ARTICLE XIV

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THAT WHICH DIFFERS FROM GOD ESSENTIALLY TO HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED?

THE fourteenth point of inquiry is whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always: and it would seem possible.

             1. The cause that produces the whole substance of a thing has not less power over its effect than the cause which produces the form alone. Now if the cause which produces the form alone be eternal it can produce it from eternity: thus the light produced and diffused by fire is co-existent with it and would be co-eternal if the fire were eternal, according to Augustine (De Trin.). Much more reason then is there why God who produces the whole substance of a thing, should be able to produce a co-eternal effect.

             2. It will be said perhaps that this is impossible because it leads to the false position of equalling a creature to God in point of duration.--On the contrary, a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but successive cannot be equalled to one that is wholly simultaneous. Now if the world had always been, its duration would not have been wholly simultaneous, since it would have been measured by time according to Boëthius (De Consol. v). Therefore a creature would not be equalled to God in point of duration.

             3. As a divine person proceeds from God without movement, so does a creature. Now a divine person can be co-eternal with God from whom he proceeds. Therefore a creature can be likewise.

             4. That which is unchangeable in its being can always do the same thing. Now God is unchangeable from eternity. Therefore from eternity he can do the same thing: and consequently if he produced a creature at any time he could do so from eternity.

             5. You will say perhaps that the above argument applies to a natural but not to a voluntary agent.--On the contrary, God's power is not nullified by his will. Now if he did not work by his will it would follow that he produced the creature from eternity. Therefore even given that he works by his will, it does not remove the possibility of his having created from eternity.

             6. If God produced a creature at a certain time or instant, and if his power does not increase, he could have produced the creature at a previous time or instant, and for the same reason, before that, and so on indefinitely. Therefore he could have produced it from eternity.

             7. God can do more than the human intellect can understand, wherefore it is said (Luke i, 37): No word shall be impossible with God. Now the Platonists understood God to have made something that had always existed. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 31): Plato writing about the world and of the gods made by God in the world, asserts most explicitly that they came into existence and had a beginning; yet they will not have an end, and he states that through the all-powerful will of their maker they will live for ever. In explaining, however, what he meant by beginning, the Platonists affirm that he meant the beginning not of time but of their formation. For, say they, even as, if a foot had pressed on the dust from eternity, there would always have been the footprint underneath, which no one would doubt to have been made by the walker, so the world always existed and he who made it always existed, and yet it was made. Therefore God could make something that always was.

             8. God can do in the creature whatever is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing: else he were not omnipotent. Now it is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing, considered as made, that it should always have existed, otherwise to say that creatures always existed would be the same as to say that they were not made, which is clearly false. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 4; x, 31) distinguishes two opinions, one asserting that the world always existed in suchwise that it was not made by God; the other stating that the world always was and that nevertheless God made it. Therefore God can do this so that something made by him should always have been.

             9. Just as nature can produce its effect in an instant, so also can a voluntary agent if unhindered. Now God is a voluntary agent that cannot be hindered. Therefore the creatures brought into being by his will, could be produced from eternity, even as the Son who proceeds from the Father naturally.

             1. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23): Seeing that the nature of the Trinity is altogether uncommunicable, it is so exclusively eternal that nothing can be co-eternal with it.

             2. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i): That which is brought into being from nothingness by its very nature is incapable of being co-eternal with one who has no beginning and is eternal. Now the creature is brought from nothingness into being. Therefore it cannot have been always.

             3. Whatsoever is eternal is unchangeable. But a creature cannot be unchangeable, because were it left to itself it would fall back into nothingness. Therefore it cannot be eternal.

             4. Nothing that depends on another is necessary, nor consequently eternal: since all that is eternal is necessary. Now that which is made depends on another. Therefore nothing made can be eternal.

             5. If God could make a creature from eternity, he did; because according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 4) in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is. Now it is against faith to say that creatures were made from eternity. Therefore it is also against faith to say that they could be.

             6. A wise man's will does not delay to do what he intends except for some reason. But no reason can be given why God made the world then and not before or from eternity, if it could be made from eternity. Therefore seemingly it could not.

             7. If creatures were made, they were made either from nothing or from something. They were not made from something: since this would either be part of the divine essence, which is impossible, or it would be something else, and if this were not made, there would be something besides God not made by him, and this has been proved to be false: and if it were made from something else, we should either go on indefinitely, which is impossible, or we should come to something made from nothing. Now it is impossible for that which is made from nothing to have always been. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to have been always.

             8. It is essential to the eternal not to have a beginning, whereas it is essential to the notion of a creature to have a beginning. Therefore no creature can be eternal.

             9. A creature is measured either by time or by eviternity. But time and eviternity differ from eternity. Therefore a creature cannot be eternal.

             10. If a thing be created it must be possible to assign an instant wherein it was created. Now before that instant it did not exist. Therefore we must conclude that creatures were not always.

             I answer that according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing is said to be possible, sometimes in reference to a power, sometimes in reference to no power. If in reference to a power, this power may be active or passive. In reference to an active power, as when we say that to a builder it is possible to build; in reference to a passive power, as when we say that it is possible for the wood to burn. Sometimes, however, a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a power, but either figuratively, as in geometry a line is said to be potentially rational--this we may pass over for the present; or absolutely, that is when the terms of a proposition are in no way mutually contradictory: whereas we have the impossible when they exclude each other. Thus it is said to be impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time, not in reference to an agent or patient, but because it is impossible in itself, as being self-contradictory. If, then, we consider the statement that something substantially distinct from God has always existed, it cannot be described as impossible in itself as though it contained a contradiction in the terms: because to be from another is not inconsistent with being from eternity, as we have proved above; except when the one proceeds from the other by movement, of which there can be no question in the procession of things from God. And when we add 'substantially distinct' this again involves no contradiction absolutely speaking with the fact of having always been.

