ARTICLE IV

CAN THERE BE SEVERAL SONS IN GOD?

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether there can be several Sons in God. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.

             1. A natural operation that is becoming to one individual is becoming to every individual of the same nature. Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) generation is an operation of nature, and it is becoming to the Father. Therefore it is becoming also to the Son and Holy Ghost who are supposits of the same nature. But the Son does not beget himself since, according to Augustine, nothing can generate itself. Therefore he begets another Son, so that in God there can be several Sons.

             2. The Father communicated all his might to the Son. Now the generative power belongs to the Father's might. Therefore the Son has this power from the Father; and the same conclusion follows.

             3. The Son is the perfect image of the Father, and this demands perfect likeness. But this would not be the case if the Son did not imitate the Father in all respects. Therefore as the Father begets a Son, so also does the Son; and the same conclusion follows.

             4. According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii) likeness to God is more perfect in respect of conformity in action than in respect of conformity in some form: thus that which both shines and illuminates is more like the sun than that which shines only. Now the Son is most perfectly like the Father. Therefore he is conformed to him not only in the power but also in the act of generation. Thus we have the same conclusion as before.

             5. The reason why God after making one creature is able to make another is because his power is neither exhausted nor diminished in creating. Now in like manner the Father's power is neither exhausted nor diminished through begetting the Son. Therefore by begetting the Son he is not disabled from begetting another: and so there can be several Sons in God.

             6. But, say you, the reason why he does not beget another Son is that the result would be unbecoming, as Augustine points out, namely that there would be an infinite number of divine generations, if the Father were to beget many sons, or the Son to beget grandsons to the Father, and so on.--On the contrary nothing in God is potential but what is also actual, else he were imperfect. Therefore if it is potential that the Father beget several sons, and nothing arise to prevent it, there will be several Sons in God.

             7. It belongs to the nature of that which is generated to proceed in likeness to the generator. Now as the Son is like the Father, so also is the Holy Ghost: so that the Holy Ghost is likewise a Son: and thus there are several Sons in God.

             8. According to Anselm (Monolog. xxxii) for the Father to beget the Son is nothing else but for the Father to speak himself. Now, as the Father can speak himself, so also can the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost can beget Sons, and the same conclusion follows.

             9. The Father is said to beget the Son, because he conceives intellectually his own likeness. But the Son and Holy Ghost can do the same: and thus we come to the same conclusion.

             10. Power comes between essence and operation. Now the essence of the Father and the Son is one, and theirs is one power. Therefore it becomes the Son to beget: and we conclude as before.

             11. Goodness is the principle of diffusion. Now even as there is infinite goodness in the Father and the Son so is there in the Holy Ghost. Therefore even as the Father by begetting the Son bestows on him his nature by an infinite communication, so likewise does the Holy Ghost by producing a divine person, since the divine goodness is not bestowed in an infinite degree on a creature. Wherefore it would seem that there can be several Sons in God.

             12. No good can be possessed happily unless it be shared with another. Now Sonship is a good possessed by the Son. Therefore seemingly his perfect happiness demands that he should beget a Son.

             13. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light, according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance. Now one splendour can produce another, and this one a third, and this one yet another. And thus it would seem to be in the procession of the divine persons, so that the Son can beget another Son; and hence the same conclusion follows.

             14. Paternity belongs to the Father's dignity. But the same dignity is both Father's and Son's. Therefore paternity is becoming to the Son: and consequently the Son begets.

             15. Where the power is there is the act. But the Son has the power to beget. Therefore he begets.

             On the contrary those creatures are most perfect which contain their entire matter, each one by itself alone forming a single species. Now as material creatures are individualised by their matter, so the person of the Son is constituted by Sonship. Therefore, as the Son of God is a perfect Son, in God seemingly Sonship is in him alone.

             Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 18, 23) that if the Father being able to beget did not beget he would be envious. But the Son is not envious. Therefore seeing that he does not beget, he cannot do so. Consequently there cannot be several Sons in God. Again, what has been said perfectly should not be said over again. Now the Son is the perfect Word lacking nothing (Augustine, De Trin. vi, 10; vii, 2). Therefore there ought not to be several Words in God, nor several Sons.

