ARTICLE IX

IS THE RATIONAL SOUL BROUGHT INTO BEING BY CREATION OR IS IT TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE SEMEN?

Sum. Th. I, Q. cxviii

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether the soul be brought into being by creation or by transmission through the semen: and it would seem that it is transmitted through the semen.

             1. It is written (Gen. xlvi, 26): All the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt and that came out of his thigh, besides his sons' wives, sixty-six. Now nothing comes from a father's thigh but what is transmitted through the semen. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the semen.

             2. It may be replied that the part is taken for the whole, namely the soul for the man.--On the contrary, a man is composed of soul and body, and therefore if the whole man comes out of his father's thigh, it follows as above that not the body only but also the soul is transmitted with the semen.

             3. An accident cannot be transmitted unless its subject be transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul is the subject of original sin. Therefore seeing that original sin is transmitted from parent to child it would seem that the child's rational soul is transmitted from its parent.

             4. It may be said that although original sin is in the soul as its subject, it is in the flesh as its cause: and consequently is transmitted by the transmission of the flesh.--On the contrary it is written (Rom. v, 12): By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned. The words 'in quo' are expounded by a gloss of Augustine (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 10) as meaning 'in which sinner' or 'in which sin.' Now all would not have sinned in that sin, unless that same sin had been transmitted to all. Therefore the same sin that was in Adam is transmitted to all men; and consequently the soul that was the subject of that sin.

             5. Every agent produces its like. Also every agent acts by virtue of its form. Therefore that which it produces is a form. Now the begetter is an agent. Therefore the form of the begetter is produced by the action of the begetter. Since then a man begets a man, and the rational soul is the form of a man, it would seem that the rational soul is produced by generation and not by creation.

             6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 7) the efficient cause produces its own species in its effect. Now man takes his species from his rational soul. Therefore seemingly the rational soul is caused by the begetter in the begotten.

             7. Children are like their parents because they are begotten by their parents. And they are like their parents not only in dispositions of the body but also in those of the soul. Therefore as bodies derive from bodies, so do souls derive from souls.

             8. Moses says (Levit. xvii, 14): The soul of all flesh is in the blood. Now blood is transmitted with the semen, especially as the seed of the male is merely blood depurated by heat. Therefore the soul is transmitted with the semen.

             9. Moreover, the embryo before it is perfected with the rational soul, has certain animate actions, namely growth, nourishment and sensation: and where there is animate action there is life: consequently it lives. Now the soul is the principle of life in a body: consequently it has a soul. But it cannot be said that it receives yet another soul: because then there would be two souls in one body. Therefore the soul which was from the beginning transmitted in the semen is the rational soul.

             10. Souls differing in species constitute animals of different species. If, then, before the rational soul there was in the semen a soul that was not rational, there was an animal of a different species from man: which consequently could not become a man since animals do not pass from one species to another.

             11. You will say that these actions belong to the embryo not through the soul, but by some power of the soul known as the formative power.--On the contrary, power is rooted in substance; hence it occupies a place between substance and operation according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi). Consequently if the soul's power is there, its substance is there also.

             12. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) that the embryo is a living being before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being. Now every animal has a soul. Therefore it has a soul before it has a rational soul whereby it is a human being.

             13. According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1) a soul is the act of a living body as such. Now if the embryo is a living being and has vital functions by means of this formative power, this very power will be its act in so far as it is a living thing. Therefore it will be a soul.

             14. According to De Anima i, 2, life comes into all living things by the vegetal soul. Now it is clear that the embryo lives before the infusion of the rational soul, since it gives signs of exercising vital functions. Therefore the vegetal soul is in it before the rational soul.

             15. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) disproves the assertion that growth is not the effect of fire as principal agent, but of the vegetal soul. Now the embryo grows before the advent of the rational soul. Therefore it has a vegetal soul.

