ARTICLE II

IS RELATION IN GOD THE SAME AS HIS SUBSTANCE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. 2: C.G. IV, xiv

THE second point of inquiry is whether in God relation is his substance: and seemingly it is not.

             1. That no substance is a relation is a self-evident proposition like no substance is a quantity. Neither then is God's substance a relation.

             2. It will be replied that God's substance is a real and not merely a logical relation.

             On the contrary an idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain. But nothing is vain in God. Therefore it is not possible that relation in God differ logically from his substance.

             3. The divine Persons are distinct by their relations: for relation alone multiplies the Trinity, according to Boethius (De Trin.). If then the divine Persons are not distinct in substance, seeing that the relations add nothing real to the substance but only a logical consideration, it will follow that the distinction between the divine Persons is only logical; which is the heresy of Sabellius.

             4. The divine Persons are not distinct by anything absolute: because it would follow that they are distinct in essence, since what is said of God absolutely signifies his essence; for instance, goodness, wisdom and so forth. If then the relations are the same thing as the divine essence it will follow either that the divine Persons are not distinct by the relations, or that they are distinct in essence.

             5. If relation is the same thing as God's very substance, it will follow that just as God and his greatness belong to the predicament of substance, since God is his own greatness, so likewise Paternity will belong to the predicament of substance: so that whatsoever is said of God will be said in reference to his substance, which is contrary to the statement of Augustine (De Trin. v, 4, 5) that not all the things said of God refer to his substance: for relations are ascribed to God such as that of Father and Son.

             6. Whatsoever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject. But if relation is God's very essence, it will be true to say: The divine essence is Paternity, and with equal reason: Filiation is the divine essence: and thus it would follow that Filiation is Paternity.

             7. Things that are the same admit of the same predicates: thus the Philosopher says (Top. i): The slightest difference that we may assign will show that the things are not the same. Now we predicate of the divine essence that it is wise, that it created the world and so on: while such things, apparently, are not predicated of Paternity and Filiation. Therefore in God relation is not the divine essence.

             8. That which distinguishes the divine Persons is not the same thing as that which neither distinguishes them nor is itself distinguished. Now in God relation distinguishes while essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished. Therefore they are not the same thing.

             9. One and the same thing cannot by its essence be the cause of contraries except accidentally. Now distinction which in God results from relation is contrary to unity, the principle of which is the essence. Therefore relation and essence are not the same thing.

             10. If two things are the same with each other, where one is there is the other. If then the divine essence is the same thing with Paternity, wheresoever is the divine essence there will be Paternity. But it is in the Son. Therefore Paternity is also: which is clearly false.

             11. In God relation and essence differ at least in our conception of them. Now where the concept or definition differs, there is a different being; since a definition states the quiddity of a thing's being. Hence in God the being of the relation will differ from the being of the substance. Consequently relation and substance differ in being, and therefore really.

             12. According to the Philosopher (Praedic.) the being of relation is to be 'to-another.' Therefore the being of relation and not the being of substance consists in respect to another. Therefore relation and substance are not the same in being; and we come to the same conclusion as before.

             13. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4, 5) that something is said of God not substantively but relatively. Now that which signifies the divine substance is predicated substantively. Therefore in God relation does not signify the essence: and the same conclusion follows.

             14. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that God is not God in the same way as he is Father. Now he is God by the divine essence, but Father by Paternity. Therefore the essence is not Paternity: wherefore in God the relations are not the divine substance.

             On the contrary, whatsoever is in God is God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 5). Now relation is in God, as Paternity in the Father. Therefore relation is God himself and the divine substance.

             Again every supposit containing things that are different is composite. Now in the person of the Father there is Paternity and the essence: wherefore if Paternity and the divine essence are two things it will follow that the person of the Father is composite; and this is clearly false. It follows therefore that in God relation is the very substance.

             I answer that given that there are relations in God we are bound to say that they are the divine essence: else we would have to say that there is composition in God and that the divine relations are accidents, since whatsoever adheres to a thing besides its substance is an accident. It would also follow that something that is not the divine substance is eternal; and all these things are heretical.

             Accordingly to make the matter clear we must observe that some of the nine kinds of accident are defined with regard to the nature of an accident, for the nature of an accident is to inhere; wherefore I describe those as defined with regard to the nature of an accident which are defined as inhering to a subject, such as quantity and quality. On the other hand relation is not defined with regard to its nature as an accident, for it is described not as being in a subject but as having a respect to something extraneous. For this reason the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that knowledge as a relation is not in the knower but in the thing known. Hence through taking note of the manner of signification in relative terms some said that they are not adherents but as it were assistants to substance, because they denote a kind of medium between the related substance and that to which it is related. From this it was necessary to infer that in creatures relations are not accidents, since the being of an accident is to be in (a subject). Hence certain theologians of the school of Gilbert de la Porrée extended this opinion to the divine relations, and contended that the relations are not in the divine Persons but are assistants to them as it were. And seeing that the divine essence is in the Persons it followed that the relations are not the divine essence: and since every accident adheres (to a subject) it followed that they are not accidents: and in this sense they took the saying of Augustine quoted above, namely that relations are not predicated of God either substantively or accidentally. But from this opinion it follows that relation is not an objective reality but only a subjective idea: since every real thing is either a substance or an accident. For this reason some of the ancients reckoned relation among the predicables, as the Commentator remarks (Metaph. xi, com. 19): wherefore the followers of de la Porrée are compelled to hold that the divine relations are merely logical. Thus it would follow that the distinction between the Persons is not real: which is heretical.