             I answer that there cannot be several Sons in God: this is proved as follows. The divine persons in all things absolute are identical, and essentially coincident with one another: and between them there can be no other distinction but that founded on the relations, and on no other relationship but that of origin. The reason of this is that of other relations, some presuppose distinction, such as equality and likeness, while some imply inequality, such as master and servant, and so on. On the other hand relations of origin by their very nature denote conformity: because that which takes its origin from another, as such bears the likeness thereof. In God, therefore, there is nothing whereby the Son can be distinguished from the other persons, except the relation of Sonship, which is his personal property, and by virtue of which he is not only the Son but also this supposit or this person. Now it is impossible for that whereby this particular supposit is individualised to be found in anything else: otherwise the supposit itself would be communicable, which is incompatible with the very nature of an individual, supposit or person. Consequently it is utterly impossible that in God there be more Sons than one. For it cannot be said that one Sonship makes one Son, and another Sonship another Son: because as sonships do not differ logically, it would follow that if they differed in matter or supposit, there would be matter in God, or some principle of distinction other than relation.

             Besides the above, another special reason may be given why the Father can beget but one Son. Nature is determined to one effect: and therefore, since the Father begets the Son by nature, there can be but one Son begotten of the Father. Nor can it be said that there are several in the one species, as is the case with us; since in God there is no matter which is the principle of numerical distinction within the one species.

             Reply to the First Objection. Although in the Father generation is an operation of the divine nature, nevertheless it belongs thereto with reference at the same time to the personal property of the Father, as stated above (A. 2): wherefore it does not follow that it belongs to the Son, who has the divine nature without that property.

             Reply to the Second Objection. The Father communicates to the Son all that divine might which goes with the divine nature absolutely. But the generative power goes with the divine nature in conjunction with the personal property of the Father, as stated.

             Reply to the Third Objection. An image is like the original in point of species, not of relation. For though the image is produced by someone it does not follow that the original is also produced by someone: because neither is likeness properly considered with regard to relation but with regard to form.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Even as the Son is like the Father in the divine nature and not in a personal property, so too is he like him in an action that goes with the nature provided it does not go with a personal property. Such, however, is not generation: wherefore the argument fails.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the Father's generative power is not exhausted nor diminished by his begetting the Son: yet the Son equals the infinity of that power, for he is infinite intelligence, and not a finite creature. Hence the comparison fails.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. In a reductio ad absurdum, the avoiding of the absurdity is not necessarily the only reason for denying the statement from which the absurdity follows, but there are also the reasons for which the absurdity is made manifest. Hence it is not only because an infinity of generations in God would be the result, that there are not more than one Son in God.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The Holy Ghost proceeds after the manner of love. Now love does not denote something that is stamped and specified with the likeness of the lover or of the beloved, whereas the word expresses the idea of the speaker and the thing to which that idea corresponds. Consequently, as the Son proceeds as Word, by the very nature of his procession it belongs to him to proceed in likeness to his Begetter, and therefore he is his Son, and his procession is called a generation. On the other hand this belongs to the Holy Ghost not by reason of his procession, but rather from a property of the divine nature; because in God there can be nothing that is not God: so that the divine love itself is God, precisely because it is divine, not because it is love.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. To speak may be taken in two senses, strictly and broadly. To speak, in a strict sense, is to utter a word, and then it denotes a notional act and is proper to the Father. Augustine employs the term in this sense when he says (Trin. vii, 1) that the Father alone speaks himself. Secondly, to speak may be taken broadly in so far as a person may be said to speak when he understands, and then it is an essential act. In this sense Anselm writes (Monolog. lx) when he says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost speak themselves.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even as to beget in God belongs to the Father alone, so also does to conceive: wherefore the Father alone conceives his own likeness intellectually, although the Son and the Holy Ghost understand it: because no relation is indicated in the word understand, except perhaps only in our way of thinking: whereas begetting and conceiving imply real origin.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. This argument holds in regard to an action that proceeds from the nature absolutely without any relation to a property. Such, however, is not generation, wherefore the argument fails.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there can be no other than spiritual procession, and this is only by way of intellect and will. Consequently another divine person cannot proceed from the Holy Ghost, because he proceeds by way of the will as love, and the Son by way of the intellect as Word.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A personal property must needs be incommunicable, as stated above: wherefore happiness does not demand that it should be shared with another.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. This comparison does not necessarily apply in every respect.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Even as paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son are one essence, so too their dignity and goodness are one.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When we speak of the potestas generandi the gerund generandi may be taken in three ways. First, as the gerund of the active voice, and thus the potestas generandi (power of generating) is in him who has the power to generate. Secondly, as the gerundive of the passive voice, and thus the potestas generandi (power to be generated) belongs to one who has the power to be generated. Thirdly, as the gerund of an impersonal verb, and then the potestas generandi belongs to one who has the power whereby he is actually generated by another. In the first sense the potentia generandi is not in the Son, but it is in the second and third sense: wherefore the argument does not prove.