ARTICLE V

DO THESE TERMS SIGNIFY THE DIVINE ESSENCE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 12

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether these terms signify the divine essence: and seemingly they do not.

             1. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i, 4): We must not think that the terms we employ in speaking of God denote what he is in his substance: rather do they indicate what he is not, or some kind of relationship, or something to be excluded from him, or else such things as are consequent to his nature or action. Now the being that is predicated of a thing substantially denotes what that thing's substance is. Therefore these terms are not predicated of God substantially as indicating his essence.

             2. No term that signifies the essence of a thing can truly be denied of that thing. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that negations about God are true, but affirmations are vague. Therefore these terms do not signify God's essence.

             3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) these expressions signify the outpouring of divine goodness into things. But God does not pour out his substance on things. Therefore such expressions do not signify the divine essence.

             4. Origen says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom. Now this denotes not the divine essence but a divine effect. Therefore these terms do not signify the divine essence.

             5. The first cause is denominated only from its first effect (De Causis, prop. xvi) which is the intelligence. Now when a cause is denominated from its effect, the predication connotes not the essence but the cause. Therefore expressions that are ascribed to God do not predicate his essence but his causality.

             6. Words signify the concepts of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). Now we are unable to understand the divine essence; since as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) we know not what he is but that he is. Therefore we cannot give him a name nor employ words to express his essence.

             7. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) all things participate of the divine goodness. But all do not participate of the divine essence which is only in the three Persons. Therefore God's goodness does not denote his essence.

             8. We cannot know God except from his likeness in creatures: thus the Apostle says (Rom. i, 20) that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made. Now we name him according as we know him. Therefore we do not name him except from his likeness in creatures. But when we name a thing from its likeness to another, such a name is predicated of it not essentially but metaphorically: inasmuch as it is said secondly of God and first of the thing whence the simile is taken: whereas that which signifies the essence of a thing is said of that thing first.

             9. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii) that which signifies the essence, denotes that and nothing else. Wherefore if this word good signifies the divine essence, there will be nothing in the divine essence that is not signified thereby: even so there is nothing in the essence of man that is not signified by this word man. But this word good does not signify wisdom: so that wisdom will not be the divine essence, and for the same reason neither will the other terms. Therefore all these words cannot possibly signify the divine essence.

             10. As quantity is the cause of equality, and quality the cause of likeness, so is essence the cause of identity. If then all these expressions signify God's essence, they would no longer indicate equality or likeness but rather identity between God and us: so that a creature might be identified with God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom, goodness and so forth: and this is absurd.

             11. Nothing can be contrary to nature in God who is the source of all nature: nor does he anything contrary to nature according to the (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24: Contrary to nature thou wert grafted. Now it is contrary to nature that an accident be substance. Since then wisdom, justice and the like are per se accidents, they cannot be substance in God.

             12. When we say that God is good, good is a complex term. But there would be no complexity if God's goodness were his very substance. Therefore seemingly good does not denote God's substance; and the same reason applies to all similar expressions.

             13. Augustine says that God eludes every conception of our intelligence, so that it cannot grasp him. But this would not be so if these terms signified the divine essence, since God would correspond to a conception of our intellect. Therefore they do not signify the divine essence.

             14. Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that man is best united to God by realising that in knowing God he knows nothing about him. But this would not be so if these ideas and expressions of man's reflected God's very essence. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

             On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 7): In God to be is to be mighty, or wise; such is his simplicity that whatsoever you may say of him is his essence.

             Again, Boethius says (De Trin.) that under whatsoever predicament, except relation, we predicate things of God they all refer to his essence: thus although just apparently indicates a quality, it signifies his essence: the same applies to great and so forth.

             Again all things that are ascribed to another by way of participation presuppose one to whom they are ascribed per se and essentially. Now these expressions are applied to creatures by way of participation. Since then they are reduced to God as their first cause, it follows that they are said of God essentially, and thus it follows that they signify his essence.

