ARTICLE I

CAN GOD DO ANYTHING IN CREATURES THAT IS BEYOND NATURE, AGAINST NATURE, OR CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE?

(Con. Gen. iii, 98, 99, 100).

THE first point of inquiry is whether God can do anything in creatures that is beyond or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature: and seemingly he cannot.

             1. The (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, says: God the author of all natures does nothing against nature.

             2. Another gloss on the same passage observes: God can no more act against the law of nature than he can act against himself. Now he can nowise act against himself because he cannot deny himself (2 Tim. ii, 13). Therefore he cannot act against the order of nature.

             3. Just as the order of human justice derives from divine justice, so does the order of nature derive from divine wisdom since it is this that ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii, 1), Now God cannot act against the order of human justice: further, he would be the cause of sin which alone is contrary to the order of justice. Since then God's wisdom is no less than his justice, it would seem that neither can he act against the order of nature.

             4. Whenever God works in creatures through the innate laws of nature, he does not act against the course of nature. Now God cannot fittingly work in a creature independently of the innate laws of nature. Therefore he cannot fittingly work against the course of nature. The minor proposition is proved as follows. Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12) that visible apparitions were shown to the patriarchs by means of the angelic ministrations, inasmuch as God governs bodies through spirits. In like manner he governs the lower bodies through the higher (ibid. 4): and it may also be said that he directs all effects through their causes. Since then the laws of nature are implanted in natural causes, it would seem that God cannot fittingly work in natural effects, except by means of the natural laws: and thus he will do nothing contrary to the course of nature.

             5. God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time: because since this is incompatible with the very nature of being as such, it is also incompatible with a creature: and the first of things created was being (De Causis, p. 54). Now the aforesaid principle, being the first principle of all, to which all others are reduced (Metaph. iv), must be implied in every necessary proposition, and its opposite in every impossible proposition. Since then things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible in nature, for instance that a blind man be made to see, or a dead man to live, they imply the opposite of the aforesaid proposition. Therefore God cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature.

             6. A gloss on Ephesians iii says that God does not change his will so as to act against the causes which he had established by his will. Now God established natural causes by his will. Therefore he neither does nor can do anything contrary to them, inasmuch as he cannot change: for to do anything contrary to that which one has deliberately decided would seem to point to a change in one's will.

             7. The good of the universe is a good of order, and to this the course of nature belongs. But God cannot act against the good of the universe, since it is due to his sovereign goodness that all things are good in relation to the order of the universe. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the order of nature.

             8. God cannot be the cause of evil. Now according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iv) evil is the privation of measure, form and order. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe.

             9. It is written (Gen. ii, 2) that on the seventh day God rested from all the work which he had done, and this because as the (ordinary) gloss observes, he ceased to produce new works. Now in the works of the six days he did nothing contrary to the course of nature: wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad. lit ii) says that in discussing the works of the six days we do not ask what God might have done miraculously, but what was compatible with nature which he established then. Therefore neither did God afterwards do anything contrary to the course of nature.

             10. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) nature causes order in all things. Now God cannot do anything that is not in order, since according to Romans xiii, I: Those that are of God are well ordered. Therefore he cannot do anything contrary to nature.

             11. Nature no less than human reason is from God. But God cannot act against the principles of reason, for instance that the genus be not predicated of its species, or that the side of a square be not proportionate to the diameter. Neither therefore can he act against the principles of nature.

             12. The entire course of nature derives from divine wisdom even as the products of art proceed from art, according to Augustine in his commentary on Jo. i, 3, 4: That which was made, was life in him. Now a craftsman does nothing against the principles of his art except by mistake: and this cannot happen to God. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

             13. The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text 78) that the manner in which a thing is done follows its natural aptitude to be done in that way. Now what has a natural aptitude to be done as it is done, is not done against nature. Therefore nothing is done contrary to nature.

             14. Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo xx) that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. Now it is unbecoming for the course of nature to be changed, while it is becoming for it to be observed. Therefore it is impossible that God act against the course of nature.

             15. Knowledge is to falsehood, as power to the impossible. Now God cannot know what is naturally false. Therefore he cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature, since this is naturally impossible.

