ARTICLE II

IS GOD'S ESSENCE OR SUBSTANCE THE SAME AS HIS EXISTENCE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. iii, AA. 3, 4

THE second point of inquiry is whether God's essence or substance is the same as his existence: and seemingly it is not.

             1. Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 1, 3): That God is, is evident to us; but what he is in substance and nature is utterly incomprehensible and unknown. Now the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore God's existence is not the same as his substance or essence.

             2. But it will be replied that God's existence is unknown to us even as his substance, as regards what it is.

             On the contrary, these two questions are different; Is he? and What is he? and we know the answer to the former, but not the answer to the latter, as evinced from the authority quoted. Therefore that which in God corresponds to the question Is he? is not the same as that which corresponds to the question What is he? and existence corresponds to the former question and substance or nature corresponds to the latter.

             3. Again it will be replied that God's existence is known not in itself but through its likeness in creatures.

             On the contrary, in the creature there is existence and substance or nature, and since it has both from God it is likened to God in both, because an agent produces its like. If then God's existence is known through the likeness of created existence, it follows that his substance is known through the likeness of created substance: and thus we would know not only that God is but also what he is.

             4. A thing is said to differ from another by reason of its substance: nor can one thing differ from another by reason of that which is common to all things: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 3) that being should not be placed in a definition, since it would not differentiate the thing defined from another. Consequently the substance of a thing that is distinct from other things cannot be its being, since being is common to all things. Now God is something distinct from all other things. Therefore his being is not his substance.

             5. Things are not distinct if they have not a distinct being. Now the being of A is not distinct from B's being considered as being but considered as in this or that nature. Hence a being that is in a nature that is not distinct from its being will not be distinct from any other being: and thus it will follow, if God's substance is his being, that he is the common being of all things.

             6. Being to which no addition can be made is being common to all things. Now if God is his own being no additions can be made to his being: and then his being will be common to all. Consequently he can be predicated of everything, and will enter into the composition of everything: which is heretical and contrary to the statement of the Philosopher who says (De Causis, prop. xx) that the first cause rules all things without being mingled with them.

             7. Nothing that implies concretion should be said of a thing that is utterly simple. Now such is existence: for it would seem that existence is to essence as whiteness is to the white thing. Therefore we should not say that God's substance is his existence.

             8. Boethius says (De Hebdom. : Whatsoever has being participates of that which is being, and thus has being; and participates of something else, and thus it is this or that thing. Now God has being. Therefore, besides his being, there is something else in him whereby he is a particular thing.

             9. That which is most imperfect should not be ascribed to God who is most perfect. Now existence is most imperfect like primal matter: for just as primal matter may be determined by any form, so being, inasmuch as it is most imperfect, may be determinated by all the proper predicaments. Therefore as primal matter is not in God, so neither should existence be an attribute of the divine substance.

             10. That which signifies something as an effect should not be ascribed to the first substance which has no beginning. Now such is existence, for every being has existence through its essential principles. Therefore it is unfitting to say that God's substance is its own existence.

             11. A proposition is self-evident wherein a thing is predicated of itself. But if God's substance is its own existence, the subject and predicate will be identical in the proposition, God exists. Wherefore it will be a self-evident proposition; yet this is not true seemingly, since it can be demonstrated. Therefore God's existence is not his substance.

             On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God existence is not an accident but subsisting truth. Now that which is subsisting is the substance of a thing. Therefore God's existence is his substance.

             Again, Rabbi Moses says that God is a being but not in an essence, is living but not with life, is powerful but not with power, wise but not with wisdom. Therefore in God essence is not distinct from existence.

             Again, a thing is properly denominated from what it is: since the name of a thing denotes its essence and quiddity (Metaph. iv). Now of all God's names He who is (Exod. iv) is the most appropriate to him. Hence as this name is given to him in respect of his existence, it would seem that God's very existence is his essence.

             I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence. In order to make this clear we must observe that when several causes producing various effects produce one effect in common in addition to their various effects, they must needs produce this common effect by virtue of some higher cause to which this effect properly belongs. The reason for this is that since a proper effect is produced by a particular cause in respect of its proper nature or form, different causes having different natures and forms must needs have their respective different proper effects: so that if they have one effect in common, this is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause by whose virtue they act: thus pepper, ginger and the like which differ in characteristics have the common effect of producing heat; yet each one has its peculiar effect differing from the effects of the others. Hence we must trace their common effect to a higher cause, namely fire to whom that effect properly belongs. Likewise in the heavenly movements each planet has its peculiar movement, and besides this they have all a common movement which must be the proper movement of some higher sphere that causes them all to revolve with the daily movement. Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this cause is God. Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness to its nature. Therefore being must be the essence or nature of God. For this reason it is stated in De Causis (prop. ix) that none but a divine intelligence gives being, and that being is the first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it.