             I answer that some have maintained, and Rabbi Moses most emphatically, that these terms when predicated of God do not signify the divine essence. He says in effect that these expressions are to be taken in reference to God in two ways. First, as indicating a likeness of effect: and that God is said to be wise, not that wisdom is something in him, but because in his effects he acts like a wise man, namely by directing each one to its due end; again that he is said to be a living God inasmuch as he acts like a living being, in that he acts of himself. Secondly, by way of negation: so that when we say God lives we do not mean that life is something in him, but that God has not that mode of existence which is in things inanimate. Likewise when we say that God is an intelligent being, we do not mean that intelligence is really in him, but that he has not that mode of existence whereby dumb animals exist: and so on. In either case, however, this explanation is apparently insufficient and objectionable. The first, for two reasons. First, because according to this explanation there would be no difference in saying God is wise, or God is angry or God is a fire: since he is said to be angry because he acts like an angry man by punishing; for angry men are wont to act thus. Also he is said to be a fire, because he acts like fire when he cleanses, and fire does this in its own way. Now this is contrary to the view taken by the saints and prophets in speaking of God: since certain things they affirm of him and deny others: for they assert that he is living, wise and the like, and deny that he is a body or subject to passions. But in the opinion we are discussing anything may be said or denied of God with equal reason. The second reason is that since, as our faith teaches and as he also grants, creatures have not always existed, it follows that we could not say that God was wise or good before the existence of creatures. For it is evident that before creatures existed he did nothing as regards his effects, neither as good nor as wise. Now this is altogether contrary to sound faith: unless perhaps he meant to say that before the existence of creatures God would be called wise, not that he worked as being wise, but because he could do so: and then it would follow that wisdom denotes something in God and consequently is his essence, since whatsoever is in God is his essence. The second explanation appears likewise to be unsatisfactory: because there is not a specific term that does not exclude from God some mode of being that is unbecoming to him. For every specific term includes the difference whereby the opposite species is excluded: thus the term lion includes the difference quadruped which differentiates a lion from a bird. Accordingly if predicates about God were employed merely for the purpose of exclusion, just as we say that God is living because, according to him (Rabbi Moses), God has not being in the same way as inanimate creatures: even so might we say that God is a lion because he has not the mode of being of a bird. Moreover the idea of negation is always based on an affirmation: as evinced by the fact that every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative: wherefore unless the human mind knew something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him. And it would know nothing if nothing that it affirmed about God were positively verified about him. Hence following Dionysius (Div. Nom. xiii) we must hold that these terms signify the divine essence, albeit defectively and imperfectly: the proof of which is as follows.

             Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is actual and consequently produces its like, the form of the thing produced must in some manner be in the agent: in different ways, however. When the effect is proportionate to the power of the agent, this form must be of the same kind in the maker and the thing made: for then maker and thing made are of the same species, and this is the case in all univocal causes: thus man begets a man, and fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is improportionate to the power of the cause, the form is not of the same kind in both maker and thing made, but is in the agent in a more eminent way. Because according as the form is in the agent, the latter has the power to produce the effect: so that if the whole power of the agent is not reflected in the thing made, it follows that the form is in the maker in a more eminent way than in the thing made. This is the case in all equivocal agents, for instance when the sun generates fire. Now it is plain that no effect equals the power of the first agent which is God, else only one effect would proceed from his one power. But seeing that from his one power many and various effects proceed, it is evident that every effect of his falls short of the power of its cause. Consequently no form of a divine effect is in the effect in the same degree as in God: and yet they must needs be in him in a more eminent way. Wherefore all forms which in the various effects are distinct and different from one another are united in him as in one common power: even so all the forms produced by the power of the sun in this lower world are in the sun in respect of its one power, to which all things generated by the sun's action are assimilated as regards their forms. In like manner the perfections of creatures are assimilated to God in respect of his one simple essence. Since then our intellect takes its knowledge from creatures, it is informed with the likenesses of perfections observed in creatures, namely of wisdom, power, goodness and so forth. Wherefore just as creatures by their perfections are somewhat, albeit deficiently, like God, even so our intellect is informed with the species of these perfections. Now whenever an intellect is by its intelligible form assimilated to a thing, that which it conceives and affirms in accordance with that intelligible species is true of that thing to which it is assimilated by its species: inasmuch as knowledge is assimilation of the mind to the thing known. Hence it follows that whatsoever the intellect informed with the species of these perfections conceives or asserts about God, truly exists in God who corresponds to each one of these species inasmuch as they are all like him. Now if such an intelligible species of our intellect were equal to God in its likeness to him, our intellect would comprehend him, and the intellect's conception would be a perfect definition of God, just as a walking animal biped is a perfect definition of a man. However, this species does not perfectly reflect the divine essence, as stated above, and therefore although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify the divine essence, they do not signify it perfectly as it exists in itself, but as it is conceived by us.

             Accordingly we conclude that each of these terms signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively but imperfectly. Wherefore this name He Who Is is most becoming to God, since it does not ascribe any particular form to God, but signifies being without any limitation. This is the meaning of Damascene (De Fide Orthod. i, 12) when he says that the name He Who Is denotes a boundless sea of substance. This solution of the question is confirmed by the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. i): Since all things are comprised in the Godhead simply and without limit, it is fitting that he should be praised and named on account of them all. Simply--because the perfections which are in creatures by reason of various forms are ascribed to God in reference to his simple essence: without limit, because no perfection found in creatures is equal to the divine essence, so as to enable the mind under the head of that perfection to define God as he is in himself. A further confirmation may be found in Metaph. v, where it is stated that the simply perfect is that which contains the perfections of all genera: which words the Commentator expounds as referring to God.

             Reply to the First Objection. Damascene means to say that these expressions do not signify what God is by defining and including his essence as it were: wherefore he goes on to say that this name He Who Is which denotes God's essence indefinitely is most becomingly ascribed to God.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Although Dionysius says that there is truth in denying these expressions of God he does not say that there is untruth in affirming them, but that their signification is vague: because as regards the thing signified they are truly ascribed to God, since in a way it is in him, as we have shown. But as regards their mode of signification they can be denied of God, since each of these terms denotes a definite form, and in this way they are not ascribed to God as we have already stated. Wherefore absolutely speaking they can be denied of God, because they are not becoming to him in the way signified: since this mode is according to the way in which they are in our intellect, as already stated, whereas they are becoming to God in a more eminent way. For this reason the affirmation of them is described as vague as being not altogether fitting on account of the difference of mode. Hence, according to the teaching of Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i; Coel. Hier. ii; Div. Nom. ii, iii), these terms are applied to God in three ways. First, affirmatively: for instance, God is wise: since we must needs say this of God because in him there is a likeness to the wisdom that derives from him.--Nevertheless seeing that wisdom in God is not such as that which we understand and name, it can be truly denied, so that we may say: God is not wise.--Again, since wisdom is not denied of God as though he were lacking in wisdom, but because in him it transcends the wisdom we indicate and name, we ought to say that God is super-wise. Accordingly Dionysius explains perfectly by these three ways of ascribing wisdom to God, how these expressions are to be applied to God.

             Reply to the Third Objection. These expressions are said to denote the divine outpourings, because they are first employed to signify these outpourings as existing in creatures, while from the likeness thereof to God the human mind is led to ascribe the same expressions to God in a higher degree.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. The saying of Origen does not mean that when we say God is wise, the sense is that God is the cause of wisdom; but that as we have explained from the wisdom which he causes our intellect is led to ascribe supereminent wisdom to God.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. When we say that God is intelligence, we name him after his effect. But a name that signifies the essence of his effect cannot be applied to him definitively in the same way as it signifies that essence. Wherefore this name, although it is applicable to him in a way, is not applicable as his name: since that which a name signifies is the definition. On the other hand it is applicable to the effect as its name.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument proves that we cannot give God a name that defines or includes or equals his essence: since we do not know to that extent what God is.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Just as all things participate in God's goodness not in identity but in likeness thereto: so also do they participate in a likeness of God's being. But there is a difference: for goodness implies the relationship of cause, since good is self-diffusive: whereas being connotes mere existence and quiescence.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. An effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take for example a brick hardened by fire: the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire: then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hot in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus it is false to say that fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God, and which as regards the thing signified do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, understanding and so forth: and these are ascribed to God properly, in fact they are ascribed to him first and in a more eminent way than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes to its being made from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, movement and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God: and whatsoever terms imply suchlike conditions cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance lion, stone and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of a likeness in their effects.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers that which signifies substance definitively and comprehensively: but none of these expressions denote the divine essence thus, as stated above.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although these perfections in God are his very substance, they are not the very substance of the creature, wherefore in their respect the creature is not said to be the same as God but like him.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. It would be contrary to nature if wisdom in God were of the same kind as that which is an accident: but this is not the case as we have already stated. Nor is the authority quoted to the point: for God makes nothing against nature in himself, because he makes nothing in himself.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. When we say God is good, this term good is complex not as reflecting any composition in God, but on account of the composition in our intellect.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God eludes the conception of our intellect because he transcends all that our mind conceives of him; but not so that our intellect is in no intelligible way likened to him.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this same divine essence surpasses our intelligence and is unknown to us: wherefore man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows him not, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatsoever he conceives of him.