ARTICLE I

CAN GOD CREATE A THING FROM NOTHING?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xlv, A. 2

WE now inquire about the creation, which is the first effect of the divine power; and the first point of inquiry is whether God can create anything out of nothing. Seemingly the reply should be in the negative.

             1. God cannot act counter to first principles; for instance, he cannot make a whole not greater than its part. Now according to Aristotle (Phys. i, 8) philosophers declare it is a commonly received axiom that out of nothing nothing comes. Therefore God cannot make a thing out of nothing.

             2. Whatever is made was possible before it was made: for if it could not be, it could not be made, since the impossible cannot be the term of a change. Now the potentiality by virtue of which a thing is possible, cannot be otherwise than in a subject, unless it be itself a subject: because an accident cannot exist but in a subject. Therefore whatever is made, is produced from matter or a subject. Therefore nothing can be made out of nothing.

             3. Infinite distance cannot be crossed. Now there is an infinite distance between absolute non-being and being: because the less a potentiality is disposed to actuality the further is it removed from act, so that if there be no potentiality at all, the distance will be infinite. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to come into being from absolute non-being.

             4. The Philosopher says (De Gen. i, 7) that things utterly dissimilar do not act on one another: because there must be common genus and matter in agent and patient. Now absolute non-entity and God are utterly dissimilar. Therefore God cannot act on absolute non-entity: and consequently he cannot make a thing out of nothing.

             5. Should it be said that the foregoing argument applies to an agent whose action is distinct from its substance, and presupposes a subject into which it is received?--On the contrary, Avicenna says (Metaph. ix, 2) that if heat were separated from matter it would act of itself without its matter: and yet its action would not be its substance. Therefore the fact that God's action is his substance is no reason for his not needing matter.

             6. From no premises we can draw no conclusion, which is a process of reason. Now logical being is consequent to natural being. Therefore neither can anything in nature be made from nothing.

             7. If a thing is made from nothing, this preposition from connotes either cause or order. And apparently if it connotes a cause it will be either the efficient or the material cause. But nothing cannot be the efficient cause of being, nor can it be the material cause, so that as regards the point at issue 'from' does not denote a cause. Nor can it denote order, because as Boethius says there is no order between non-being and being. Therefore in no sense can a thing be made from nothing.

             8. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) active power is the cause whereby one thing is changed into another, as such. Now there is no power in God save that which is active. Therefore it requires a thing which is the subject of change and consequently cannot make a thing out of nothing.

             9. Things differ from one another in that one is more perfect than another. Now the cause of this difference is not on the part of God, since he is one and simple. Therefore we must assign matter as the cause thereof: and consequently we must hold that things were made from matter and not from nothing.

             10. That which is made from nothing has being after nonbeing. Consequently it is possible to conceive an instant which is the last of its non-being, and when it ceases not to be; and another instant which is the first of its being and from which it begins to be. Now these instants are either one and the same, or distinct. If they coincide it follows that two contradictory statements are true at the same instant: if they are distinct, then since there is an intervening time between the two instants, it follows that there is a mean between affirmation and negation: for it cannot be said that it is not after the last instant of its non-existence, nor that it is before the first instant of its existence. But both these things are impossible, namely that contradictory statements be true simultaneously, and that they have a mean. Therefore a thing cannot be made from nothing.

             11. That which is made of necessity at some time was becoming: and what is created was at some time being created. Hence that which is created was becoming and was made either simultaneously or not simultaneously. Now it cannot be said that it was not simultaneously, since the creature, before it is made, is not: and if its becoming precedes its having been made, there must have been a subject of the making, and this is contrary to the definition of creation. On the other hand if its becoming and its having been made are simultaneous, it follows that at the same time it is being made and not being made, since in things that are not purely transient, that which has been made is: whereas that which is being made, is not. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to be made from nothing or to be created.

             12. Every agent produces its like: and every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual. Therefore nothing is made but what is actual. Now primal matter is not actual. Therefore it cannot be made, especially by God who is pure act. Hence whatsoever things are made, are made from pre-existing matter, and not from nothing.

             13. Whatsoever God makes he fashions according to his idea, even as an artist produces art-works according to art-forms. Now there is no idea of primal matter in God, because an idea is a form and the likeness of that which it represents: whereas primal matter, since it is conceived to be essentially formless, cannot be represented by a form. Therefore primal matter cannot be made by God; and thus the same conclusion follows.

             14. The same thing cannot be a principle both of perfection and of imperfection. Now things are said to be imperfect when they are inferior to others, and this can only be the case when their inferiority is due to their being imperfect. Since then God is the principle of perfection, we must needs ascribe imperfection to some other principle: and this can only be matter. Therefore things must needs have been made from matter of some kind, and not from nothing.