             16. If before the advent of the rational soul there is not a vegetal soul but a formative power, at the advent of the soul this power will be inoperative, since the function it exercised in the embryo will subsequently be sufficiently fulfilled in the animal by the soul. Consequently it would remain superfluous: and this would seem to be unreasonable since nothing is superfluous in nature.

             17. You will say perhaps that this power ceases at the advent of the rational soul.--On the contrary, dispositions do not cease at the advent of the form, but remain, and after a fashion maintain the form in matter. Now this power was a kind of disposition to the soul. Therefore at the advent of the latter, it does not cease.

             18. By its action this power conduces to the infusion of the soul. If, then, at the soul's advent this power is destroyed, seemingly the soul has something to do with its destruction: and this is impossible.

             19. A man is a human being by his rational soul. Therefore if the soul is not brought into being by generation, it will not be true that a man is generated: which is clearly false.

             20. Further, the human body comes into being by the action of its begetter. If, then, the soul is not brought into being by the begetter, there will be a twofold being in man; corporeal being derived from the begetter, and animate being derived from another source: and consequently soul and body will not form one being simply, since each has its own being.

             21. Moreover, it is impossible that the matter be the term of action of one agent, and the form the term of action of another agent: otherwise form and matter would not together make one thing simply, for one thing is made by one action. Now the action of nature in generating terminates in the body. Therefore it terminates in the soul also, which is the form of the body.

             22. Moreover, according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3) principles whose actions are not performed independently of the body are produced together with the body. Now the action of the rational soul is not performed independently of the body: since most of all would understanding be independent of the body, and this is clearly not the case, because we cannot understand without images (De Anima iii, 8): and there cannot be images without a body. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the body.

             23. To this it may be replied that the rational soul when it understands requires images for the acquisition of intelligible species but not after it has acquired them.--On the contrary, after a man has acquired knowledge, his act of intelligence is hindered if the organ of imagination be injured. And this would not be the case if the intellect after acquiring knowledge were no longer in need of images. Consequently it needs them not only in acquiring knowledge but also in applying the knowledge it has acquired.

             24. And if it be replied that the impediment to the act of intelligence arising from an injury to the organ of imagination arises not from the fact that the intellect needs images in using the knowledge it has acquired, but from the imagination and intellect being both seated in the one essence of the soul, so that the intellect is hindered accidentally through the imagination being hindered.--On the contrary the conjunction of powers in the one essence of the soul is the reason why if the act of one power be intense the act of the other is remiss: thus a person who is intent on seeing is less intent on hearing. It is also the reason why one power acts with greater strength when another is deprived of its act: thus the blind are often sharp of hearing. Therefore this conjunction of powers is not a reason for the action of the intellect being hindered through an impediment to the imagination, in fact it should rather be strengthened.

             25. He who gives the work its final complement is the worker's chief co-operator. Now if all human souls are created by God and by him infused into bodies, he gives the final complement to a generation that comes of adultery. Therefore he co-operates in adultery: and this is absurd.

             26. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv, 12; De Anima ii, 4) a perfect thing is one that can make its like: and consequently the more perfect a thing is, the more is it able to make its like. Now the rational soul is more perfect than the material forms of the elements which produce other forms like themselves. Therefore the rational soul has the power by way of generation to produce another rational soul.

             27. The rational soul is situated between God and corporeal things: wherefore (De Causis, prop. ii) it is asserted that it is created on the horizon between eternity and time. Now in God there is generation and also in corporeal things. Therefore the soul which is situated between them is produced by generation.

             28. The Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) says that the spirit that comes forth with the seed of the male, is a force emanating from the soul, and is a divine thing. Now such a thing is the intellect. Therefore the intellect seemingly is transmitted with the seed.

             29. The Philosopher (ibid. 4) says that in generation the female provides the body, and that the soul proceeds from the male: so that seemingly the soul is procreated and not created.

             On the contrary it is written (Isa. lvii, 16): Every breathing I have made, and by breathing we are to understand the soul. Therefore seemingly the soul is created by God.

