ARTICLE XV

DID THINGS PROCEED FROM GOD OF NATURAL NECESSITY OR BY THE DECREE OF HIS WILL?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xix, A. 4

THE fifteenth point of inquiry is whether things proceeded from God of natural necessity or by a decree of his will: and it would seem that they proceeded of natural necessity.

             1. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says: As our sun neither by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being enlightens all things that can participate its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon all things according to their capacity. Seeing then that the sun enlightens without reason or pre-election, it does so of natural necessity. Therefore God also produces creatures by communicating his goodness to them of natural necessity.

             2. Every perfection of a lower nature derives from the perfection of the divine nature. Now it belongs to the perfection of a lower nature by its own power to produce its like in some effect. A fortiori therefore God naturally and not voluntarily communicates the likeness of his goodness to creatures.

             3. Every agent produces its like; wherefore the effect proceeds from its active cause in so far as it bears a likeness thereto. Now the creature bears a likeness to God as regards those things which belong to God by nature, namely being, goodness, unity and so forth; and not as regards things willed or understood, as the product of his art bears a likeness to the craftsman as regards the art-given form and not as regards his nature, for which reason he produces it voluntarily and not naturally. Therefore things proceed from God by virtue of his nature and not by his will.

             4. It may be replied that the divine will communicates the likeness of the natural attributes.--On the contrary, a likeness of nature cannot be communicated otherwise than by the power of nature. Now the power of nature is nowhere subject to the will: wherefore in God, since the Father begets the Son naturally he does not beget him by his will: and in man the forces of the vegetal soul which are called natural forces are not subject to his will. Therefore it is not possible for a likeness of the divine attributes to be communicated to creatures by the divine will.

             5. Augustine says (De Doct. Christ. i, 32) that we exist because God is good, so that seemingly God's goodness is the cause of the production of creatures. Now goodness is natural to God. Therefore the emanation of things from God is natural.

             6. In God nature and will are the same: and consequently if he produces things willingly it would seem that he produces them naturally.

             7. Natural necessity results from the fact that nature invariably acts in the same way, unless prevented. Now God is more unchangeable than the lower nature. Therefore God produces his effects more of necessity than the lower nature.

             8. God's operation is his essence: and his essence is natural to him. Therefore whatever he does he does naturally.

             9. Again, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 2) the end is what is willed, the means are what we choose. But God has no end since he is infinite. Therefore he acts not willingly but rather of natural necessity.

             10. God operates inasmuch as he is good, according to Augustine (De Doct. Christ. i, 32). Now he is the necessary good. Therefore he works of necessity.

             11. Whatsoever exists is either contingent or necessary. Now a thing is necessary in three ways, by coercion, by supposition and absolutely. It cannot be said that in God anything is potential or contingent: since this argues mutability according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xi, 5), because what is contingent may happen not to be. Again, nothing in God is necessary by coercion because in him nothing is violent or contrary to nature (Metaph. v, 5). Nor is there anything necessary by supposition, because this depends on certain things being presupposed, and God is not dependent on anything. It remains then that all in God is absolutely necessary, and it would seem consequently that he produced things necessarily.

             12. It is written (2 Tim. ii, 13) that God continueth faithful, he cannot deny himself. Now seeing that he is his own goodness he would deny himself were he to deny his own goodness. But he would deny his own goodness were he not to pour it out by communicating it to others, for this is proper to goodness. Consequently God cannot but produce creatures by communicating his own goodness to them: and therefore he produces them of necessity: because that which cannot but be is convertible with that which is necessary (Perihermen. ii, 3).

             13. According to Augustine the Father in begetting the Son expressed himself by his word. Now Anselm says (Monolog. lii) that by the same word the Father expresses himself and the creature. Seeing then that the Father begot the Son naturally and not by the command of his will, it would seem that thus also did he produce creatures, since in God to speak and to make do not differ according to the words of Scripture (Ps. xxxi, 1, 9): He spake and they were made.

             14. Every voluntary agent wills of necessity his ultimate end; thus man of necessity wills to be happy. Now the ultimate end of the divine will is the communication of his goodness: since to this end did he make creatures that he might communicate his goodness to them. Therefore God wills this of necessity, and thus of necessity does he produce them.

             15. Just as God is good by his essence so is he necessary by his essence. Now because God is good by his essence there is nothing in God but what is good. Therefore in like manner there is nothing in him but what is necessary: and consequently he produces things necessarily.

             16. God's will is determined to one thing, namely the good. Now nature through being determined to one works necessarily. Therefore God's will produces creatures necessarily.

