ARTICLE I

ARE THINGS PRESERVED IN THEIR BEING BY GOD?

III Contra Gent. lxv, lxvii, xliv. Sum. Th. I, Q. civ. A. 1

THE question at issue is about the preservation of things in their being by God: and the first point of inquiry is whether they continue to exist independently of all divine action: and seemingly they do.

             1. It is written (Deut. xxxii, 4): God's works are perfect. Accordingly it is argued thus. A perfect thing is that which lacks nothing, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii). Now a thing lacks something in its very being if it cannot exist without the assistance of an external agent. Such a thing therefore is not perfect, and consequently the works of God are not such.

             2. It may be said that God's works are not simply perfect but only in regard to their nature.--On the contrary a thing is perfect as to its nature if it has all that its nature is capable of having. Now whatsoever has all that its nature is capable of having, is able to continue in existence, even if God cease to preserve it from without. If then some creatures are perfect in their nature they can continue to exist without God keeping them in existence. The minor premise is proved thus. The preservation of things is a work of God: hence is said (Jo. v. 17): My Father worketh even till now, and I work (cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. x): and when an agent works, the effect receives something. Wherefore as long as God preserves things the things preserved receive something from God, and thus whatsoever needs to be preserved has not all that it is capable of having.

             3. A thing is not perfect unless it fulfils its purpose. Now the principles of a thing are intended for the purpose of preserving the being thereof. If then the created principles of things are unable to keep things in existence, it follows that they are imperfect, and are not God's works: which is absurd.

             4. God is the efficient cause of things. Now the effect remains when the action of the efficient cause ceases: thus the builder ceases to act yet the house remains; the flame that caused the fire may cease to burn yet the fire caused by it continues. Therefore even if God's actions cease altogether, creatures can continue to exist.

             5. But someone will say that lower agents are the causes of things becoming but not of their existence: so that the existence of an effect remains when the causes of its becoming have been removed: whereas God is the cause of things not only in their becoming but also in their being. Wherefore things cannot continue to exist if the divine action ceases.--On the contrary every thing generated has being by its form. If then the lower generating causes do not cause existence, they will not be causes of forms: and consequently forms that are in matter are not produced by forms in matter, which is contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) who asserts that a form which is in this or that flesh and bones is produced by a form that is in this or that flesh and bones: and it will follow that forms in matter are produced by forms outside matter, which was Plato's view, or by the giver of forms, as Avicenna contended (Metaph. ix, 4, 5).

             6. Things whose being is as yet in the state of becoming cannot continue after the agent has ceased to act, as instanced in movement, fire and the like, whereas those in actual existence can continue even after the agent has been removed. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) says: By the presence of light the air is not made (permanently) lightsome, but is being made lightsome, for if it had been made (permanently) lightsome, it would not continue to be made lightsome, and if the light were removed it would remain lightsome. Now there are many creatures whose being is not in a state of becoming but of actual existence, such as the angels and all bodies. Therefore creatures can remain in existence after God has ceased to act.

             7. Lower generating causes, as proved above, cause the existence of the things they generate; not, however, as principle and first, but as second causes. Now the first cause of existence which is God, does not give the things he produces the beginning of existence except through the second causes mentioned above. Wherefore neither does he give them continuance of existence, since one and the same thing derives both being and continuance of being from the same cause. Wherefore things generated are kept in existence by their essential principles, when second active causes have ceased: and consequently even when the first cause, namely God, withdraws his activity.

             8. If a thing cease to exist this is either by reason of its matter or because it is produced from nothing. But matter is not a cause of corruption except through being subject to contrariety; and there is not in all creatures matter subject to contrariety. Hence those things in which there is no matter subject to contrariety, such as the heavenly bodies and angels, cannot cease to exist by reason of matter. Nor can they cease to exist through being produced from nothing since from nothing nothing comes, and nothing has no action, and consequently does not cause a thing to be corrupted. Therefore if all divine action were to cease, such things would not cease to exist.

             9. The form begins to be in matter in the last instant of a thing's becoming when it is no longer in the state of becoming but of actual existence. Now in Avicenna's opinion (Metaph. ix, 4, 5) the forms of generated things are inserted in matter by an active intelligence which is the giver of forms. Wherefore that intelligence is the cause of being and not only of becoming so that by its action things can be kept in existence apart from God's action.

             10. The substantial form also is a cause of existence: so that if the cause of a thing's existence also keeps it in existence, it follows that the form of a thing suffices to keep it in existence.

             11. A thing is kept in existence by its matter inasmuch as this upholds the form. Now according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 82: De Coelo et Mundo, i, 20) matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, so that it is not produced by a cause, and, therefore remains even when all action of an efficient cause ceases. Wherefore it will be possible for things to remain in existence after the action of the first efficient cause, namely God, has ceased.

             12. It is written (Ecclus. xxxiii, 15): Look upon all the works of the most High. Two and two, and one against another. Now some of God's works need his action to keep them in existence. Therefore as against these there must be some of God's works which do not need to be kept in existence by him.

