima* 9; In II De An., lec. 1, 234; In VIII Met. lec. 5; Quodl. I, a. 6; XII, a. 9; Compend. theol., 91-92; (The question is not taken up in Comment. in Sent., and is scarcely raised in Contra Gentiles; later it was his custom to treat it in detail.)

             Avicenna, Liber De Sufficientia 1, c. 2 (on the form of corporeity) Isaac de Stella, Epistola De Anima, PL 194, 1881. Alcherus de Claravalle, De Spiritu et Anima PL XL, 780, c. 14 and elsewhere. Phil. Cancellarius, De An., q. 10b (xvii). Guil. Alvernus, De An. VI, 35-36 (indirectly). Ioan. de Rupella, De An. I, 35-37. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 419 sqq. Summa Philos., tr. 4, c. 13 (and elsewhere, teaching the plurality of forms). Roger Bacon. Comm. Nat. IV, 3, c. 4. Albertus M., Summa Theol. II, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 1, vol. 33 p. 68.

   This is found almost word for word in Augustine also (De Gen. ad Litt. III, 5, 7; VII, 19, 25).

   Costa ben Luca, whose work was translated in the twelfth century by John of Spain, and was lectured on in the faculty of arts of the University of Paris. C. S. Baruch has published some selections (Bibliotheca philos. mediae aetatis, Innsbruck, 1878).

   Here he seems to be referring to Avicenna, Liber Sufficientiae I, c. 2, where it is proved that there is a form of corporeity.

   Dimensions, namely, indeterminate dimensions, which St. Thomas defends in several places (v. g., In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 2. sol. 4; In Boeth. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2; Contra Gentiles IV, cap. 81, etc.), but in the (genuine?) work De Natura Materiae (c. 4), he refutes them with many arguments, nor does he subscribe to them in his later works.

   Namely, in air the hot and the moist, in water the cold and the moist. This whole difficulty is discussed at length in De Natura Materiae (cc. 8-9).

   Cf. Q. De An. (9, ad 13): "It must be said that the heart is the primary instrument by means of which the soul moves the other parts of the body; and therefore through it as a medium the soul is united to the other parts of the body as the mover"; ibid., ad 7: "although the same effect is partly produced by the dissolution, caused by the blood, of those humors whereby the heart is dilated and contracted." Perhaps then our text ought to read: "and also moves the heart through the spirit."

   It may be the case that changes from the plural to the singular number, which are common to all our manuscripts, were in the autograph text itself, the author sometimes thinking of the Platonists, sometimes of Plato.

   Compare a similar exposition and refutation of Avicebron's doctrine in Art. I, ad 9. The repetition can be explained on the ground that St. Thomas here wishes to show the similarity between Avicebron's doctrine and that of the Platonists.

   Such is the doctrine of Proclus (Instit. Theol., 72), but not of Plotinus, namely, that the most formal and universal cause, because its power has the widest range, produces the lowest and, as it were, the most distant effect in things; and this effect is matter.

   As he says in Q. De. An. 9, resp.: "between substantial form and matter, there cannot occur any intermediate substantial form."

   This passage coincides almost verbatim with Summa Theol. I, q. 76, a. 4, resp.

   For an agent produces something that is like itself, and it acts by introducing a form.

   The reading of the manuscripts is certainly incorrect; cf. Q. De An. 2, obj. 3: "The Philosopher says in De An. II that just as a triangle is in a quadrilateral and a quadrilateral is in a pentagon, so the nutritive power is in the sentient, and the sentient is in the intellectual": and so in many other places to the same effect. The analogy is explained more fully in De Unit. Intell., c. 1, §49.

   Alcher of Clairvaux wrote it about 1165. Cf. below, Art. XI, ad 2; and Q. De An. 12, ad 1; "It must be said that the book De Spiritu et Anima is not Augustine's, but is said to have been that of a certain Cistercian; nor is much account to be taken of what is said in it."

