ARTICLE V

WOULD THE HOLY GHOST STILL BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SON IF HE DID NOT PROCEED FROM HIM?

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Ghost would still be distinguished from the Son if he did not proceed from him: and seemingly he would.

             1. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 13, 15) says that the Persons differ in origin in that one has an origin and the other not: or if they have an origin, in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other. Now the origin of the Holy Ghost differs from that of the Son, since the Holy Ghost proceeds as spirated, but the Son as begotten. Therefore the Holy Ghost would differ personally from the Son even if he did not proceed from him, on account of the difference of origin.

             2. Anslem says (De Process. Sp. S. ii): The Son and the Holy Ghost have their being from the Father, but each in a different way; one by birth, the other by procession, so that thus they are distinct from each other, and afterwards he adds: For even if for no other reason were the Son and Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would distinguish them. Therefore even if the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, he would be a distinct Person from the Son on account of the different manner of origin.

             3. The divine Persons are distinct from one another for the reason that one is from another according to a particular manner of origin. Now in God one Person proceeds according to one manner of origin: and consequently if there be two manners of origin there will be two proceeding Persons, even though one proceed not from the other. Now it is agreed that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father according to different ways of origin. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct Persons even if we suppose that one does not proceed from the other.

             4. No hypostasis can possibly proceed in respect of one nature by more than one procession, since a hypostasis receives its nature by proceeding: thus the Son has two nativities corresponding to his two natures. Now in God there are two processions, one in respect of nativity, the other in respect of spiration. Consequently it is impossible that one and the same Person proceed according to these two modes of procession. Therefore the Persons who proceed by these two processions must needs be distinct. Therefore the Holy Ghost would still be personally distinct from the Son even if he did not proceed from him.

             5. The eternal relations in God are neither accidental nor assistant, but are subsistent Persons. Consequently whatever causes plurality of relations in God suffices for a distinction of Persons. Now specific diversity of actions suffices for a diversity of relations. Thus from the action of governing follows the relation of Lordship, while from the action of begetting follows another relation which is Paternity. Even so different relations follow from specifically different quantities: thus the relation double results from the number two and treble from the number three. Now in God processions are indicated as actions: wherefore if there are two processions there must be two relations resulting from the processions and consequently two Persons: so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

             6. Procession is more perfect in God than in creatures: therefore the Apostle says (Eph. iii, 15) that of the heavenly Father all paternity in heaven and earth is named. Now in creatures procession suffices to distinguish the proceeding supposits: thus distinct men are born by distinct processions or births. Therefore in God a difference of procession suffices to distinguish the divine Persons, namely the Son and the Holy Ghost.

             7. Procession by way of nature is not the same as procession by way of love. Now the name Son designates a Person proceeding by way of nature, while the name Holy Ghost indicates a Person proceeding by way of love. Therefore even if the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son he would be distinct from him for the sole reason that their processions are different.

             8. In the Father there are active generation and active spiration. Now generation and spiration distinguish the Persons in God. Therefore as the Son proceeds from the Father as a distinct Person by the fact that he is begotten of the Father; even so the Holy Ghost by the fact that he is spirated by the Father proceeds, as a distinct Person, from the Father. Thus then there are three Persons in God even if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son.

             9. Anselm (De Process. Sp. S.) says that the Holy Ghost is as perfectly from the Father as from the Father and the Son. Now he proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from both. Therefore he would still be distinct from both even if he proceeded from the Father alone.

             10. The Father is an adequate and perfect principle. Now the perfect principle of a thing needs not another in order to produce perfectly that whereof it is the principle. Consequently the Father needs not the Son in order to produce a third Person, namely the Holy Ghost. Therefore granted that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, there would still be three distinct Persons in God.

             11. The removal of that which follows does not of necessity involve the removal of what proceeds: thus if we remove man we do not thereby remove animal. Now three things are predicated of the divine Persons, to wit procession, communion and kinship. The notion of procession precedes the notion of community as also the notion of kinship. But there would be neither communion nor kinship in God without plurality of Persons multiplied by procession. Consequently if we remove communion and kinship from God procession still remains. Hence even if there were not community of Father and Son in spirating the Holy Ghost, nor kinship of the Holy Ghost to the Son resulting from his proceeding from him: there would still remain procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father, and thus there would still be three distinct Persons, namely two proceeding and one from whom they proceed.

             12. We speak of properties, relations and notions as being in God. Now property logically precedes relation or notion, since the Persons are first understood as constituted with their personal properties and afterwards as related to one another and beknown. Moreover apart from the relations the properties still remain which constitute the Persons. Therefore even if the Holy Ghost were not related to the Son as having existence from him, the Son and Holy Ghost would still be distinct Persons by reason of their properties.

             13. Filiation is the property of the Son constituting his Person: and procession is the property of the Holy Ghost constituting his Person. But Filiation is not procession nor is it opposed thereto relatively. Therefore even if we entirely remove relation of the Holy Ghost to the Son, the Son and Holy Ghost will still be distinct Persons.

             14. Many, the Greeks for instance, have denied that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and yet acknowledged three Persons in God. Therefore even if the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, he would still be distinct from him.

             15. Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 11) says: We assert that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father but not from the Son: but we call him the Spirit of the Son. Consequently even if he proceed not from the Son he is still the Spirit of the Son and therefore distinct from him.

             16. The Greek saints in speaking of the Son and Holy Ghost in comparison with the material world, say that they are like two rays of the Father's splendour; as two streams of the Godhead that is in the Father; and as two flowers of the Father's nature. Now rays, streams and flowers are mutually distinct even if one does not proceed from the other. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost are in like manner distinct from each other.

             On the contrary, Boethius (De Trin. vi) says that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. But if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son there will not be a relation of the Holy Ghost to the Son. Therefore he would not be personally distinct from him.

             Again, Anselm (De Process. Sp. S. ii) says that the Father and Son are in every respect one except in so far as they are distinguished by relative opposition: and this by reason of the unity of essence. Now the Son and Holy Ghost are likewise one in essence. Therefore they are one in every respect, except in those things wherein relative opposition makes them distinct. But if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son they would nowise be distinct by reason of relative opposition: and consequently they would in no way be distinct from each other.

             Again, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 14) says that in the Trinity there can be but one Person who proceeds from only one. Now if the Holy Ghost be not from the Son: then like the Son he will be from one Person only, namely the Father: and consequently the Son and Holy Ghost will be but one Person.

             Again (ibid.) he says that in God there can be but one Person from whom no other Person proceeds. But if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son, just as he has no Person proceeding from him, so neither has the Son: and thus the Son and the Holy Ghost will be only one Person.

             Again, wherever persons are distinguished by relations the persons thus distinct must be related to each other. Now in God the Persons are distinguished by relations: since they cannot be distinguished by anything absolute. Therefore in God there is no distinction where there is no relation. But if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son he is not related to him: and consequently is not personally distinct from him.

             Again, of two opposites the one does not differentiate its subject otherwise than from the subject of the other: thus whiteness does not differentiate a thing except from that which is black. Therefore a relation does not distinguish its subject except from the subject of the opposite relation. Now the relation proper to the Holy Ghost and whereby he is a distinct Person is procession. Consequently he is not personally distinct save from the Person in whom is the opposite relation which is active spiration: and this is not in the Son unless the Holy Ghost proceeds from him. Therefore if the Holy Ghost be not from the Son, he is not personally distinct from him.

             Again, in God two things belong in common to relation, one from whom another is and one who is from another. Now he from whom another is is not personally distinct by reason of a different mode of origin, since from the same person of the Father is the Son by generation, and the Holy Ghost by procession. Neither then is he who is from another by spiration (i.e. the Holy Ghost) distinct from him who is from another by generation (i.e. from the Son).

             Again, Richard (De Trin. vi) states the difference between the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Ghost in the following terms: Communion of majesty, so to speak, was the cause of the one's origin, namely the Son's; communion of love was the cause of the other's origin, namely the Holy Ghost's. Now the procession of the Holy Ghost would not be caused by communion of love, unless the Father and the Son loved each other, and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed from them. Therefore if the Holy Ghost proceeded not from the Son there would be no difference between the procession of the Holy Ghost and the generation of the Son, and consequently neither would the Holy Ghost be personally distinct from the Son.

             I answer that if we take careful note of the statements of the Greeks we shall find that they differ from us in words rather than in thought. Thus they will not grant that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, either through ignorance, obstinacy or sophistry or some other cause, no matter what, and yet they acknowledge that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, and that he is of the Father through the Son, which would not be true if the procession of the Holy Ghost were entirely independent of the Son. Hence we may infer that even the Greeks themselves understand that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some connection with the Son. But I say that if the Holy Ghost be not from the Son, and if the Son be in no way a principle of the Holy Ghost's procession, then it is impossible that the Holy Ghost be a distinct Person from the Son, and further that the procession of the Holy Ghost cannot possibly differ from the generation of the Son.

