ARTICLE XIX

WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ANGELS TO EXIST BEFORE THE VISIBLE WORLD?

Sum. Th. I, Q. lxi, A. 3

THE nineteenth point of inquiry is whether it were possible for the angels to exist before the visible world: and seemingly it was impossible.

             1. Two distinct things that cannot be in the same place require a difference of place. Now it is universally agreed that two angels cannot be in the same place. Hence it is inconceivable that there be two distinct angels unless there be two distinct places. Now there was no place before the visible creature, for place according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 4) is a space occupied by a body. Therefore the angels could not exist before the visible world.

             2. The production of the corporeal creature nowise deprived the angels of their natural power. Hence if it was possible for the angels to exist outside a place before the visible world was made, it would be possible even now that the visible world has been created: and this apparently is not true, because if they were not in a place they would be nowhere and thus they would seem not to exist at all.

             3. Boëthius says that every created spirit needs a body. Now an angel is a created spirit. Therefore he needs a body and consequently could not exist before the corporeal creature.

             4. To this it may be replied that an angel needs a body not for his existence but for his ministrations.--On the contrary, the angelic ministrations are exercised where we are, namely in this world. Now the angels have a corporeal place besides our abode, namely the empyrean heaven. Therefore it is not only in order to minister to us that they need a body in a corporeal place.

             5. It is impossible to imagine 'before' and 'after' without time. Now if the angels had existed before the world, the beginning of the angels' existence would have preceded the beginning of the visible world. Consequently time would have begun before the visible world, and that is impossible, since time follows movement, and movement is consequent to the thing moved. Therefore it was impossible for the angels to exist before the world.

             On the contrary whatsoever does not involve a contradiction God can do in his creatures. Now no contradiction is involved if the angels exist while the visible creature exists not. Therefore it was not impossible for God to create the angels before the world.

             I answer that, as Boëthius says (De Trin.) in speaking of God, we must not be led astray by our imagination, nor indeed should we in speaking of any corporeal things whatsoever: because seeing that the imagination is founded upon our senses, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 3), it cannot rise above quantity which is the subject of sensible qualities. Through failing to note this, and to transcend their imagination, some have been unable to understand that anything can exist without being situated somewhere. For this reason some of the philosophers of old said that what is not in a place is not at all (Phys. iv, 3): and through the same error some of the moderns have maintained that angels cannot exist without a corporeal creature, through thinking angels to be like things which they imagine to occupy different places. This is in contradiction with the opinion of those of old who held the angels to have existed before the world. It is also prejudicial to the dignity of the angelic nature which being naturally superior to the corporeal creature is nowise dependent thereon. Therefore absolutely speaking it was possible for the angels to exist before the world.

             Reply to the First Objection. Two angels cannot be in the same place, not because they are distinct from each other, but because this would confuse their operations: hence the argument does not prove.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Even now nothing prevents angels from not being in a place if they so will: although they are always in a place on account of the order by virtue of which the spiritual creature presides over the corporeal, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii).

             Reply to the Third Objection. As Boëthius himself explains, angels need bodies only for their ministrations and not for the perfection of their nature.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. The angels are in the empyrean heaven as being a place befitting contemplation, not as though contemplation were impossible elsewhere.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. This 'before' and 'after' do not prove that there was real time before the world but only imaginary time, as we have stated above when discussing the eternity or creation of the world.

The Mayflower Press, Plymouth. William Brendon & Son, Ltd.

Footnotes

   The class atmosphere is suggested by remarks made here and there. For instance, in his course on God's Knowledge (Quæstiones Disputatæ de Veritate, Q. II). St. Thomas introduces a discussion of a problem that had apparently cropped up in class: quæritur et fuit quæsitum incidenter utrum Deus possit facere infinita (II de Veritate, 10).

   Quæstiones Disputatæ. Introduction. Paris 1925.

   Einführung in die Summa Theologiæ des heiligen Thomas von Aquin. Freiburg-im-Breisgau. 1928.

   Ambrosiaster.

   Sum. Theol. I, Q. xiv, A. 8: Q. xv.

   i.e. as a property or note of a divine person. See Sum. Theol. I, Q. xxxii, A. 2.

   Vellet. The text of Hilary has nollet followed by a comma--not led by natural necessity against his will.

   Himself here is the objective case.

   Himself.... Themselves ... objective case.

   Sum. Theol. P. I, Q. xli, art. 6, ad 1.

   Damascene, De Fide Orthod. iii, 21; iv, 19.

   i.e. not a permanent quality but something flowing `like colours in the air, or the energy of a craftsman in his tools,' as St. Thomas explains elsewhere.

   Sum. Theol. I-II, Q. x, art. 4.