             15. If a thing is made from nothing, it is made therefrom either as from a subject, as a statue made of bronze; or as from its opposite, as a shape from something shapeless: or as from these two combined, as a statue from shapeless bronze. Now a thing cannot be made from nothing as subject, since non-being cannot be the matter of being. Nor as a composite, since then non-being would be transformed into being, as shapeless bronze is transformed into shapely bronze; so that there would have to be something common to being and non-being; which is impossible. Nor again as from its opposite, since absolute non-being differs more from being than two beings of the same genus, and yet one of the latter cannot be changed into another; for instance, shape is not changed into colour, except perhaps accidentally. Therefore by no means can a thing be made from nothing.

             16. Whatsoever accidentally is originates in that which is essential. From that which is opposite a thing is made accidentally, and from a subject a thing is made essentially: thus a statue is made accidentally from that which is shapeless, but from bronze essentially, since shapelessness is accidental to the bronze. If, then, a thing is made from nothing, this will be accidentally: and thus it follows that it will need to be made from a subject, and therefore not from nothing.

             17. The maker gives being to that which is made. If then God makes a thing out of nothing, he gives being to that thing. Hence either there is something that receives being, or there is nothing. If nothing, then nothing receives being by that action of God's, and thus nothing is made thereby. And if there is something that receives being, this something will be distinct from that which is from God, since recipient is distinct from that which is received. Therefore God makes a thing from something already existing, and not from nothing.

             On the contrary, on Genesis i, 1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, a gloss taken from Bede says that to create is to make a thing from nothing. Therefore God can make a thing from nothing.

             Again, Avicenna (Metaph. vii, 2) says that an agent who acts by virtue of an accident requires matter to act upon. But God does not act by virtue of an accident, indeed his action is his very substance. Therefore he requires no matter to act upon, and consequently can make a thing from nothing.

             Again, God's power is greater than that of nature. Now the power of nature makes things from that in which previously they were in potentiality. Therefore God's power does something more, and makes things out of nothing.

             I answer that we must hold firmly that God can and does make things from nothing.

             In order to make this evident we must observe that every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: wherefore action must needs be attributed to an agent according to the measure of its actuality. Now a particular thing is actual in a particular manner, and this in two ways. First by comparison with itself, because its substance is not wholly act, since such things are composed of matter and form: for which reason a natural thing acts not in respect of its totality, but in respect of its form whereby it is in act. Secondly, in comparison with things that are in act: because no natural thing comprises the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act: but each one has an act confined to one genus and one species, so that none has an activity extending to being as such, but only to this or that being as such, and confined to this or that species: for an agent produces its like. Wherefore a natural agent produces a being not simply, but determines a pre-existent being to this or that species, of fire, for example, or of whiteness and so forth. Wherefore the natural agent acts by moving something, and consequently requires matter as a subject of change or movement, and thus it cannot make a thing out of nothing.

             On the other hand God is all act,--both in comparison with himself, since he is pure act without any admixture of potentiality,--and in comparison with the things that are in act, because in him is the source of all things, wherefore by his action he produces the whole subsistent being, without anything having existed before (since he is the source of all being), and in respect of his totality. For this reason he can make a thing from nothing, and this action of his is called creation. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xviii) that being is by creation, whereas life and the like are by information: for all causation of absolute being is traced to the first universal cause, while the causation of all that is in addition to being, or specific of being, belongs to second causes which act by information, on the presupposition as it were of the effect of the first cause. Hence no thing gives being except in so far as it partakes of the divine power. For this reason it is said again in De Causis (prop. iii) that the soul, by giving us being, has a divine operation.