             17. The Father by virtue of his nature is the principle of the Son and the Holy Ghost, as Hilary says (De Synod.). Now the same nature that is in the Father and Son is also in the Holy Ghost. Therefore likewise the Holy Ghost is a principle by his nature. But he is not a principle except of creatures. Therefore creatures proceed from God naturally.

             18. The effect proceeds from its cause in action: wherefore a cause is not related to its effect except as related to its action or operation. Now the relation of God's action or operation to himself is natural, since God's action is his essence. Therefore the relation of God to his effect is also natural so that he produces it naturally.

             19. By that which is essentially good nothing is made but what is good and well made. Therefore by that which is essentially necessary, nothing is made but what is necessary and necessarily made. Now such is God. Therefore all things proceed from him of necessity.

             20. Since what exists of itself is prior to that which exists by another, it follows that the first agent acts by his essence. Now his essence and his nature are the same. Therefore he acts by his nature: and thus creatures proceed from him naturally.

             On the contrary Hilary says (De Synod.): The will of God gave all things their substance: and (ibid.): Such are creatures as God willed them to be. Therefore God produced creatures by his will and not by natural necessity.

             Moreover Augustine addressing God says (Confess. xii, 7): Lord, thou didst make two things, one nigh to thyself, the angel, to wit, the other nigh to nothing, namely matter. Yet neither is of thy nature, since neither is what thou art. Now the Son proceeds from the Father naturally inasmuch as he has the same nature as the Father, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Therefore the creature does not proceed naturally from God.

             I answer that without any doubt we must hold that God by the decree of his will and by no natural necessity brought creatures into being. This may for the present be made clear by four arguments.

             First argument. The universe must needs be directed to an end, otherwise all things in the universe would befall by chance. Unless one were to say that the first creatures were not directed to an end but produced by natural necessity; and that subsequent creatures are directed to an end. This was the opinion of Democritus who maintained that the heavenly bodies were produced by chance, but lower bodies by determinate causes; and is refuted (Phys. ii, 4) for the reason that more exalted beings cannot be less ordinate than those of lower dignity. We must therefore hold that in producing creatures God had some end in view. Now both will and nature act for an end, but not in the same way. Nature has no knowledge of the purpose for which it acts, nor does it view it in the light of an end, nor is it aware of the connection between the means and the end; so that it cannot propose an end to itself, nor move order or direct itself towards the end, whereas this is within the competency of a voluntary agent that can understand the end and all those other things.. Wherefore the voluntary agent acts for the end in suchwise that he proposes the end to himself, and to a certain extent moves himself towards the end by directing his actions thereto. On the other hand nature tends to its end as a thing that is moved and directed by an intelligent and voluntary agent, even as an arrow flies towards a certain mark through the aim of the archer: and in this sense philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence. Now that which is by another is always preceded by that which is of itself. Consequently the first director to an end must direct by his will: and thus God brought creatures into being by his will and not naturally. Nor may it be objected that the Son was naturally begotten by the Father, and yet his birth preceded creation: because the Son proceeds not as one ordained to an end, but as the end of all.

             Second argument. Nature is determined to one thing: and since every agent produces its like, it follows that nature must tend to produce a likeness that is determinately in one subject. Now seeing that equality is caused by unity, whereas inequality is caused by multitude which is manifold (wherefore equality exists between things in only one way, but inequality in many various degrees), nature always produces its equal unless it be hindered by a defect either in the active force or in the recipient or patient. But God is not hindered by a defect in the patient, since he needs not matter: nor is his power defective, but infinite. Wherefore nothing proceeds from him naturally but what is his equal, namely the Son. On the other hand creatures, being unequal, are produced not naturally but voluntarily, for there are many degrees of inequality. Nor may it be said that the divine power is determined to one only, seeing that it is infinite. Wherefore since the power of God extends to the production of various degrees of inequality among creatures, it was by the decree of his will and not of natural necessity that he fashioned this or that creature in this or that particular degree.

             Third argument. Since every agent in some way produces its like, the effect must in some way pre-exist in its cause. Now whatsoever is contained in another is therein according to the mode of the container: wherefore as God himself is intelligence it follows that creatures pre-exist in him intelligibly, in which sense it is written (Jo. i, 3): That which was made was life in him. But that which is in an intelligence does not proceed therefrom except by means of the will: for the will is the executor of the intellect, and the intelligible moves the will. Consequently creatures must have proceeded from God by his will.