             Again, it is written (Ps. xxxii, 15): He maketh the heart of each one of them. Therefore one soul is not engendered by another, but all are created separately by God.

             I answer that in times past this question has been answered in various ways by different people. Some said that the soul of the child is procreated from the soul of the parent, even as its body is from the body of the parent. Others said that all souls were created apart from bodies: but they held that they were all created together without bodies, and afterwards each one was united to a body when this was begotten, either by an act of its will according to some, or by God's command and operation according to others. Others held that souls are created and at the same time infused into bodies. Although formerly these opinions were held and it was doubtful which of them came nearest to the truth, as may be gathered from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. x, 21, 22; De anima et ejus orig.), afterwards, however, the first two were condemned by the Church and the third approved. Hence we read in De Eccles. Dogm. (xiv): We do not believe in the fiction of Origen that human souls were created at the beginning with other intellectual natures, nor that they are procreated together with their bodies by coition, as the Luciferians with Cyril, and certain Latin writers have presumed to maintain. But we affirm that the body alone is begotten by sexual procreation, and that after the formation of the body the soul is created and infused.

             A careful examination will make it clear that the opinion now under consideration was rightly condemned which held the rational soul to be transmitted with the semen. Three arguments will make this sufficiently evident for the present.

             First argument. The rational soul differs from other forms, in that the latter have a being not wherein they subsist but whereby the things informed by them subsist: whereas the rational soul has being in suchwise as to subsist therein: and this is made clear by their respective modes of action. For seeing that only that which exists can act, a thing is referred to operation or action as it is referred to being: so that since the body must of necessity take part in the action of other forms, but not in the action of the rational soul, which is to understand and will: it follows of necessity that being must be ascribed to the rational soul as subsisting, but not to other forms. For this reason the rational soul is the only form that can exist separate from the body. Hence it is clear that the rational soul is brought into being not as other forms are, which properly speaking are not made but are said to be made in the making of this or that thing. That which is made is made properly speaking and per se. And that which is made, is made either of matter or out of nothing. Now that which is made from matter, must needs be made from matter subject to contrariety: since generation is from contraries according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. i, 18). Wherefore since a soul has either no matter at all or at least none that is subject to contrariety it cannot be made out of something. Hence it follows that it comes into being by creation as being made out of nothing. Now to maintain that the soul is made by the generation of the body, is to say that it is not subsistent and consequently that it ceases with the body.

             Second argument. It is impossible for the action of a material force to rise to the production of a force that is wholly spiritual and immaterial: because nothing acts beyond its species, in fact the agent must needs be more perfect than the patient as Augustine asserts (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Now the begetting of a man is effected by the generative power which is exercised through organs of the body: moreover, the seminal force acts only by means of heat (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3): wherefore since the rational soul is a wholly spiritual form, neither dependent on the body nor exercising its action in common with the body, it can by no means be produced through the procreation of the body, nor be brought into being by an energy residing in the seed.

             Third argument. Every form that comes into being by generation or the forces of nature is educed from the potentiality of matter (Metaph. vii, 7). Now the rational soul cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter: because a form whose operation is independent of matter cannot be produced from corporeal matter. It follows, then, that the rational soul is not evolved by the generative power. This argument is given by Aristotle (De Gen. Animal. ii, 3).

             Reply to the First Objection. In the passage quoted the part stands for the whole, namely the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche: and this because the soul is the chief part of man, and a whole is considered as though it were identified with its most important part: so that the soul or intellect is considered as constituting to whole man (Ethic. ix, 4).

