ARTICLE XI

ARE THESE TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN GOD AS LOGICAL RELATIONS?

THE eleventh point of inquiry is whether these temporal relations are in God as logical relations: and it would seem that they are not.

             1. An idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain, according to Boethius (Super Proem. Porphyr. in Praedicab.). Now these relations are not really in God, as proved above. Therefore it is vain and idle for the reason to attribute them to him.

             2. That which has only a logical existence is not ascribed to things except according as they are in the mind, for instance genus, species and order. Now these temporal relations are not ascribed to God according as he is only in our mind, since if they were, then, to say that God is Lord because we understand him to reign over creatures would have no objective reality, which is clearly false. Therefore these relations are not in God as logical relations.

             3. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical.

             4. If there were no created intelligence God would still be Lord and Creator. But there would be no logical relations if there were no created intelligence. Therefore God and Lord and the like do not denote merely logical relations.

             5. That which has existence in our mind only has not existed from eternity. Now some of God's relations to the creature have been from eternity, such as the relations implied in the terms knowledge and predestination. Therefore such are not merely logical relations in God.

             On the contrary, names signify ideas or concepts (Peri Herm. i). Now it is plain that these names are relative terms. Therefore these relations must be logical.

             I answer that just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways. First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another. Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself), and be referable to the other. Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other: wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the relationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature's relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical.

             Reply to the First Objection. In these relations there is something objective corresponding to them, namely the relation of the creature to God. For just as a thing is said to be knowable relatively, not in reference to knowledge but because knowledge refers to it (Metaph. v), even so God is spoken of relatively because creatures are related to him.

             Reply to the Second Objection. This argument considers those relations that are discovered by reason and attributed to things that are in the mind. The relations in question, however, are not of this kind but arise from the mode of understanding.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects' relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence.

             Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated above God's knowledge is related essentially not to the creature but to the essence of the Creator whereby God knows all things.