   {peri zoon kineseos} is generally regarded as spurious.

   Roger Bacon attacks most bitterly this view of St. Thomas on the generation of man, which (he says) "theologians in England and all philosophers still" contradict (Comm. Nat. IV, 3, c. 1, p. 281 sqq.).

   This difficulty, which later writers made so much of, namely, that the soul, being simple and without quantity, cannot give matter quantity by informing it, does not trouble St. Thomas much. Everywhere he answers by saying that the higher form virtually contains that which the lower contains, by appealing to the example of numbers and figures.

   In De Natura Materiae (cc. 8-9) accidents are said to remain numerically the same, because the forms themselves are present "essentially, but not existentially."

   In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 3; Contra Gentiles II, cap. 72; Summa Theol. I, q. 76, a. 8; Q. de An.*, 10; In De An. I, lec. 14.

St. Augustine, De Quant. Animae; De Immort. Animae xvi; De Trin. VI, vi. Avicenna, De An. V, cc. 2-3. Alcherus de Claravalle, De Spiritu et Anima, 18-19. Phil. Cancellarius, q. 9 De An. Guil. Alvernus, De An. VI, 38-39. Ioan. de Rupella, De An. 1, 40. Albertus M., Summa Theol. II, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 4, vol. 33, p. 100. (There was no controversy on this matter, except as regards the way of expressing it, or further developments, for all approved of what Augustine had said).

   Cf. Art. III, n. 15. The whole passage is cited in Q. De An., 10, obj. 4.

   This statement is cited from Met. VII, c. 16, 1040b 13; but cf. rather I De Anima, c. 5, 411b as well as St. Thomas' commentary.

   The correspondence between this responsio and that given in Q. De An., 10 is remarkable.

   Thus Aristotle, II, De An., 1, 412b 21.

   Cf. Q. De An., 10, resp.: "In a third sense the word 'whole' is used in reference to virtual or potential parts, and these parts are based on a division of activities."

   The general solution is valid also concerning the souls of more perfect brute animals; cf. Contra Gentiles II, cap. 72: "If, then, there is some form which is not divided by the division of its subject, and such are the souls of perfect animals, there will be no need of distinction, inasmuch as only one wholeness is applicable to them; but it must be said without qualification that this form is whole in every part of the body."

   St. Thomas seems to have before him Avicenna's argument (De An. V, c. 2, ab init.).

   Contra Gentiles II, cap 46, 91,* 92; De Potentia* VI, a. 6; Summa Theol. I, q. 50, a. 1; In Lib. de Causis, comm. 7; De Subst. Separatis, 18; Compend. Theol., 74-75.

             Aristotle, XII, Met., c. 8. St. Augustine (look in the index of the Maurine edition, under the heading "Angeli, an habeant corpora"). Avicebron, Fons Vitae III. Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 2, cc. 1-4. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, pp. 131-133. Albertus M., II Sent., d. 3, a. 1, vol. 27, p. 60. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 1, p. 41; Summa Philos., tr. 10, c. 1. The history of the controversy is adequately set forth in the Dict. de théol. cath., art. "Anges." It is not usual for the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (A.D. 1215, Denz 428) to be cited by the doctors of that time: "The creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; Who by His own omnipotent power, right from the beginning of time created from nothing both creations, the spiritual and the corporeal; namely, the angelic and the mundane; and then the human, common to both, as it were, made up of spirit and body."

   Here St. Thomas is quoting rather freely from John Damascene (De Fide Orth. II, c. 27, PG XCIV, 959).

   This conclusion "Therefore there is also to be found" is not drawn by Richard, at least not in the passage cited.

   Concerning the Anthropomorphites, see Augustine (Epist. 148, iv, PL XXXIII, 628), where he cites Jerome.

   These views of Anaxagoras are taken from various passages in Aristotle (Met. I, c. 3, 984ab; Phys. I, c. 4, 187a; Phys. VIII, c. 1, 250b, etc.). In the work De Subst. Separatis the various opinions are more fully set forth and compared with one another.