             Reply to the Second Objection. The whole man comes from the thigh of the begetter,--in so far as the force in the semen coming from the thigh conduces to the union of soul and body, by giving the matter its ultimate disposition which calls for the introduction of the form: by reason of which union man is a man:--but not as though each part of man were caused by that seminal force.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Original sin is said to be the sin of the entire nature just as actual sin is said to be the sin of the individual: wherefore the comparison between actual sin and the one individual person is the same as that between original sin and the entire human nature transmitted by our first parent in whom was the beginning of sin and by whose voluntary act original sin is imputed as voluntary to all men. Hence original sin is in the soul in so far as it is the sin of human nature. Now human nature is transmitted from parent to child by procreation of the flesh into which subsequently the soul is infused: and the soul contracts the infection because together with the transmitted flesh it forms one nature: for were it not united thereto so as to form one nature it would not contract the infection, as neither does an angel by assuming a human body.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. As in Adam's nature the nature of us all originated, so original sin which is in us originated in that original sin: because nature, as already stated, is the direct recipient of original sin, while the soul is its consequent recipient.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. A man begets his like in species by virtue of his form, namely his rational soul: not that this is the immediate active principle in human generation, but because the generative force and the active principles of the semen do not dispose the matter so as to make it a body fit to be perfected by a rational soul, except in so far as they act as instruments of a rational soul. Nevertheless this action does not go so far as to produce a rational soul, for the reasons already given.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generator begets his like in species in so far as the begotten is produced by the action of the generator in order that it may share in his species: and this comes to pass by the begotten receiving a form like that of the generator. If, then, that form be non-subsistent, and its being consist merely in that it is united to its subject, it will be necessary for the generator to be cause of that form; as is the case with all material forms. If on the other hand it be a subsistent form, so that its being is not entirely dependent on its union with matter, as in the case of the rational soul, then it suffices that the generator be the cause of the union of such a form with matter by merely disposing the matter for the form: nor need it be the cause of the form.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The disposition of the rational soul is in keeping with the disposition of the body: both because it receives something from the body, and because forms are diversified according to the diversity of their matter. Hence it is that children are like their parents even in things pertaining to the soul, and not because one soul is evolved from another.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Because properly speaking a soul is the act of a living body, and life is conditional upon heat and humidity which are preserved in an animal by means of its blood: therefore it is stated that the soul is in the blood, thus indicating the proper disposition of the body as matter perfected by the soul.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. There are several opinions about the life of the embryo. According to some in human generation the soul, like the human body, is subject to stages of progression, so that as the human body is virtually in the semen, yet has not actually the perfection of a human body by having distinct members, but gradually reaches this perfection through the force of the semen, so at the beginning of the generation the soul is there having virtually all the perfection which subsequently is to be seen in the perfect human being, yet it has not this perfection actually, since there is no sign of the soul's activity, but attains thereto by degrees: so that at first there are indications of the action of the vegetal soul, then of the sensitive soul, and lastly of the rational soul. Gregory of Nyssa mentions this opinion (De Homine): but it cannot be admitted. It means either that the soul in its species is in the semen from the very outset, deprived however of its perfect activity through lack of organs, or that from the beginning there is in the semen some energy or form not having as yet the species of a soul (just as the semen has not as yet the appearance of a human body) but by the action of nature gradually transformed into a soul at first vegetal, then sensitive and lastly rational. The former alternative is rebutted first by the authority of the Philosopher. He says, in fact (De Anima ii, 1), that when we say that the soul is the act of a physico-organic body which has life potentially we do not exclude the soul, as we exclude it from the semen and the fruit. Hence we gather that the semen is animated potentially in that the soul is not therein. Secondly, because as the semen has no definite likeness to the members of the human body (else its resolution would be a kind of corruption) but is the residue of the final digestion (De Gener. Anim. i, 19), it was not yet while in the body of the begetter perfected by the soul, so that in the first instant of its separation it could not have a soul. Thirdly, granted that it was animated when it was separated, this cannot refer to the rational soul: because since it is not the act of a particular part of the body, it cannot be sundered when the body is sundered.

