ARTICLE IV

IS THERE A CREATURE THAT OUGHT TO BE OR ACTUALLY IS ANNIHILATED?

THE third point of inquiry is whether any creature is to be annihilated, or is actually annihilated: and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative.

             1. Just as a finite power cannot move in an infinite time, even so by no finite power can a thing exist for an infinite time. Now all corporeal power is finite (Phys. viii). Therefore no body has the power to exist for an infinite time. But there are bodies that cannot be corrupted, because nothing is contrary to them, like the heavenly bodies. Therefore at some time they must of necessity be annihilated.

             2. That which is directed to the attainment of an end is no longer needed where the end has been reached: thus a ship is necessary that we may cross the sea, but we no longer need it after crossing the ocean. Now corporeal creatures were made for the sake of the spiritual creature, in order to help it to reach its end. When therefore the spiritual creatures arrive at their ultimate end they no longer need corporeal creatures: and since there is nothing superfluous in God's works it would seem that at the last end of all things every corporeal creature will cease to exist.

             3. Nothing accidental is infinite. Now existence is accidental to the creature according to Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 4); wherefore Hilary (De Trin. vii) distinguishes God from his creatures by stating that there is no accident in God. Therefore no creature will last for ever, and all creatures will at some time be reduced to nothing.

             4. The end should correspond to the beginning. Now creatures had their beginning after nothing had existed but God. Therefore creatures will return to an end wherein there will be absolutely nothing in existence.

             5. That which has no power to exist always, cannot endure for ever. And that which has not always been has no power to exist always. Therefore that which was not always cannot endure for ever. But creatures were not always. Therefore they cannot last for ever, and thus they will at length be annihilated.

             6. Justice requires, if a man is ungrateful for a benefit bestowed or acquired, that he should be deprived of it. Now by committing mortal sin man proved himself ungrateful. Therefore justice demands that he be deprived of all the benefits he has received from God, among which is his very existence: also God's judgement on sinners will be just according to the Apostle (Rom. ii, 2). Therefore they will be annihilated.

             7. The words of Jeremias are to the point (x, 24): Correct me O Lord, and yet with judgement and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing.

             8. It will be said perhaps that God's punishments are even less severe than what is deserved, on account of his mercy which in his judgements is always mingled with justice: so that God does not exclude sinners entirely from a share in his benefits.--On the contrary, mercy is not shown to man by granting him what it were better for him not to have: and it were better for the damned not to be at all than to be thus, as evidenced by the words about Judas (Matt. xxvi, 24): It were better for him had that man not been born. Therefore it is no part of God's mercy that the damned be kept in existence.

             9. Things that have no matter in their composition are altogether, i.e. utterly destroyed when they disappear (Metaph. iii): for instance accidents. Now accidents frequently disappear. Therefore some things are reduced to nothing.

             10. The Philosopher (Phys. vi) argues that if a continuous quantity is composed of indivisible parts, it must be resolved into indivisible parts. Whence we may infer that everything is resolved into the elements from which it is produced. Now all creatures are produced from nothing. Therefore all at some time will be resolved into nothing.

             11. It is written (2 Pet. iii, 10): The heavens shall pass away with great violence. But they cannot pass away by corruption so as to be changed into some other body, since they have no contrary. Therefore they will pass away into nothing.

             12. Again to the point are the words of Psalm ci, 26, 27: The heavens are the works of thy hands: they shall perish, and of Luke xxi, 63: Heaven and earth shall pass away. On the contrary it is written (Eccles. i, 4): The earth standeth for ever: and again (ibid. iii, 14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. Therefore creatures will not be annihilated.

             I answer that the created universe will never be annihilated. And notwithstanding that corporeal creatures have not always existed they will last nevertheless for ever as to their substance: although it has been maintained by some that at the final consummation all corruptible creatures will be reduced to nothing, an opinion that has been ascribed to Origen, who however apparently does not assert it as his own but rather as a view held by others.

             In support of this solution to the question we may argue from a twofold source. First from the divine will, on which the existence of creatures depends. Although considered in itself God's will about creatures is indifferent to opposite things, since it is not more bound to one alternative than to another, yet it is necessitated in a way of speaking through the granting of a supposition. For even as in creatures that which is indifferent to opposite things is necessitated through a supposition being made (thus it is possible for Socrates to sit or not to sit, but while he sits, it is necessary that he sit), so too the divine will which, considered in itself, can will either a certain thing or its opposite--for instance, to save or not to save Peter--cannot will not to save Peter so long as he wills to save him. And whereas God's will is unchangeable, if it be supposed that he wills a certain thing at some time, on that supposition it is necessary that he will it always, although it is not necessary if he will a thing to last for a time, that he also will it to last for ever. Now he who wills a thing for its own sake, wills it to last for ever, for the very reason that he wills it for itself: because if he wills a thing to exist for a time, and afterwards not to exist, he wills that thing to exist for the perfection of something else, and when this latter is perfected, he no longer wills the thing that he only willed that this other thing might be made perfect. Now God wills the created universe for its own sake, although he wills its existence for his own sake: for these two are not incompatible with each other. Because God wills creatures to exist for his goodness' sake, namely that they may imitate and reflect it; which they do inasmuch as from it they derive their being, and subsist in their respective natures. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we say that God made all things for himself according to the text of Proverbs xvi, 4, The Lord hath made all things for himself, or that he made creatures that they might exist, according to Wisdom, i, 14, He created all things that they might be. Wherefore from the very fact that God made creatures it is to be inferred that he willed them to last for ever, and seeing that his will is unchangeable the opposite will never happen.