             If we refer the possibility to an active power, then God does not lack the power to produce from eternity an essence distinct from himself.

             On the other hand if we refer the possibility to a passive power, then given the truth of the Catholic faith, it cannot be said that something substantially distinct from God can proceed from him and yet have always existed. For the Catholic faith supposes that all things other than God at some time existed not. Now as it is impossible for a thing never to have existed, if it be granted that at some time it has been, so is it impossible for a thing to have been always, if it be granted that at some time it did not exist. Wherefore some say that this is possible on the part of God creating, but not on the part of an essence proceeding from God because our faith teaches the contrary.

             Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equalled to God simply but in so far as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force.

             Reply to the Third Objection. In the divine person there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will, except in so far as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist.

             This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always: but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed: hence the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness: because infinite goodness is incompatible with the notion of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.

             It must also be observed that when we say that God could have made the world sooner than he did, if this priority be referred to the power of the maker, the statement is undoubtedly true, because he had from eternity the power to do this; and eternity precedes the time of the creation. If, however, it be referred to the being of the thing made, as though before the instant wherein the world was created there were a real time wherein the world could have been made, it is evident that then the statement is false, since before the world there was no movement and consequently no time. Yet it is possible to imagine a time anterior to the world, just as we can imagine altitudes and dimensions outside the heavens: and forasmuch we can say that God could make the heavens higher, and that he could have created them sooner, since he could have made time longer and altitude higher.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is true that the Platonists understood this: but they were not guided by faith, since it was unknown to them.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument proves nothing more than that to be made and to be always are not incompatible considered in themselves: so that it considers that which is possible absolutely.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers possibility in reference to an active power.

             Whereas the arguments on the contrary side would seem to conclude that it is impossible from every point of view, we must now proceed to answer them.

             Solution of the First Argument. According to Boëthius (De Consol. v), even if the world had always existed it would not be co-eternal with God, because its duration would not be wholly simultaneous, which is essential to eternity. For eternity is the perfect possession of endless life without succession (ibid.). Now the succession of time results from movement according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 11). Hence whatsoever is subject to change, even if it be always, cannot be eternal: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23) that no creature can be co-eternal with the unchangeable nature of the Trinity.

             Solution of the Second Argument. Damascene speaks on the supposition of the Catholic faith: this is clear from his saying: That which is brought into being from nothingness, etc.

             Solution of the Third Argument. Changeableness by its very nature excludes eternity but not indefinite duration.

             Solution of the Fourth Argument. It is true that what depends on another can never exist unless it be upheld by that whence it proceeds: yet if the latter always existed the former also existed always.

             Solution of the Fifth Argument. From the fact that God was able to do a thing it does not follow that he did it, because he acts by his will and not by natural necessity. And where it is said that in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is, this refers to passive and not to active power: because a passive power that is not perfected by its act is a principle of corruption and therefore repugnant to eternity: whereas it casts no reflection on an active power that its effect be not actually in existence, especially if the active power be a voluntary cause: because the effect is not the perfection of an active power in the same way as the form is of a passive power.

             Solution of the Sixth Argument. Our intelligence is unable to fathom the production of the first creatures, because it cannot grasp that Art which is the sole reason why the creatures in question were such as they were. Hence just as no man can explain why the heavens are so great and not greater, so neither can we tell why the world was not made sooner, although both came within the scope of the divine power.

             Solution of the Seventh Argument. The first creatures were produced not from something but from nothing. Not, however, from the mode of their production but from the teaching of faith do we gather that they were non-existent before they were brought into being. For the statement that a creature is made from nothing may mean according to Anselm (Monolog. viii) that it is not made from something, so that the negation includes the preposition and is not included by it, and thus denies the order implied by the preposition; while the preposition itself does not imply order to nothing. If on the other hand order to nothing is affirmed, and the preposition includes the negation, it still does not follow that at some time the creature was non-existent. For one might say with Avicenna that nonexistence preceded the existence of a thing not by duration but by nature: since, to wit, were it left to itself it would have no existence, and it has existence solely from another: because that which a thing is competent to have of itself is naturally prior to that which it is not adapted to have save from another.

             Solution of the Eighth Argument. It belongs to the notion of eternity to have no beginning of duration: while it belongs to the notion of a created thing to have a beginning of its origin but not of duration: unless we take creation according to the teaching of faith.

             Solution of the Ninth Argument. Eviternity and time differ from eternity, not only in the point of a principle of duration but also in the point of succession. Time in itself implies succession; while succession is annexed to eviternity, inasmuch as eviternal substances are in a way changeable, though they are unchangeable as measured by eviternity. On the other hand eternity has no succession nor is succession annexed to it.

             Solution of the Tenth Argument. God's work whereby he brings things into being must not be taken as the work of a craftsman who makes a box and then leaves it: because God continues to give being, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12; viii, 12). Hence it does not follow that we must assign an instant wherein things were brought into being, before which they existed not, except on account of the teaching of faith.