   Namely, that on account of which the movement takes place.

   Following the astronomical theories of his time, Aristotle held the number "55" as more probable.

   Among the philosophers known to the mediaeval writers, the one who made the most elaborate attempt to demonstrate the existence of simple substances below God was Avicebron, whose treatise III (Fons Vitae) is nothing but "an assertion of simple substances;" namely, that (§1) "between the first high and holy maker and between the substance which supports the nine categories there is an intermediate substance"; and (§11) "there is not one substance but many." William of Auvergne (I, 1235) seems to have been the first theologian to develop arguments from reason that angels exist, and we know how highly he esteemed Avicebron. But in discussing this point St. Thomas does not mention Avicebron, but rather has reference to previous Scholastics, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Liber de Causis.

   Cf. Augustine, Conf. XIII, xxviii, 43: "For individual things were merely good; but all things collectively were both good and exceedingly good."

   Although the Angelic Doctor expounds these arguments so firmly and systematically, he certainly perceived that they prove no more than a kind of fitness, and in the De Subst. Separatis, leaving out all proofs from reason, he cites only authorities. This is an instance of the style of writing and type of speaking wherein he draws up and sets forth arguments that are merely probable along the lines of a demonstration. Cf. P. Rousselot, L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas, pp. 156 sqq. (2 edit., Paris, 1924).

   He says quite exactly in De Pot. VI, 6, ad 2: "And hence (Origen) seems to have been of the opinion that all incorporeal substances are united to bodies; although he does not assert this, but proposes it doubtfully, and also touches on another opinion."

   Nevertheless in the sermon referred to St. Bernard openly contends that all angels have bodies conjoined to them.

   In Quodl. II, a. 4 (Paris, 1269-1272) he teaches that the supposite adds something real, over and above the nature of the angels. In explaining this, John of Naples wrote (ca. 1323 A. D.): "He expressly says in his Quodl. II, 4 that in the angels the supposite differs from the nature, because in them the supposite also adds being over and above nature." Cf. Xenia thom. III, p. 89 (Rome, 1925).

   In II Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3; De Veritate V, a. 9, ad 14; Contra Gentiles II c. 70; Contra Gentiles III,* c. 23, 24; De Pot.* VI, a. 6; Summa Theol. I, q. 70, 3; Q. De An. 8, ad 3, ad 17, ad 18; Quodl. XII, a. 8; In II De Caelo, lec. 3 and 13; In XII Met., lec. 9; Resp. de 36 Articulos, 1-3; Resp. ad 42 Articulos, 1-18.

             Aristotle, De Caelo II, c. 2; Met. XII, cc. 7-8. Avicenna, Met. IX, cc. 1-2. Algazel, I, tr. 4, cc. 2-3. Averroes, In XII Met., comm. 44; De Substantia Orbis, c. 2; etc. Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 1, cc. 3-7, pp. 808 sqq. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. I, tr. 3, q. 16, a. 2, vol. 34, p. 439; In II Sent., d. 14, a. 6, vol. 27, p. 265; Summa Theol. II, tr. 11, q. 53, m. 3, vol. 32, p. 566. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, p. 347 (here, cf. the marginal note); Summa Philos., tr. 15, cc. 10-13. Avicenna had said that heavenly bodies are informed by a sentient soul also, but Averroes that they were informed by an intellectual soul only. The more common belief among doctors at the time of St. Thomas was that they are not animated in the proper sense, yet are moved by angels. And this doctrine St. Thomas himself constantly professes, even if he does not always observe the same manner of speaking.

   Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo II, c. 3, 286a.

   Cf. the Philosopher, Phys. VIII, c. 4.

   Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo II, c. 3, 286a, where the matter is put more clearly.

   Cf. Aristotle, II, c. 1, 284a 17.

