ARTICLE I

ARE THE RELATIONS PREDICATED OF GOD FROM ETERNITY REAL OR ONLY LOGICAL RELATIONS?

C.G. IV, xiv: Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. 1

WE have now to inquire into the relations attributed to God from eternity: and the first point of inquiry is whether the relations attributed to God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son be real or only logical relations. It would seem that they are not real.

             1. According to Damascene (De Fid. Orth. i, 11) in the subsistent Trinity there is something common and identical, and if there be any distinction or diversity this is in our knowledge and understanding. Now the Persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore in God the relations are merely logical.

             2. Boethius says (De Trin. iv): Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Ghost is like the relation of the same to the same. Now the relation of identity is purely logical. Therefore such are the relations of paternity and filiation.

             3. In God there is no real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16). Now much more true is it that the Father produced the Son, and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change taking place. Therefore in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son or vice versa.

             4. Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter and movement, are not attributed to God. Now of all things relation has the most unstable being, so much so that some have reckoned it among the predicables; according to the Commentator (Metaph. xi). Therefore there can be no relation in God.

             5. In creatures there is always composition of the 'relation and its subject': for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition. Now there can be no composition in God. Therefore there cannot be real relation in him.

             6. Things that are absolutely simple differ from one another by themselves. Now the divine Persons are absolutely simple. Therefore they differ by themselves and not by any relations: and consequently there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the Persons.

             7. Just as the relations are properties of the divine Persons so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now the absolute attributes have only a logical being in God. Therefore the relations in God are merely logical.

             8. A perfect thing lacks nothing (Phys. iii). Now the divine substance is most perfect, and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to its perfection. Therefore there is no need to place relations in God.

             9. Seeing that God is the first beginning and last end of things, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot be in God, but only those things to which others are reduced: thus the movable is reducible to the immovable, and the accidental to the essential; wherefore God is not moved, and nothing in him is accidental. Now everything that denotes 'to-another' being is reducible to absolute or 'to-itself' being. Therefore in God nothing is relative to another but all is absolute.

             10. By his very nature God exists of necessity. Now everything that by its very nature exists of necessity is absolute: for the relative cannot exist without its correlative. But that which by its very nature exists of necessity, does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore no real relations are in God.

             11. As stated in the preceding question (A. 9) every real relation arises from some kind of quantity or from action or passion. But there is no quantity in God: for in the words of Augustine (De Trin. v, 1) God is great without quantity. Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says (De Trin.), whence relations could arise, although there is number resulting from relations. Hence if there be real relations in God they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. Not, however, in respect of the action whereby he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question (A. 10) it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. Nor again in respect of the personal action ascribed to God, such as generation: for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action, so that it cannot result from it. Accordingly we must conclude that, if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of intelligence or volition. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real: else in God he who understands and that which he understands would be really distinct, which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each Person: for not only does the Father understand, but also the Son and the Holy Ghost: and likewise each of them is understood. Wherefore seemingly no real relation is in God.

             12. Man's natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind: for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is intelligence. If then real relations which in God are said to distinguish the Persons arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of Persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb. xi, 1).

             13. Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition: and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither therefore can relative opposition.

             On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now this multiplication is not merely logical but is real, for as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three things. Therefore the relations in God are not merely logical but real.

             Again, that which is real is constituted by something real. Now the relations in God are properties which constitute the Persons; and person signifies something real. Therefore the divine relations also must be real.

             Again, generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now in creatures generation produces a real relationship, namely that of father and son. Therefore a fortiori relations in God are real.

             I answer that those who follow the teaching of the catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. The catholic faith teaches that there are in God three Persons of one Essence. Now number results from some kind of distinction: wherefore in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature. But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence, so that it would follow that the divine Persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows then that the divine Persons are distinct only by their relations. Now this distinction cannot be merely logical, because things that are only logically distinct can be predicated of one another: thus we say that the beginning is the end, because one point in reality is both beginning and end (of a line) although there is a logical distinction. Hence it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father: because seeing that names are given in order to distinguish things, it would follow that the divine Persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be we must endeavour to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to do so fully.