             The second alternative is also clearly false. For seeing that a substantial form is brought into act not continuously or by degrees but instantaneously (else movement would needs be in the genus of substance just as it is in that of quality) the force which from the outset is in the semen cannot by degrees advance to the various degrees of soul. Thus the form of fire is not produced in the air so as gradually to advance from imperfection to perfection, since no substantial form is subject to increase and decrease: but it is the matter alone that is changed by the previous alteration so as to be more or less disposed to receive the form: and the form does not begin to be in the matter until the last instant of this alteration.

             Others say that in the semen there is at first the vegetal soul and that afterwards while this remains the sensitive soul is introduced by the power of the generator, and that lastly the rational soul is introduced by creation. So that they posit in man three essentially different souls. Against this, however, is the authority of the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus (xv): Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated and which is mingled with the blood, the other spiritual, which obeys the reason. Moreover, it is impossible for one and the same thing to have several substantial forms: because, since the substantial form makes a thing to be, not in this or that way, but simply, and establishes this or that thing in the genus of substance; if the first form does this, the second form at its advent will find the subject already established with substantial being and consequently will accrue to it accidentally: and thus it would follow that the sensitive and rational souls in man would be united accidentally to the body, Nor can it be said that the vegetal soul which is the substantial form in a plant is not the substantial form in a man, but a mere disposition to the form, since that which is in the genus of substance cannot be an accident of anything.

             Hence others say that the vegetative soul is potentially sensitive and that the sensitive soul is its act: so that the vegetative soul which at first is in the semen is raised to the perfection of the sensitive soul by the action of nature; and further that the rational soul is the act and perfection of the sensitive soul, so that the sensitive soul is brought to its perfection consisting in the rational soul, not by the action of the generator but by that of the Creator. Hence they hold that the rational soul is in man partly from within, namely as regards its intellectual nature, and partly from without as regards its vegetative and sensitive nature. Now this is altogether impossible, because either it means that the intellectual nature is distinct from the vegetal and sensitive souls, and thus we return to the second opinion, or it means that these three natures constitute the substance of the soul wherein the intellectual nature will be the form as it were, and the sensitive and vegetative natures, matter. From this it would follow, as the sensitive and vegetative natures are corruptible through being educed from matter, that the substance of the rational soul would not be immortal. Moreover, this opinion is involved in the same impossibility as we have shown to be implicated in the first opinion, namely that a substantial form be brought into act by degrees.

             Others say that there is no soul in the embryo until it is perfected by the rational soul, and that the vital functions to be observed therein proceed from the soul of the mother. But this also is impossible: because living and non-living things differ in that living things are self-moving in respect of vital functions, whereas non-living things are not. Wherefore nutrition and growth which are the functions proper to a living being cannot result in the embryo from an extrinsic principle such as the mother's soul. Moreover, the mother's nutritive power would assimilate food to the mother's body and not to the body of the embryo: since nutrition serves the individual just as generation serves the species. Further, sensation cannot be caused in the embryo by the mother's soul. Wherefore others say that there is no soul in the embryo before the infusion of the rational soul, but that there is a formative force that exercises these vital functions in the embryo. This again is impossible, because before the embryo attains to its ultimate complement it shows signs of various vital functions; and these cannot be exercised by one power: so that there must needs be a soul there having various powers.