             Reply to the First Objection. The Philosopher says that it is a common axiom or opinion of the physicists that from nothing nothing is made, because the natural agent, which was the object of their researches, does not act except by movement. Consequently there must needs be a subject of movement or change which, as we have stated, is not required for a supernatural agent.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be: but it does not follow that there was need of matter as the base of that possibility. For it is stated in Metaph. v, 12, that sometimes a thing is said to be possible, not in respect of some potentiality, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly it is said that before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active power of the agent, but not on account of any passive power of matter. The Philosopher uses this argument (Metaph. vii, 13) in treating of natural generation against the Platonists who maintained that separate forms are the principles of natural generation.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Between being and absolute non-being there is an infinite distance in a certain sense, and that always, but not in the same way. Sometimes it is infinite on both sides, as when we compare nonbeing with the divine being which is infinite: thus we might compare infinite whiteness with infinite blackness. Sometimes it is finite on one side only, as when we compare absolute non-being with created being which is finite: thus we might compare infinite blackness with finite whiteness. Accordingly then from non-being it is impossible to pass to the being that is infinite: but it is possible to pass to the being that is finite, inasmuch as the distance from non-being to that kind of being is determinate on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking: for thus it is in continuous movements through which one part passes after another. But there is no such passage for that which is infinite.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, non-being or nothing does not hold the position of patient, save accidentally, but rather that of the opposite to the thing made by the action. Nor again is the opposite in the position of patient in the action of nature, except accidentally; but the subject is this.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. If heat were separated from matter, it would act indeed without matter as a requisite for the agent, but not without that matter that is required on the part of the patient.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. In the acts of the reason to come to a conclusion is like being moved in the processes of nature, because in reaching a conclusion the reason discourses from one thing to another: wherefore as all natural movement is from a starting-point, so also is every conclusion of the reason. And as the understanding of first principles, which is the starting-point whence the conclusion is derived, does not proceed as a conclusion from something else, even so creation which is the principle of all movement, is not from something else.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. When a thing is said to be made from nothing, the sense is twofold, as Anselm says (Monolog. v, viii). The negative implied in the word 'nothing' may bear directly on the preposition 'from,' or it may be included in that preposition. If it bears directly on the preposition, again a twofold sense is possible. It may bear on the whole so that the negative extends not only to the preposition but also to the verb; in this sense we might say that a thing is made from nothing because it is not made: thus it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In this sense we may say of God that he is made from nothing, because he is utterly not made: but this manner of speaking is not customary. In another sense the verb remains affirmed, and the negative bears on the preposition only: and then we say that a thing is made from nothing, because it is made indeed, but there is no pre-existing thing from which it is made: thus we say that so-and-so grieves for nothing, because he has no cause for grieving: it is in this sense that a thing is said to be made from nothing by creation. If, however, the preposition includes the negation, then again the sense is twofold, one true, one false. It is false if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can non-being be the cause of being): it is true if it implies mere order, so that to make a thing from nothing, is to make a thing whereas before there was nothing, and this is true of creation. The statement of Boethius that there is no order between non-being and being, refers to the order of definite proportion, or of real relation; such order, says Avicenna (Metaph. iii) cannot be between being and non-being.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. This definition applies to a natural active power.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. God produces things not of natural necessity but according to the order of his wisdom. Hence it does not follow that diversity among things arises from their matter but from the ordering of divine wisdom, which established diverse natures for the adornment of the universe.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, its being begins in an instant, and its nonbeing is not in that instant, nor is it in any real but only in an imaginary instant. For as outside the universe there is no real but only an imaginary dimension, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make a thing outside the universe at this or that distance from the universe; even so before the beginning of the world there was no real but an imaginary time, wherein it is possible to conceive an instant which was the last instant of non-being. Nor does it follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since real time is not a continuation of imaginary time.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is made from nothing becomes and is already made simultaneously: and the same applies to all instantaneous changes; thus the air is being illuminated and is actually illuminated at the same time. For in such things to become and to be already made are synonymous, in so far as a thing already is in the first instant of its making.

             It may also be replied that a thing which is made from nothing is said to be in course of making when it is already made, not in respect of movement, which is from one term to another, but in respect of the outflow of the agent into the thing made. For these two are to be found in natural generation, namely transition from one term to another, and outflow of agent into the thing made, but the latter alone has a place in creation.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Properly speaking neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said to be made: but that which is made is the thing that subsists. For since to be made terminates in being, it belongs properly to that to which it belongs per se to be, namely to a subsistent thing: wherefore neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said properly speaking to be created, but to be concreated: whereas a subsistent thing, whatsoever it may be, is properly said to be created. Without, however, laying stress on this, we may reply that primal matter has a likeness to God in so far as it has a share of being. For even as a stone, as a being, is like God, although it has no intelligence as God has, so primal matter in so far as it has being and yet not actual being, is like God. Because being is, so to say, common to potentiality and act.

             The Reply to the Thirteenth Objection follows from this: because properly speaking there is no idea of matter but of the composite, since the idea is the form whereby something is made. Yet we may say that there is an idea of matter in so far as matter in a sense reflects the divine essence.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If one of two creatures be inferior to the other, it does not follow that it is imperfect, because imperfection denotes the lack of something which is natural or due to a thing. Hence in heaven though one saint is above another, none will be imperfect. And if there be imperfection in creatures, it need not be ascribed to God or to matter, but to the fact that the creature is made from nothing.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing is said to be made from nothing as from an opposite, in the sense explained above. Yet it does not thereby follow that a being of one kind can be made from one of another kind, for instance, shape from colour: because being and non-being cannot possibly co-exist, whereas colour and shape can. On the other hand that wherefrom a thing is made must needs be in contact with the thing made, yet they are not simultaneous.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. If from connotes causality, a thing is not made from its opposite except accidentally, that is by reason of the subject. If however it connotes order, a thing is made from its opposite even per se: hence privation is said to be the principle of a thing's becoming but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above, that a thing is said to be made from nothing.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. God at the same time gives being and produces that which receives being, so that it does not follow that his action requires something already in existence.