   Liber Sex Principiorum, by Gilbert de la Porrée.

   Douay, `in whom,' but may also be rendered `in which.'

   Douay,--life.

   The full text is: `The spirit shall go forth from my face, and breathings I will make.'

   Sum. Theol. I, Q. cxviii, A. 3.

   Pope Vigilius, Can. i, contra Originem; Council of Braga, Anathem. vi, contra haeret. Pope Anastasius II, Epist. ad episc. Galliue.

   See below Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Cf. also Sum. Theol. I, Q. cxix, art. 2. `The semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole: rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body.'

   Pelagius, Expositio Fidei ad Damasum.

   Cf. Sum. Th. I, Q. xc, A. 4.

   See Sum. Th. I, Q. cxix, A. 2.

   Cf. Sum. Th. I, Q. xlv, A. 1 ad 3.

   Douay and A.V. For ever and ever.

   Cf. Sum. Theol. I, Q. xli, A. 3, ad 4.

Book 2 (Q. 4-6)

ON THE

POWER OF GOD

(QUÆSTIONES DISPUTATÆ DE POTENTIA DEI)

BY

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

SECOND BOOK

(QUESTIONS IV-VI)

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY THE

ENGLISH DOMINICAN FATHERS

LONDON

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

1933

APPROBATIO ORDINIS.

NIHIL OBSTAT:

GABRIEL COYLE, O.P., S.T.L.

THOMAS GILBY, O.P., S.T.L., PH.D.

IMPRIMATUR:

BERNARDUS DELANY, O.P.,

Prior Provincialis Angliae.

In festo Sti. Bernardi.

20 Aug. 1933.

NIHIL OBSTAT:

GEORGIUS D. SMITH, S.TH.D., PH.D.,

Censor deputatus.

IMPRIMATUR:

JOSEPH BUTT,

Vicarius generalis.

WESTMONASTERII,

die 5 Octobris, 1933.

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

1933

CONTENTS

QUESTION IV. OF THE CREATION OF FORMLESS MATTER

I.  DID THE CREATION OF FORMLESS MATTER PRECEDE IN DURATION THE CREATION OF THINGS?

II.  WAS MATTER FORMED ALL AT ONCE OR BY DEGREES?

QUESTION V. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THINGS BY GOD

I.  ARE THINGS PRESERVED IN THEIR BEING BY GOD?

II.  CAN GOD ENABLE A CREATURE TO KEEP ITSELF IN EXISTENCE BY ITSELF AND WITHOUT GOD'S ASSISTANCE?

III. CAN GOD ANNIHILATE A CREATURE?

IV.  IS THERE A CREATURE THAT OUGHT TO BE OR ACTUALLY IS ANNIHILATED?

V.  WILL THE HEAVENLY MOVEMENT CEASE AT ANY TIME?

VI.  CAN ANY MAN KNOW WHEN THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS WILL CEASE?

VII. WILL THE ELEMENTS REMAIN WHEN THE HEAVENS CEASE TO BE IN MOTION?

VIII. WILL ACTION AND PASSION REMAIN IN THE ELEMENTS AFTER THE HEAVENS HAVE CEASED TO BE IN MOTION?

IX.  WILL PLANTS, ANIMALS AND MINERALS REMAIN AFTER END OF THE WORLD?

X.  WILL HUMAN BODIES REMAIN AFTER THE HEAVENLY MOVEMENT HAS CEASED?

QUESTION VI. ON MIRACLES

I.  CAN GOD DO ANYTHING IN CREATURES THAT IS BEYOND NATURE, AGAINST NATURE, OR CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE?

II.  CAN EVERYTHING THAT GOD DOES WITHOUT NATURAL OR CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE BE CALLED A MIRACLE?

III. CAN SPIRITUAL CREATURES WORK MIRACLES BY THEIR NATURAL POWER?

IV.  CAN GOOD ANGELS AND MEN WORK MIRACLES BY SOME GIFT OF GRACE?

V.  DO THE DEMONS ALSO CO-OPERATE IN THE WORKING OF MIRACLES?

VI.  HAVE ANGELS AND DEMONS BODIES NATURALLY UNITED TO THEM?

VII. CAN ANGELS OR DEMONS ASSUME BODIES?

VIII. CAN AN ANGEL OR DEMON BY MEANS OF AN ASSUMED BODY EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OF A LIVING BODY?

IX.  SHOULD THE WORKING OF A MIRACLE BE ATTRIBUTED TO FAITH?

X.  ARE DEMONS FORCED TO WORK MIRACLES BY SENSIBLE AND CORPOREAL OBJECTS, DEEDS OR WORDS?

ON THE POWER OF GOD