             Accordingly we must reply that a thing may be adherent and yet not be defined as adherent: even as action is not defined as being in but from the agent, and yet it is clear that it is in the agent. In like manner although relation is not defined as adhering yet it needs must be adherent: that is to say when it is a real relation, for if it be a logical relation it is not adherent. And just as in creatures it must be an accident, so in God it must be the substance, since whatsoever is in God is his substance. Therefore real relations must be the divine substance, yet they have not the mode of substance, but receive another mode of predication differing from those things that are predicated of God substantively.

             Reply to the First Objection. No substance that is in a genus can be a relation, because it is confined to one genus and is therefore excluded from another. The divine essence, however, is not in the genus of substance, but is above every genus, and comprises the perfection of all genera. Wherefore nothing prevents its including that which pertains to relation.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Substance and relation differ logically and in that thing which is God something corresponds to both: yet not a different thing to each but one and the same. Moreover it is most appropriate that one thing should correspond to two points of view, when its nature comprises that thing perfectly: and thus it is in the case in point.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Although relation does not add a thing to the essence, but only a point of view, yet it is itself a thing, even as goodness is a thing in God, and yet it does not differ from the essence otherwise than logically; and the same applies to wisdom. Wherefore just as things which pertain to goodness or wisdom, such as intelligence and so on, are really in God, even so that which is proper to a real relation, namely opposition and distinction, is really in God.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. The essential attributes not only signify that which is the divine essence, but they also signify it in a certain way, since they signify something as existing in God: and for this reason a difference in respect of anything absolute would reflect on the divine essence. On the other hand the divine relations, though they signify that which is the divine essence, they do not signify it by way of essence, since they do not convey the idea of existence in something, but of reference towards something else. Hence the distinction arising from the divine relations does not point to a distinction in the essence but only to respect to another by way of origin, as explained above.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the relation is the divine substance, it does not convey the idea of substance, as already explained: wherefore it is not predicated substantively, because to be predicated thus belongs to the mode of signification.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to the per se predicables. Now a thing is predicated per se of something when the predication regards the proper nature of that thing; whereas if the predication arises not from the proper nature but from identity, it is not even per se predication. Hence when it is said, The divine essence is Paternity, Paternity is predicated of the divine essence on account not of a logical but of a real identity: and the same applies if essence be predicated of Paternity, as already stated; because essence and relation differ logically. Wherefore this argument falls into the fallacy of accident: because although there is no accident in God, there is a certain likeness to an accident, inasmuch as things which are predicated of one another in respect of an accident while differing logically have but one subject.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3) it is not things which are in any way the same that receive the same predicates but only those that have the same definition. Now the divine essence and Paternity, although the same in reality, have not the same definition: wherefore it does not follow that whatsoever is predicated of the one is predicated of the other. It must be observed, however, that certain things follow the definitions of essence and relation: wherefore one of these removes the other; thus neither does essence distinguish nor is relation common. On the other hand certain things imply a certain difference from the definition of essence or relation, not in their principle signification but in their mode of signifying: and these are predicated of essence or relation, although not properly: such are adjectives and verbal substantives, e.g. good, wise, to understand, to will: because suchlike terms as to the thing signified, signify the essence; yet they signify it as though it were a supposit and not in the abstract. For this reason good, wise, creating and the like are most appropriately predicated of the Persons and of the concrete essential names such as God, Father; yet they may be predicated, albeit improperly, of the essence in the abstract and not taken as a supposit. Still less properly are they predicated of the relations: because they are applicable to the supposit in respect of the essence and not of the relation: thus God is good or creative through having his essence--not through having a relation.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. That which causes a distinction and that which neither distinguishes nor is distinguished can be the same in reality but not logically.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. The unity of the essence is not opposed to the distinction of the relations: wherefore it does not follow that relation and essence are causes of contraries.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. If two things be the same both really and logically, wherever the one is there must the other be. But this does not necessarily apply when they are the same really but not logically: thus the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: yet not the beginning of the future but that which is the beginning of the future is said to be in the past. In like manner we do not say that Paternity is in the Son, but that which is Paternity, the essence.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no being save that of the essence, even as there is no (act of) understanding but the intellect: and therefore as in God there is but one act of understanding, so is there but one being Wherefore it can nowise be granted that in God the being of the relations is distinct from the being of the essence. Now the definition of a thing does not signify its being but its being this or that, namely what that thing is. Wherefore two definitions of one thing do not prove that it has a twofold being, but that it can be said in two ways of that thing that it is: thus we may say of a point what it is as a beginning, and what it is as an end, on account of the different definitions of beginning and end.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Since in creatures relation is an accident its being is to be in something, and not to have a respect to some other thing: but considered as a relation its being is to have respect to something else.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Relatives are said not to be predicated of God substantially, because they are not predicated as something existing in a substance, but as having a respect to something else, yet not as though that which they signify were not the substance.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God is said not to be God in the same way as Father on account of the different ways of signifying godhead and paternity, as explained above.