             Secondly, from the very nature of things. God fashioned each nature in such a way as not to deprive it of its property. Hence on the words of Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, a gloss says that God who is the author of nature does not act contrary to nature, although at times in support of the faith he performs in creatures works that surpass nature. Now it is a natural property of those immaterial things which have no contrary that they last for ever, since in them there is no potentiality to non-existence, as we have shown above. Thus even as he does not deprive fire of its natural inclination to rise, so neither does he deprive the aforesaid things of their everlastingness by reducing them to nothing.

             Reply to the First Objection. According to the Commentator (Metaph. xi, comm. 41) although all potentiality residing in a body is finite it does not follow that every body has a finite potentiality to exist: seeing that bodies that are actually corruptible have no potentiality, finite or infinite, to exist but only to be moved. This solution however apparently does not solve the difficulty. Potentiality to exist may be taken not only in the sense of a passive potentiality that is on the side of matter, but also in the sense of an active power which is on the part of the form which cannot be lacking to incorruptible things: because power of existence is proportionate to the degree in which a form is in a thing: wherefore the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, i) holds that certain things have the virtue and power to last for ever. Accordingly we reply otherwise as follows. From the fact that a thing lasts for an infinite time we cannot infer that it has an infinite potentiality to exist, unless it be itself measured by time either directly, as movement, or indirectly, as the existence of things that are subject to movement, and are for a certain period of time, beyond which they cannot last. Now the existence of a heavenly body is not affected by time or movement, since it is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore from the fact that the heaven lasts for an infinite time, it does not acquire infinity of existence, seeing that it is altogether outside the continuance of time: for which reason theologians say that it is measured by eviternity. Therefore the heaven does not require an infinite power in order to last for ever.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Just as one part of an army is related both to another part and to the commander-in-chief, so too the corporeal creature is directed both to assist in the perfecting of the spiritual, and to reflect the divine goodness. The latter it will do for ever, though it cease to do the former.

             Reply to the Third Objection. If we speak of substantial existence, then existence is not described as an accident as though it were in the genus of accident (for it is the act of an essence) but by a kind of similitude, inasmuch as like an accident it is not part of the essence. And yet even if it were in the genus of accident nothing prevents it from lasting for ever, seeing that proper accidents are of necessity in their respective substances, so that nothing hinders them from being in them for ever. On the other hand accidents that adhere to their subjects accidentally are nowise everlasting by nature: but the substantial existence of a thing cannot be an accident of this kind, because it is the act of its essence.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Before things existed, there was no nature having everlastingness as a property, as there was when things had been created. Moreover it would conduce to a certain perfection of the spiritual creature that things did not always exist, since this is a distinct proof that God is the cause of things: whereas no good would result if all things were annihilated. Hence the comparison fails between the beginning and the end.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Those things that will last for ever have the power to last for ever; but they did not always have this power, wherefore they did not always exist.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although in justice God could deprive of existence and annihilate a creature that sins against him, yet it is a more becoming justice that he keep it in existence to punish it: and this for two reasons. First, because in the former case justice would have no admixture of mercy, since nothing would remain to which he might show mercy: and yet it is written (Ps. xxiv, 10) that all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Secondly, because in the second case justice is more in proportion with sin, and this in two respects. In the first place, when a sin is committed the will rebels against God, whereas nature does not, but observes the order assigned to it by God: so that the punishment should be such as to afflict the will by hurting the nature which the will had abused: whereas if the creature were utterly annihilated, nature would be hurt indeed, but the will would not be afflicted. In the second place, seeing that sin contains two things, aversion from the incommutable good, and conversion to transient good, aversion results from conversion, since no sinner intends to turn away from God, but seeks the enjoyment of a temporal good which is incompatible with the enjoyment of evil. Wherefore as the pain of loss corresponds to the aversion of sin, while the pain of sense corresponding to the conversion is inflicted for the actual sin, it is fitting that the pain of loss should not be without the pain of sense: whereas if the creature were annihilated there would be eternal pain of loss, but the pain of sense would cease.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The judgement mentioned by the prophet signifies the infliction of a congruous punishment in proportion to sin, as explained above: and the fury from which he prays to be delivered is that which excludes the moderation of mercy.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing is said to be better either because it includes a greater good, and thus it is better for the damned to exist than not to exist: or because it excludes an evil, since even absence of evil is reckoned a good by the Philosopher (Ethic. v., 8). The words of our Lord quoted are to be taken in the latter sense.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although forms and accidents have no matter in their composition, they have matter in which they exist and from the potentiality of which they are educed: wherefore when they cease to be, they are not utterly annihilated, but remain in the potentiality of matter as before.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Even as creatures are made from nothing, so are they reducible to nothing, if so it pleased God.

             Reply to the Eleventh and Twelfth Objections. The sense of the passages quoted is not that the substance of the world will perish, but that its outward appearance will vanish according to the Apostle (I Cor. vii, 31).