ARTICLE III

IN THE ACT OF GENERATION DOES THE GENERATIVE POWER COME INTO ACTION AT THE COMMAND OF THE WILL?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xli, A. 2

THE third point of inquiry is whether in the act of generation the generative power comes into action at the command of the will. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.

             1. Hilary (De Synod.) says that not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son. Now if he did not beget of his will he begot of natural necessity, since an agent is either voluntary or natural. Therefore the Father begot the Son by his will: and thus the generative power proceeded to generate through the command of the will.

             2. But, you will say, the Father begot the Son by an act of his will, neither preceding nor following but accompanying the act of generation.--On the contrary this argument is seemingly inadequate. For since everything in God is eternal, nothing in him can precede in point of time anything that is in him: and yet we find in him one thing having to another the relation of a principle, for instance, his will in relation to his election of the just, from the mere fact that it proceeds from his intellect. Therefore though the will to beget did not precede the begetting of the Son, nevertheless it would seem that we may consider it to be the principle of the Son's generation, for the reason that it proceeds from the intellect.

             3. The Son proceeds through an act of the intellect since he proceeds as the Word: because there is no intellectual word except when thinking of a thing we understand it, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4). Now the will is the principle of the intellectual operation: for it commands the act of the intellect, even as those of the other powers, as Anselm says (De Simil. ii): thus I understand because I wish to do so, just as I walk because I wish to walk. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son's generation.

             4. But, say you, it is true of man that the will commands the act of the intelligence, but not of God.--On the contrary predestination is, in a way, an act of the intelligence: for we say that God predestined Peter because he willed, according to Romans ix, 18: He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Therefore not only in man but also in God does the will command the act of the intelligence.

             5. According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 5) that which causes its own movement can be either in motion or not: and for the same reason that which is cause of its own act, can act or not act. But nature cannot act or not act, since it is determined to one action. Therefore it is not the cause of its own action, but acts as moved by another. Now this cannot be the case in God. Therefore in God no action is from nature, and consequently neither is generation. Therefore generation is from his will, since all agents are reduced to nature or will as stated in Phys. ii, 4.

             6. If the action of nature precede that of the will, this leads to an absurdity, for the will would be rendered void. Because since nature is determined to one course of action, if it moved the will, it would move it to one thing alone, and this is contrary to the essence of the will which, as such, is free. On the other hand if the will move nature, neither nature nor will is abrogated, since that which is indifferent to many things is not debarred from moving towards one. Therefore the action of the will reasonably precedes the action of nature, rather than vice versa. Now the generation of the Son is pure action or operation. Therefore it comes from the will.

             7. It is written (Ps. cxlviii, 5): He spake and they were made, which words Augustine expounds as follows (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): He begat the Word in whom they were that they might be made. Accordingly the procession of the Word from the Father is the reason of the creature's production. Wherefore if the Son proceeds not from the Father by the command of the Father's will, it would seem that all creatures proceed from the Father naturally and not only by his will: which is erroneous.

             8. Hilary says (De Synod.): If anyone say that the Son was born of the Father without the concurrence of the Father's will, let him be anathema. Therefore the Father did not beget the Son involuntarily; and so the same conclusion follows.

             9. It is written (Jo. iii, 35): The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand, which words a gloss expounds of the giving of the eternal generation. Therefore the love of the Father for the Son is the reason rather than the sign of the eternal generation. Now love is from the will. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son's generation.

             10. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says that God's love does not allow him to be without offspring. Hence again it would seem to follow that love is the reason of generation.

             11. Any opinion about God that does not involve absurdity or error can be maintained. Now if we suppose that the Father begat the Son voluntarily, no absurdity follows, since neither does it follow apparently that the Son is not eternal, nor that he is not consubstantial with or equal to the Father, since the Holy Ghost who proceeds as an act of the will, is co-eternal, co-equal and consubstantial with the Father and Son. Therefore seemingly it is not erroneous to assert that the Father begat the Son by his will.

