ARTICLE VIII

IS THERE ANY DIVERSITY IN GOD?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxi, A. 2

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there is diversity in God: and seemingly there is.

             1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v) unity of substance makes things the same, multitude in substance makes things diverse. Now in God there is multitude of substance: thus Hilary says (De Synod.) that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three in substance, one in harmony. Therefore there is diversity in God.

             2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) diversity is absolute, but difference is relative: wherefore all that differs is diverse, but not everything that is diverse is different. Now it is granted that there is difference in God, since Damascene (De Fid. Orth. iii) says: We acknowledge a difference between the Persons arising from the three properties, namely paternity, filiation and procession. Therefore there is diversity in God.

             3. Accidental difference only makes a thing other, but substantial difference makes another, i.e. a diverse, thing. Since then in God there is a difference, which must be substantial, seeing that it cannot be accidental, there must be diversity in him.

             4. Number results from division, as stated above (A. 7, ad 15). Now where there is division there must be diversity. Therefore in God, since there is number, there must be diversity.

             5. Identical and diverse are an adequate division of being. Now the Father is not the same as the Son, for it is not granted that in begetting the Son he begets God who is himself. Therefore the Son is diverse from the Father.

             On the contrary Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God nothing is new, nothing diverse, nothing foreign, nothing separable.

             Again Ambrose says (De Trin.): Father and Son are one in Godhead, nor is there any substantial difference in them, nor any diversity whatsoever.

             I answer that, as Jerome says, the careless use of terms leads to heresy: wherefore in speaking of God we must choose our words so as to avoid any occasion of error. Now about the divine nature there are two errors especially to be avoided by those who would discuss the unity and trinity of the Godhead: namely the error of Arius who denied the unity of the essence, and asserted a difference between the essence of the Father and that of the Son: and the error of Sabellius who denied the distinction of the Persons and asserted that the Father is the same as the Son. Accordingly to guard against the error of Arius there are four points on which we must be wary in confessing our belief. First, diversity which is incompatible with that unity of essence which we acknowledge when we profess our belief in one God; secondly, division which is incompatible with the divine simplicity; thirdly, inequality which is incompatible with the equality of the divine Persons; fourthly, that we do not believe the Son to be alien to the Father, whereby we would deny their likeness. Again against the error of Sabellius four points call for caution. First, singularity which excludes communicability of the divine nature; secondly, the word only which excludes the real distinction of the Persons; thirdly, confusion which excludes the order existing between the divine Persons; fourthly, dissociation (solitudo) which excludes the fellowship of the divine Persons. Accordingly against diversity we acknowledge unity of essence; against division simplicity; against inequality equality; against difference likeness; not one only but several Persons; distinction against identity; order against confusion; and against dissociation the harmony and bond of love.

             Reply to the First Objection. In the words quoted substance stands for hypostasis, not for essence, multiplication of which causes diversity.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Although some doctors of the Church use the term difference in reference to God, it should not be employed as a general rule, or enlarged upon: because difference denotes a distinction of form, and this is impossible in God since God's form is his nature according to Augustine. But we must explain the term difference as standing for a distinction of the slightest kind: since some things are described as distinct in respect of a mere relation or even only logically. Again if we meet with the term diversity in connexion with God, we must explain it in the same way: for instance, if we find it stated that the Person of the Father is diverse from that of the Son, we must take diverse to denote distinct. Yet in speaking of God we must be more wary of using the word diverse than the word different, because diversity refers more to an essential division: inasmuch as any multiplication whatsoever of forms causes a difference, whereas diversity arises only from substantial forms.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Though there is no accident in God there is relation; and relative opposition causes distinction but not diversity in God.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Though properly speaking there is not division in God, there is relative distinction, and this suffices to make a number of Persons.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Son is the same God as the Father, yet it cannot be said that the Father in begetting the Son begot God who was himself; because himself being reciprocal indicates identity in the supposit: whereas in God Father and Son are two supposits.