             16. That which is impossible of itself is more impossible than that which is accidentally impossible, since that which is of itself so and so is more than other things so and so. Now it is accidentally impossible for that which has been not to have been: and yet God cannot do this according to Jerome and the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2). Therefore neither can God do things that are contrary to the course of nature and impossible in themselves, for instance that a blind man see.

             17. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) an action is compulsory when its principle is external, and the person compelled contributes nothing to it. Now nature cannot contribute to things that are done against the course of nature: and thus if they are done by God they will be compulsory and will not last. But this cannot be admitted, since the blind retain their sight after having it restored by God.

             18. Every genus is divided into potentiality and act (Phys. iii): and passive potentiality comes under potentiality, while active potentiality comes under act: wherefore nature has no passive potentiality without a corresponding active potentiality, since they come under the same genus, as again the Commentator states (Metaph. ix, text. 11, 17). Now there is no natural active potentiality directed to things contrary to the course of nature: and consequently neither is there a natural passive potentiality. But when a creature has no passive potentiality in respect of a thing, this is said to be impossible, although by virtue of his omnipotence God can do all things. Therefore things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible through something lacking to creatures, although not by reason of a defect in God's powers.

             19. Whatsoever God has done once it would not be unbecoming if he did it always. Yet it would be unbecoming were he to produce all natural effects independently of their natural causes, because in that case natural things would be deprived of their operations. Therefore it is unbecoming for him to produce at times an effect in this lower world without the agency of natural causes: and if he acts by their means he does nothing against the course of nature. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

             20. A natural cause is ordained to its effect essentially, and vice versa. Now God cannot deprive a thing of that which is essential to it, so long as the thing remains: for instance, that a man be not an animal. Therefore he cannot produce an effect without the natural cause that is essentially ordained to that effect: for instance he cannot give sight without the natural causes whence sight is produced.

             21. It is unfitting for a greater good to be neglected for a lesser good. Now the good of the universe is greater than any particular good of any thing whatsoever: wherefore Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God made every single thing good, and all things together very good, for the order of the universe. Therefore it is unfitting that God for the spiritual good of an individual man or of a nation, change the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe, wherein its good consists. Therefore God never does anything contrary to the course of nature.

             On the contrary, nature cannot restore a habit to one who is deprived of it: yet this can be done by God: thus it is written (Mt. xi, 5): The blind see, the deaf hear, etc. Therefore God does something contrary to the order of nature. Again, the power of a higher being is not dependent on or limited by the power of a lower being. Now God is above nature. Therefore his power is not limited by that of nature: so that nothing prevents him from acting against the order of nature.

             I answer that, without any doubt God can work in creatures independently of created causes, just as he works in all created causes, as shown elsewhere: and by working independently of created causes he can produce the same effects and in the same order as he produces them by their means: or even other effects and in a different order: so that he is able to do something contrary to the common and customary course of nature. We shall realise how true this is if we consider the views that have been held in opposition to this truth. These are three in number.

             The first is that of some early philosophers who contended that these corporeal things do not derive their existence from any higher cause; thus some of them, as Anaxagoras, said that an intelligence was the cause of some kind of movement in them, for instance, a movement of segregation. According to this opinion natural forms which are the principles of natural actions cannot be influenced, nor their actions hindered, by any supernatural cause: so that nothing can happen contrary to the course of nature, which is unchangeably regulated by these corporeal causes. Now this opinion is false: because the supreme being must needs be the cause of being in all things (Metaph. ii, text. 4), just as that which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in all other things. We have treated this point more fully elsewhere (Sum. Theol., P. I, Q. xliv, A. 1) when we proved that nothing can exist unless it be made by God.

             A second opinion in opposition to this truth was held by other philosophers who asserted that God is the cause of all by his intellect. They maintained however that God has a universal knowledge of things inasmuch as he knows himself, and that he himself is the source of all being, but that he has no proper knowledge of each individual being. But, said they, from common and universal knowledge individual effects do not follow except by means of particular knowledge. Thus, if I know that all fornication is to be avoided, I shall not avoid this particular action unless I know that it is fornication. Accordingly they said that particular effects do not proceed from God except in a certain order by means of other causes, of which the higher are more universal, and the lower more particular: and according to this view God is unable to do anything contrary to the order of nature. But this opinion is false: for since God knows himself perfectly, he must needs know all that is in him in any way whatsoever. Now in him is the likeness of every one of his effects, inasmuch as there can be nothing that does not imitate him: and thus it follows that he has proper knowledge of all things, as we have proved elsewhere (Sum. Theol., P. I, Q. xiv).