   This is the argument of Rabbi Moses; cf. Q. De An. 8, ad 19.

   Cf. Diog. Laert. II, 8, but St. Thomas had this from Augustine (De Civitate Dei XVIII, 41) and he refers to this passage in Summa Theol. I, q. 70, a. 3.

   Cf PL XXIII, 1016: "or if he has called the sun itself 'spirit' because it gives life (some codices read: Because it is animal), and breathes, and has strength." The passage is cited by St. Thomas, De Veritate V, 9, ad 14: "He has called the sun 'spirit' because, like an animal, it breathes and has strength." Elsewhere Jerome does not teach that the heavens are animate.

   The moving angel, understanding and desiring some higher good (whether God or a higher angel), aims at assimilating himself to that good in his activity, by producing the most perfect movement of his own sphere, that is, the circular, by which movement the process of generation and corruption is carried forward in this sublunar world, particularly the generation and evolution of men, in order that the number of the Elect may be completed. In the following passages St. Thomas favors the view (of Averroes in Met. XII; cf. below, ad 10) which assigns to the individual spheres, besides an angel who moves as an efficient cause, another higher angel which is aimed at by that one as its end. So also in II Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3: "On this point, moreover, (the position of the philosophers) can be upheld, so that we may say that higher angels, which have more universal forms, are separate and remote movers; whereas lower angels, which have more particular forms, . . . are proximate movers." Yet for the most part he says nothing about remote movers.

   In Respons. ad 42 Articulos (ad 3) he says: "I remember having read that the statement: heavenly bodies are moved by a spiritual creature, was denied by no one of the saints or philosophers." Yet the difficulties raised in that passage and in Respons. ad lect. Venetum (made up of 36 articles) show that some of his contemporaries doubted this.

   Cf. Liber de Causis, §15

   For he says that God Himself is the mover of the first sphere, while Avicenna affirms that the first heaven is moved by the first created intelligence.

   In II Sent., d. 14, i, 3, and in De Ver. V, ad 14, he does not want them to be called forms. In De Pot. VI, a. 6, the matter is not entirely clear. Moreover, he writes in Contra Gentiles II, c. 72: "It will be necessary to say that the intellect is substantially united to a heavenly body as a form"; and similarly in Q. De An. 8, ad 3. But, as here, so in Summa Theol. I, q. 70, a. 3, he again finds fault with the word "form": "But in order that it may do its moving, it need not be united to it as a form, but through the contact of power, as a mover is united to a mobile thing."

   In II Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; Contra Gentiles II, cap. 90, 91; De Pot. VI, 6; Summa Theol. I, q. 51, a. 1; De Malo,* XVI, 1; De Subst. Separatis, 18-19.

             St. Augustine (in various passages where he is recording the views of the Platonists, which he sometimes seems to approve of, at least as regards demons). Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 2, cc. 5, 27, 28. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 238. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 8, p. 210. Albertus M., In II Sent., d. 8, A, a. 1,

vol. 27, p. 168. Summa Philos. tr. 10, c. 1 and following.

   But we must note that it is an entirely different question whether angels can ever assume ethereal bodies, of which they are the movers and not the forms; and this is admitted. Cf. Summa Theol. I, q. 51, a. 2-3.

   In De Malo (XVI, 1, resp.) St. Thomas warns us that "the Peripatetics, Aristotle's followers, did not assert that there are demons." And there he admits (ad 3) that "It is probable enough that Dionysius, who was in many respects a follower of the Platonist view, thought in company with them that demons are a kind of living beings which have sense-appetite and sense-knowledge", and in ad 7 he thinks that Damascene held with Origen that demons have bodies.

   De Ente et Essent., 5; De Natura Materiae, 3; In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4-5; In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 3; Contra Gentiles II, cap. 93, 95; Summa Theol.* I, q. 50, a. 4; Q. De An. 7 (indirectly); In Librum de Causis, lec. 4; De Unit. Intell. 5, §105 (but very roughly); De Subst. Separatis 8; Quodl. II, a. 4.