             We must therefore say differently that from the moment of its severance the semen contains not a soul but a soul-power: and this power is based on the spirit contained in the semen which by nature is spumy and consequently contains corporeal spirit. Now this spirit acts by disposing matter and forming it for the reception of the soul. And we must observe a difference between the process of generation in men and animals and in air or water. The generation of air is simple, since therein only two substantial forms appear, one that is voided and one that is induced, and all this takes place together in one instant, so that the form of water remains during the whole period preceding the induction of the form of air; without any previous dispositions to the form of air. On the other hand in the generation of an animal various substantial forms appear: first the semen, then blood and so on until we find the form of an animal or of a man. Consequently this kind of generation is not simple, but consists of a series of generations and corruptions: for it is not possible, as we have proved above, that one and the same substantial form be educed into act by degrees. Thus, then, by the formative force that is in the semen from the beginning, the form of the semen is set aside and another form induced, and when this has been set aside yet another comes on the scene, and thus the vegetal form makes its first appearance: and this being set aside, a soul both vegetal and sensitive is induced; and this being set aside a soul at once vegetal, sensitive and rational is induced, not by the aforesaid force but by the Creator. According to this opinion the embryo before having a rational soul is a living being having a soul, which being set aside, a rational soul is induced: so that it does not follow that two souls are together in the same body, nor that the rational soul is transmitted together with the body.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the embryo is not a perfect being but is on the way to perfection: and therefore it is not in a genus or species save by reduction, just as the incomplete is reduced to the genus or species of the complete.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is not in the semen from the beginning, the soul-force is there, as stated above, which force is based on the spirit contained in the semen; and is called a soul-force because it comes from the soul of the generator.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the semen is a living and animate being, as stated above; wherefore we grant this argument.

             The same answer applies to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Objections.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The formative force that is from the outset in the semen remains even after the advent of the rational soul; just as the animal spirits remain into which nearly the whole substance of the semen is changed. This force, which at first served to form the body, afterwards regulates the body. Thus heat which at first disposes matter to the form of fire remains after the advent of the form of fire as an instrument of the latter's activity.

             This answer applies to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Objections.

             Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although the rational soul is not evolved from the generator, its union with the body is in a manner from the generator, as stated above. Consequently we say that a man is begotten.

             Reply to the Twentieth Objection. There is not a twofold being in man for the simple reason that when it is said that man's body is from his begetter and his soul from his Creator we are not to understand that the being acquired by the body from its begetter is distinct from that which the soul acquires from its Creator, but that the Creator gives being to the soul in the body, while the begetter disposes the body to participate in this being through the soul united to it.

             Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Two agents that are altogether disparate cannot combine so that the one's action terminate in the matter and the other's in the form, but this is possible in the case of two co-ordinate agents one of which is the instrument of the other: because the action of the principal agent sometimes extends to something that is beyond the range of the instrument. Now nature is a kind of instrument of the divine power as we have shown above (A. 8, rep. 14; A. 7). Hence it is not impossible that the divine power alone produce the rational soul, while the action of nature extends no further than to giving the body the requisite disposition.

             Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. An intelligence existing in a body, in order to understand, needs nothing corporeal as a co-principle of intellectual action, in the same way as the sight in order to see: for the principle of vision is not the sense of sight only, but the eye consisting of pupil and the faculty of seeing. But it needs a body objectively, as the sight needs the wall on which is the colour: because images are compared to the intellect as colours to sight (De Anima iii, 5). This is why the intellect is prevented from understanding when the organ of the imagination is injured: since so long as it is in the body it needs images, not only as receiving from the images when it is acquiring knowledge, but also as referring the intelligible species to the images when it applies knowledge already acquired. For this reason science makes use of examples.

             From this we gather how to reply to the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Objections.

             Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. This was the argument of Apollinaris according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Homine vi). He was deceived, however, in failing to distinguish the action of nature which is the procreation of the child, to which action God gives the complement, from the deliberate act of adultery wherein the sin consists.

             Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. The soul being more perfect than material forms would be able to produce its like if a rational soul could be produced otherwise than by creation, which is impossible. And this is owing to its perfection as may be gathered from what has been said.

             Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. In God alone can there be one nature in several supposits, wherefore in him alone can there be generation without the imperfection of change and division. Hence the higher creatures which are indivisible and unchangeable in substance such as the rational soul and the angels are not generated: whereas the lower creatures are, being divisible and corruptible.

             Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. The force that is in the semen is called intellect by the Philosopher according to the Commentator (in Metaph. vii, 9) on account of a certain likeness: inasmuch as like the intellect its action is exercised without an organ.

             Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. This saying of the Philosopher refers to the sensitive but not the rational soul.