ARTICLE VI

CAN GOD DO WHAT OTHERS CAN DO?

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether God can do things that are possible to others, for instance, can he sin, walk and so forth? And seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.

             1. Augustine says (Enchir. cv) that it is a better nature that can sin than that which cannot. Now whatsoever is best should be ascribed to God. Therefore God can sin.

             2. We should not withhold from God anything that is praiseworthy. Now it is said in praise of a man (Ecclus. xxxi, 10) that he could have transgressed and hath not transgressed. Therefore the power to sin and not to sin should be ascribed to God.

             3. The Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 5) that evil deeds are possible to a god or a wise man. Therefore God can sin.

             4. To consent to a mortal sin is to sin mortally: and he who commands the commission of a mortal sin, is a consenting party, in fact sometimes he is the principal. Since then God commanded Abraham to commit a mortal sin, namely to slay his innocent son, and Osee to take a wife of fornication, and have of her children of fornication, and Semei to curse David (2 Kings xvi), although he sinned by so doing since we find that he was punished for the deed (3 Kings ii); it would seem that he sinned mortally.

             5. It is a mortal sin to co-operate with one who sins mortally. Now God co-operates with him who commits a mortal sin: since he operates in every deed, and consequently in every man who commits a mortal sin. Therefore God sins.

             6. Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xxi, cf. Gloss on Rom. i) says that God operates in the hearts of men, by inclining their will whithersoever he will, be it to good or to evil. Now it is a sin to incline a man's will to evil. Therefore God sins.

             7. Man was made to God's image (Gen. i). Now whatsoever is in the image must needs be in the original: and man's will is indifferent to this or that. Therefore God's will is also: and consequently he can sin and not sin.

             8. Whatsoever a lower power can do, a higher power can do also. Now man whose power is inferior to God's power is able to walk, to sin and so forth. Therefore God also can do these things.

             9. To omit is not to do the good one is able to do. But God is able to do many good things that he does not. Therefore he omits them and consequently sins.

             10. Apparently he sins who can prevent the commission of sin, and prevents it not. Now God can prevent all sins being committed. Since then he does not do so it would seem that he sins.

             11. It is written (Amos iii, 6): Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done? But this cannot refer to penal evil, since it is written (Wis. i, 13): God made not death. Therefore it must refer to the evil of sin: so that God is the author of the evil of sin.

             On the contrary it is said (1 Jo. i, 5): God is light, and in him there is no darkness. Now sin is spiritual darkness. Therefore in God there can be no sin.

             Moreover, a sovereign is not bound by his own laws. And every sin is contrary to the divine law as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). Therefore God cannot be subject to sin.

             I answer that, as already stated (A. 5) there are two ways in which God may be said to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his will and in respect of his power. On the part of his will God cannot do what he cannot will. And since no will can consent to the contrary of what it naturally desires,--thus a man's will cannot desire unhappiness,--it is clear that God's will cannot will what is contrary to his goodness, since he wills this naturally. Now sin is a lapse from divine goodness: wherefore God cannot will to sin. Therefore we must grant absolutely that God cannot sin. On the part of his power God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his power and in respect of the thing. His power considered in itself, since it is infinite, lacks nothing that appertains to power. There are certain things, however, which in name denote power whereas in reality they are wanting in power. Such are many negations that are expressed affirmatively: as when we say that so and so can fail, the terms would seem to imply some sort of power, whereas it is rather a lack of power that is signified. For this reason, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a power is said to be perfect when it is unable to do such things: because while such affirmations are in reality negations, the corresponding negations have an affirmative force. Hence we say that God cannot fail, and consequently that he cannot be moved (since movement and failing imply imperfection), and therefore that he cannot walk nor perform any other bodily actions, since these are inseparable from movement. On the part of the thing, God is said to be unable to do a thing when it implies a contradiction, as stated above (A. 5): and in this way we say that God cannot make another God equal to himself: since a contradiction is implied in that what is made must needs be somewhat in potentiality, seeing that it receives its being from another, and consequently cannot be pure act which is proper to God.

             Reply to the First Objection. This comparison must not be taken universally, but only as between man and dumb animals.

             Reply to the Second Objection. That which is said in praise of man is not always becoming to the praise of God; it might even be a blasphemy, as if I were to say that God repents and the like. Because, as Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv) what is praised in a lower nature is blamed in a higher.

             Reply to the Third Objection. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as conditional to the will. This conditional statement is true: God can do wicked things if he will, although both antecedent and consequence are impossible; thus it is clear that if a man flies he has wings.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nothing prevents an act that is in itself a mortal sin from becoming virtuous through the addition of a circumstance. Thus absolutely speaking it is a mortal sin to kill a man: yet it is not a mortal sin but an act of justice for the judge's minister to put a man to death for justice' sake in pursuance of the judge's sentence. Now, even as the civil authority has the disposal of men in matters of life and death, and all that touches the end of its government, namely justice, so God has all things at his disposal to direct them to the end of his government, which end is his goodness. Wherefore though it may be in itself a mortal sin to slay an innocent son, yet if this be done at God's command for an end foreseen and preordained by God, though unknown to the slayer, it is not a sin but a meritorious act. The same applies to the fornication of Osee, for it is clear that God orders all human procreation. Some, however, assert that this did not happen in reality, but only in a prophetic vision. As to the command given to Semei we must give a different reply. God is said in two ways to command. In one way by speaking either interiorly or outwardly through a created substance: and thus he commanded Abraham and the Prophets. In another way by inclination: thus it is related that he commanded (Vulg., prepared) a worm to consume the ivy (Jonas iv, 7). In this way he commanded Semei to curse David, by inclining his heart, and this in the manner we shall explain in the Reply to the Sixth Objection.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. The sinful act, forasmuch as it has entity and actuality, is to be referred to God as its cause; but in so far as it has the deformity of sin, it must be referred to the free-will and not to God: thus all that there is of movement in limping comes from the power to walk, whereas the defect is owing to a misshapen leg.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. God is said to incline man's will to evil, not as though he infused malice into it, or urged it to wickedness, but by permitting and directing the evil, for instance he directs the exercise of cruelty to the punishment of those whom he deems deserving of it.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although man is made in God's image, it does not follow that whatever is in man is also in God. Nevertheless, as to the point raised, God's will is indifferent to this or that, since it is not fixed to one object. For he is able either to do a thing or not to do it, to do this or to do that: yet it does not follow that in either case he can do ill, which is to sin.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument applies to those things which refer to the perfection of power but not to those which refer to the lack of power.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Though God is able to do many good things which he does not, he does not omit them, since he is not bound to do them, which is a necessary condition of an omission.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. The same answer applies here, since a man is not guilty of a sin through failing to prevent it, unless he be bound to do so.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The words of Amos refer to penal evil. And the words of the Book of Wisdom, God hath not made death, refer to the cause of death, as the wages of sin; or to the original formation of human nature when man was made by nature immortal.