             Avicenna, Met. V, c. 2; IX, c. 4. Algazel, tr. IV, c. 3, ad fin. Liber de Causis, §4. Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 2, cc. 9-12, p. 852. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 154. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. I, tr. 4, q. 28, a. 2, vol. 34, pp. 495-496; In II Sent., d. 3, A, a. 5, vol. 27, p. 69; ibid., d. 9, a. 7, p. 203. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, p. 102; ibid., d. 9, a. 1, q. 1. (Among the articles censured at Paris in the year 1277 was this (42): "That God could not multiply individuals within one species without matter.")

   The reading in Migne is {en te physei} not {ou te physei}.

   In the French translation edited by S. Munk, I, p. 434.

   This question was not debated among the Latins before the coming in of Peripatetic philosophy. The Aristotelians, of course, Greeks as well as Arabs, all maintained that separated substances are not multiplied within one species; and so did the Latin Averroists. But I do not know whether any theologian before St. Thomas taught this doctrine clearly and consistently about the angels. Albert (In II Sent., d. 9, a. 7), after saying that certain philosophers held that "all angels differ in species, and this seems to me more probable," goes on defending the contrary view, "that all are in one species," because it is "the more common opinion among the doctors."

   Compare In II Sent., d. 3. q. 1, a. 4, resp. and Summa Theol. I, q. 50, a. 4: "Yet if angels had matter, even then there could not be many angels of one species. For thus the principle of distinction of one from another would have to be matter, not indeed by way of a division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but by way of a diversity of potencies; and such a diversity of matter causes a diversity not only of species but also of genus."

   In this sentence alone is contained the fundamental argument of St. Thomas. In those which follow he rather tries to turn against his adversaries those arguments which they were accustomed to urge in behalf of the contrary view. Many weighty authors have believed that St. Thomas concedes the possibility of a multiplication of angels in one species by a miracle, in a passage of De Unitate Intellectus (5, §105); but elsewhere I have shown that his apparent stand is due in great part to the corrupt text (De Unit. Intell., ed. critica, Rome 1936, ad loc.). Concerning Quodl. II, a. 4, see above, Art. 5, n. 12.

   Compare Arist., Met. XII, c. 10, 1075a 12.

   Compare the long question De Ver. VIII, 7: "Does one angel understand another?"

   How immaterial substances can exist and how they are numerically many is more fully explained in De Unit. Intell. 5, §§101-103, 107.

   In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; Contra Gentiles II, cap. 59, 73, 75; Summa Theol. I, q. 76, a. 1-2; Q. De An. 2-3*; In De An. III, lec. 7 (689-699) and 8 (719); De Unitate Intell.*, cc. 4-5; Compend. Theol., 85.

Aristotle, De An. III, c. 4. Avicenna, De An., c. 3. Algazel, De An. II, tr. 4, c. 5. Averroes, In III De An., comm. 4-8 and 36. Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 1, cc. 10-11 (p. 817); De An. VII, cc. 3-4. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. II, 1, q. 2, a. 5 and q. 3, a. 2, vol. 35, pp. 17 and 29; In III De An., tr. 2, c. 7, vol. 5, p. 340; Opusc. De Unit. Intell., vol. 9, p. 437 (almost the same as in Summa Theol. II, q. 77, vol. 33, p. 75). St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, p. 446. Summa Philos., tr. II, c. 10 (briefly at the end). Roger Bacon, Comm. Nat. IV, 3, c. 3, pp. 286-291. (Among the outstanding Peripatetics only Averroes asserted that the possible intellect too is one and separate.)

   The true author is thought to have been Vigilius Tapsensis.

   According to the statement of Averroes (In III De An., comm. 5, f. 166r): "And thus the thing that is understood will possess a thing that is understood, and so there is an infinite process." Cf. below, obj. 13.