             This will be evident if we consider those things in reference to which various writers explain the distinction between the divine Persons. Thus some refer the distinction of the Persons to the relations; others, to the mode of origin; others, to the essential attributes. If then we consider the manner of distinguishing the Persons by the relations, it is evident that the Holy Ghost cannot be personally distinct from the Son if he does not proceed from him. First, because things cannot be properly distinct from one another otherwise than either by reason of matter, i.e. by a difference of quantity, or by reason of form. Now distinction in respect of material and quantitative division is to be found in corporeal things wherein there are several individuals of the same species by reason of the specific form being in various parts of matter according as it is divided quantitatively: wherefore if there be an individual consisting of all the matter wherein the specific form can be, there cannot be more than one individual of that species, as Aristotle proves (De Coelo et Mundo i). Now this kind of distinction is utterly foreign to God, seeing that in him there is neither matter nor corporeal quantity. Things that have a common, and at least generic, nature, cannot be distinct from one another by reason of a difference of forms except on account of some kind of opposition. Hence we find that the differences of any genus are in opposition to one another: and consequently it is impossible and even inconceivable that there be any distinction save one of opposition in the divine nature, seeing that it is one not only in genus but also in number. Wherefore since the divine Persons are distinct from one another, this must be on account of a relative opposition, in that no other opposition is possible in God. This is sufficiently evident, since no matter how much certain things may differ in definition, for instance the essential attributes, they do not distinguish the Persons, since they are not mutually opposed to one another. Thus again several notions are to be found in one divine Person, for the reason that they are not opposed to one another: for instance, in the Father there are innascibility, paternity and active spiration. For there do we first find distinction where first there is relative opposition: for instance, in this that there are Father and Son. Accordingly in God where there is no relative opposition there can be no real distinction and this is a distinction of Persons. Now if the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, there will be no opposition between them and the Holy Ghost will not be a distinct Person from the Son. Nor can it be said that for this distinction opposition of affirmation and negation is enough: because this kind of opposition follows and does not cause distinction, since that which already exists is distinct from another by something inherent either substantial or accidental: whereas that this is not that, is a result of their being distinct. Likewise it is evident that the truth of a negative statement about things in existence is based on the truth of a positive statement: thus the truth of this negation, An African is not white is based on the truth of this affirmation, An African is black: wherefore all differences in respect of affirmation and negation must be reducible to a difference of positive opposition. Consequently the primary reason for the distinction between the Son and Holy Ghost cannot be that the one is begotten and not spirated, the other spirated and not begotten, unless we presuppose the distinction between begetting and spirating and between Son and Holy Ghost by reason of an opposition between two affirmations.

             Secondly, because according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 2) whatsoever is said of God absolutely is common to the three Persons. Whence it follows that distinction between the divine Persons can only be in respect of what is said relatively: for these two predicaments are applicable to God. Now the primary relative distinction to be found in God is that between one from whom is another and one who is from another. And if one of these must be subdivided, namely one that is from another, it must be subdivided by something that belongs to it per se. For as the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. viii) it is against the rules of subdivision to subdivide a thing in reference to that which is accidental to it and does not belong to it per se: thus, if one were to say animals are divided into rational and irrational, and irrational animals are divided into white and black, the division would not be right, because since things that are accidental do not combine to make that which is simply one, the ultimate species resulting from many differences would not be one simply. Accordingly, if in God he who is from another be distinguished or subdivided, this must be in reference to differences per se, namely that one of those who is from another be from the other: and this involves a difference of processions, which is indicated when we say that one proceeds by generation, the other by spiration. Hence Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 10) distinguishes the Person proceeding from another thus--one who has another proceeding from him and one who has not.

             Thirdly, because whereas in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, paternity alone constitutes the Person of the Father: wherefore it is said to be a personal property or relation: while active spiration, being adventitious, so to speak, to the already constituted Person, is the relation of a Person but not a personal relation. Hence it is plain that active generation or paternity, in the logical order, precedes active spiration. Consequently in like manner filiation which corresponds to paternity as its opposite must in some order be presupposed to passive spiration which is the procession of the Holy Ghost: and this must mean--either that passive spiration is understood as supervening to filiation in the same Person, just as active spiration supervenes to paternity, and thus the same Person will be spirated and begotten just as the same Person begets and spirates--or that there is some other order between filiation and passive spiration. But there is no order in God other than that of nature, in respect of which one is from another, as Augustine says (De Trin. et Unit. xiii). It follows then that either the Son and the Holy Ghost are one Person, or the Holy Ghost is from the Son.

             We shall come to the same conclusion if we consider the distinction of the divine Persons in reference to their origin, but not to their relations of origin. This is evident for the following reasons. First, if we consider a property of the divine nature, we shall see how impossible it is that there be distinction between the divine Persons unless one originate from another, and that the fact that two originate from one does not cause a personal distinction. This is made plain if we observe how various things are distinguished from one another. In the material world where, as stated above, it is possible for things to be multiplied by a division of matter and quantity, two individuals of the same species can be on an equal footing, thus two quantitative parts may be equal: but where the primary difference is one of form it is impossible for two individuals to be on a par with each other. For as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii) forms are like numbers in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of unity: and formal differences consist in a certain order of perfection. Thus the species of the plant differs from that of the stone in that it has life in addition: and the species of the dumb animal from that of the plant in that it has sensation, and the species of man from that of the dumb animal in that reason is added to it. Wherefore in immaterial things which cannot be multiplied by a division of matter, there cannot be plurality without some kind of order. Thus in created immaterial substances there is order of perfection according as one angel is in nature more perfect than another. And as some philosophers thought that every imperfect nature is created by a more perfect one, they therefore contended that in separate substances there cannot be multiplication otherwise than by reason of cause and effect. The true Faith, however, does not hold this, since we believe that the various orders of immaterial substances were produced according to the disposition of divine wisdom. Now whereas in God there cannot be order of perfection, as the Arians contended, saying that the Father is greater than the Son, and each of them greater than the Holy Ghost, we must conclude that plurality in the divine Persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than according to the sole order of origin: so that, to wit, the Son be from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Son. For if the Holy Ghost were not from the Son, they would be equally referred to the Father in point of origin: wherefore either they would not be two Persons, or there would be order of perfection between them as the Arians pretended, or there would be a distinction of matter between them: which is impossible. Hilary follows this line of argument (De Synod.) when he says that to assert that in God there are two who are unbegotten, i.e. who do not derive existence from another, is to posit two Gods: since if multiplication be not by the order of origin, it must be by the order of nature: so that the same argument avails if we do not acknowledge order of origin between the Son and Holy Ghost.

             Secondly, because that which proceeds naturally from one must itself be one: since nature is always confined to one effect: whereas things which proceed from the operation of the will may be many, although they proceed from one: thus from one God a diversity of creatures proceeded according to his will. Now it is certain that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, and not through his will as the Arians maintained: and this because, as Hilary says (De Synod.), that which proceeds from its source naturally is of the same nature as its source, but that which proceeds according to the direction of a will, is not of the same nature as he from whom it proceeds, but such as he wishes it to be. Now the Son is of the same nature as the Father: while creatures are such as God wished them to be. Hence the Son is from the Father naturally, and creatures proceed from him according to his will. In like manner the Holy Ghost is of the same nature as the Father, for he is not a creature as Arius and Macedonius asserted. Wherefore he must proceed from the Father naturally: for which reason he is said by Athanasius and other holy men to be the natural spirit of the Father and the Son. Consequently it is impossible that the Son and Holy Ghost proceed from the Father except in suchwise that from the Father alone one alone, i.e. the Son, proceeds, and from the Father and Son inasmuch as they are one the one Holy Ghost proceeds.

             Thirdly, because as Richard (De Trin. v, 9) proves, there cannot be an indirect procession in God. Because since each divine Person dwells in the other, each must be ordered immediately to the other. But if the Son and Holy Ghost were from the Father without the Holy Ghost being from the Son, there would not be immediate order between the Son and the Holy Ghost, since they would not be ordered to each other except through the one from whom they proceed; like two brothers begotten of the same father. Hence it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father as distinct Persons, unless one proceed from the other.

             Again, if we consider the distinction of the Persons in reference to the essential attributes we shall come to the same conclusion. First, because in this respect we say that the Son proceeds by way of the nature, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will: and the procession of nature is the source and origin of every other kind of procession, for whatsoever things have their being through art and the will or the intellect, proceed from things that are according to nature. Hence Richard (De Trin. vi, 17) says that without doubt of all modes of procession the first and chief place belongs to the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father: since unless the Father had preceded neither of the other Persons would have had any foundation for his existence. Secondly, this is evident if we realise that the Son proceeds by an intellectual procession as the Word, and the Holy Ghost by a procession of the will as Love. For it is both impossible and inconceivable that an object can be loved that has not first been understood by the intellect, wherefore in the intellectual nature all love proceeds from a word. Thirdly, it is evident, if we say with Athanasius that the Holy Ghost is the life-giving breath of the Godhead. Because all vital movement and action is directed by an intelligence, unless the contrary occur on account of an imperfection of nature. Hence from all that has been said we infer that the Holy Ghost would not be a distinct Person from the Son if he proceeded not from him, nor would spiration be distinct from generation.