             The third opinion opposed to the aforesaid truth is that of some philosophers who said that God produces things by natural necessity: so that his works are confined to the course of things appointed by nature, and thus he is unable to act against it. But this again is evidently false: since above all those things that act of natural necessity there must be something that determines nature to one mode of action, as elsewhere (Sum. Th., P. I, Q. xix, A. 4) we have proved. It is impossible then that God the first agent act of natural necessity: and this again has been proved in several ways in another question (ibid. A. 3 and above Q. iii, A. 15).

             These three points being established, namely that God is the author of being in all things of nature; that he has proper knowledge and providence in respect of each individual; and that he does not act of natural necessity, it follows that he can act independently of the course of nature in the production of particular effects--either as regards being by producing in natural things a new form which nature is unable to produce, for instance, the form of glory; or by producing a form in a particular matter, as sight in a blind man: or as regards operation, by restraining the action of nature from doing what it would naturally do, for instance, by hindering fire from burning (Dan. iii, 49, 50), or water from flowing, as happened in the Jordan (Jos. iii, 13).

             Reply to the First Objection. Both God and nature act against individual nature: for instance, it is against the nature of this or that particular fire that it be extinguished: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo et Mundo, ii) that corruption, decrepitude, and in general all defects are contrary to nature: whereas nothing in nature acts against universal nature. For particular nature denotes the relation of a particular cause to a particular effect, while universal nature denotes the relation of the first agent in nature, which is the heavens, to all agents in the lower world. And seeing that none of the lower bodies acts save by virtue of the heavenly body, it is impossible for any natural body to act against universal nature: while the very fact that anything acts against a particular nature, is in accord with universal nature. Now just as the heaven is the universal cause in respect of lower bodies, so God is the universal cause in respect of all beings, and in comparison with him even the heaven is a particular cause. For nothing prevents one and the same cause from being universal in relation to things below it, and particular in relation to those above it: thus if we take the predicables, animal is universal in relation to man, and particular in relation to substance. Accordingly just as by the power of the heavens something can happen that is contrary to this or that particular nature, and yet not contrary to nature simply, since it is in accord with universal nature: even so by the power of God something can occur that is contrary to universal nature which is dependent on the power of the heavens; without being contrary to nature simply, since it will be in accord with the supremely universal nature, dependent on God in relation to all creatures. It is in this sense that Augustine in the gloss quoted says that God does nothing contrary to nature: wherefore he goes on to say, because the nature of each thing is what God does in it.

             The Reply to the Second Objection is evident from what has just been said: because in that gloss Augustine refers to the supreme law of nature which is God's ordinance with regard to all creatures.

