ARTICLE IX

ARE THERE ONLY THREE PERSONS IN GOD: OR ARE THERE MORE OR FEWER THAN THREE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxi, A. 1

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether in God there are only three Persons, or more or fewer than three. It would seem that there are more than three.

             1. Augustine says (Con. Maxim. iii, 12): The Son did not beget a creator, not that he could not but because it was unfitting. Now in God, just as in all perpetual things, there is no difference between the actual and the possible (Phys. iii, text. 32). Therefore the Son begot another Son: and thus there are two Sons in God, and consequently more than three Persons.

             2. To this it may be replied that the words he could not mean that it was not due to his inability.

             On the contrary the acts belonging to a particular nature are appropriate to every supposit of that nature, except through inability to execute them. Now generation is an act pertaining to the perfection of the divine nature, otherwise it would not be appropriate to the Father, in whom there is nothing that is not perfect. If then the Son begets not another Son, this will be because he is unable to do so.

             3. If the Son cannot beget he can be begotten: and therefore he has the power to be begotten but not the power to beget. Since then to beget differs from being begotten; and since powers are distinguished in reference to their objects, the Father's power will not be the same as the Son's: and this is heretical.

             4. In things active and passive action and passion are reduced to different principles, since in creatures a thing acts by reason of its form and is patient by reason of its matter. Now to beget and to be begotten express action and passion. Therefore they must be referred to different principles: so that it cannot be the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten.

             5. But to this it might be replied that it is the same power inasmuch as on either hand it is rooted in the divine essence which is one in Father and Son.

             On the contrary the power to heat and the power to dry are rooted in one subject, namely fire: and yet they are not one and the same power, since heat which is the principle of calefaction is a distinct quality from dryness which is the principle of desiccation. Wherefore the unity of the divine essence does not suffice to make one the Father's power to beget and the Son's power to be begotten.

             6. Every wise and intelligent subject forms a concept by his wisdom. Now the Son is wise and intelligent even as the Father. Therefore he has a concept. But the Father's concept is the Word which is the Son. Therefore the Son also has a Son.

             7. To this it may be replied that word is predicated of God not only personally but also essentially, and thus the Word predicated essentially may be the concept of the Son.

             On the contrary word denotes the species conceived and ordered for the purpose of manifestation, and thus it implies origin. Now those terms which indicate origin in God are predicated personally and not essentially. Therefore word cannot be predicated essentially.

             8. Anselm (Monolog.) says that as the Father utters (dicit) himself, so do the Son and the Holy Ghost. Now, as he says (ibid.), for the Father to utter himself is the same as to beget a Son. Therefore the Son begets another Son: and thus the same conclusion follows.

             9. God is proved to beget from the fact that he bestows on others the faculty of begetting (Isa. lxvi, 9): Shall I that give generation to others be barren? saith the Lord. Now as the Father gives generation, even so does the Son: because the works of the Trinity are undivided. Therefore the Son begets a Son.

             10. Augustine (Dial. ad Oros. lxv, 7) says that the Father begets the Son naturally: and Damascene (De Fide Orth. xxvii, 2) says that generation is a work of nature. Now the Father and the Son have the same nature. Therefore as the Father begets, so also does the Son: and consequently in God there are several Sons and more than three Persons.

             11. But someone will reply that there cannot be more than one Son in God since there can be but one filiation: because the form of one species is not multiplied otherwise than by division of matter, and there is no such thing in God.

             On the contrary any difference whatsoever must naturally connote number. Now there can be more than one filiation, not only by reason of the matter but also because this filiation is thiswise and that filiation is thatwise. Therefore nothing prevents several filiations being in God, although there is no matter in him.

             12. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from the sun, according to Hebrews i, 3, being the brightness of his glory. Now one brightness can produce another brightness. Therefore the Son can beget another Son: and thus there would be several Sons in God and more than three Persons.

             13. The Holy Ghost is the Father's love of the Son. Now the Father also loves the Holy Ghost. Therefore there must be another Spirit whereby the Father loves the Holy Ghost: and thus there will be four Persons in God.

             14. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) the good is self-communicative. Now goodness is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as power to the Father and wisdom to the Son. Therefore one would think it most appropriate to the Holy Ghost that he should communicate the divine nature to another person: and thus there will be more than three Persons in God.

             15. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv) a thing is perfect when it can of itself produce its like. Now the Holy Ghost is perfect God. Therefore he can produce another Person: and consequently . . . etc.