             Reply to the First Objection. The Holy Ghost is personally distinct from the Son in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other: but this very difference of origin is due to the Son being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Ghost is from both the Father and the Son. Richard of S. Victor makes this plain when he says (De Trin. v, 20): Observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons producing, in that the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Anselm is quite correct in saying that the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct from each other by this alone that they proceed in different ways: but as we have already shown, they cannot proceed in different ways unless the Holy Ghost proceed from the Son: wherefore if it be denied that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, it must likewise be denied that he is distinct from the Son. However, it is Anselm's intention (in his work on the Procession of the Holy Ghost) first to indicate the points in which we agree with those who deny that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son and yet assert that he is a distinct Person from him. Wherefore the words quoted from Anselm are in the nature of an argumentative hypothesis rather than a statement of the truth.

             Reply to the Third Objection. If there are two modes of origin in God it is right to infer that there are two Persons who proceed: but as we have shown there cannot be two modes of origin except by reason of the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Son.

             The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. There need not be as many subsistent Persons in God as there are relations: since in the one Person of the Father there are two relations, namely paternity whereby he is referred to the Son, and common spiration whereby he is referred to the Holy Ghost. For the relation of paternity constitutes a subsistent person; whereas the relation of common spiration is not a property constituting a Person, but a relation inherent to a subsistent Person. Thus if two relations result from generation and procession it does not follow that therefore there are only two subsistent Persons: since one might reply that there are not two processions unless one of the proceeding Persons proceed from the other, as we have already stated.

             From this may be gathered the Reply to the Sixth Objection.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. As already explained, that which proceeds as love must proceed from that which proceeds by way of nature.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Spiration distinguishes the Holy Ghost from the Spirator, just as generation distinguishes the Begotten from the Begetter: but it does not follow that the Spirated is distinct from the Begotten, since both Spirator and Begetter are the same Person. Nor does it follow from the fact that the same thing can proceed by two processions, that processions in God cannot differ except by reason of one proceeding Person being from another, as proved above (A. 4).

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as perfectly as from the Father and Son: yet he is distinct from the Son, not because he proceeds from the Father, but because he proceeds from the Son.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Father is the sufficient principle of the Holy Ghost, nor does he need another principle for the Holy Ghost's spiration: because in spirating the Holy Ghost the Son is not a distinct principle from the Father, but is one principle with him.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although procession is logically prior to communion, as communion is to property: nevertheless in this particular kind of procession, namely that of the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love, communion and kinship of Father and Son is not logically prior to communion: wherefore it does not follow that if we remove communion procession remains: thus animal is prior to man logically, whereas rational animal is not.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God property, relation and notion are one and the same in reality: except that there are but three properties, to wit paternity, filiation and procession, while there are four relations, common spiration being added to the three aforesaid relations, since it is a relation but not a property, inasmuch as it belongs not to one Person but to two. The notions are five in number, since they include innascibility which is not a relation but a notion, inasmuch as by it the Father is known: besides which it is a property since it belongs to the Father alone, but not a personal property, since it does not constitute the Person of the Father. Accordingly there can be no real order between the properties, relations and notions since the same thing is identified with all three. But if we consider their order in the light of their respective definitions, then notion precedes relation logically in the same way as one thing is prior to another from our point of view: while relation and property precede in the order of real priority. If, however, we seek the order between relation and property, we can find no such order in creatures: because some properties are relations, but not all, and in like manner some relations are properties, but not all. If, however, we consider property in something absolute, then property precedes in the order whereby the absolute precedes the relative. In the divine Persons relation precedes property logically: because as the property is that which belongs to one alone, property logically presupposes distinction: and in God nothing is distinct otherwise than by reason of a relation. Wherefore relation which is the principle of distinction in God is logically prior to property. It must be observed, however, that neither property nor relation as such are defined as constituting a Person. Because since a Person is an individual substance of rational nature, that which is outside substance cannot constitute a Person: wherefore in created things properties and relations are not constituent of, but are incidental to the persons already constituted: whereas in God the relation itself which is also a property is the divine essence: so that by this very fact that which is constituted thereby is a Person: inasmuch as unless paternity were the divine essence, the name Father could by no means signify a Person, but only a relative accident of a Person, as in the case of human persons. Hence paternity inasmuch as it is the divine essence constitutes a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature; inasmuch as it is a relation it distinguishes; inasmuch as it is a property it belongs to one Person only and not to another; inasmuch as it is a notion it is the principle whereby that Person is known. Accordingly in the logical order, the first is that which constitutes the Person, the second is that which distinguishes it, the third is the property, and the fourth is the notion.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although filiation is not opposed relatively to procession, nevertheless the Person proceeding is opposed relatively to the Son; and this is the reason why procession is distinguished from filiation.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Though the Greeks do not acknowledge that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, they believe that the Son in some way is the principle whence the Holy Ghost originates. This is plain from the fact that they state that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that he is the Spirit of the Son. And yet a statement may imply a contradiction, whereas one who is ignorant may grant it explicitly: and thus an unintelligent person might say that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son and yet is distinct from the Son.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. By acknowledging that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son Damascene implies that in some way the Holy Ghost originates from the Son.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Holy Ghost and the Son are said to be two streams inasmuch as both proceed from the Father. Yet the Greek doctors say that the Son is the fount of the Holy Ghost, but that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from him. The same applies to the other comparisons.

THE END

The Mayflower Press, Plymouth. William Brendon & Son Ltd.

Footnotes

   Ad Paulinam, Ep. cxlvii.

   The Liber de Causis ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrée (1076-1154) is an abridged translation of the Institutio Theologica of Proclus, a neoplatonic philosopher of the fifth century.

   Alias, An omne quod est sit bonum.

   Cf. Sum. Th. I, Q. iii,A. 5, ad 1: III, Q. lxxvii, A. 1, ad 2.

   Alias, An omne quod est sit bonum.

   Ibid.

   Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. 2.

   Cf. Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 7, ad 1.

   Contra Ep. Manich. quam vocant, Fund. xv.

   Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, ii.

   Fulgentius.

   Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 3, ad 2.

   Myst. Theol. i.

   See Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxix, A. 4, obj. 4.

   See above, Q. ii, A. 4.

   De Anima ii.

   Trismegistus, Poemand. iv.

   Sum. Th. I, Q. xciii, A. 8.

   Supra Q. ix, A. 2: Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 3, ad 2.

   Epist. Contra eos qui dicunt Sp. S. esse creatum.

   Epist. Contra eos qui Spiritum Sanctum dicunt creaturam.

   See Sum. Th. I, Q. xiv, A. 3.

   Sum. Th. I-II, Q. xxvi, A. 2, ad 3.

   Ibid., Q. xxviii, A. 1.

   Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii.

   Luke iv, 18.

   For the text of the Acts see Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxvi, A. 2, obj. 4.

   Third Council of Constantinople, A.D. 680-1.

   The full text is: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me . . . he hath sent me, etc.

   See above, Q. viii, A, 1.

On Spiritual Creatures

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

On Spiritual Creatures

(DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS)

Translation from the Latin

with an introduction,

By

MARY C. FITZPATRICK, Ph.D.

in collaboration with

JOHN J. WELLMUTH, S.J., Ph.D.

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

1949

             Nihil Obstat

   Gerard Smith, S.J., censor deputatus

   Milwaukiae, die 25 mensis Martii, 1949

             Imprimi Potest

   Leo D. Sullivan, S.J., Praep. Provinc. Prov.

   Chicagiensis, die 28 mensis Martii, 1949

             Imprimatur

   Moyses E. Kiley

   Archiepiscopus Milwaukiensis

   Milwaukiae, die 5 mensis Aprilis, 1949

COPYRIGHT

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1949

MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION

No. 5

Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation

EDITORIAL BOARD

THE REV. GERARD SMITH, S.J., PH.D., chairman

CHARLES J. O'NEIL, L.S.M., PH.D.

THE REV. MICHAEL V. MURRAY, S.J., PH.D.

THE REV. RICHARD E. ARNOLD, S.J., PH.D.

DAVID HOST, A.M.

Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation are published at Marquette University by the Marquette University Press,

1131 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin.

CONTENTS

Prefatory Remarks

Translator's Introduction

 I.  The Mediaeval Disputation

 II.  The Structural Form of a Disputed Question

 III. Date and Place of composition of De Spiritualibus Creaturis

 IV.  The value of the Disputed Questions

 V.  Bibliography

Article I Whether a spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

Article II Can a spiritual substance be united to a body?

Article III Is the spiritual substance which is the human soul, united to the body through a medium?

Article IV Is the whole soul in every part of the body?

Article V Is there any created spiritual substance that is not united to a body?

Article VI Is a spiritual substance united to a heavenly body?

Article VII Is a spiritual substance united to an ethereal body?

Article VIII Do all angels differ in species from one another?

Article IX Is the possible intellect one in all men?

Article X Is the agent intellect one intellect belonging to all men?

Article XI Are the powers of the soul the same as the essence of the soul?

PREFATORY REMARKS

THIS translation was originally undertaken at the request of Mother Margaret Reilly, R.S.C.J., president of Barat College of the Sacred Heart in Lake Forest, Illinois. Its completion is due in great part to her kind encouragement but most of all to the unfailing and unstinted work of my collaborator, Father John J. Wellmuth, S.J., formerly chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago and now filling a like post at Xavier University in Cincinnati. To him I am greatly indebted for numerous elucidations of the thought of St. Thomas, much helpful criticism, and innumerable suggestions for more felicitous turns of phrase. During the time of our work together the entire manuscript was revised and every effort was made to keep the style of the translation as close to that of the original as the exigencies of the English language permit.