             12. No will can fail to will its last end. Now the end of God's will is to communicate his goodness, and this is especially effected by generation. Therefore the Father's will cannot but will the generation of the Son. Therefore by his will he begat the Son.

             13. Human generation is drawn from the divine according to Ephesians iii, 15: Of whom all paternity is named in heaven and on earth. Now human generation is subject to the command of the will, else there could be no sin in the act of generation. Therefore the divine generation is also, and so the same conclusion follows.

             14. Every action proceeding from an unchangeable nature is necessary. Now the divine nature is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore if the (divine) generation be the operation of the nature and not of the will, it follows that it is necessary, so that the Father begat the Son of necessity: and this is contrary to the teaching of Augustine (Ad Oros. iii).

             15. Augustine (De Trin. xv, xx) says that the Son is Counsel of counsel, and will of will. Now the preposition of (de) indicates a principle. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son's generation, and so the same conclusion follows.

             On the contrary Augustine (Ad Oros. iii) says: The Father begot the Son neither by his will nor of necessity.

             Again, the supreme effusion of the will is through the channel of love. But the Son proceeds not by way of love, rather is it the Holy Ghost who proceeds thus. Therefore the will is not the principle of the Son's generation.

             Further, the Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance. Now brightness does not proceed from light by the will. Neither therefore does the Son proceed thus from the Father.

             I answer that the generation of the Father may be referred to the will as the object of the will: since the Father both willed the Son and the generation of the Son from eternity: but by no means can the will be the principle of the divine generation. This is made evident as follows. The will as such being free is indifferent to either of the alternatives: for it can act or not act, do thus or do otherwise, will and not will. And if this does not apply to the will with regard to a certain thing, this will be true of the will not as will, but on account of the natural inclination it has for a certain thing, as for the last end which it is unable not to will: thus the human will is unable not to will happiness, and cannot will unhappiness. Wherefore it is clear that whenever a thing has the will for its principle, it is possible for it to be or not to be, to be such or otherwise, to be now or then. Now everything of this description is a creature; since in an uncreated being there is no possibility of being or not being, but the essential necessity of being, as Avicenna proves (Metaph. viii, 4). Wherefore if we suppose the Son to be begotten by the will, it must needs follow that he is a creature. For this reason the Arians who held the Son to be a creature, said that he was begotten by the will: whereas Catholics say that he was begotten not by will but by the nature. For nature is determined to one effect: and accordingly since the Son is begotten of the Father by nature, it follows that it is impossible for him not to be begotten, or to be otherwise than he is, or not consubstantial with the Father: since that which proceeds naturally, proceeds in likeness to that from which it proceeds. This is the teaching of Hilary (De Syn.): God's will gave every creature its nature, whereas a perfect nativity gave the Son his nature. Hence everything is such as God willed it to be, while the Son is such as God is. Now, as already stated, although the will is indifferent to some things, it has a natural inclination in regard to the last end: and in like manner the intellect has a certain natural movement in respect of its knowledge of first principles. Moreover, the principle of the divine knowledge is God himself, who is the end of his will; wherefore that which proceeds in God by his act of self-knowledge, proceeds naturally, and likewise that which proceeds by his act of self-love. And for this reason, since the Son proceeds as the Word by an act of the divine intellect inasmuch as the Father knows himself, and the Holy Ghost by an act of the will inasmuch as the Father loves the Son: it follows that both Son and Holy Ghost proceed naturally, and further, that they are consubstantial, coequal and coeternal with the Father and with each other.

             Reply to the First Objection. Hilary is speaking of the necessity that denotes violence: this is evident from the words that follow: Not led by natural necessity, since he willed to beget the Son.