             13. The natural appetite cannot be null and void. Now everything has a natural appetence for the preservation of its existence. Wherefore a thing is able of itself to remain in existence, else its natural appetite would be frustrated.

             14. Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God makes each thing good, and all things together very good; for which reason it is written (Gen. i, 31): God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good. Accordingly the universe of creatures is very good and the best of all since best produces best according to Plato (Tim.). Now it is better not to need another thing for one's preservation in existence, than to need another for that purpose. Therefore the universe of creatures needs no other to keep it in existence.

             15. Heavenly bliss is something created in the nature of the blessed. Now heavenly bliss is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 2): and this must needs include continuance in existence, which is one of the greatest goods. Therefore there is a creature that can of itself remain in existence.

             16. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei vii, 30) that God so governs things by his providence that he allows them to exercise their own movements. Now the proper movement of nature since it proceeds from nothing is to return to nothing. Therefore God allows the nature that comes from nothing to return to nothing: and consequently he does not keep things in existence.

             17. A recipient that is contrary to what it has received does not preserve it but destroys it. Thus we observe that when a natural agency produces in a subject an effect by violence, this effect remains for a time in the subject opposed to it, after the natural agent has ceased to act: thus after the fire has ceased to act, heat remains in the water heated, but only for a time. Now God's effects are received not in a contrary but in nothing, since he is the author of the whole substance of a thing. Much more then will the divine effects remain, be it only for a time, after God's action has ceased.

             18. Form is the principle of knowledge, operation and existence. Now a form without assistance from without can be a principle of operation and knowledge. Therefore it can also be a principle of existence, so that after all divine action has ceased, things can be kept in existence by their forms.

             On the contrary it is written (Heb. i, 8): Upholding all things by the word of his power: and the gloss remarks: Even as all things were created by him, so by him are they preserved unchangeable.

             Again, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): The might of the Creator and the power of the Almighty is the cause of existence in every creature; and if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would at once cease and all nature would collapse; and further on: The world would not stand for one instant, if God withdrew his support. Again, Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 37) that all things would fall into nothingness were they not upheld by the hand of the Almighty.

             Again, in the book De Causis (prop. ix) it is said: Every intelligence derives its immobility i.e. stability and essence, from that goodness which is the first cause. A fortiori therefore other creatures are not stabilised in existence save by God.

             I answer that without any doubt whatever it must be admitted that things are preserved in existence by God, and that they would instantly be reduced to nothing were God to abandon them. The proof of this may be expressed as follows. An effect must needs depend on its cause. This is part of the very nature of cause and effect; and is evidenced in formal and material causes, seeing that on the removal of any of its material or formal principles, a thing at once ceases to exist, because such principles enter into its essence. The statement applies to efficient causes even as to formal and material causes: since the efficient cause produces a thing by inducing the form or disposing the matter. Hence a thing depends equally on its efficient cause, its matter and its form since through the one it depends on the other. As to final causes the same is to be said of them as of efficient causes: because the end is a cause only for as much as it moves the efficient cause to act, since it comes first not in existence but in the intention. Consequently there is no action where there is no final cause (Metaph iii, 2). Accordingly the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form, but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire directly and by reason of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, and the form of fire is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating fire, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, through being seated in another matter. Hence since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle, that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species. Now seeing that properly speaking the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change except accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle on which the form depends directly must be something incorporeal, for the effect depends on its active cause through the action of a principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting by virtue of an incorporeal principle and as its instrument. In fact this is necessary in order that the form begin to exist, inasmuch as it does not begin to exist otherwise than in matter: because matter cannot be subject of a form unless it have a particular disposition, since the proper act should be in its proper matter. When, therefore, matter is in a disposition unsuitable to a particular form, it cannot directly receive that form from an incorporeal principle on which the form directly depends, so that there is need for something to transmute the matter: and this will be a corporeal agent whose action consists in moving something. This corporeal agent acts by virtue of the incorporeal principal, and its action terminates in this or that form, inasmuch as this or that form is in the corporeal agent either actually (as in universal agents) or virtually (as in equivocal agents). Accordingly these lower corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except to the extent of their causality in transmuting matter, since they do not act except by transmuting, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 7, 8): and this is by transmuting matter and educing the form from the potentiality of matter. Hence the form of the thing generated depends naturally on the generator in so far as it is educed from the potentiality of matter, but not as to its absolute existence. And, therefore, when the act of the generator ceases, the eduction of the form from potentiality into actual being, that is the becoming of the thing generated, ceases, whereas the form itself whereby the thing generated has its existence, does not cease. Hence it is that the existence of the thing generated, but not its becoming, remains after the action of the generator has ceased. On the other hand, forms that do not exist in matter, such as intellectual substances, or that exist in matter nowise indisposed to the form, such as the heavenly bodies wherein there are no contrary dispositions, must proceed from a principle that is an incorporeal agent that acts not by movement, nor do they depend on something for their becoming without depending on it also for their being. Wherefore just as when the action of their efficient cause which acts by movement ceases, at that very instant the becoming of the thing generated ceases, even so when the action of an incorporeal agent ceases, the very existence of things created by it ceases. Now this incorporeal agent by whom all things, both corporeal and incorporeal are created, is God, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 5, 6, 8), from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And as to the question at issue it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately, or in a certain order as certain philosophers have maintained. We conclude then that with the cessation of the divine operation, at the same instant all things would fall into nothingness, as we have proved by the authorities quoted in the arguments `On the contrary.'