             The translation has been made from the critical text of Father Leo Keeler. That editor's notes have also been incorporated. The arrangement of these has been faithfully preserved, including the references at the beginning of the notes on each Article to other works of St. Thomas as well as to those of other Christian writers and ancient or mediaeval philosophers where the same problems as are handled in the Articles are also discussed. All other references, after being carefully checked and corrected occasionally where typographical errors had occurred in the Keeler text, have been left within brackets in the body of the translation. English words within parentheses owe their presence to the parentheses used in Father Keeler's text. Wherever Latin words occur in the body of the translation, they have been taken from the Latin text to clarify the translation where that seemed advisable.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

ON SPIRITUAL CREATURES

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

I. The Mediaeval Disputation

Since De Spiritualibus Creaturis belongs to that form to which the Scholastic philosophers applied the name disputation, it would seem well to examine in some detail the origin, the nature and the use of the disputation as a teaching device in the mediaeval universities.

             During the Middle Ages methods of teaching were largely conditioned by a paucity of texts, for printing was as yet unknown and the only available books were in the form of manuscripts that had been laboriously copied by hand. These could only be obtained with the greatest difficulty either through purchase or rental. Consequently the master was forced to read (legere) those texts he wanted his students to know. During the course of such reading not all the thoughts or the implications of the passage were clearly understood. In order that he might insure his pupil's having a firm grasp of the thought, the master frequently made explanations of difficult passages either by a paraphrase or by still further exposition of the thought. At times the passage that was being read might raise a problem in a student's mind. In that case the student was led to ask questions or, failing that, the master himself might raise the issue that he wanted discussed, guide the pupil toward the desired solution or, if a pupil utterly failed to grasp the point, himself give the explanation or proof. As students advanced in knowledge and attainments, a capable master would often pose questions on dogmatic or moral theology, canon law, or liturgy. These could take the simplest form, that of question and answer, or the form of question that was known as a disputation (disputatio ordinaria; quaestio disputata).

             By the thirteenth century the disputation had been entirely separated from the interpretation of any text and was a separate and public part of the master's lesson. The question or the thesis to be disputed was set in advance by the master who was to conduct the disputation. It, together with its date, was announced in the other schools of the faculty in order that the other faculty and student members of the university might attend. Usually the subjects chosen by each master varied, because ordinarily each professor held but a small number of disputations annually. When, as St. Thomas did, a master held disputations every two weeks or even weekly, he could take a central theme as, for instance, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, which would form the material for a more or less long series of disputations. His Disputed Questions vary in length from the five that comprise De Unione Verbi Incarnati to the one hundred twenty-four that compose De Veritate.

             On the day of a disputation all lessons given by the other masters and bachelors of the faculty stopped. Only the master who was giving the disputation on that day had a short lesson for his students before the others arrived. Once the visitors were assembled, the disputation began. It was held under the master's direction although he himself did not directly dispute. His bachelor took on the role of respondent or defender of the thesis, thus beginning his apprenticeship in such exercises. Objections to the thesis were presented by the other masters and bachelors who were present and, if there were time, by students. The bachelor answered the arguments and, if necessary, the master came to his assistance, although the bachelor was meant to bear the brunt of sustaining the argument. The objections were not raised according to any order that had been established beforehand. When all objections were in and answered, the actual disputation was at an end.

             Notes on the proceedings were kept which, however, at the end of the disputation still presented but a disordered and chaotic mass of material. In order to give it a logical form the master worked over the arguments pro and con, reducing them to a definite form; then he "determined" the truth of the matter; that is, gave a definite form to the views on the subject that he proposed henceforth to hold. Only a master had the right to "determine" a question.

             The determination took place at the first meeting of the class after the actual disputation. First, the material was coordinated as far as possible in logical order by presenting all the objections that had been advanced against the thesis. These were followed by the arguments in favor of the thesis. From that point he passed on to a further exposition of the question, the answer (responsio), which formed the central and essential part of the determination, wherein he definitely formulated his own views on the question. This in turn was succeeded by an individual answer to each objection that had been advanced against the thesis. If there was any opportunity to do so, this in turn was followed by supplementary information. Once "determined", the matter of the disputation was committed to writing by the master.

             St. Thomas conducted hundreds of such disputations, which collectively form his Quaestiones Disputatae. Among them are to be found his disputations De Veritate, De Potentia, De Malo, De Unione Verbi Incarnati, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, De Anima and De Virtutibus.

II. The Structural Form of a Disputed Question

De Spiritualibus Creaturis belongs to that group of St. Thomas' works which is known as Quaestiones Disputatae or Disputed Questions. While all share a common form, the following remarks apply specifically to the series of Disputed Questions that deals with spiritual creatures.

             This series breaks down the broad general topic "spiritual creatures" into eleven subdivisions, each of which handles one particular aspect of the subject. These are known as "articles." Each begins with the posing of a question about spiritual creatures; for instance, Article I puts the following question: "Is spiritual substance composed of matter and form?" An affirmative answer follows immediately in this Article, although this is not the case with regard to all the articles. The answer in Article II, for example, is made in the negative. Objections to the thesis are then brought forward. These are based on statements that are taken from the Bible, the works of the Church Fathers, or the writings of pagan and Christian philosophers. Aristotle is frequently cited, invariably under the name of "the Philosopher." Averroes, the Arabian commentator on the works of Aristotle, is also often referred to, but almost always as "the Commentator." In Article I twenty-five such objections are raised. These in turn are followed by fourteen arguments in support of the thesis.

             The most significant part of an article is, however, the "answer", where St. Thomas resolves the objections to the thesis and, by stating his own views on the matter, gives a definitive form to the doctrine that he holds and proposes to teach. The last part of the answer is always devoted to a point by point rebuttal of each of the objections that have been made against the thesis. As in the case of the objections, views are supported by quotations from ecclesiastical and philosophical writings, so also in the rebuttal recourse is had to the same sort of writings.

III. Date and Place of Composition of De Spiritualibus Creaturis

The question of the date and place of composition of De Spiritualibus Creaturis confronts the investigator with many difficulties. The problem is an important one, for by its ultimate solution differing data concerning St. Thomas' life and the development of his thought can be fixed. During the first three decades of this present century a healthy controversy raged on the point, yet even now the matter in all its aspects has by no means been conclusively settled, the evidence thus far assembled being subject to more or less subjective interpretation.

             The arguments whereby the chief figures in the controversy support their various positions are based on 1) old catalogues of the works of St. Thomas, 2) apparent interrelations between De Spiritualibus Creaturis and others of the Quaestiones Disputatae, 3) various bits of internal evidence within the work itself.

             The data to be gathered from the catalogues is highly unsatisfactory. The official catalogue of the proceedings of St. Thomas' canonization divides the Quaestiones Disputatae into three groups: 1) those written in Paris (1256-1259); 2) those composed in Italy (1260-1268); 3) those written in Paris during the Saint's second stay there (1268-1272). Only one work is mentioned by name for each period, this name being followed by the cryptic phrase et ultra. Consequently there is no definite information about De Spiritualibus Creaturis to be gleaned from this source. As for the catalogue compiled by Ptolemy of Lucca, Ptolemy definitely places the work as having been written in Italy in the time of Pope Clement IV (1265-1268). Unfortunately this information is not conclusive, as Ptolemy is notorious for the unreliability of his information. Other catalogues, such as those of Bernardo Guido, Pierre Roget, Louis of Valladolid, St. Antoninus, John of Colonna, and the Tabula Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum include our work by name but furnish no further information, while that of William of Tocco omits any mention of it. Accordingly the catalogues are of little or no help. Nor in the lists of St. Thomas' works that were circulated by the booksellers of Paris during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries do we find much to aid us. They mention our work, but follow no fixed order nor do they make any attempt to indicate its date or its place of composition.

             Nor does the second type of evidence supply any more definite information. In several articles of De Spiritualibus Creaturis St. Thomas sets forth his teaching on the soul, a subject that is discussed more fully in De Anima. This circumstance caused Father Mandonnet to assert that our work was composed prior to De Anima and to note what he termed a particularly close correspondence between portions of the two. In this regard, however, Father Keeler remarks that there is no explicit reference in either work to the other. In the place already cited Father Mandonnet also maintains that Siger of Brabant consulted De Spiritualibus Creaturis before writing his De Anima Intellectiva (q. 7, ad fin.) in 1271, but, as Father Keeler again notes, the information on which this statement is made is not entirely certain.

             Father Glorieux used the aforesaid similarity between our work and De Anima to build up his theory that De Spiritualibus Creaturis had been composed at Viterbo in Italy. In his view St. Thomas, not having time to edit this series of questions before leaving Italy, brought them along to Paris with him where, after working them over again, he used them in his battle with the Averroists. This same evidence Father Pelster likewise uses in support of an Italian origin for De Spiritualibus Creaturis. According to his theory the Angelic Doctor, having written Summa contra Gentiles, which deals with Averroism, while he was in Italy, there is no improbability in his having written our work, which in part touches on some of the same themes, at the same time. These various theories are extremely ingenious, but can scarcely be classed as definitive evidence. Nor can we place much trust in the arithmetical computations of Mandonnet, whereby he sought to prove the number of disputations that were held by St. Thomas in given years and thereby establish the dates and places of composition of the various Quaestiones Disputatae, since these computations are much too subjective and uncertain to be given much credence.