             16. The Son does not receive the divine nature from the Father more perfectly than the Holy Ghost. Now the Son receives from the Father the divine nature not only passively (so to speak) as being begotten of him, but also actively, because he can communicate the same nature to another. Therefore the Holy Ghost also can communicate the divine nature to another Person.

             17. Whatsoever belongs to perfection in creatures must be attributed to God. Now it belongs to perfection in creatures to communicate nature, although the mode of communication has a certain imperfection in that it involves division or change in the generator. Therefore to communicate the divine nature belongs to perfection in God, and consequently it must be attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore a Person proceeds from the Holy Ghost, and thus it follows that there are more than three Persons in God.

             18. Just as the Godhead is a good in the Father, so also is paternity. Now from the fact that no good is possessed with pleasure without others sharing in it, some prove that in God there are several Persons having the divine nature. Therefore for the same reason there are several Fathers, and several Sons and several Holy Ghosts in God: and consequently more than three Persons.

             19. The Son and the Holy Ghost are seemingly distinguished from each other in that the Son proceeds from the Father by way of the intellect as his word, while the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of the will as his love. But there are other essential attributes besides the intellect and will, such as goodness, power and so forth. Therefore other Persons proceed from the Father besides the Son and Holy Ghost.

             20. Apparently the process of nature differs from the process of the intellect more than does the process of the will: inasmuch as in creatures the process of the intellect is always accompanied by that of the will, since whatever understands something also wills something: whereas the process of nature is not always accompanied by the process of intellect, thus not everything that can generate can understand. If then in God the Person who proceeds by way of the will as love is distinct from the Person who proceeds by way of the intellect as word, there will also be a Person who proceeds by way of the intellect distinct from the Person who proceeds by way of nature as Son. Hence there will be three Persons proceeding in God and one who does not proceed: and thus there are four Persons.

             21. In God the Persons are multiplied on account of the subsistent relations. Now in God there are five relative notions, viz. paternity, filiation, procession, innascibility and common spiration. Therefore there are five Persons in God.

             22. The relations which are attributed to God from eternity are not in creatures but in God. Now whatsoever is in God is subsistent, since in him there is no accident. Therefore any relation that belongs to God from eternity is subsistent and consequently is a Person. Now such relations are infinite in number: thus the ideas of creatures are in God from eternity, and they are not mutually distinct except by their relation to creatures. Therefore the Persons in God are infinite in number.

             On the other hand it would seem that there are fewer than three.

             1. In one nature there is but one mode of communication of that nature: wherefore, according to the Commentator (Phys. viii), animals generated from seed are not of the same species as those engendered from corrupt matter. Now the divine nature is supremely one: wherefore it can be communicated in one way only. Therefore there cannot be more than two Persons, one that communicates the Godhead in some particular way, and another that receives the Godhead in that same way.

             2. Hilary (De Synod.) shows that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally because he is such as God is, but that creatures proceed from God according to his will, because they are such as he wishes them to be, not such as he is. Now the Holy Ghost, like the Son, is such as God the Father is. Therefore the Holy Ghost, like the Son, proceeds from the Father naturally; and consequently there is no distinction between the Holy Ghost and the Son through the Son proceeding naturally and the Holy Ghost not.

             3. In God will and intellect differ not in nature but only logically: and consequently procession by nature, by intellect and by will differ but logically in God. Therefore if the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinguished through the one proceeding naturally and the other by the will, they will be but logically distinct: and they will not be two Persons, since plurality of persons implies a real distinction.

             4. The Persons in God are distinct by relations of origin only. Now two relations suffice to indicate origin, namely one from whom is another, and one who is from another. Therefore there are but two Persons in God.

             5. Every relation requires two extremes. Since then in God the Persons are not distinct save by the relations; it follows that in God there are either two relations, and consequently four Persons; or one relation, and therefore only two Persons.

             On the contrary it is manifest that there are but three Persons in God from I Jo. v, 7, There are three who bear witness in heaven: and if we ask, Three what? the Church replies: Three Persons, as Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4). Therefore there are three Persons in God.