             Reply to the First Objection. 'Being' and 'is' may be taken in two ways (Metaph. x, 13, 14). Sometimes they signify the essence of a thing and the act of being, and sometimes they denote the truth of a proposition even in things that have no being: thus we say that blindness is because it is true that a man is blind. Accordingly when Damascene says that God's existence is evident to us, the existence of God is taken in the second sense and not the first. For in the first sense God's existence is the same as his essence, and as his essence is unknown so also is his existence. In the second sense we know that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our mind from his effects.

             This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. God's being which is his essence is not universal being, but being distinct from all other being: so that by his very being God is distinct from every other being.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated in De Causis (prop. iv) God's being is individualised and distinct from every other being by the very fact that it is self-subsistent being, and is not something additional to a nature that is distinct from its being. Now every other being that is not subsistent must be individualised by the nature and essence that subsists in that being: and of such beings it is true that the being of A is distinct from the being of B by the fact that it is the being of another nature: even so if there were one heat existing of itself without matter or subject, by that very fact it would be distinct from every other heat, just as heats existing in a subject are not differentiated otherwise than by their subjects.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. Being to which no addition is made is universal being, though the possibility of addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being: whereas the divine being is being to which no addition can be made and this enters into the very notion of the divine being: wherefore the divine being is not universal being. Thus by adding the difference rational to animal in general we do not add anything to the notion of animal in general: and yet it is not incompatible with the idea of animal in general that an addition to it be possible: for this enters into the notion of irrational animal which is a species of animal.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. The mode of signification of the names we give things is consequent upon our mode of understanding: for names signify the concepts of our intellect (Peri Herm. i). Now our intellect understands being according to the mode in which it finds it in things here below from which it gathers its knowledge, and wherein being is not subsistent but inherent. Now our reason tells us that there is a self-subsistent being: wherefore although the term being has a signification by way of concretion, yet our intellect in ascribing being to God soars above the mode of its signification, and ascribes to God the thing signified, but not the mode of signification.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. The saying of Boethius refers to things that have being by participation and not by their essence: since that which has being by its essence, if we stress the terms, should be described as being itself rather than as that which has being.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Being, as we understand it here, signifies the highest perfection of all: and the proof is that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now no signate form is understood to be in act unless it be supposed to have being. Thus we may take human nature or fiery nature as existing potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the mind: but when it has being it becomes actually existent. Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Nor may we think that being, in this sense, can have anything added to it that is more formal and determines it as act determines potentiality: because being in this latter sense is essentially distinct from that to which it is added and whereby it is determined. But nothing that is outside the range of being can be added to being: for nothing is outside its range except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence being is not determined by something else as potentiality by act but rather as act by potentiality: since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of the difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an organic physical body. Accordingly this being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature. For this reason Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that though things having life excel those that merely have being, yet being excels life, since living things have not only life but also being.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. The order of agents follows the order of ends, in that the last end corresponds to the first agent and in due proportion other ends to other agents in their order. Take, for example, the ruler of a state, the commander of the army and a private soldier: the ruler is clearly the first in the order of agents; at whose orders the commander goes forth to the war; and under him is the private soldier who engages in hand-to-hand combat at the orders of his commander. Now the end of the private soldier is to overthrow his opponent, and this is directed yet further to the victory of the army, which is the end of the commander-in-chief; and this again is directed to the welfare of the state or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler or king. Accordingly being which is the proper effect and end of the operation of the first agent must occupy the position of last end. Now although the end is first in the intention, it is last in execution, and is the effect of other causes. Therefore created being, which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent, is caused from other principles, and yet the first cause of being is the first principle of all.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. A proposition may be self-evident in itself and yet not self-evident to this or that individual; when, to wit, the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject, which definition is unknown to him: thus if he knew not what is a whole, he would not know this proposition, A whole is greater than its part. The reason is that such propositions become known when their terms are known (Poster. Anal. i). Now this proposition, God is, is in itself self-evident, since the same idea is expressed in both subject and predicate: but with regard to us it is not self-evident, because we know not what God is: so that for us it needs to be proved, though not for those who see God in his essence.