             With regard to internal evidence, much has been made of the passage in Article IX (ad 11), apparently first noted by Georg von Hertling in 1881, where the river Seine is referred to in this fashion: "as the Seine river is not 'this' particular river because of 'this' flowing water, but because of 'this' source and 'this' bed etc." From it von Hertling made the deduction that the example of the Seine would be appropriate only if the question had been disputed at Paris. Many years later Mandonnet also became a fervent champion of this view and has heatedly defended it against all adversaries. Others, seeking to combat this thesis, have brought to light several variant readings in the manuscripts. At least fifteen different manuscripts were examined ranging in date from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. One of these yielded the reading fluvius Renus, which has been taken to refer to the German Rhine on the banks of which St. Thomas studied under Albertus Magnus. Father Pelster, however, believes that not the Rhine is meant but rather the little river Renus in Italy which flows past Bologna, making this reading serve to bolster his thesis that De Spiritualibus Creaturis was written in Italy. Another manuscript supplies fluvius Corezia, a river which flows through southern Germany. Still another has merely the word fluvius with the addition of no name. Although sheer numbers is not a reliable index for the authenticity of the reading fluvius Sequana or fluvius Secana ("Seine River"), yet this reading is very likely the genuine one, and this is the reading that our printed texts have adopted. Among the manuscripts showing this reading is the Codex Bodleianus 214, which had been in the personal library of Archbishop Robert of Winchelsea (1293-1313), a personage who in all likelihood would have seen that he possessed a carefully copied manuscript. Granted then that Sequana is the correct reading, Father Pelster's argument based on the reading fluvius Renus would seem to be seriously weakened. Consequently, if this passage has any worth for the controversy and granted that fluvius Sequana were words that might have been used appropriately only in Paris, it would seem that De Spiritualibus Creaturis originated there, as Father Mandonnet has always sturdily maintained.

             But on the other hand M. Grabmann challenged this position on the ground that he had found a manuscript which bore on the margin of De Spiritualibus Creaturis the words: Hic incipiunt questiones fratris Thome d'Aquino disputate in Ytalia. This he urged in support of the thesis that the series was disputed in Italy. Father Mandonnet, however, in a review of Grabmann's Indagini e scoperte intorno alla cronologia delle Quaestiones Disputatae, attacks the assertion on the ground that the last three words of the notation had been written by some other hand than that of the original scribe. In the same review he again cites the passage on the Seine River and inquires with some heat, "Is there a like text that can arise from a disputation held in Italy?"

             Still, Father Glorieux very definitely thinks that the evidence of this marginal note plus that of a similar one in another manuscript are to be taken in support of the question's Italian origin. His view is that the work was disputed at Viterbo during the fall of 1262. He upholds his thesis by the following arguments: a) the eleven articles which compose our series correspond to the eleven weeks between the opening of the fall term in September and the time of St. Thomas' departure toward the end of November, it being the Saint's custom at this time to conduct weekly disputations; b) De Spiritualibus Creaturis would seem to be incomplete, something which might be accounted for by the Angelic Doctor's sudden departure for Paris; c) knowing that the Master General of the Dominican order was planning to send him to Paris to do battle with the Averroists, he was working out this particular series of disputations that he might search out data to enable him to take a position on the matter later. Having thus rationalized his stand, Father Glorieux then proceeded to account for the allusion to the Seine in Article X. This he flatly ascribed to a substitution made by the Parisian booksellers out of local pride, since he firmly stated that St. Thomas, because of his sudden departure from Italy, had not time to edit the work at Viterbo and consequently brought it along to Paris, where he edited it and handed it on to the copyists. All of this is logical enough, taking into account as it does known facts of the Saint's life, but the whole chain of reasoning would seem to rest on the acceptance as fact of the authority of three manuscripts.

             Besides the highly controversial information that centers around the passage in Article IX, there are three other internal sources that have been employed to shed light on the problem. All are based on quotations from the works of Greek philosophers which were translated into Latin during the adult years of St. Thomas and can thus furnish some indication of the date of composition of De Spiritualibus Creaturis. One of these in Article III (Resp.), cites Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories. From the researches of Grabmann we know that this was first made available in Latin through the translation of William of Moerbeke in March 1266. The second (Art. IX, ad 10) quotes from Aristotle's Politics, which St. Thomas knew after 1261. The last (Art. X, Resp.) cites Themistius' commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, which dates in its Latin version from 1270. This saying, wherein St. Thomas refers to Aristotle according to Themistius as having compared the agent intellect to light, whereas Plato compared it to the sun, is very often used by St. Thomas; although Salman noted the fact and stated that it does not necessarily prove that St. Thomas had already read the commentary. Granted, however, that he had, 1270 would have been the earliest date at which De Spiritualibus Creaturis could have been written. However, since this is more or less conjectural, we are thrown back to 1266 as the definite date before which the work could not have been written.

             In conclusion, the evidence justifies no more than the following assumptions: that De Spiritualibus Creaturis was not written before 1266; that it may have been written in Italy between the years 1266-1268; that it more probably was written in Paris in 1269.

IV. The Value of the Disputed Questions

The Disputed Questions have long been considered among the important works of St. Thomas. As early as the seventeenth century the Dominican Father Santé Marialès wrote a commentary on them, saying that although he was then eighty years of age and had already spent an entire lifetime in studious pursuits, he had derived more profit from the three or four years of labor on them than he had from what he had accomplished during all the rest of his life. And of recent years Grabmann has considered them "the deepest and most profound work that Thomas has written." Their peculiar value lies in the fact that a given disputed question entered deeply into the discussion of a subject and was not confined to one point of doctrine. In this way a subject could be copiously and profoundly treated. As Dr. Pace has summed up the matter: "This method facilitated analysis and obliged the writer to examine every aspect of the problem. It secured breadth of view and thoroughness of treatment, and was a transparent medium for reason unbiased either by sentiment or verbiage." By reason of their very nature, therefore, they were a sort of work in collaboration with the Angelic Doctor's adversaries, for their objections forced him to solve the difficulties that they brought up against his theories and ideas. This necessity of submitting his thought to severe criticism forced St. Thomas to state his doctrines with the highest precision and coherence. This he might not have achieved had they been the product solely of his own musings.

             The topics embraced under the Disputed Questions contain a grand total of 510 articles or separate disputations, far more than any other master of the time produced. This was due in no small part to the stormy atmosphere of Paris during the years he spent there. His days as a young professor or master (1256-1259) were days of conflict between the order priests and the seculars over the disposition of the teaching chairs in theology at the University of Paris. This controversy reached its crux when the secular priests withdrew entirely, thus throwing the burden of teaching on the friars. In the face of this difficulty the young master Thomas Aquinas chose to use the disputation at regular and frequent intervals that he might reach a larger body of listeners. Later in his life when he was recalled from Italy to teach a second time at Paris, he found the city in violent upheaval over the burning questions of Augustinianism and Averroism, and again disputations were held at no long intervals.

             But we must not imagine that all the Disputed Questions were written in Paris. Some too were held in Italy, for the composition of the whole series extended over the entire teaching career of St. Thomas (1256-1272). In them the materials and doctrines were elaborated which he used more than once later in the composition of the Summa Theologica. Because of their regular and successive publication they can furnish the modern scholar with a scale of comparison for the more voluminous works, a scale by means of which we can follow the various phases in the development of the doctrines of St. Thomas.

Bibliography

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Birkenmajer, A., "Kleinere Thomasfragen." Philosophisches Jahrbuch XXXIV (1921) pp. 31-49.

de Bruyne, Edgar, S. Thomas d'Aquin. (Paris, 1928).

Glorieux, P., "Les questions disputées de S. Thomas d' Aquin et leur suite chronologique." Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale IV (1932) pp. 5-33.

Grabmann, M., Forschungen über die Lateinischen Aristoteles-übersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts. (Münster, 1916).

Grabmann, M., Thomas Aquinas, His Personality and His Thought, a translation by Virgil Michel, O.S.B. (New York, 1928).

Grabmann, M., "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters." Baeumker Beiträge XXII (1930).

Grabmann, M., "Die Werke des hl. Thomas." Baeumker Beiträge XXXII (1931).

von Hertling, Georg, "Wo und wann verfasste Thomas von Aquin die Schrift de Spiritualibus Creaturis?" Historisches Jahrbuch V (1884) pp. 144-145.

Hourcade, René, "Des écrits authentiques de Saint Thomas d' Aquin." Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique (1912) pp. 175-180.

Mandonnet, P., "Chronologie des Questions disputées de Saint Thomas d' Aquin." Revue Thomiste I (1918) pp. 266-287.

Mandonnet, P., "Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des écrits de S. Thomas." Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques IX (1920) pp. 148 ff.

Mandonnet, P., A review of M. Grabmann's Indagini e scoperte intorno alla cronologia delle Quaestiones Disputatae e Quodlibeta di S. Tommaso. Bulletin Thomiste I (1924-1926) pp. 58-61.

Mandonnet, P., Quaestiones Disputatae, Introduction, vol. I, pp. 1-24, (Paris, 1925).

