ARTICLE IV

IN GOD DOES THE TERM 'PERSON' SIGNIFY SOMETHING RELATIVE OR SOMETHING ABSOLUTE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxix, A. 4

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether this term person signifies something relative or something absolute in God: and seemingly it signifies something absolute.

             1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when John states that there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost, if it be asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons. Now the query What? refers to the essence. Therefore in God person signifies the essence.

             2. Augustine (ibid. 6) says that in God to be and to be a person are the same. Now in God to be denotes the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.

             3. Augustine (loc. cit.) says: Person is predicated (of the Father) absolutely not with respect to the Son or the Holy Ghost: just as he is called God, great, good or just absolutely. Now all these denote the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.

             4. Augustine (ibid. 4) says that although the term essence is common to them, namely the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so that each one is called the essence, yet the term person is common to them. But relation in God is not common but distinctive. Therefore person does not signify relation in God.

             5. It will be replied that in God person is common logically and not really. On the contrary, there are no universals in God: hence Augustine (ibid. 6) rejects the opinion of those who said that the essence in God is like a genus or species, and person like a species or individual. Now that which is common logically and not really is common after the manner of a universal. Hence in God person is common not merely logically but really, so that it cannot denote a relation.

             6. A term does not denote things of different genera except equivocally: thus acute is applied equivocally to the sense of taste and to a mathematical figure. Now it is evident that person does not signify a relation in angels and man, but something absolute. Therefore if it signifies a relation in God, it will be employed equivocally.

             7. That which is accidental to the thing signified by a term is beside the term's signification; thus white which is accidental to man is beside the signification of man. Now the thing signified by the word person is an individual substance of rational nature, since according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) the description of what a word means is its definition: and it is accidental to such a substance that it be related to something else. Therefore relation is beside the signification of the word person.

             8. It is inconceivable that any term be predicated of a thing to which the meaning of that term is seen to be inappropriate: thus if we understand that a certain thing is not a rational animal it is inconceivable that such a thing be a man. Now Jews and pagans acknowledge God to be a person; yet they do not acknowledge relations in him, whereas we ascribe them to him according to faith. Therefore person does not signify these relations in God.

             9. But to this it will be replied that Jews and pagans err in their views about God: and thus we cannot argue from their opinion.--On the contrary neither an erroneous opinion not truth itself can change the meaning of a word: so that if the word person does not signify relation in the opinion of those who err about God, neither will it do so with those who think aright about him.

             10. According to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) words are signs of ideas. Now the idea conceived of the word person is the idea of a 'first' substance. Therefore this word person signifies a 'first' substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since it is self-existent. Therefore the word person does not signify a relation, but something absolute.

             11. But to this it may be replied that the word person signifies a relation after the manner of a substance.--On the contrary, this is a self-evident proposition: No relation is a substance, just as this: No quantity is a substance, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i). If then the word person signifies the substance as we have already proved, it cannot possibly signify a relation.

             12. Opposite terms cannot be true of the same thing. Now self-existence and existence by another are opposite terms. If then person signifies substance which is a self-existent being, it cannot signify a relation.

             13. A term that signifies a relation, is referred to something that it co-signifies, for instance, master and servant. Now it is clear that person has no reference to something else. Therefore it does not signify a relation, but something absolute.

             14. Person is as it were one by itself (per se una). Now unity in God regards the essence. Therefore person signifies essence and not relation.

             15. To this it will be replied that this word signifies one distinct thing, and since distinction in God arises from relation, person must signify relation.

             On the contrary, the Son and Holy Ghost are said to be distinguished by the mode of their origin; because the Son proceeds by way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will, as Love. Therefore distinction in God is not through the relations alone: and consequently it does not follow that person signifies relation.

             16. If relation causes distinction in God, while person is something distinct without causing distinction, relation cannot be signified by the word person.

             17. The relations in God are called properties: whereas the person is something underlying the properties. Therefore it does not signify relation.

             18. There are four relations in God, paternity, filiation, procession, common spiration: for innascibility which is the fifth notion is not a relation. But the word person signifies none of these: because if it signified paternity, it would not be said of the Son; if it signified filiation, it would not be said of the Father; if it signified the procession of the Holy Ghost, it would be said neither of the Father nor of the Son; and if it signified the common spiration, it would not be said of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the word person does not signify relation.

             On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that every term that refers to the persons signifies relation. Now no term refers to the persons more than person itself. Therefore the word person signifies relation.

             Again, in God under Person are included the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. But these names signify relation. Therefore person does also.

             Again, nothing absolute is divided in God. But person is divided. Therefore it is not absolute but relative.

             I answer that the term person in common with the absolute names of God is predicated of each Person, and does not in itself refer to anything else, and in common with the names signifying relation it is divided and predicated of several: wherefore it would seem that person admits of both significations absolute and relative. How the name person can admit of both significations has been explained in various ways.

             Some say that person signifies both, but equivocally. They assert that in itself it expresses the essence absolutely both in the singular and in the plural, like the name God, or good or great: but that owing to the insufficiency of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of Nicea accommodated the term person so that it could be employed sometimes in a relative sense, especially in the plural, as when we say that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three Persons, or with the addition of a disjunctive term, as when we say: One is the Person of the Father, another of the Son, or: The Son is distinct from the Father in Person. And that when it is predicated in the singular absolutely, it may equally signify the essence or the relation, as when we say: The Father is a Person, or: The Son is a Person. Apparently this is the opinion of the Master (I., D. xxv): but this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation. For it was not without reason taken from the very signification of the word, that the holy fathers inspired by God chose this term to express a profession of the true faith: and all the more seeing that they would have provided an occasion for error in affirming three Persons, if the word person signified the essence absolutely.