             Moreover for the perfection of divine goodness, happiness and glory there must be true and perfect charity in God: for nothing is better or more perfect than charity, as Richard says (De Trin. iii, 2). Now there is no happiness without enjoyment, and this arises chiefly from charity: for as we read (ibid. 5), Nothing is sweeter than charity, nothing more enjoyable, the intellectual life affords no sweeter experience, or delight more exquisite. And the perfection of glory consists in the splendour of perfect communication, which is effected by charity. And true and perfect charity requires the trinity of Persons in God. For the love whereby a person loves himself is selfish love and is not true charity. But God cannot love supremely another who is not supremely lovable; and none is supremely lovable that is not supremely good. Hence it is evident that true charity cannot be supreme in God if there be but one Person in him. Nor can it be perfect if there be but two Persons: since perfect charity demands that the lover wish that what he loves himself be equally loved by another. For it is a sign of great imperfection to be unwilling to share one's love, whereas to be willing to share it is a sign of great perfection: The more one is pleased to receive a thing the greater our longing in seeking for it, as Richard says (ibid.). In God therefore, since there is perfection of goodness, happiness and glory, there must be a trinity of Persons.

             Again, as goodness is self-communicative, the perfection of divine goodness requires that he communicate his perfections supremely. But if there were only one Person in God he would not communicate his goodness supremely: for he does not communicate himself supremely to creatures: and if there were but two Persons, the delights of mutual charity would not be communicated perfectly. Hence there must be a second Person to whom the divine goodness is perfectly communicated, and a third to whom the delights of divine charity are perfectly communicated.

             Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 1, 2), three things are required for love, the lover, the beloved and love itself. Now the two who love each other are the Father and the Son: and the love that is their mutual bond is the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are three Persons in God.

             Again, as Richard remarks (De Trin. v, 6), in mankind it is to be observed that a person proceeds from persons in three ways: first, immediately only, as Eve from Adam: secondly, mediately only, as Enoch from Adam: thirdly, both immediately and mediately, as Seth from Adam, immediately as his son, mediately as the son of Eve who proceeded from Adam. Now in God one Person cannot proceed from another mediately only, since there would not be perfect equality. Hence we must conclude that in God there is one Person that does not proceed from another, i.e. the Father from whom two other Persons proceed; one immediately only, i.e. the Son; and the other both mediately and immediately, i.e. the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore there are three Persons in God.

             Again, to both give and receive the fulness of the Godhead comes between giving and not receiving it, and receiving without giving it. Now it belongs to the Person of the Father to give the fulness of the Godhead without receiving it: and to receive the fulness of the Godhead without giving it belongs to the Person of the Holy Ghost. Therefore there must be a third Person who both gives and receives the fulness of the Godhead: and this is the Person of the Son: and thus there are three Persons in God.

             I answer that according to the opinions of heretics it is impossible to assign a definite number of Persons in God. Arius took the trinity of Persons to mean that the Son and Holy Ghost are creatures: and Macedonius was of the same opinion in regard to the Holy Ghost. Now the procession of creatures from God is not necessarily limited to a certain number, seeing that the divine power being infinite surpasses all mode, species and number of the creature. Wherefore if God the Father almighty created two super-excellent creatures, whom Arius stated to be the Son and Holy Ghost, there is no reason why he should not create others equal to them or even greater than they. Sabellius contended that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are only nominally and logically distinct: and here again it is evident that there would be an indefinite multiplication, inasmuch as our reason can consider God in an infinite number of ways in respect of his various effects, and give him various names. The Catholic faith alone which acknowledges unity of the divine nature in Persons really distinct, can assign a reason for the trinity in God. For it is impossible that one simple nature be in more than one as principle: wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.) that whosoever acknowledges two innascibles in God must acknowledge two gods. Now the nature of one innascible God demands that we should acknowledge but one God. Hence certain philosophers asserted that in immaterial things there cannot be plurality except in respect of origin. For one nature can be equally in several subjects on account of the division of matter, which does not apply to God. Wherefore there cannot be in God more than one innascible Person that does not proceed from another. Now if other Persons proceed from him this must be by some action. Not, however, by an action passing into a subject outside the agent, as heating and cutting are the actions of fire and saw, and as creation is the act of God himself: since then the proceeding Persons would be outside the divine nature. It follows then that the procession of Persons into the one divine nature is by reason of an action that does not pass into an extraneous subject but remains in the agent: and in the intellectual nature such actions are but two, to understand and to will. In each of these actions something is found to proceed when the action is performed. The action of understanding is not exercised without something being conceived in the mind of the one who understands, and this is called the word: since before a concept of some kind is fixed in the mind we are not said to understand but to think about a thing in order to understand it. In like manner the act of willing is exercised by love proceeding from the lover through his will, for love is simply the fixation of the will in the good that is willed. In creatures word and love are not subsistent persons in the nature that is endowed with intelligence and will: for a creature's acts of understanding and will are not its very being. Hence its word and love are accessories of and accidental to the understanding and willing creature. But seeing that in God, being, intelligence and will are one and the same, it follows of necessity that word and love in God are not accidents but subsist in the divine nature For in God there is but one simple act of intelligence and one simple act of will, since by understanding his essence he understands all things, and by willing his goodness, he wills whatsoever he wills. Hence there is but one Word and one Love in God. Now the order of understanding and willing is not the same in God as in us. We receive our intellective knowledge from external things: and by our will we tend to something external as an end. Wherefore our act of intelligence is according to a movement from things to the soul: but our act of will is according to a movement from the soul to things. On the other hand God does not acquire knowledge from things, but by his knowledge is the cause of things: nor by his will does he tend to anything external as his end, but he directs all external things to himself as their end. Accordingly both in us and in God there is a certain rotation in the acts of the intellect and will: for the will returns to that whence came the beginning of understanding: but whereas in us the circle ends in that which is external, the external good moving the intellect and the intellect moving the will, and the will by appetite and love tending to the external good; in God, on the other hand, the circle ends in him. For God, by understanding himself, conceives his word which is the type of all things understood by him, inasmuch as he understands all things by understanding himself, and from this word he proceeds to love of all things and of himself. Thus someone has said that a monad engendered an atom and reflected its own heat upon itself. And the circle being closed nothing more can be added, so that a third procession within the divine nature is impossible, although there follows a procession towards external nature. Hence in God there must be but one Person that does not proceed, and only two Persons that proceed, one of whom proceeds as love, the other as word: and thus the Persons in God are three in number.