Pelster, F., "Der Katalog des Bartholomaeus von Capua und die Echtheitsfragen bei den Schriften des hl. Thomas." Zeitschrift für katolische Theologie XLI (1917) pp. 820-832.

Pelster, F., "Zur Datierung des Qu. dis. De Spiritualibus Creaturis." Gregorianum VI (1925) pp. 231-247.

Sertillanges, A., S. Thomas d'Aquin. (Paris, 1925).

Synave, P., Bulletin Thomiste I (1924-1926) pp. 1-21.

Synave, P., "Le Probléme chronologique des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas d' Aquin." Revue Thomiste XXXI (1926) pp. 154-159.

Article 1

On Spiritual Creatures

THE TOPIC TO BE INVESTIGATED IS

CONCERNING SPIRITUAL CREATURES

ARTICLE I

AND the first question is: Whether a spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             And it would seem that it is. 1 For Boethius says in his book De Trinitate [II, Patrologia Latina LXIV, 1250 D]: A simple form cannot be a subject. But a created spiritual substance is a subject of knowledge and of power and of grace; therefore, it is not a simple form. But neither is it simple matter, for in that case it would exist in potency only, and would have no activity. Therefore it is composed of matter and form.

             2 Furthermore, any created form is limited and finite. But form is limited through matter. Therefore, any created form is a form in matter. Therefore no created substance is a form without matter.

             3 Furthermore, the principle of changeability is matter; hence, according to the Philosopher [Metaphysica II, 2, 994b 26], "it is necessary that matter be conceived in a thing that is moved." But a created spiritual substance is changeable; for only God is by nature unchangeable. Therefore a created spiritual substance has matter.

             4 Furthermore, Augustine says in XII Confessiones [17, 25] that God made matter common to things visible and things invisible. Now the things invisible are spiritual substances. Therefore a spiritual substance has matter.

             5 Furthermore, the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysica [6, 1045a 36] that if any substance is without matter, it is at once both being and one (ens et unum), and there is no other cause for it to be both being and one. But everything that has been created has a cause of its being and of its unity. Therefore no created thing is substance without matter. Therefore, every created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             6 Furthermore, Augustine says in his book De Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti [q. 23, PL XXXV, 2229] that Adam's body was formed before the soul was infused into it, because a dwelling must be made before a dweller is introduced. Now the soul is related to the body as a dweller to a dwelling; but a dweller has a subsistence of its own: the soul accordingly has a subsistence of its own, and, for all the greater reason, an angel. But a substance with a subsistence of its own does not seem to be merely a form. Therefore a created spiritual substance is not merely a form; it is, therefore, composed of matter and form.

             7 Furthermore, it is manifest that the soul is able to take on contraries. Now this would seem to be a property of a composite substance. Therefore the soul is a composite substance, and by the same reasoning so is an angel.

             8 Furthermore, form is that whereby a thing is (quo aliquid est). Whatever, therefore, is composed of that whereby it is and of that which it is (quo et quod est) is composed of matter and form. Now every created spiritual substance is composed of that whereby it is and of that which it is, as Boethius makes clear in his book De Hebdomadibus [PL LXIV, 1311]. Therefore, every created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             9 Furthermore, there are two kinds of "commonness" (duplex communitas): one, in the divine order, whereby the essence is "common" to the three persons; another, in the created order, whereby the universal is "common" to the things that come under it (suis inferioribus). Now it would seem to be a peculiarity of the first sort of "commonness" that the feature which makes a difference between those beings which share the common element is not really anything else than the common element itself. For the paternity by which the Father is different from the Son is itself the essence which is common to the Father and to the Son. Now in the "commonness" of the universal the feature that makes a difference between the things which are included under the common element must be something else than the common element itself. In every created thing, therefore, which is included in a common genus there necessarily is a composition of the common element and of that whereby the common element itself is restricted. Now a created spiritual substance is in a given genus. Therefore in a created spiritual substance there must be composition of the common nature and of that whereby the common nature is confined. Now this seems to be a composition of form and of matter. Therefore in a created spiritual substance there is composition of form and of matter.

             10 Furthermore, the form of a genus cannot exist save in the intellect or in matter. But a created spiritual substance, such as an angel, is in a given genus. Accordingly, the form of that genus exists either in the intellect only, or in matter. But if an angel did not possess matter, it would not exist in matter. Therefore it would exist in the intellect only, and so, supposing that nobody had intellectual knowledge of an angel, it would follow that the angel did not exist. This is an incongruity (inconveniens). Accordingly, it is necessary to say (as it seems) that created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             11 Furthermore, if a created spiritual substance were merely form, it would follow that one spiritual substance would be present to another. For if one angel has intellectual knowledge of another, either this happens through the essence of the understood angel, and in this case it will be necessary for the substance of the understood angel to be present in the intellect of the angel understanding it; or else it happens through a species, and in that case the same conclusion follows, if the species through which the angel is understood by the other angel does not differ from the very substance of the understood angel. Nor does it seem possible to indicate anything wherein it does differ, if the substance of the angel is without matter, as is its intelligible species also. Now this latter is an incongruity, that one angel should be present in another by its own substance, because it is only the Trinity that enters into the rational mind (menti rationali illabitur). Therefore the first point too, from which this follows, is incongruous; namely, that a created spiritual substance is immaterial.

             12 Furthermore, the Commentator says in XI Metaphysica [XII, comm. 36] that if there were a box without matter, it would be the same as the box which exists in the intellect. Consequently the conclusion seems the same as before.

             13 Augustine says in VII Super Genesi ad Litteram [6, 9] that, just as the flesh had matter (that is, earth) from which it was made, so perhaps it might have been the case that, even before that very nature which is called the soul was made, it had as its own genus a kind of spiritual matter, which was not yet a soul. Therefore the soul seems to be composed of matter and form, and by the same reasoning an angel also.

             14 Furthermore, Damascene says [De Fide Orthodoxa II, 3 & 12, Patrologia Graeca XCIV, 867 and 919] that "God alone is essentially immaterial and incorporeal." Therefore a created spiritual substance is not immaterial and incorporeal.

             15 Furthermore, every substance circumscribed by the limits of its own nature has a limited and confined existence. But every created substance is circumscribed by the limits of its own nature. Therefore every created substance has a limited and confined existence. But every thing which is confined is confined by something. Therefore in any and every created substance there is a confining element and a confined element; and these seem to be matter and form. Therefore every spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             16 Furthermore, nothing is active and passive on the same basis, but each thing is active through its form, whereas it is passive through its matter. But a created spiritual substance, such as an angel, is active while it is enlightening a lower angel and is passive while it is being enlightened by a higher angel. Similarly, there is in the soul the agent intellect (intellectus agens) and the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis). Therefore an angel as well as the soul is composed of matter and form.

             17 Furthermore, every thing that is either is a pure act or a pure potency, or is something composed of act and potency. But a spiritual substance is not a pure act (for this is characteristic of God alone), nor is it a pure potency either. Therefore it is something composed of potency and act, which seems the same as something composed of matter and form.

             18 Furthermore, Plato in the Timaeus [13, 41 AB] introduces the highest god as saying, when speaking to the created gods: "My will is greater than your bond." Augustine quotes these words in his book De Civitate Dei [XIII, 16, 1]. Now the created gods seem to be angels. Therefore in angels there is a bond or composition.

             19 Furthermore, in those things which are counted, and are different in essence, there is matter; because matter is the principle of numerical distinction. But spiritual substances are counted, and are different in essence. Therefore they have matter.

             20 Furthermore, nothing is acted on by a body except a thing that has matter. But created spiritual substances are acted on by bodily fire, as Augustine makes clear in De Civitate Dei [XXI, 10]. Therefore created spiritual substances have matter.

             21 Furthermore, Boethius in his book De Unitate et Uno [PL LXIII, 1076-77] expressly says that an angel is composed of matter and form.

             22 Furthermore, Boethius says in his book De Hebdomadibus [PL LXIII, 1311] that that which is can have something else mixed with it. But existence itself has absolutely nothing else mixed with it; and we can say the same about all abstract and concrete things. For in man there can be something other than "humanity", such as "whiteness" or something of that sort; but in "humanity" itself there can be nothing other than what pertains to the character of "humanity". If, therefore, spiritual substances are abstract forms, there will not possibly be in them anything that does not pertain to their species. But if something that pertains to the species of a thing be taken away, the thing is corrupted. Since, therefore, every spiritual substance is incorruptible, nothing that is in a created spiritual substance will possibly be lost; and so it will be utterly immobile, which is incongruous.

             23 Furthermore, every thing which is in a genus participates in the principles of the genus. Now a created spiritual substance is in the category of substance. Now the principles of this category are matter and form, as Boethius makes clear in his Commentum Praedicamentorum [PL LXIV, 184], where he says that Aristotle, leaving out of consideration the extremes, namely, matter and form, discusses the mean, namely, the composite; and gives us to understand that the substance, which is the category about which he is speaking in that passage, is composed of matter and form. Therefore a created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

             24 Furthermore, every thing which is in a genus is composed of genus and difference. Now the difference is obtained from the form, whereas the genus is obtained from the matter, as he makes clear in VIII Metaphysica [2, 1043a 19; 3, 1043b 30]. Since, then, a spiritual substance is in a genus, it seems that it is composed of matter and form.

