ARTICLE IV

SHOULD WE JUDGE A THING TO BE POSSIBLE OR IMPOSSIBLE WITH REFERENCE TO LOWER OR TO HIGHER CAUSES?

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether we ought to judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility in reference to its lower or its higher causes. And it would seem that we should consider its higher causes.

             1. The (interlinear) gloss on 1 Corinthians i says that the folly of the wise men of the world consisted in their judging of possibility and impossibility by observing nature. Therefore we should judge a thing to be possible or impossible by considering not its lower but its higher causes.

             2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, 1), that which is first in any genus is the measure of whatsoever is included in that genus. Now God's power is the first power. Therefore a thing should be deemed possible or impossible in reference to it.

             3. The more a cause penetrates its effect, the better it serves as a guide to our judgement of the effect. Now the First Cause reaches further into the effect than do secondary causes. Therefore we should rather judge of an effect by referring to the First Cause: and consequently we should deem a thing possible or impossible in relation to the higher causes.

             4. To give sight to a blind man is impossible with respect to the lower causes: and yet it is possible, since sometimes it is done. Therefore we should judge of a thing's impossibility not according to the lower but according to the higher causes.

             5. Before the world existed it was possible that it would exist. But this possibility did not rest on lower causes. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

             1. On the contrary an effect should be adjudged possible in reference to the cause on which its possibility is based. Now an effect derives its possibility, contingency or even necessity from its proximate and not from its remote cause: thus merit is a contingent effect by reason of the free-will, its proximate cause, and not a necessary effect by reason of its remote cause which is divine predestination. Therefore one should judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility by referring to its lower or proximate causes.

             2. What is possible in regard to lower causes is also possible in regard to higher causes, and therefore in every way possible. Now that which is possible in every way is possible simply. Therefore in order to judge whether a thing be simply possible, we must refer to the lower causes.

             3. The higher causes are necessary. If, then, we are to consider effects in the light of higher causes, all effects will be necessary: and this is impossible.

             4. All things are possible to God. Therefore if we must judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility in reference to him, nothing will be impossible: and this is absurd.

             5. In the employment of terms we should follow the common use. Now we are wont in referring to power, to speak of power, disposition, necessity and action as being related to one another. But these are to be found in the lower and not the higher causes. Therefore we should judge of the possibility or impossibility of a thing in reference to the lower and not the higher causes.

             I reply that judgement as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing may be considered in two ways; with reference to the one who judges, and with reference to the thing in question.

             As regards the first it must be observed that if there are two sciences, one of which considers the higher causes, and the other the less high, judgement in each must not be formed in the same way, but in reference to those causes which both sciences consider. Take, for instance, the physician and the astrologer, of whom the latter considers the highest causes and the former the proximate causes: the physician will form his judgement about a man's illness or death according to the proximate causes, namely the forces of nature and the gravity of the disease: whereas the astrologer will judge according to the remote causes, namely the position of the stars. It is thus with the point at issue. For wisdom is twofold: mundane wisdom called philosophy, which considers the lower causes, causes namely that are themselves caused, and bases its judgements on them: and divine wisdom or theology, which considers the higher, that is the divine, causes and judges according to them. Now the higher causes are the divine attributes, such as the wisdom, goodness, will of God, and the like. It must be noted, however, that there is no point in referring this question to those effects which belong exclusively to the higher causes, and which God alone can produce; since it were senseless to say that they are possible or impossible in relation to lower causes. The point in question is about effects produced by lower causes: since such effects may be produced by both lower and higher causes, and it is about them that a doubt may occur. Again the question at issue does not concern things that are possible or impossible not with respect to a power, but in themselves. Accordingly these effects of second causes with which this question is concerned are judged by the theologian to be possible or impossible with regard to the higher causes, and by the philosopher, with regard to the lower causes. If, however, this judgement be formed with respect to the nature of the thing in question, it is clear that the effects must be judged to be possible or impossible with respect to their proximate causes, since the action of their remote causes is determined according to their proximate causes, to which those effects are especially likened: and with respect to which, therefore, any judgement about the effects should be formed. This may be made evident by comparison with passive power. For properly speaking matter is not said to be potentially this or that when the matter is remote, as earth with respect to becoming a goblet: but when the matter is proximate and potentially receptive of actuality by one agent, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix, 1, 7): thus gold is potentially a goblet, since it receives that form by art alone. In like manner an effect, so far as its nature is concerned, is said to be possible or impossible in respect of its proximate causes alone.

             Reply to the First Objection. The wise men of the world are said to be foolish because they judged things that are impossible with regard to lower causes, to be absolutely and simply impossible even to God.

             Reply to the Second Objection. The possible is compared to power not as the thing measured is compared to its measure, but as object to power. And yet the divine power is the measure of all powers.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Although the first cause has the greatest influence on the effect, its influence, nevertheless, is determined and specified by the proximate cause, whose likeness therefore the effect bears.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although to make the blind see is possible to God, it cannot be said to be possible in every way.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. That the world would exist was possible with respect to the higher causes; hence this does not concern the question at issue. Wherefore the statement that the world will exist, was possible not only as regards the divine power, but also in itself, because the terms do not contradict each other.

             Reply to the First Objection on the other side. This argument considers the nature of the effect that is in question.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Although what is possible with respect to inferior causes is also possible with respect to higher causes, this does not apply to the impossible, rather is it the other way about. Consequently we must not form a universal decision on the matter, or judge that a thing is possible or impossible in every case with respect to lower causes.

             Reply to the Third Objection. We do not judge a thing to be possible or impossible to this or that cause through some likeness in point of possibility or impossibility between that cause and some other cause, but because it is possible or impossible to that cause.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. The theologian would say that whatever is not impossible in itself is possible to God; according to Mark ix, 22, All things are possible to him that believeth, and Luke i, 37, No word shall be impossible with God.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Though all these things are not to be found in the higher causes, they are subject to them: hence this argument considers passive and not active power of which we are speaking now.