             In creatures a likeness to this trinity appears in three ways. First as an effect reflects its cause; and in this way the principle of the whole Godhead, i.e. the Father, is represented by that which holds the first place in the creature, namely by being in itself one subsistent thing. The Word is represented by the form of each creature; because in those things which are done by an intellectual agent the form of the effect derives from the concept of his intelligence. Love is represented in the order of creatures: because from the fact that God loves himself, he directs all things to himself in a certain order. Wherefore this likeness is called a vestigiary likeness in that this bears the trace of the foot as an effect bears a trace of its cause. Secondly, by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image; because in order that one thing be the image of another it must present a like species. Thirdly, on account of the unity of object, inasmuch as the rational creature understands and loves God: this is a kind of conformity of union that is found in the saints alone who understand and love the same thing as God understands and loves.

             Of the first kind of likeness it is written (Job xi, 7): Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God? Of the second (Gen. i, 26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness: and this is called the image of creation. Of the third it is written (2 Cor. iii, 18): But we beholding the glory of the Lord with open face are transformed into the same image: and this is called the image of re-creation.

             Reply to the First Objection. The reason why Augustine says that it is not true that the Son was unable to beget, but that it was not fitting for him to beget, is that it was not through inability that the Son does not beget: so that the words was unable must be taken privatively and not simply negatively, and the words it was not fitting indicate that the consequence would be unfitting if in God the Son were to beget another Son. How true this is may be considered in four ways. First, seeing that in God the Son proceeds as word, if the Son begot a Son it would follow that in God word proceeds from word: and this is impossible except in an inquiring and discursive intellect, wherein word proceeds from word when the mind proceeds from the consideration of one truth to the consideration of another: whereas this is nowise consistent with the perfection and simplicity of the divine intellect which at one glance sees all things at the same time. Secondly, because that which renders a thing individual and incommunicable cannot possibly be common to several: thus that which makes Socrates to be this particular thing cannot even be conceived as being in others besides. Hence if in God filiation were common to several (Persons) it would not make the personality of the Son incommunicable, and thus the Son would have to be made an individual Person by something absolute, and this is incompatible with the unity of the divine essence. Thirdly, because nothing that is one in species can be more than one except by reason of matter: for which reason there can be but one essence in God, because the divine essence is utterly immaterial. Now if there were several Sons in God there would also be several filiations, and consequently they would have to be multiplied according to matter subjected to them: and this is incompatible with the divine immateriality. Fourthly, because a man is a son as resulting from a process of nature. Now nature is confined definitely to one effect: except when by accident several effects are produced on account of the matter being divided: and consequently where nature is utterly devoid of matter, there can be but one son.