             25 Furthermore, that which is first in any genus whatever is the cause of the things which are subsequent; as for instance, the first act is the cause of every being that is in act. Therefore by the same reasoning every thing that is in potency in any way whatever has this character from the first potency which is pure potency, namely, from prime matter. But there is some potency in created spiritual substances, because God alone is pure act. Therefore a created spiritual substance has this character from matter; which could not be so unless matter were a part of it. Therefore it is composed of matter and form.

             But on the other hand i there is what Dionysius says in chapter IV of De Divinis Nominibus [lec. 1] about the angels, that they are "incorporeal and immaterial."

             But you will say that ii they are called "immaterial" because they do not have matter that is subject to quantity and to change. But this is at variance with what he himself says above, that "they are free from all matter."

             iii Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in IV Physica [4, 211a 12], the question of place would not arise were it not for movement; and similarly neither would the question of matter arise were it not for movement. Therefore, according as given things have movement, on this ground matter must be looked for in them; hence those things which are subject to generation and corruption have matter with respect to their being; while those which are changeable according to place have matter with respect to their place. But spiritual substances are not changeable on the basis of their being. Therefore matter for being is not in them, and so they are not composed of matter and form.

             iv Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says on Dionysius' De Caelesti Hierarchia [V, PL CLXXV, 1010B], that in spiritual substances that which vivifies and that which is vivified is the same. But that which vivifies is form, whereas that which is vivified is matter; for form gives being to matter, and in the case of living things "to live" is "to be". Therefore in angels there is no distinction of matter and form.

             v Furthermore, Avicenna [Met. IX, 4] and Algazel [I, tr. IV, 3] say that the separated substances, which are called spiritual substances, are entirely devoid of matter.

             vi Furthermore, the Philosopher says in III De Anima [8, 431b 29] that "the stone does not exist in the soul, but the species" of stone does. This seems to be due to the soul's simplicity, namely, the fact that material things cannot exist in it. Therefore the soul is not composed of matter and form.

             vii Furthermore, in the Liber de Causis [§6] it is said that an intelligence is a substance which is not divided. But every thing which is composite is divided. Therefore an intelligence is not composite substance.

             viii Furthermore, "in those things which are without matter, the understanding being and the understood being are the same" [III De An., 4, 430a 3]. But that which is understood is an entirely immaterial intelligible form. Therefore the understanding substance also is without matter.

             ix Furthermore, Augustine says in his book De Trinitate [IX, 4] that the whole soul understands itself. Now it does not understand through matter: therefore matter is not a part of it (aliquid eius).

             x Furthermore, Damascene says [De Fide Orth. II, 12] that the soul is simple. Therefore it is not composed of matter and form.

             xi Furthermore, a rational soul more closely approaches the absolutely simple First Being (namely, God) than the animal soul (spiritus brutalis) does. But the animal soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore much less is the rational soul.

             xii Furthermore, the angelic substance more closely approaches the simple First Being than a material form does. But a material form is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, neither is the angelic substance.

             xiii Furthermore, accidental form is below substance in the order of importance. But God makes a given accidental form subsist without matter, as is evident in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore, so much the more does He make a given form in the genus of substance subsist without matter; and this especially seems to be spiritual substance.

             xiv Furthermore, Augustine says in XII Confessiones [7]: You have made two things, O Lord, "one next to Yourself", that is, angelic substance, "another next to nothing", namely, matter. So, therefore, there is no matter in an angel, since "matter" is distinguished from "angel" as its contrary.

             ANSWER. There are a variety of conflicting opinions concerning this question. For some assert that a created spiritual substance is a composite of matter and form; but some deny this. And hence, in order not to proceed to the investigation of this truth in an ambiguous fashion, we must consider what is meant by the term "matter." For it is obvious that since potency and act are divisions of being (ens), and since any genus whatever is divided into potency and act, the term "prime matter" is generally used to mean something which is in the genus of substance as a kind of potency, which is understood as excluding every species and form, and even as excluding privation, and yet is a potency capable of receiving both forms and privations; as Augustine makes clear in XII Confessiones [vii, viii, xv] and in I Super Genesi ad Litteram [xiv, xv], and the Philosopher in VII Metaphysica [3, 1029a 20].

             Now if matter be taken in this sense, which is its proper and generally accepted meaning, it is impossible for matter to be in spiritual substances. For although in one and the same given thing which is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency, potency is prior to act in the order of time, yet in the order of nature act is prior to potency. Now that which is prior does not depend on that which is subsequent, but vice versa. And consequently one comes upon a first act in isolation from all potency; yet one never finds in nature a potency which is not perfected by some act, and on this account there is always some form in prime matter. Now the first absolutely perfect act, which has in itself all the fullness of perfection, causes actual existence in all things; but yet according to a certain order. For no caused act has all the fullness of perfection, but in comparison with the first act every caused act is imperfect. Still, the more perfect an act is, the nearer it is to God. Now of all creatures, the spiritual substances are nearest to God, as Dionysius makes clear in chapter 4 of De Caelesti Hierarchia [§1]. And hence they most nearly approach the perfection of the first act, since they are related to lower creatures as the perfect is to the imperfect and as act is to potency. Therefore the ordered scheme of things does not in any sense imply that spiritual substances, for their own actual being, need prime matter, which is the most incomplete of all beings; but they are on a level that is far above all matter and all material things.

             This fact also becomes evident if one takes into consideration the activity that is proper to spiritual substances. For all spiritual substances are intellectual. Now the potency of each individual thing is such as its perfection is found to be; for a proper act requires its own proper potency. Now the perfection of any intellectual substance, insofar as it is intellectual, is intelligible because it is in the intellect. The sort of potency then that we must seek in spiritual substances is one that is proportionate to the reception of an intelligible form. Now the potency of prime matter is not of this sort, for prime matter receives form by contracting it to the individual being. But an intelligible form is in the intellect without any such contraction; for thus the intellect understands each intelligible as its form is in it. Now the intellect understands the intelligible chiefly according to a common and universal nature, and so the intelligible form is in the intellect according to its universality (secundum rationem suae communitatis). Therefore, an intellectual substance is not made receptive of form by reason of prime matter, but rather through a character which is, in a way, the opposite. Hence it becomes obvious that in the case of spiritual substances the kind of prime matter which of itself is void of all species cannot be part of that substance.

             Yet on the other hand if we use the terms "matter" and "form" to mean any two things which are related to each other as potency and act, there is no difficulty in saying (so as to avoid a mere dispute about words) that matter and form exist in spiritual substances. For in a created spiritual substance there must be two elements, one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were "whiteness" apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body.

             Hence in composite objects there are two kinds of act and two kinds of potency to consider. For first of all, matter is as potency with reference to form, and the form is its act. And secondly, if the nature is constituted of matter and form, the matter is as potency with reference to existence itself, insofar as it is able to receive this. Accordingly, when the foundation of matter is removed, if any form of a determinate nature remains which subsists of itself but not in matter, it will still be related to its own existence as potency is to act. But I do not say, as that potency which is separable from its act, but as a potency which is always accompanied by its act. And in this way the nature of a spiritual substance, which is not composed of matter and form, is a potency with reference to its own existence; and thus there is in a spiritual substance a composition of potency and act, and, consequently, of form and matter, provided only that every potency be called matter, and every act be called form; but yet this is not properly said according to the common use of the terms.

             As to the first argument, therefore, it must be said that the character of a form is in sharp contrast to the character of a subject: for every form, as such, is an act, whereas every subject is related to that of which it is the subject, as a potency is related to an act. If therefore, there is any form which is exclusively an act, such as the divine essence, it cannot in any sense be a subject; and it is of this form that Boethius is speaking. Now if there happens to be a form, which is in act in one respect and is in potency in another, it will be a subject only in that precise respect in which it is in potency. Now spiritual substances, although they are subsistent forms, are nevertheless in potency inasmuch as they possess a finite and limited existence. And because the intellect, as a consequence of its character, has a capacity for knowing all things, and the will has a capacity for loving all good, there always remains within the intellect and the will of a created substance a potency toward something which is outside of itself. Hence, if one views the matter rightly, spiritual substances are not found to be subjects, except of accidents which pertain to the intellect and to the will.

             As to the second, it must be said that there are two kinds of limitation of form. There is one in consequence of which the form of the species is limited to the individual, and this kind of limitation of form comes about through matter. There is a second, however, in consequence of which the form of the genus is limited to the nature of the species; and this kind of limitation of form does not come about through matter, but rather through a more determinate form, from which the difference is derived; for the difference when added to a genus narrows down this latter to the species. And this kind of limitation is the one that is in spiritual substances, in view of the fact that they are forms of determinate species.

             As to the third, it must be said that changeability is not to be found in spiritual substances as a consequence of their being, but as a consequence of their intellect and their will. But this kind of changeability is not the result of matter, but of the potentiality of the intellect and the will.