             Fourth argument. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text 16) action is twofold: one that remains in the agent, of which it is the perfection and act; such as to understand, to will and the like: the other issues from the agent into an extrinsic patient which it perfects and actuates, such as to heat, to move and the like. Now God's action cannot be taken as belonging to this latter kind of action, because his action is his very essence, and consequently does not issue outside him. Hence it must be taken as belonging to the former kind of action which is only to be found in one possessed of intelligence and will, or also of the faculty of sense, which latter again does not apply to God, because sensation, though it does not issue into an external object, is caused by the action of an external object. Therefore whatsoever God does outside himself he does it as understanding and willing it. Nor does this argument belie the naturalness of the Son's begetting, the term of which was not something outside the divine essence. We must therefore hold that all creatures proceeded from God by his will and not of natural necessity.

             Reply to the First Objection. The comparison of Dionysius must be understood to refer to the universality of diffusion: as the sun sheds its rays on all bodies without differentiating one from another, so likewise is it with God's goodness: but it does not apply to the absence of will.

             Reply to the Second Objection. It is owing to the perfection of the divine nature that by virtue thereof its likeness is communicated to creatures: yet this communication was made not of natural necessity but voluntarily.

             This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nature is not subject to will from within: but in externals nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will. Thus in the local movements of animals nature in their muscles and sinews is subject to the command of their appetite. Consequently it is not unreasonable if by virtue of the divine nature creatures be brought into existence according to the behest of the divine will.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. The good is the proper object of the will: hence the goodness of God as willed and loved by him is the cause of things through his will.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although will and nature are identically the same in God, they differ logically, in so far as they express respect to creatures in different ways: thus nature denotes a respect to some one thing determinately, whereas will does not.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is owing not merely to the unchangeableness of nature that it produces a particular effect of necessity, but to its being determined to one: this does not apply to the divine will although it is supremely unchangeable.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Although God's operation belongs to him naturally seeing that it is his very nature or essence, the created effect follows the operation of his nature which, in our way of understanding, is considered as the principle of his will, even as the effect that is heating follows according to the mode of the heat.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although God is infinite he is the end of all things. He is not infinite as though he were deprived of finiteness in the same way as there may be an infinite in quantity, although quantity by nature is finite, for in this way an end is neither finite nor infinite. But he is infinite in a negative sense, because he is altogether without an end.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. It is true that God operates inasmuch as he is good, and that goodness is in him of necessity, but it does not follow that he works of necessity. Because his goodness works through his will in so far as it is the object or end of his will. Now the will is not inclined of necessity to the means, although it is necessitated in respect of the last end.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. As regards the things which are in God himself, nothing can be described as potential: all is naturally and absolutely necessary. But in respect of creatures we can call certain things potential not in regard to passive potentiality, but in regard to an active power which is not limited to one effect.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Were God to deny his own goodness by doing something contrary thereto or wherein his goodness were not expressed, we should arrive at the impossible conclusion that he denied himself. But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything: since it would suffer nothing by not being communicated.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the Word of God proceeds from the Father naturally, it does not follow that creatures proceed from God naturally. The Father by his words speaks his creatures according as they are in him: and in him they are as producible not necessarily but voluntarily.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The last end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but that goodness itself for love of which God wills to communicate it. He works for his goodness' sake not as desiring to have what he has not, but as wishing to communicate what he has: for he acts not from desire, but from love, of the end.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. As in God there is naught but good, so is there naught but what is necessary. But it does not follow that whatsoever proceeds from him does so of necessity.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As stated above God's will inclines naturally to his goodness: so that he cannot will but what is becoming to him, namely the good. Yet he is not determined to this or that good: wherefore it does not follow that the goods which exist proceed from him necessarily.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Though the same nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost it has not the same mode of existence in each one of the three, and when I say 'mode of existence' I mean in respect of the relations. In the Father nature is considered as not received from another: in the Son, as received from another. Consequently we must not infer that whatsoever belongs to the Father by virtue of his nature, belongs also to the Son or the Holy Ghost.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The effect follows from the action according to the mode of the principle of the action: wherefore since the divine will which has no necessary connection with creatures is considered, in our way of thinking, to be the principle of the divine action in regard to creatures, it does not follow that the creature proceeds from God by natural necessity, although the action itself is God's essence or nature.

             Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The creature is like God as regards general conditions, but not as to the mode of participation: thus being is in God otherwise than in creatures, and so too is goodness. Hence although from the first good all goods derive, and all beings from the first being, yet all do not derive supreme goodness from the sovereign good, nor from the necessary being do all things proceed of necessity.

             Reply to the Twentieth Objection. God's will is his essence: wherefore his working by his will does not prevent his working by his essence. God's will is not an intention in addition to his essence, but is his very essence.