             Reply to the Second Objection. A thing may be of this or that nature in two ways. First, as considered absolutely: and thus whatsoever belongs to a particular nature must be appropriate to every supposit of that nature: in this sense it is competent to the divine nature to be almighty, creator and other similar attributes that are common to the three Persons. Secondly, a thing belongs to a particular nature as considered in one particular supposit: and then whatsoever belongs to the nature does not necessarily belong to every supposit of that nature. Thus just as the generic nature includes something in one species which does not belong to another species (for instance, the sensible nature endows man with certain qualities with which it does not endow dumb animals, such as a delicate sense of touch and memory and so forth); even so certain things belong to the specific nature in one individual, and not to another individual of the same species. For instance, it was peculiar to human nature considered as in Adam that it was not received by him through the natural process of generation, which does not apply to other individuals of human nature. In this way then the ability to beget belongs to the divine nature as in the Person of the Father, precisely because the Father is not constituted an incommunicable Person otherwise than by paternity which belongs to him as begetting: hence though the Son is a perfect supposit of the divine nature it does not follow that he can beget.

             Reply to the Third Objection. Although the Father can beget whereas the Son cannot, it does not follow that the Father has a power which the Son has not: because in the Father and the Son it is the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten. For power is something absolute, wherefore it is not distinguished in God as neither is goodness nor anything else of the kind. On the other hand in God to beget and to be begotten do not denote something absolute, but merely a relation. Now opposite relations in God meet together in the one same absolute and do not divide it; thus it is clear that the one essence is in Father and Son; wherefore neither is power divided in God through being referred to begetting and being begotten. In fact not even in creatures does every difference of objects necessarily differentiate powers, but only when the objects differ formally within the same genus: thus the power of sight is not differentiated by seeing a man and seeing a horse, because these sensible objects do not differ quâ sensible: and in like manner the absolute is not divided by the relative in God.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. In every action that passes from the agent into an extraneous thing there must be a principle in the agent whereby it is agent, and another principle in the patient whereby it is patient. But in the operation which does not pass into anything extraneous, but remains in the agent, only one principle is required: thus in order to will a principle is necessary on the part of the willer that enables him to will. Now in creatures generation is an operation passing into something extraneous, wherefore the active power in the generator must be distinct from the passive power in the generated. Whereas the divine generation is an operation that does not pass into anything extraneous but remains within; consisting as it does in the conception of the Word. Wherefore there is no need for distinct powers, active in the Father and passive in the Son.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. Heat and dryness considered in themselves are qualities; however, we may call them powers, inasmuch as they are principles of certain actions. Hence it is clear that although the primary and remote root, i.e. the subject, is but one, the proximate root which is the quality is not one.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. As the Father is God begetting and the Son God begotten, so must we say that the Father is wise and conceiving, while the Son is wise and conceived. Because the Son in that he is the Word is a conception of a wise being. But since whatsoever is in God is God it follows that the very conception of a wise God is God, is wise, is powerful and whatsoever is appropriate to God.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Taken in its proper sense word cannot be attributed to God otherwise than personally: because in God there cannot be any origination but what is immaterial and consistent with an intellectual nature, such as the origination of word and love: wherefore if the procession of word and love is not enough to indicate a personal distinction, no distinction of Persons will be possible in God. Thus John both in the beginning of his gospel and in his first epistle employs the term Word instead of Son, nor may we in speaking of God express ourselves in terms other than those of Holy Writ.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Dicere may be taken in two senses. First strictly and then it means to utter a word: and in this sense Augustine (De Trin. vii) says that in God each Person does not 'speak,' but the Father alone. Secondly, in a broad sense in which to speak denotes intelligence: and thus Anselm (loc. cit.) says that not only the Father speaks but also the Son and the Holy Ghost: and though there are three who speak there is but one Word which is the Son: because the Son alone is the concept of the Father who understands and conceives the Word.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. That there is generation in God is not proved from the mere fact that God gives generation to others as efficient cause, since it would follow in like manner that there is motion in God because he gives motion to others. Generation is proved to be in God from the fact that he gives generation to others as both efficient and exemplary cause: and the Father is the exemplar of generation as begetting, while the Son is the exemplar as begotten: wherefore it does not follow that he begets.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Generation is an operation of the divine nature as residing in the Person of the Father, as we have already stated, hence it does not follow that it is appropriate to the Son.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Since filiation is a relation arising from a determinate mode of origin, i.e. according to nature, it is impossible that filiation differ from filiation formally; unless perhaps by reason of a difference of natures communicated by generation: thus we might say that the species of filiation whereby a particular man is a son differs from the species of filiation whereby a particular horse is a son. But in God there is but one nature, wherefore there cannot be several formally different filiations: and it is evident that there cannot be several filiations differing in matter. Consequently in God there is but one filiation and one Son.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. One brightness proceeds from another by the diffusion of light on to another subject: wherefore this is clearly due to a division of matter, which is impossible in God.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. A thing is loved in so far as it is good: hence since one and the same goodness is that of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the Father with the same love, which is the Holy Ghost, loves himself, the Son, the Holy Ghost and all creatures. Even so by the same Word, which is the Son, he utters himself, the Son, the Holy Ghost and all creatures.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Goodness is something in which terminates the living being's operation that abides in the operator. First a thing is understood as true, and then is desired as good: and there the internal operation stops and rests as in its end. But from this point begins the process of external operation: because through the intellect's desire and love for that which it has already considered as good there follows an external operation towards that good. Wherefore from the very fact that goodness is appropriated to the Holy Ghost it is reasonable for us to conclude that the procession of the divine Persons goes no further. What does follow, however, is the procession of creatures, which is outside the divine nature.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Of all lines the circle is the most perfect, because it admits of no addition. Hence this belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost that as it were he closes the circle of the divine origin, so that no addition is possible, as we have shown above.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. In the reception or communication of the divine nature there is no other difference but that arising from the relations: and this difference cannot cause inequality of perfection: because as Augustine says (Cont. Maxim. iii, 18), when we ask who proceeds from whom, it is a question of origin, not of equality or inequality.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Just as the communication of the divine nature by the Father to the Son belongs to their perfection, so the perfect reception of the communicated nature belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost: and both perfections differ not in quantity but only in respect of relation which does not constitute imperfection, as already stated.

             Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. As we have already observed, that which makes a person incommunicable cannot be common to many. Hence the result of sharing therein would be not enjoyment but the destruction of the distinction of the persons. Thus were the Father to have a companion in the Godhead to share his paternity there would be a confusion of Persons: and the same applies to filiation and procession.

             Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The other attributes have no intrinsic operation as the intellect and will have, whence could arise the procession of a divine Person.

             Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The process of nature and the process of the intellect have this in common that in either case one thing proceeds from one thing in likeness to that whence it proceeds. But love which proceeds from the will, proceeds from two who love each other mutually: nor can we infer that because there is love there is a likeness of the lover. Wherefore in God the same (Person) proceeds by way of nature and by way of the intellect, i.e. as Son and as Word: whereas it is another Person that proceeds by way of the will as love.

             Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Although there are five notions in God there are but three personal properties constituting the Persons: and therefore there are but three Persons.

             Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The ideal relations in God refer to things outside, i.e. to creatures: and consequently they do not cause a distinction of Persons in him.

             We must also reply to the other arguments which would prove that there are fewer than three Persons in God.

             1. In every created nature there are many modes of procession, yet the specific nature is not communicated in each of them: and the reason of this is to be found in the imperfection of created nature, inasmuch as not everything of a created nature subsists in itself: thus the word that proceeds from a man's intellect is not subsistent, nor is the love that proceeds from his will: whereas the son who is begotten by an operation of nature subsists in human nature: wherefore this is the only way in which human nature is communicated, although there are several modes of procession. On the other hand whatsoever is in God is subsistent, wherefore in God the divine nature is communicated in every mode of procession.

             2. There is no reason why something should proceed even naturally from the will: for the will naturally wills and loves something, viz. happiness and the knowledge of the truth. Hence there is no reason why the Holy Ghost should not proceed from the Father and the Son, although he proceeds by way of the will.

             3. Although will and intellect do not differ in God except logically, he that proceeds by way of the intellect must be really distinct from him who proceeds by way of the will: because the Word which proceeds by way of the intellect proceeds from one only as from the speaker: while the Holy Ghost who proceeds by way of the will as love, must needs proceed from two who love each other mutually, or from one who speaks and his word. For nothing can be loved unless the intellect has first conceived it by its word. Hence he who proceeds by way of the will must proceed from him who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently must be distinct from him.

             4. He that proceeds from another in God may do so in two ways, namely by way of word and by way of love. Hence to be from another in a general way is not enough to constitute an incommunicable person, and must be defined in reference to that which is proper.

             5. In God there are four relations and not only two: yet only three of them are personal, for one, namely common spiration, is not a personal property, seeing that it is common to two Persons: and for this reason there are only three Persons in God.

             We grant the remaining arguments.