             As to the fourth, it must be said that Augustine's meaning is not that the matter of things visible and things invisible is the same numerically; since he himself says that two kinds of formlessness are meant by "heaven" and "earth," which are said to have been created first, so that by "heaven" is meant the spiritual substance that is still formless, whereas by "earth" is meant the matter of corporeal objects, which considered in itself is formless, since it is without any species; hence it is also said to be "void and empty", or "invisible and non-composite" according to another reading, whereas heaven is not described as "void and empty." From this it is plainly manifest that matter, which is without any species, is not a part of the angelic substance. But the formlessness of spiritual substance is a consequence of the fact that the substance has not yet been turned toward the Word whereby it is enlightened, and this is something that pertains to its power of understanding. In this sense, therefore, he calls them both "common matter of things visible and things invisible," according as each is formless in its own way.

             As to the fifth, it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking in that passage not of the agent cause but of the formal cause. For those things which are composed of matter and form are not immediately both being and one, but matter is being in potency and becomes actual being through the coming of the form, which serves as the cause of existence in its regard. But a form does not have being through another form. And hence, if there be a subsisting form, it is immediately both being and one, nor does it have a formal cause of its own existence; it does nevertheless have a cause that pours existence into it, but not a moving cause such as would bring it into act out of previously existent potency.

             As to the sixth, it must be said that, although the soul has a subsistence of its own, nevertheless it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form, because to have a subsistence of its own can also be an attribute of a form apart from matter. For since matter has existence through form, and not conversely, there is nothing to prevent a given form from subsisting without matter, although matter cannot exist without form.

             As to the seventh, it must be said that the capacity of receiving contrary attributes is characteristic of a substance that exists in potency in some way or other, whether it be composed of matter and form or whether it be simple substance. Now the substance of spiritual things is not the subject of contrary attributes, save of those pertaining to the will and to the intellect, since it is in consequence of these that it is in potency, as is clear from what has been said.

             As to the eighth, it must be said that to be composed of "that which is" (quod est) and of "that whereby something is" (quo est) is not the same as to be composed of matter and form. For although form can be called "that whereby something is," nevertheless matter cannot properly be called "that which is," since it is not, save in potency. But "that which is" is that which subsists in existence and this, in the case of corporeal substances, is the thing itself that is composed of matter and form, whereas in the case of incorporeal substances it is the simple form itself. Now "that whereby something is" is participated existence itself, because each individual is, insofar as it participates in existence itself. And hence Boethius also uses these words in this sense in the book De Hebdomadibus, saying that in the case of beings other than the First "that which is" and "existence" (esse) are not the same.

             As to the ninth, it must be said that a thing is "under" something common in two senses: in one, as an individual is "under" a species; in another, as a species is "under" a genus. Whenever then many individuals are under one common species, the distinction between many individuals is effected through individual matter, which has nothing to do with their specific nature. This is true in the case of created things. But when there are many species under one genus the forms whereby the species are distinguished from one another should in reality be something other than the common form of the genus. For through one and the same form this particular individual is put in the genus "substance", in the genus "body", and so on down to the most specific species. For if this particular individual were to possess its substantiality in consequence of some form, then necessarily it would have to be the case that the other additional forms in consequence of which it is placed in lower genera and species would be accidental forms.

             This is clear from the following. For an accidental form differs from a substantial form because a substantial form makes this given thing to be something, whereas an accidental form is added to a thing which already exists as "this something." If then the first form by which the individual is placed in a genus will make the individual to be "this something," all the other forms will be added to an individual that subsists in actuality, and consequently they will be accidental forms. It will also follow that through the addition of the later forms whereby something is given its place in the most specific species or in some subordinate species, generation does not occur, and by the taking away of these forms there is no corruption in an absolute sense but in a qualified sense (secundum aliquid). For since generation is a change oriented to the existence of a thing, something is said to be generated, absolutely speaking, if it absolutely becomes a being (ens) out of that which is non-being in act but being in potency only. If, then, something comes into being out of something that is previously existing in act, what will be generated is not a being in an absolute sense, but "this particular being." Concerning corruption the same reasoning holds good. It must, therefore, be said that the forms of things are ranged in order, and that one form exceeds another in perfection. This is clear both from what the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysica [3, 1043b 33], namely, that the definitions and species of things are like numbers, in the case of which the species are multiplied by adding one; and also from the fact that through induction the species of things appear to be multiplied hierarchically according to the perfect and the imperfect.

             Thus, then, by this line of argument Avicebron's position in the book Fons Vitae is ruled out, to the effect that prime matter, something that is regarded as entirely without form, first receives the form of substance; and once this form is supposed in any part of itself it receives, in addition to the form "substance", another form through which it becomes a body; and so on in succession down to its ultimate species. And in that part in which it does not receive a corporeal form it is incorporeal substance, the matter of which, not being subject to quantity, some call "spiritual matter". Moreover, the matter itself, already perfected through the form of substance which is the subject of quantity and of the other accidents, is "the key", he says, to the understanding of incorporeal substances [II, 6, p. 35]. For the reason why some individual thing happens to be a non-living body and another happens to be a living body is not the fact that a living individual has some form of which the substantial form of a body is a substratum; but the reason is that this particular living individual has a more perfect form, through which it has not only subsistence and bodily existence, but also life; whereas the other has a more imperfect form, through which it does not attain to life, but only to bodily existence.

             As to the tenth, it must be said that the form of a genus whereof matter is an essential part cannot exist outside the intellect except in matter, like the form "plant", for instance, or the form "metal". But this genus of substance is not the sort of thing whereof matter is an essential part. Otherwise it would not be a metaphysical genus but a natural one. Hence the form of this genus does not depend on matter as regards its own existence, but can be also found outside matter.

             As to the eleventh, it must be said that the intelligible species which is in the intellect of the understanding angel is different from the understood angel, not in the way of "something abstracted from the matter" and "something concreted of matter", but as an intentional being differs from a being which has an established existence in nature, as the species of color in the eye differs from the color which is in a wall.

             As to the twelfth, it must be said that if the box were self-subsistent apart from matter, it would be something that understands its own self, because immunity from matter is the essential character of intellectuality. And in view of this, the box apart from matter would not be different from an intelligible box.

             As to the thirteenth, it must be said that Augustine brings in that point as a matter to be investigated. This is clear from the fact that he rejects the assertion in question.

             As to the fourteenth, it must be said that God alone is said to be immaterial and incorporeal, because all things, when compared to His simplicity, can be reckoned as material bodies, although in themselves they are incorporeal and immaterial.

             As to the fifteenth, it must be said that the existence of a spiritual creature's substance is confined and limited, not by matter, but by the fact that it is something that has been received and participated in a nature of a determinate species, as has been said.

             As to the sixteenth, it must be said that a created spiritual substance is active and passive, not in consequence of form or matter, but according as it is in act or in potency.

             As to the seventeenth, it must be said that a spiritual substance is neither a pure act nor a pure potency, but is something that has potency along with act; yet it is not composed of matter and form, as is clear from what has been said.

             As to the eighteenth, it must be said that Plato gives the name of "second gods" not to the angels, but to the heavenly bodies.

             As to the nineteenth, it must be said that matter is the principle of numerical distinction within the same species, but not of the distinction between species. Now the angels are not numerically many within the same species, but their manyness (multitudo) is that of many self-subsistent specific natures.

             As to the twentieth, it must be said that spiritual substances are not acted on by bodily fire by way of a material alteration but by way of a confinement (alligationis), as Augustine says [De Civitate Dei XXI, 10, 1]. And hence it is not necessary for them to have matter.

             As to the twenty-first, it must be said that the book De Unitate et Uno is not a book of Boethius, as its very style indicates.

             As to the twenty-second, it must be said that a separated form, inasmuch as it is an act, cannot have anything extraneous mixed with it, but only inasmuch as it is in potency. And in this way the spiritual substances, inasmuch as they are in potency as regards the intellect and the will, receive some accidents.

             As to the twenty-third, it must be said that Boethius does not mean to say that it is essential to substance, which is a genus, to be composed of matter and form, since substance comes within the purview of the metaphysician, not of the natural philosopher. But he does mean to say that, since form and matter do not pertain to the genus of substance as a species thereof, only that substance which is something composite is placed within the genus of substance as a species.

             As to the twenty-fourth, it must be said that in the case of objects composed of matter and form, the genus is obtained from the matter and the difference from the form: yet in such a way that by "matter" is not understood prime matter, but matter according as it receives through the form a certain being (esse), imperfect and material in comparison with specific being (esse); thus, for instance, the being (esse) of "animal" is imperfect and material in comparison with "man." Still that two-fold being (esse) is not the consequence of two different forms, but of one form, which confers on man not only "animal being" (esse) but "human being" (esse). Now the soul of another animal confers on it only "animal being" (esse). Hence the common element "animal" is not one numerically, but mentally only, because it is not from one and the same form that a man and an ass are "animal". Once matter is taken away, therefore, from spiritual substances, the genus and the difference will remain in them, not in consequence of matter and form, but in consequence of considering in a spiritual substance both that element which is common to itself and to less perfect substances, and also that element which is proper to itself.

             As to the twenty-fifth, it must be said that the more a thing is in act, the more perfect it is; whereas the more a thing is in potency, the less perfect it is. Now, imperfect beings derive their origin from perfect beings, and not conversely. And hence it does not have to be the case that every thing which is in potency in any way whatever must get its potentiality from the pure potency which is matter. And on this point Avicebron seems to have been deceived, in his book Fons Vitae, since he believed that every thing which is in potency, or is a subject, has this character somehow from prime matter.

Article 2