             Reply to the First Objection. God's creatures are perfect in their nature and order: and their perfection requires among other things that they be kept in existence by God.

             Reply to the Second Objection. God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. The existence of permanent things is not divisible except accidentally in so far as it is subject to some kind of movement: and in itself is in an instant. Hence God's action which is the direct cause of a thing's existence is not distinct as the principle of its being and as the principle of its continuance in being.

             Reply to the Third Objection. As long as the essential principles of a thing remain, so long does that thing continue to exist: but those very principles would cease to be, were the divine action to cease.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. These lower agents cause a thing as to its becoming, but not as to its existence properly speaking: whereas God is the direct cause of existence: wherefore the comparison fails. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): When a man is building a house and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant if God withdrew his support.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as corporeal agents do not act except by transmuting, and as nothing is transmuted except by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents cannot extend beyond things that in some way are in matter. The Platonists together with Avicenna through denying the eduction of forms from matter were obliged to hold that natural agents merely dispose matter, and that the form is induced by a principle that is separate from matter. On the other hand if with Aristotle we hold substantial forms to be educed from the potentiality of matter, natural agents will dispose not only matter but also the substantial form, only, however, in regard to its eduction from the potentiality of matter into actual existence, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 9, 11): so that they will be principles of existence as considered in its inchoation but not as considered absolutely.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. Some of the forms that begin to exist in matter through the action of a corporeal agent are when produced perfect both in their specific nature and in their being in matter, like the form of their generator: the reason being that the matter does not retain contrary principles: and such forms remain after the action of their generator, until the time of their corruption. Other forms however when produced are perfect in their specific nature, but have not perfect being in matter: thus heat in hot water has the perfect species of heat, but not perfect being which depends on the hold that the form has on the matter, inasmuch as the matter retains the form that is contrary to the quality of heat. Forms of this description can remain for a short time after the action of the agent, but are prevented from remaining for long by the contrary principle that is in the matter. Again other forms when produced in matter are imperfect both in species and in being: as for instance light which is produced in the air by a luminous body: for light in the air is not a perfect natural form as light in the luminous body, but rather after the manner of an intention. Hence just as a man's likeness does not remain in a mirror save as long as the mirror is in front of him, even so neither does light remain in the air when the luminous body is no longer present. For these intentional beings depend on the natural forms of bodies directly and not only accidentally, so that they no longer remain in existence after the action of the agent has ceased. Wherefore suchlike things are said to be in a state of becoming on account of the imperfection of their being, whereas perfect creatures are not said to be in a state of becoming although they have an imperfect being, and God who made them never ceases to uphold them.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The action of a corporeal agent does not extend beyond movement, so that it is the instrument of the first agent in the eduction of forms from potentiality to actuality which education is by movement: but not in their preservation, except in so far as through some kind of movement matter is made to retain the disposition which renders it appropriate to the form: it is thus in fact that the lower bodies are kept in existence through the movement of the heavenly bodies.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. If the divine action were to cease, the creature also would cease to exist, not through the presence of a contrary in its matter, since that would cease to exist at the same time as the matter, but because the creature is made from nothing: and yet not in the sense that nothingness conduces actually to the corruption of the creatures, but that it does not act for its preservation.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even the giver of forms, if we suppose with Avicenna that it is something apart from God, must cease to exist if God who is its cause cease to act.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. The form also would cease to exist if the aforesaid action were to cease, so that it could no longer be a principle of existence.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Matter is said to be ungenerated because it is not produced by generation: but this does not exclude its being produced by God, seeing that every imperfect thing must needs originate from a perfect one.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God's works the presence of one contradictory does not argue the presence of its opposite (for then it would follow that since some of his works are created, there must be some that are not created) although this is true if we apply it to other kinds of opposition. But the things to which the objection refers are in contradictory opposition to each other; wherefore the argument does not prove.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. It is true that everything has a natural desire to be kept in existence, not however by its own action but by its cause.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The universe of creatures is the best, not simply, but in the genus of created things: so that nothing prevents something from being better.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The goods, the accumulation of which makes the state of beatitude perfect, have their source in the creature's union with its cause: since the beatitude of the rational creature consists in enjoying God.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Properly speaking tendency to nothingness is not a movement of nature, which always has a tendency to the good; but it is a defect of nature that it tends to nothingness, so that the argument is based on a false supposition.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. A violent agent that produces a violent impression is the cause of that impression as to its becoming and not simply as to its being, as explained above (ad 6). Wherefore as soon as the agent ceases to act the impression may last for a time but not for long on account of its imperfection.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Just as a form cannot be a principle of existence, unless we presuppose some previous principle, even so neither can it be a principle of operation since God works in everything as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 6): nor again of knowledge, since all knowledge derives from the uncreated light.