   "Thus," says Averroes (In III De An., comm. 5), "it will be impossible for the pupil to learn from the master, unless the knowledge which is in the master is a power that creates and generates the knowledge which is in the pupil, in the manner in which fire generates another fire like to itself in species; which is impossible."

   The words within brackets [ ] were evidently taken by the scribe from the following line by mistake; and yet they are present in all our manuscripts.

   According to Augustine the eyes send forth rays of light, through the medium of which things are seen by the soul.

   This is the same objection as the sixth above.

    Vigilius Tapsensis.

   How that connection is made according to Averroes, St. Thomas explained above (Art. 2, resp.).

   This difficulty is repeatedly urged by St. Thomas (Q. De An. 3, resp.; De Unit. Intell. 4, §§90-91). And it is cited again by Siger of Brabant (De Anima Intellectiva, q. 7) among those arguments which to him cast doubt on the single intellect for all men.

   Compare De Unit Intell. 5, §91: "For phantasms are preliminary to the action of the intellect, as colors are to the action of seeing; and hence through their diversity the action of the intellect could not be diversified, especially in regard to some one intelligible."

   Many commentators have distinguished the passive intellect from the intellect in potency, or the possible intellect, on the ground that Aristotle in III De An. after having said (c. 4) that this latter is unmixed and separable, declared that the passive intellect (c. 5) is corruptible. Cf. St. Thomas In III De An., lec. 10, 745.

   Compare De Unit. Intell. 5, §94: "If, therefore, through any of the preceding men one intellect has been actuated as regards some intelligible species and has been perfected by a habit of knowledge, that habit and those species remain in it. Now, since every thing that receives is void of that which it is receiving, it is impossible that those species are acquired in the possible intellect by my act of learning or remembering."

   Throughout the entire first chapter of De Unit. Intell. the true mind of Aristotle is explored.

   In other words, in that passage Aristotle so sets forth his view on the possible intellect that it is valid in both hypotheses, whether the possible intellect be separated or not; therefore he does not suppose an Averroistic doctrine.

   Here St. Thomas means the species that is expressed through the intellect or "the thing that is understood" of Averroes. Concerning this Roger Bacon says (Comm. Nat. IV, c. 3): "But many explain it in several ways, some as referring to the thing that is understood, and some as referring to the species of the thing in the mind." Compare the long discussion in De Unit. Intell. (5, §§109-112.)

   Algazel's Logic begins thus: of the sciences "there are two properties, imagination and belief. Imagination is the apprehension of the things which single words signify . . . But belief is like when one says: the world began to exist." But we must not believe, because of such terminology, that the Arabs conceived these acts differently from the rest of the Peripatetics.

   Cf. Art. I, resp.

   In the Introduction we have already spoken of the importance of this remark in discussions concerning the year and the place where this question was composed.

   This also seems to be the opinion of Augustine himself; cf. De Quant. Animae XXIII, 43; De Gen. ad Litt. I, xvi. 31; ibid. IV, xxiv, 54; De Trin. IX, iii, 3.

   In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; De Ver. X, 6; Contra Gentiles II*, cap. 76-78; Summa Theol. I, q. 79, 4-5; Q. De An. 4, 5*, 16; In III De An., lec. 10; Compend. Theol. 86. Aristotle, De An. III, c. 5. Avicenna, De An. V, c. 5; Met. IX, c. 3. Algazel, II, tr. 5, cc. 1-3. Averroes, In III De An., comm. 17-20, and 36. Guil. Alvernus, De Universo II, 1, c. 14 sqq.; De An. V, 2 and 7; ibid., VII, 4. Ioan. de Rupella, De An. II, c. 37. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 451. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 24, p. 567. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. II, q. 55, a. 3, vol. 35, p. 461; In III De An., vol. 5, p. 363; Summa Theol. II, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 3, and tr. 15, q. 93, m. 1-2. Summa Philos., tr. 15, c. 11. Roger Bacon, Opus Maius II, c. 5; Opus Tertium, c. 23.