             We must observe then that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes. Now in God there cannot be quantity either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity, except number arising from and presupposing relation; and unity, which regards the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely logical, as, for instance, the relation implied in the word same, as we have stated in the preceding question (A. 11). It follows then that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action: not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved (Q. vii, A. 10). Consequently real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are intelligence and volition, since sensation through being effected by means of a corporeal organ cannot be attributed to God who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi) says that in God Fatherhood is perfect, i.e. not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. Now the one who understands may have a relation to four things in understanding: namely to the thing understood, to the intelligible species whereby his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual concept. This concept differs from the three others. It differs from the thing understood, for the latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas the intellectual concept is only in the intellect. Moreover the intellectual concept is ordered to the thing understood as its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its concept thereof that it may know the thing understood. It differs from the intelligible species, because the latter which makes the intellect actual is considered as the principle of the intellect's act, since every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual: and it is made actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action. And it differs from the act of the intellect, because it is considered as the term of the action, and as something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or negative proposition. This intellectual concept in us is called properly a word, because it is this that is signified by the word of mouth. For the external utterance does not signify the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the concept of the intellect by means of which it relates to the thing. Accordingly this concept or word by which our intellect understands a thing distinct from itself originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through an act of the intellect: and it is the likeness of the thing understood. Now when the intellect understands itself this same word or concept is its progeny and likeness, that is of the intellect understanding itself. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the thing understood. Wherefore the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else. And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the essence of the intellect (for it is not the essence but a kind of passion thereof), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect's act of intelligence, since this act cannot be complete without it. If then there be an intellect whose act of intelligence is its very essence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the essence of that intellect even as it is not extrinsic to its act of intelligence. Such is the divine intellect: since in God to be and to understand are the same. Wherefore his word is not outside his essence, but co-essential with it. Accordingly in God we find the origin of one from another, namely a word proceeding, and one from whom the word proceeds without prejudice to the unity of the essence. For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real relation--either only on the part of that which originates, when it receives not the same nature as its principle, as in the creature's origination from God--or on the part of both, when to wit that which originates attains to the nature of its principle, as when a man is begotten, and a real relation results between father and son. Now in God the Word is co-essential with its principle, as we have proved. It follows then that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the Speaker.

             Reply to the First Objection. In the divine Persons there is essential unity, but there is a logical distinction by reason of the relation which does not differ from the Essence really but only logically, as we shall state further on.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Relation in the divine Persons bears a certain likeness to the relation of identity if we consider the unity of Essence: whereas if we consider the origin of one (Person) from another in the same nature we must conclude that these relations are real.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Just as God undergoes no change in producing his creature, so is he not changed in the production of his Word. Yet the creature does not attain to the divine essence and nature, wherefore the divine essence is not communicated to the creature. For this reason the relation of God to the creature does not result from anything in God but only with respect to something done on the part of the creature. On the other hand the Word is produced as co-essential with God himself; wherefore God is related to his Word in respect of something in God and not only with respect to something on the part of the Word. For then is there a real relation on one side and not on the other, when the cause of the relation is on one side and not on the other: for instance, the relation between the knowable object and knowledge results from the act of the knower and not from anything that he may know.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relation has a most unstable existence, if this belongs to it alone: but it is not so in God, for in him relation has no other existence than that of the substance, as we shall show further on in the next Article. Hence the argument fails.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. This argument considers the real relation whose being is distinct from the substance in which it is. But this is not so in the case in point, as we shall show further on.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since the divine Persons differ by their relations only, they do not differ otherwise than by themselves, for the relations are the very Persons who subsist, as we shall prove (A. 4).

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The essential attributes which are properties of the essence are in God really and not logically. For God's goodness is something real, and so is his wisdom and so forth, although they are not distinct from his essence otherwise than logically: and the same applies to the relations, as we shall prove further on.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. God's substance would be imperfect were there anything in it distinct therefrom. But in God relation is his substance, as we shall prove further on: wherefore the objection fails.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. The movable and the accidental are reducible to something previous as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is imperfect: and movement is the act of what is imperfect. But relation sometimes follows from the perfection of a thing, as in the case of the intellect, since it follows the operation which is its perfection. Hence the divine perfection does not hinder us from ascribing relations to God, as it forbids us to ascribe movement and accident to him.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. That which necessarily exists of itself is not related to anything extraneous, but nothing prevents it from being related to something within it. Wherefore as it is not said to be necessary through another, it is said to be necessary of itself.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Real relation in God follows the action of his intellect, not as though this real relation were that of the one who understands to what he understands, but to his word: for the word and not the thing understood proceeds from him who understands.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although natural reason is able to succeed in proving that God is intelligence, it is not able to discover adequately his mode of understanding. Just as we are able to know that God is but not what he is: even so we are able to know that God understands, but not how he understands. Now to understand by conceiving a word belongs to the mode of understanding: wherefore reason cannot prove this adequately, but it can form a kind of conjecture by comparison with what takes place in us.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. In other kinds of opposition one of the extremes is always by way of being imperfect or non-existent, or with an admixture of non-entity: since negation excludes being and privation is a negation, and of two contraries one always includes a privation. Hence other kinds of opposition cannot be in God, whereas relative opposition can because on neither side does it imply imperfection.