ARTICLE VI

ARE THE GENERATIVE AND CREATIVE POWERS THE SAME?

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether the power to beget is the same as the power to create: and the answer, seemingly, should be in the negative.

             1. According to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 27) generation is the operation or work of nature: whereas according to Hilary (De Synod.) creation is a work of the will. Now will and nature are not one and the same principle, but are opposite members of a division, as stated in Phys. ii, 4, 5. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same.

             2. Powers are distinguished by their acts (De Anima ii, 4). Now generation and creation are very different acts. Therefore the generative and creative powers are also distinct.

             3. There is less unity among things that admit of a same common predication, than among those that have the same being. Now in no respect do the generative and creative powers admit of a same common predication, as neither do the acts of generating and creating, nor the Son and a creature. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same in being.

             4. There is no order among things that are identical. Now the creative power logically precedes the generative power, even as the essential precedes the notional. Therefore these powers are not the same.

             On the contrary in God power and essence are not distinct. But there is only one divine essence. Therefore there is only one divine power. Therefore the powers in question are not distinct.

             Again, God does not do by several means what he is able to do by one. Now God is able both to generate and to create by one power, and all the more seeing that the generation of the Son is the prototype of the production of creatures, as Augustine expounds the words, He spake, and they were made (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): That is to say He begot the Word in whom they existed as things to be made. Therefore the generative and creative powers are but one power.

             I answer that, as stated above (A. 5), in speaking of the divine power we must take as our guide those things that apply to the divine essence. Now in God though one relation is really distinct from another on account of the mutual opposition between the relations which are real in God, nevertheless the relation and the divine essence are distinct not really, but only logically, since there is no opposition between them. Consequently we cannot grant that there are several absolute things in God, as some have asserted who maintained that there is a twofold being in God, an essential being and a personal being. The reason is that all being in God is essential, and the very persons are constituted by virtue of that essential being. Now when we consider the divine power we find besides the power a certain relation to what is subject to that power. Accordingly if we take power in its relation to an essential act, such as intelligence or creation, and power in its relation to a notional act such as generation, and compare them together as power, we find that they are one and the same power, even as nature and person have but one being. And yet we understand at the same time that each power has its peculiar relationship to its respective act to which it is directed. Therefore the generative and creative powers are one and the same power, if we consider them as powers, but they differ in their respective relationships to different acts.

             Reply to the First Objection. Although in creatures nature and will are distinct, in God they are one and the same.--Or we may reply that the creative power does not denote the purpose or will, but the power as directed by the will: whereas the generative power acts as inclined by nature. But this does not necessitate a distinction of powers, since there is nothing to prevent the same power from being directed to one act by the will and inclined to another by nature. Thus our intellect is urged by the will to believe, and is led by nature to understand first principles.

             Reply to the Second Objection. The higher the power the wider its scope: so that a diversity of objects does not require that it should be divided: thus the imagination is one power covering all objects of sense, for the perception of which distinct senses are appropriated. Now the divine power is raised above all others: wherefore a difference of acts requires no distinction therein, if we consider it as power; but God by his one power is able to do all things.

             Reply to the Third Objection. The generative and creative powers, considered as to their substance, so to speak, do not merely admit of a same common predication, but they are one and the same thing: the analogy comes in through this relationship to their respective acts.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is no order of first and second between these powers, except in respect of their being distinct: so that such an order is only in reference to their acts. Hence it is clear that the generative power precedes the creative power, as generation preceded creation. But in relation to the essence they are identical and there is no order between them.