   William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon had made this assertion. Later, many other Augustinians say the same.

   It is strange how often in our manuscripts the numeral IV is written for another number.

   The text "or filled . . . possible" is not certain, but the sense seems to be entirely clear.

   Compare Avicenna (De An. V, c. 7): "If the soul had not known at some time what it now does not know and seeks to get knowledge of: when it obtained this it would not know that it was the thing which it had sought, as, for example, he who seeks a fugitive prisoner . . ."

   Where he asserts: "It is necessary for these differences to be in the soul."

   Because empirical and historical knowledge of this sort is distinguished from purely intelligible things, Augustine is saying that the Platonists knew the latter in the eternal ideas, but not the former. And yet, because they knew many things empirically, and this through the aid of an intelligible light, it must be the case that they knew these things by the light of the agent intellect, which is proper and connatural to themselves.

   According to St. Thomas, the expression "sui generis" signifies "of the genus of the soul itself"; but this seems less probable. For very often Augustine calls even the power of sensing and imagining a kind of "incorporeal light"; but intelligible light is another and far more noble light: "unique of its kind."

   In the first paragraph he points out in what sense God is that which enlightens all intellects; and in the second, what must be put in our soul itself. St. Thomas always had the same view about the theory of a separate agent intellect: 1) that the theory is much less absurd than the doctrine of a separated possible intellect; indeed, that it could in a sense be defended; 2) but that it had not been taught by Aristotle; 3) that the agent intellect of which Aristotle speaks cannot be stretched to include this meaning.

   Compare Summa Theol. I, q. 79, a. 4, resp.: "And this we know by experience;" Q. De An. 5, resp.: "Now we experience both of these activities in ourselves; for we both receive things that are intelligible and we abstract them."

   I believe that for "apprehendo" we should read "abstrahendo."

   Namely, the tenth intelligence, "which is related to our souls and to the whole sphere of active and passive things as the higher separated substances, which they call intelligences, are related to the souls of the heavenly bodies which they assert as animate, and to the heavenly bodies themselves." Q. De An. 5, resp. He refers especially to the doctrine of Avicenna.

   In this all the Arabian Peripatetics agree. Cf. Avicenna (De An. V, c. 6): "Now when the soul will be freed from the body and from the accidents of the body, then it will be able to be conjoined to the agent intelligence; and then it will find therein intelligible beauty and perennial delight."

   This famous passage is explained more fully in Contra Gentiles II, cap. 78. The principal difficulty in the interpretation given is that according to it Aristotle would be distinguishing in that brief paragraph not two intellects only, namely, the possible and the agent, but four: the possible intellect, the agent intellect, the intellect in act, the passive intellect.

   Compare Summa Theol. I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4: "The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potency with respect to definite species of things; the phantasms, however, on the other hand, are actually likenesses of certain species, but are potentially immaterial."

   Compare Q. De An. 5: "And something like this is apparent, in a sense, in the case of animals that see by night. Their pupils are in potency with respect to all colors, insofar as they have no definite color in act; but through a kind of light that is in them they somehow make colors actually visible."

   And from this explanation it is obvious that St. Thomas clearly perceived the profound differences between his own Peripateticism and St. Augustine's doctrine of knowledge, although he usually interprets the sayings of Augustine on divine light and illumination according to his own principles. The same is clear from De Ver. (X, 6, resp.), which refers especially to the Augustinian doctrine: "But others have said that the soul is unto itself a cause of knowledge (scientia). For it does not receive knowledge from sensible things, as though by the action of sense objects the likenesses of things somehow reach the soul; but the soul itself in the presence of sense objects forms" and so on.

   Evidently the difference will depend upon the meaning which is assigned to such formulas.

   Yet St. Augustine carefully distinguishes between the knowledge of purely intelligible things (numbers), and of empirical things (stones), a distinction which loses its importance in the Peripatetic teaching.