             Reply to the Third Objection. As we have already explained although God can do something contrary to the relation between one creature and another, he cannot do anything contrary to a creature's relation to himself. Now the justice of a man consists chiefly in his being duly referred to God: so that God cannot do anything contrary to the order of justice. On the other hand the course of nature is dependent on the relation of one creature to another, wherefore God can act against the course of nature.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Just as God can produce effects in nature without employing natural causes, so also can he without the ministry of the angels: but the reason for his doing so is not the same in both cases. He acts independently of natural causes in order that being unable to ascribe the effect to visible causes we may be compelled to attribute it to some higher cause, and that thus a visible miracle may be a manifestation of the divine power. But the activities of the angels are not visible; wherefore their ministrations do not hinder us from ascribing something to the divine power. For this reason Augustine does not say that God is unable to work without the ministry of the angels, but that he does not do so.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Just as God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, so neither can he do what is impossible in nature in so far as it includes the former impossibility. Thus for a dead man to return to life clearly involves a contradiction if we suppose that his return to life is the natural effect of an intrinsic principle, since a dead man is essentially one who lacks the principle of life. Wherefore God does not do this but he makes a dead man to regain life from an extrinsic principle: and this involves no contradiction. The same applies to other things that are impossible to nature, and which God is able to do.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. God does not change his will when he does anything contrary to natural causes: because from eternity he foresaw and decreed that he would do what he does in time. Wherefore he so ordered the course of nature, that by his eternal decree he preordained whatsoever he would at some time do independently of that course.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. When God does anything outside the course of nature he does not put aside the entire order of the universe wherein its good consists, but the order of some particular cause to its effect.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Penal evil is contrary to the order between one part of the universe and another part: and in like manner every evil that is a defect of nature. But sinful evil is contrary to the order between the whole universe and its last end, inasmuch as the will in which sinful evil resides, is deprived by sin of its order in relation to the last end of the universe. Wherefore God cannot be the cause of this evil: since he cannot act against the latter order, although he can act against the former.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. God does not work miracles except in creatures that already exist, and in some way existed already in the works of the six days. Hence miraculous works, in a manner of speaking, existed already materially in the works of the six days, although it was not befitting that anything should be done miraculously contrary to the course of nature, when nature itself was being established.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Nature is the cause of order in all natural things, but not in all things absolutely speaking.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The logician and the mathematician consider things in their abstract principles, so that in logic and mathematics nothing is impossible except what is contrary to the abstract notion of a thing. These things involve a contradiction and consequently are of themselves impossible. Such impossibilities God cannot do. On the other hand the physicist studies individual matter, wherefore he reckons as an impossibility, even that which is impossible to an individual. But nothing prevents God from being able to do what is impossible to lower agents.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The divine art is not fully extended in producing creatures: so that God can by his art do something otherwise than the course of nature requires. Hence although he can do something contrary to the course of nature it does not follow that he can act against his art: since even a human craftsman can by his art produce another work in a different way to that in which he produced a previous work.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The Philosopher refers to things that are done in nature: for such things are so done as they have a natural aptitude to be done.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is fitting that the course of nature be observed forasmuch as it is ordained by divine providence: wherefore if it be in the order of divine providence that something be done otherwise, there is no reason why it should not be.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing cannot be said to be false simply or false relatively in the same way as a thing is impossible simply or impossible relatively: if a thing is false at all, it is false simply. Hence God cannot know falsehood, even as he cannot do what is simply impossible. And yet just as he can do what is relatively impossible, so is he able to do what is relatively unknown.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. All accidental things are to be reduced to something per se; wherefore nothing prevents that which is accidentally impossible from being more impossible when reduced to that which is impossible in itself: thus snow by its whiteness dazzles the eyes more than the whiteness of the wall does, because the whiteness of the snow is greater than that of the wall. In like manner that Socrates did not run is an impossibility because it is reduced to a per se impossibility, namely that the past has not been; which involves a contradiction. Consequently nothing prevents this from being more impossible than that which is impossible relatively, although accidentally it is not impossible.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In every natural thing there is natural order and relationship to all higher causes: and therefore things that happen to lower bodies through the influence of the heavenly bodies, are not compulsory, although they may seem contrary to the natural movements of these lower bodies, as evidenced in the ebb and flow of the sea consequent upon the movement of the moon. And much less compulsory is what God does in this lower world.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. A higher active force can produce a higher effect with the same material: thus nature can produce gold out of earth and a mixture of other elements, which art cannot do. Hence it is that the same thing has a potentiality for various effects, according to its relation to various agents. Wherefore nothing prevents created nature from being in potentiality to certain effects that can be produced by the power of God, and which cannot be produced by a lower power: this potentiality of nature is called obediential forasmuch as every creature obeys its Creator.

             Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Every created thing is ordered to its own operation by God: and thus it is not unfitting if by divine providence a certain effect is produced without the co-operation of nature.

             Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Although God produces an effect without the action of its natural cause, he does not destroy the relation between cause and effect. Thus the fiery furnace retained its relation to burning, although it burned not the three children in the furnace.

             Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. When God does anything contrary to the course of nature, the whole order of the universe is not subverted, but the course resulting from the relation between one particular thing and another. Hence it is not unfitting if at times something is done contrary to the course of nature for man's spiritual welfare which consists in his being ordered to the last end of the universe.