             Wherefore others said that it expresses at the same time essence and relation but not equally; the one directly and the other indirectly. Some of them maintained that it expresses the essence directly and the relation indirectly: while others took the contrary view. Yet neither opinion solves the difficulty: for if it signifies the essence directly it should not be predicated in the plural, and if it signifies the relation directly, it should not be predicated absolutely or of each Person. Hence others said that it signifies both directly: and some of them said that it expresses equally both essence and relation, and neither more than the other.

             But this is unintelligible: since that which does not signify one thing signifies nothing: wherefore according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) every term signifies one thing in one sense. Hence others said that it signifies relation as affecting the essence: but it is difficult to see how this is possible inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence in God. And so others said that the relation does not express the absolute, i.e. the substance which is essence, but the substance which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation. This is indeed true, but does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or subsistence is less clear than that of person.

             Accordingly to elucidate the matter it must be noted that, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the proper definition of a term is its signification. Now when a term is predicated of a thing which is directly included in the signification of that term as the determinate in the indeterminate, that thing is said to be classed under that term: but if it is not directly included in the term's signification it is said to be coupled with it. Thus animal signifies a sensible animate substance, and white signifies a colour that dilates the sight: while man is included directly in the idea of animal as the determinate in the indeterminate; for man is a sensible animate substance, having a rational soul: and is included under white, not directly, however, since white is outside his essence. Hence man is classed under the term animal, but is coupled with the term white. And since that which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the determinate to the indeterminate, that which was included becomes the thing signified by the addition of a determining word to the common term: thus a rational animal is a man. But we must observe that a thing is signified in two ways, formally and materially. Formally a term signifies that which it was chiefly intended to signify and this is the definition of the term: thus man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. Materially a term signifies that which is requisite for that definition: thus man signifies something that has a heart, brain and such parts as are required in order that the body be animated with a rational soul.

             Accordingly we reply that the term person signifies nothing else but an individual substance of rational nature. And since under an individual substance of rational nature is contained the substance, individual, i.e. incommunicable and distinct from others, whether of God, of man or of angels, it follows that a divine Person must signify something subsistent and distinct in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies something subsistent and distinct in human nature: and this is the formal signification of a person whether divine or human. Since, however, that which is distinct and subsistent in human nature is nothing else than something individualized and differentiated from others by individual matter, it follows that this is the material signification when we speak of a human person. But the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation, since all that is absolute is common and undivided. Now in God relation is really the same as the essence. And as in God essence is identical with the one who has the essence (e.g. the Godhead is identical with God), so also is relation the same as the one who is related. Consequently relation is the same as that which is distinct and subsists in the divine nature. It is evident then that person commonly speaking signifies an individual substance of rational nature; while a divine Personin its formal signification denotes a distinct being subsistent in the divine nature. And seeing that this can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way of substance not quâ essence but quâ hypostasis, even as it signifies a relation not quâ relation but quâ relative: e.g. as signifying Father not as signifying Paternity. For in this way the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence.

             Reply to the First Objection. What? queries not only the essence but also sometimes the supposit, for instance: What swims in the sea? Fish. And so the answer to what? is the person.

             Reply to the Second Objection. It is on account of the mode of signification of this word person, that Augustine says: In God to be and to be a Person are the same. For it does not signify by way of relation as Father and Son do.

             Reply to the Third Objection. It is due to the formal signification of person that it is predicated absolutely without reference to another.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. In God essence is common in reality, but person only logically, like the word relation.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. In God there are no differences of being since there is but one being in him. Now this is incompatible with the idea of universal, wherefore there is no universal in him, although there is in him one thing logically and not really.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. The fact that person designates one thing in God and another in man must be referred to a difference in suppositality rather than in the signification of the word person: and equivocation arises from a difference in signification but not in suppositality.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although relation is accidental to the common signification of person, it is not accidental to the divine Person, as we have proved above.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument considers the formal and not the material signification of the term: and the same answer applies to the Ninth Objection.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. A 'first' substance is said to be absolute as being independent of another. In God, however, the relative term does not exclude the absolute that depends on another, but the absolute that is not related to another.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This proposition, No relation is a substance is self-evident if it refer to relation and substance that are in a genus. God, however, is not confined within the limits of a genus, but contains in himself the perfections of all genera. Wherefore relation and substance are not really distinct in him.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Self-existent is opposed to non-self-existent and not to that which is related to another.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The word person does not itself refer to a relation, but by its mode of signification.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In God one is common to essence and relation: thus we say that the essence is one, and that the Father is one.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It may be that this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy Ghost by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Ghost and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their Persons.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Just as relation signifies as causing distinction in God, so is that which is related signified as being distinct. Now in God relation and the thing related are not distinct, as neither are essence and that which is: hence in God that which distinguishes and that which is distinct are one and the same.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In God property is not an accident, but is really the same as the thing whose property it is: although it differs therefrom logically. Accordingly person does not signify relation as a property, but as the essence underlying the property.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although there cannot be a universal without singulars, it can be understood apart from them and consequently signified. Hence it follows that if there are no singulars there is no universal: but it does not follow that unless some one singular be misunderstood or signified amiss, the universal is not understood or signified. Thus the word man does not signify any one individual man but only man in general: and in like manner the word person, although it does not signify paternity or filiation or common spiration or procession, it nevertheless signifies relation in general in the way already explained, even as the word relation does in its own particular way.