             Reply to the Second Objection. There is not an antecedent will in God in respect of anything whatsoever; because everything that God ever wills, he has willed from eternity. But his will is concomitant with every good that is in him and creatures: for he wills himself to be and the creature to be. It is, however, precedent or antecedent in point of time with reference to creatures alone who have not existed from eternity. His intellect is precedent as regards those eternal acts which are denominated as terminating in creatures, such as government, predestination and the like. But the generation of the Son is neither a creature nor does it signify an act terminating in a creature. Therefore with regard to it God's will is not antecedent either in time or in our way of thinking, but only concomitant.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Just as the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will, in so far as it is commanded by the will, so on the other hand the act of the will seems to follow the act of the intellect, in so far as the will's object, namely the good understood, is offered to it by the intellect. Hence we should go on indefinitely unless we come to a stop either in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will. But we cannot come to a stop in an act of the will whose object is presupposed to its act. Therefore we must come to a stop in an act of the intellect, and an act which proceeds from the intellect naturally, so as not to be commanded by the will. It is in this way that the Son of God proceeds as the Word, by an act of the divine intellect, as we have already stated.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. The act of the divine intellect is natural, in so far as it terminates in God himself who is the principle of his intellect: but in so far as it is described as terminating in creatures, its relation to whom is somewhat like the relation of our intellect to its conclusions, it proceeds not naturally but voluntarily. Consequently some of the acts of the divine intellect are designated as being commanded by the divine will.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. With regard to those things to which it can extend by virtue of its essential principles, nature does not need to be determined by another, but only with regard to those things for which its own principles do not suffice. Consequently philosophers in saying that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, were not led by observing the effects of heat and cold considered in themselves, since even those who said that natural effects were necessitated by matter referred all the works of nature to the agency of heat and cold. But they were led by observing those effects which were beyond the power of these qualities of heat and cold: such as the arrangement of members in the body of an animal in suchwise that nature is safeguarded. Since this generation is the work of the divine nature considered in itself, there is no need for it to be determined to such an action by the will.--It may also be replied that nature is determined by something for some particular end. But a nature which is itself the end and not directed to an end does not require determination from without.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action of the will precedes the action of nature if we take them in separate subjects. Wherefore the action of the entire inferior nature is dependent on the will of its Governor. But in the same subject the action of nature must needs precede the act of the will. For nature is logically prior to will, since nature in the logical order comes the first in a thing's subsistence, while the will comes last as directing that thing to its end. Yet it does not follow that the will is rendered void. For although the will follows the natural inclination in being determined to that one thing which is the last end to which nature inclines, it nevertheless remains undetermined with regard to other things. Take man, for instance, who desires happiness naturally and of necessity, but not other things. Accordingly in God the action of nature precedes the act of the will both naturally and logically: for the generation of the Son is the prototype of all the productions that proceed from the divine will, that is to say of all creatures.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Though all creatures were made by the Word of God begotten of the Father, it does not follow that if the Word proceeded naturally, creatures also proceed naturally: thus although our intellect knows first principles naturally, it does not follow that it knows naturally the conclusions deduced from them. For the will makes use of our natural gifts for this or that purpose.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. The Father begot voluntarily, but this indicates nothing else than his concomitant will.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. If these words are made to refer to the eternal generation, the Father's love for the Son is not to be taken as the reason but as the sign of that giving whereby the Father from all eternity gave all things to the Son. For likeness is the reason of love.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Dionysius is speaking of the formation of creatures, not of the generation of the Son.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The Holy Ghost is said to proceed by way of the will, because he proceeds by an act which is naturally an act of the will, namely the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For the Holy Ghost is love even as the Son is the Father's Word expressive of himself.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Again this argument proves only that the Father wills the generation of the Son: and this denotes a concomitant will that regards the generation as its object, not as something whereof it is the principle.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Human generation is effected by a natural force, namely the generative power, through the medium of the motive power which is subject to the command of the will, whereas the generative power is not. This does not apply to God, and so the comparison fails.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine does not mean to deny the necessity attaching to immutability as the argument suggests, but the necessity induced by force.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When it is said that the Son is 'will of will' the sense is 'will of the Father' who is will. Hence this preposition 'of' denotes the generative principle that is the begetter, and not the principle whereby generation is effected, which is the point of our inquiry.