   He is perhaps thinking of prop. 9 of the Liber de Causis, "every intelligence is full of forms" and the statement made by Aristotle that the intellect is the "place of species".

   In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; Quodl. VII, a. 5; Quodl. X, a. 5; Summa Theol. I, q. 77, a. 1*, q. 79, a. 1 (and on the angels, q. 54, a. 3); Q. De An. 12*.

             St. Augustine, De Trin. IX, iv; X, xi, 18, etc. Avicenna, De An. V, c. 7. Peter Lombard, Sent. I, d. 3. Isaac de Stella, Epist. De An., PL 194, 1883. Alcherus de Claravalle, De Spiritu et Anima 13. Phil. Cancellarius, q. 3 and q. 4 De An. Guil. Alvernus, De An. III, c. 6. Ioan. de Rupella, De An. II, c. 1. Alex. Halensis, Summa II, 1, p. 424. Albertus M., Summa de Creat. II, q. 7, vol. 35, p. 89; In I De An., tr. 3, cc. 15-16. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 3, p. 84; In II Sent., d. 24, p. 558 (and compare the scholia at that place in the Quaracchi edition). Summa Philos. VI, c. 6. Roger Bacon, Comm. Nat. IV, 3, c. 5.

   In that passage Alcher emphatically asserts that the powers are identical with the essence.

   Thus Lombard (Sent. I, d. 3); they are "natural properties or powers."

   He is talking about the famous passage of St. Augustine (De Trin. IX, iv, 5): "For whatever there is of this kind (quantity or quality) does not exceed the subject in which it is. For that particular color or the shape of this particular body cannot belong to another body also. But the mind through the love with which it loves itself can also love something other than itself. Likewise the mind not only knows itself, but many other things also. Wherefore, love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject, but also exist substantially, as the mind itself does because, although they are used in relation to each other, yet each is individually in its own substance."

   Both in Augustine and in the Lombard the question is raised not on its own account, but in relation to determining the image of the Holy Trinity in the soul; and they did not want to admit that that image is merely in the accidents of the soul. This St. Thomas clearly intimates in Q. De An. 10, obj. 6. St. Bonaventure In II Sent., d. 24, p. 559) begins his answer thus: "It must be said that, although the aforesaid question has more of curiosity than of usefulness in it on account of the fact that whether one side or the other is taken, no prejudice either to faith or morals arises" etc.

   So says William of Auvergne (De An. III, 6), who vehemently attacks a real distinction. Avicenna teaches that the powers are really distinct from the essence.

   Cf. Aristotle (II De An. c. 1, 413a 5-7): "For some parts have an act of their own. But as regards some parts, there is nothing to prevent (the soul from being separated), because of the fact that they are not acts of any part of the body."

   Cf. Peter Lombard (I Sent., d. 3).

   This is called by Roger Bacon (Comm. Nat. IV, 3, c. 5): "the damnable view that is popularly accepted at Paris."

   In this famous passage there was either a lacuna or some corrupted word in the first copy. The same interpretation is put on Augustine in Sum. Theol. I. q. 77, a. 1, ad 1: "It must be said that Augustine is speaking of the mind according as it knows itself and loves itself. Thus therefore knowledge and love, inasmuch as they are referred to the mind itself as that which is known and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul; because the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved." And yet in that passage another interpretation is added. And in Q. De An. (12. ad 5) the above exposition is prefaced by this formula: "And hence perhaps it is in this sense that he said . . ."

   Cf. above, Art. 3, ad 6.

   Cf. above, Art. 9, resp.

   Here he touches on a difficulty that afterwards became classical: if the same soul cannot act on many different things save through the medium of different powers, for the same reason it will not be able to put forth many powers from itself save through the medium of other powers, and so on to infinity.

   These words "inasmuch as it is a substantial form" appear to be a gloss that was introduced into the text.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS