ARTICLE II

IS THERE BUT ONE PROCESSION IN GOD, OR ARE THERE MORE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxvii, A. 3

THE second point of inquiry is whether there is only one procession in God, or more than one: and seemingly there is but one.

             1. Boethius (De Trin.) says that in God procession is substantial. Now in God what is substantial is not multiplied. Therefore there are not several processions in God.

             2. To this it will be replied that the processions in God do not differ in respect of the substance which is communicated by procession and by reason of which the processions are said to be substantial, but by themselves.--On the contrary whenever a number of things are distinct from one another, their difference is either one of matter, as, for instance, individuals of the same species, or of form, as for example things of different genus or species. Now the processions in God are not distinguished in the same way as things that differ in matter, since God is altogether immaterial. Wherefore it follows that all distinction in God is after the manner of a formal distinction. Now all formal distinction is by reason of some opposition, especially in things of the same genus: because a genus is divided by contrary differences which differentiate the species (Metaph. x). Accordingly if there be a distinction between the divine processions, this must be by reason of some opposition. But processions, actions and movements are not mutually opposed except by reason either of their principles or of their terms; as, for example, heating and chilling, ascent and descent. Therefore the divine processions cannot be distinguished by themselves: but if they be distinguished at all, this must be either on the part of the principle of the procession, or on the part of the term, i.e. the Person in whom the procession terminates.

             3. Things that can exist side by side cannot constitute a difference (thus white and sweet do not differentiate two substances, since they can be together in the same subject): because the reason why one thing is distinct from another is that the one cannot be the other. Now that certain things cannot be together in the same subject is due to some kind of opposition: for things are said to be opposite when they cannot coexist in the same subject. Hence there can be no distinction without opposition: thus even when things differ by reason of matter, there is opposition in regard to situation, since such a division is one of quantity. If then there cannot be opposite processions otherwise than by reason of the terms or principles, as stated above (Obj. 2), it is impossible that the processions be distinguished by themselves.

             4. But it will be replied that the divine processions are distinguished in that one is by way of nature, i.e. the procession of the Son, and the other by way of will, i.e. the procession of the Holy Ghost.--On the contrary, that which proceeds naturally proceeds by way of nature: and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father naturally: for Athanasius says that he is the natural Spirit of the Father. Therefore he proceeds by way of nature.

             5. The will is free: and consequently that which proceeds by way of will proceeds by way of liberty. If then the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of will he must proceed by way of liberty. Now that which proceeds by way of liberty may or may not proceed, and may proceed in this or that degree, since what is done freely is not confined to this or that. Therefore the Father could produce the Holy Ghost or not, and could give him whatsoever degree of greatness he wished. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost was a potential being and not an essentially necessary being, and thus he would not be of divine nature, which is the heresy of Macedonius.

             6. Hilary (De Synod.) in assigning the difference between creatures and the Son, says that the will of God gave all creatures their substance, while the Son received his substance from the Father by a natural birth. Therefore if the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of will it follows that he proceeds in the same way as creatures.

             7. In God nature and will differ but logically. If then the processions of the Son and the Holy Ghost differ in that one is by way of nature and the other by way of will, it follows that these processions differ but logically: and thus the Son and the Holy Ghost are not distinct Persons.

             8. But it will be replied that the spirative and generative powers in the Father differ but logically, and yet there is a real distinction between the Son and the Holy Ghost: and likewise nature and will can cause a real distinction in processions and proceeding persons, although they differ but logically.--On the contrary, the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinguished by things that are in them. But the generative power is not in the Son, nor is the spirative power in the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost are not distinguished by these things.

             9. Generation which is procession by way of nature is proved to be in God by the fact that its likeness is communicated to the creature according to Isaiah lxvi, 9, Shall I that give generation to others be barren? But procession by way of will is not communicated to the creature, since nothing created receives its nature otherwise than by generation. Therefore in God there is no procession by way of will.

             10. Mode adds somewhat to a thing and consequently induces composition, especially if there be a number of modes. Now in God there is utter simplicity: and consequently there are not a number of modes in him to justify one's saying that the Son has one mode of procession, i.e. the mode of nature, and the Holy Ghost another, i.e. the mode of the will.

             11. In God will differs from nature no more than does the intellect. But there is not in God a procession by way of the intellect other than that by way of nature. Therefore neither is there another procession by way of the will besides that which is by way of nature.

             12. It will be replied that the procession of the Holy Ghost differs from that of the Son in that the procession of the Son is solely from one who does not proceed, i.e. the Father, whereas the procession of the Holy Ghost is both from one who proceeds not and from one who proceeds, and simultaneously, namely from the Father and the Son.--On the contrary, if we allow that there are two processions in God, they must differ either numerically only, or specifically. If only numerically, it follows that both must be called generation or birth, and each of the proceeding Persons must be called a Son: and if they differ specifically, the nature communicated by the procession must differ specifically: for thus the procession of a man and that of a horse from their respective principles differ specifically, whereas the procession of Socrates and that of Plato do not. Since then there is but one divine nature there cannot be several specifically different processions, although one is from one who proceeds and the other not.

             13. The Son and the Holy Ghost are not distinct in the same way as creatures that differ specifically, for they are hypostases of one nature. Now processions whereby things proceed that are of the same species but are distinct numerically, do not themselves differ specifically, as, for instance, the generation of Socrates and the generation of Plato. Therefore the procession of the Son and that of the Holy Ghost are not specifically distinct processions.

             14. Just as it is possible for one to proceed from one who proceeds so is it possible for one to be born of one who was born: for instance, A who is the son of B may himself have a son C. If then there are two processions in God through another Person proceeding from one who proceeds, there will likewise be two generations through another Person being begotten of one who is begotten.

             15. If the procession of the Holy Ghost differs from the procession of the Son, in that the Holy Ghost proceeds from one who does not proceed and from one who does, i.e. from Father and Son, then either he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one or inasmuch as they are several. If inasmuch as they are several it follows that the Holy Ghost is composite, since one simple thing cannot proceed otherwise than from one as principle: and if he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one, it matters not whether he proceed from both or from one only. Consequently the procession of the Holy Ghost cannot differ from that of the Son by the fact that the Son proceeds from one only and the Holy Ghost from two.

             16. Procession is condivided with paternity and filiation; for these are called the three personal properties. Now in God there is but one paternity and one filiation. Therefore there is likewise but one procession.

             17. In creatures there is but one kind of procession whereby the nature is communicated, for which reason the Commentator (Phys. vii) says that animals generated by seed are not of the same species as those which are engendered by corrupt matter and without seed. Now the divine nature is one only. Therefore it cannot be communicated by more than one kind of procession. Therefore there are not several processions in God.

             18. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness according to Hebrews i, 3, Who being the brightness of his glory: and this because he proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him, as brightness from the sun or fire. But the Holy Ghost likewise proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him. Therefore he proceeds from him in the same way as the Son, and thus there are not several processions in God.

             19. The eternal procession of the divine Person is the type and cause of the temporal procession of the creature and of whatsoever is in the creature. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6) expounds the words of Genesis i, He spoke . . . and it was made, thus: He begot the Word in whom (the creature) was that it might be made. Now the Son is the perfect type and cause of the creature's production. Therefore there is no need of another procession of a divine Person besides that of the Son.

             20. The more perfect a nature the fewer the things through which it works. Now the divine nature is most perfect. Since then one created nature is communicated by only one kind of procession, neither can the divine nature be communicated by more than one kind of procession.

             21. From one simple thing only one thing can proceed. Now the Father is one simple thing. Therefore there can be but one procession from him: and thus there are not several processions in God.

             22. A thing is said to be generated inasmuch as it receives a form: since in creatures generation is change terminating in a form. Now the Holy Ghost by proceeding receives a form, i.e. the divine essence, of which it is said (Phil. ii, 6): Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Therefore the procession of the Holy Ghost is generation; and thus it differs not from the generation of the Son.

             23. Nativity is the way to nature as the very word implies. Now the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Ghost through his procession. Therefore the procession of the Holy Ghost is nativity: thus it differs not from the procession of the Son, and consequently there are not two processions in God.

             On the other hand it would seem that there are more than two processions in God.

             1. There is a procession by way of nature in respect of which the Son is named, and a procession by way of intellect, in respect of which the Word is named, and a procession by way of will in respect of which the proceeding Love is named. Therefore there are three processions in God.

             2. It will be replied that in God the procession by way of nature is one and the same as the procession by way of intellect: since the Son is the same Person as the Word.--On the contrary processions in creatures are a representation of the processions of the divine Persons; wherefore it is said of God the Father that of him all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph. iii, 15). Now in creatures the procession of nature whereby man begets man is distinct from the processions of the intellect whereby it produces its word. Therefore neither in God is there a distinction between procession by way of intellect and procession by way of nature.

             3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) it belongs to the divine goodness that it proceed. Now the Father is supremely good. Therefore he proceeds. Hence in God there are three processions, one whereby the Father proceeds, another whereby the Son proceeds, and a third whereby the Holy Ghost proceeds.

             On the contrary it would seem that in God there are but two processions. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that the procession of the Son is a begetting or nativity, the procession of the Holy Ghost is not a nativity, yet both are ineffable. Therefore in God there are but two distinct processions.

             I answer that the early doctors of the faith were compelled to discuss matters of faith on account of the insistence of heretics. Thus Arius thought that existence from another is incompatible with the divine nature, wherefore he maintained that the Son and the Holy Ghost, whom Holy Writ describes as being from another, are creatures. In order to refute this error the holy fathers had to show that it is not impossible for someone to proceed from God the Father and yet be consubstantial with him, inasmuch as he receives from him the same nature as the Father has. Since, however, the Son in that he receives from the Father the nature of the Father is said to be born or begotten of the Father; whereas the Holy Ghost is not said in the Scriptures to be born or begotten while he is said to be from God, Macedonius thought that the Holy Ghost is not consubstantial with the Father but his creature: for he did not believe it possible for anyone to receive from another the latter's nature unless he were born of him and were his son. Hence he thought that if the Holy Ghost receives from the Father the latter's nature and essence it must infallibly follow that he is begotten and a Son. Wherefore to refute this error it was necessary for our doctors to show that the divine nature can be communicated by a twofold procession, one being a begetting or nativity, and the other not: and this is the same as to seek the difference between the divine processions. Accordingly some have maintained that the processions in God are distinct by themselves. The reason for this view was because they held that the relations do not differentiate the divine hypostases but only manifest their distinction: for they thought relations in God were like individual properties in creatures, which properties do not cause but only manifest the distinction between individuals. They say then that in God the hypostases are distinct only by their origin. And seeing that those things whereby certain things are distinguished primarily must be distinguished by themselves--thus opposite differences, whereby species differ, differ by themselves, otherwise we should go on for ever--they maintain that the divine processions are distinct by themselves. But this cannot be true: because one thing is distinguished from another specifically by that which gives it its species, and numerically by that which gives it individuality. Now the difference between the divine processions must not be merely like that which distinguishes things numerically; it must be like that which differentiates things specifically, since one is generation and the other not. Consequently the divine processions are distinguished by that which gives them their species. But no procession, operation or movement has its species from itself, but from its term or principle. Hence it is futile to say that any processions are distinguished by themselves: and they must differ in relation either to their principles or to their terms.

             Wherefore some said that in God the processions are distinguished in relation to their principles: inasmuch as one procession is by way of nature or intellect, and the other by way of will, since the terms intellect and will would seem to indicate principles of operations and processions. But if we consider the matter carefully we shall easily see that this does not suffice for the distinction of the divine Persons unless something else be added. For since that which proceeds must bear a resemblance to the principle of the procession, just as in creatures a likeness to the form of the generator must be in the thing generated; it follows--if processions in God are distinguished by the fact that the principle of one is the nature or intellect, while the principle of the other is the will--that in the Person proceeding by the one procession there will be something pertaining only to nature or intellect, and in the other something that pertains only to the will: which is evidently false. Because by the one procession, i.e. of the Son from the Father, the latter communicates to the Son all that he has, nature, intelligence, power and will, and whatsoever is attributed to him absolutely; wherefore as the Son is the Word, i.e. Wisdom Begotten, so may he be called Begotten Nature, Will, or Power Begotten, i.e. received by generation, or rather the recipient of these by generation. Hence it is plain that since all the essential attributes concur towards the one procession of the Son, the difference between the processions cannot be ascribed to the different concepts of the attributes; as though one attribute were communicated by one procession, and another attribute by another procession. Now whereas the term of a procession is to have (since a divine Person proceeds so as to have what he receives by proceeding), and whereas processions are distinguished by their terms, it follows of necessity that in God he who proceeds is distinguished in the same way as he who has. Now in God haver is not distinguished from haver by the fact that the one has these attributes, and the other has those; but by the fact that the one has the same things from the other. For the Son has all that the Father has: yet in this is he distinguished from the Father, that he has them from the Father. Accordingly one proceeding Person is distinguished from the other proceeding Person, not as though the one by proceeding receives some things, while the other receives other things, but because one of them receives from the other. Hence whatever is in a divine procession that can at once be conceived as being in one procession without any other procession being presupposed, belongs to one procession only: but there will be at once another procession if those same things that were received by the first procession are again received by another procession. Thus it is only the order of processions, which arises from their origin, that multiplies processions in God.

             Hence not without reason some held that one procession being by way of intelligence and nature, and the other by way of will, the former procession does not presuppose another procession, whereas the latter does: because love of a thing cannot proceed from the will except on the presupposition that the conceived word of that thing has already proceeded: since good understood is the object of the will.

             Reply to the First Objection. Procession in God is said to be substantial because it does not arise from an accident: nevertheless thereby the proceeding Person receives substance.

             We grant the Second and Third Objections.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is nothing to prevent something proceeding from the will naturally. For the will naturally tends to the ultimate end, just as every other power naturally works to attain its object. Hence it is that man naturally desires happiness, and in like manner God naturally loves his own goodness, just as he naturally understands his own truth. Accordingly just as the Son as Word naturally proceeds from the Father, so the Holy Ghost naturally proceeds from him as Love. The Holy Ghost does not, however, proceed by way of nature, because in God to proceed by way of nature is to proceed in the same way as in creatures things are produced by nature and not by the will. Wherefore to be produced naturally and to be produced by way of nature differ inasmuch as a thing is said to be produced naturally on account of its natural connexion with its principle, whereas it is said to be produced by way of nature if it be produced by a principle in the same way as nature produces.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. As Augustine teaches (De Civ. Dei, v, 10) the natural necessity under which the will is said to will a thing of necessity--happiness, for instance--is not incompatible with free-will: but free-will is opposed to violence or compulsion. Now there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the centre. Hence the will naturally desires happiness, although it desires it necessarily: and thus also God by his will loves himself freely, although he loves himself of necessity. Moreover it is necessary that he love himself as much as he is good, even as he understands himself as much as he is. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father freely, not however potentially but necessarily. Nor was it possible for him to proceed so as to be less than the Father: but it was necessary for him to be equal to the Father, even as the Son who is the Father's Word.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. The creature does not proceed naturally or necessarily from the divine will: for though God by his will naturally and necessarily loves his goodness, and the love thus proceeding is the Holy Ghost, yet neither naturally nor necessarily does he will creatures to be produced, but gratuitously. For creatures are not the last end of the divine will, nor does God's goodness depend on them (which goodness is his last end), since it gains nothing from creatures: even so man of necessity desires happiness, but not the things ordained thereto.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although nature and will in God differ not in reality but logically, nevertheless he who proceeds by way of will must be distinct from him who proceeds by way of nature, and the one procession must differ from the other. For we have already stated that to proceed by way of nature means to proceed in the same way as that which proceeds from nature, and that to proceed by way of will means to proceed as that which proceeds from the will. Now the will does not proceed without a previous procession; for it does tend to a thing without the previous procession of the intellect in forming its concept of that thing, since the good understood moves the will. Now the procession from a natural agent does not presuppose another procession unless accidentally, inasmuch as one natural agent depends on another natural agent: but this is not essential to nature quâ nature. Therefore in God this procession by way of nature is one that presupposes no other: while the procession by way of will has its beginning from a procession that is presupposed. Hence there must needs be procession from procession, and proceeding Person from a proceeding Person: and this causes a real distinction in God.

             We grant the Eighth Objection.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. God has implanted in the creature a likeness to both processions. By the procession that is by way of nature it is possible in created things for the nature to be communicated, since the effect is like the agent as such: wherefore by an action whereof nature is the principle, the effect can receive the nature: whereas by an action whereof the will is the principle, the effect can receive the likeness of that alone which is in the will, for instance, a likeness of the end in view; or of the form, as in the products of art. But whatsoever is in God is the divine nature: and consequently the nature must be communicated by either procession.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. When we speak of procession in God by way of nature or will, we do not ascribe to God a mode as though it were a quality added to the divine substance, but we indicate a comparative likeness between the divine processions and the processions to be observed in creatures.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no distinction between procession by way of intelligence and procession by way of nature: but there is a distinction between both of these and the procession by way of will: and this for three reasons.--First, because just as procession by way of nature does not presuppose another procession, so neither does procession by way of intelligence: whereas procession by way of will necessarily presupposes procession by way of intelligence.--Secondly, because just as nature produces something in likeness to itself, so also does the intellect both within and without: within, since the word is the likeness of the thing understood, and of the intellect understanding itself: without, as when the form understood is introduced into the product of art. On the other hand the will does not produce its likeness either within or without. Not within, since love which is the intimate procession of the will is not a likeness of the will or the thing willed, but a kind of impression made on the will by the thing willed, or a kind of union between these two. Nor without, because the will imprints on the artifact the form which in the logical order was understood before it was willed, wherefore it is a likeness first of the intellect, though secondly of the will.--Thirdly, because the procession of nature is from only one agent, if the agent be perfect. Nor does it matter that in animals one is generated of two, namely the father and mother; since the father alone is agent in generation while the mother is patient. Likewise the procession of the intellect is from one only; whereas friendship or mutual love proceeds from two loving each other.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although strictly speaking genus and species, universal and particular, are not predicated of God, nevertheless as far as it is possible to compare God to creatures, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinguished from one another like several individuals of one species, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of considering the species in a particular individual of the genus of substance: we may consider the species of its hypostasis, or we may consider the species of its individual property. Thus given that Socrates is white and Plato black, and granted that white and black are properties individualising Socrates and Plato, it will be true to say that Socrates and Plato are one in species, in which their hypostases are contained. For they agree in humanity, but differ in the species of their property; since white and black differ specifically. It is the same with the Father and the Son. For they are considered as one in the species of which their hypostases are supposits, in that they agree in the nature of the Godhead: but they differ in the species of a personal property: since paternity and filiation are relations of different species. It must also be observed that in creatures generation is per se directed to the species, for nature intends to generate a man; wherefore the specific nature is multiplied by generation in created things. But in God procession is directed to the multiplication of hypostases in which the divine nature is numerically one: wherefore in God the processions are quasi-specifically different by reason of the difference between the personal properties, although in the proceeding Persons there is one common nature.

             This suffices for the Replies to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Objections.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two Persons if we consider the spirating supposits: because since the Holy Ghost is the mutual love and bond of two he must needs be spirated by two. But if we consider that whereby they spirate, thus he proceeds from them as one in the divine nature: since from none but God can God proceed.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Procession as condivided with paternity and filiation is the personal property of the Holy Ghost: and although it is a relation, yet since it has not a special name as paternity and filiation have, it is indicated by the name procession, just as if filiation were unnamed, and signified under the name of nativity, which is the special name of the Son's procession. The procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name because, as already stated, in creatures a nature is not communicated in this way: and we transfer names from creatures in speaking of God. Hence it does not follow that in God there is but one common procession.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In a creature which is susceptive of accidents there can be something in a thing besides its nature: but not in God. For this reason in God the nature is communicated by any mode of procession, but not in creatures: because although there are various processions in creatures, the nature is communicated in one way only.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The procession of the Son is co-eternal with the Father inasmuch as it is a divine procession, wherefore this applies also to the procession of the Holy Ghost: but it does not apply to the procession of the Son as distinct from that of the Holy Ghost.

             Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The Son is a sufficient type of the temporal procession of the creature, if we consider him as Word and exemplar: but the Holy Ghost must needs be the type of that procession inasmuch as he is Love. For just as it is said (Wis. ix, 1) that God made all things by his Word, so is it stated (ibid. xi, 23) that he loves all things that are and hates none of the things which he has made: and Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God's love did not permit him to be barren.

             Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Perfect nature is capable of many works although few things suffice it for each one.

             Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. From the one Father alone there is only one procession, namely of the Son: but from the Father and Son together, there is another procession, that of the Holy Ghost.

             Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The procession of the Holy Ghost is a procession of love. Now by a procession of love nothing is produced as a recipient of the form or nature of that whence it proceeds: and consequently it is not a generation or nativity. That the Holy Ghost receives by his procession the nature and form of God the Father is owing to the fact that he is God's love, wherein there is nothing that is not the divine nature.

             This suffices for the Reply to the Twenty-third Objection.

             We must also reply to the arguments which concluded that there are more than two processions in God.

             1. As stated above (replies to seventh and eleventh objections) in God it is but one and the same procession by way of intelligence and by way of nature.

             2. Human nature is material, that is to say composed of matter and form: wherefore in man there cannot be procession by way of nature save in respect of a natural transmutation. But procession by way of intelligence is always immaterial, wherefore in man procession by way of nature and procession by way of intelligence cannot be one and the same, whereas in God it is one and the same because the divine nature is immaterial.

             3. Procession into differs from procession from. To proceed into something is to communicate one's likeness to something, and in this sense Dionysius means that the divine goodness proceeds into creatures. To proceed from a thing is to receive one's being from another, and as in this sense we are speaking of procession now, it is clear that procession is not to be attributed to the Father.