ARTICLE III

DO THE RELATIONS CONSTITUTE AND DISTINGUISH THE PERSONS OR HYPOSTASES?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. 1: Q. xl. A. 2

THE third point of inquiry is whether the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons or Hypostases: and seemingly they do not.

             1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): Every relative expression signifies something besides the relation expressed: thus a master is a man, a slave is a man. Now the Persons in God are expressed relatively. Therefore they are something besides the relative term: and consequently they are not constituted by the relations: for if you remove that which constitutes a thing it is no longer a thing.

             2. It will be replied that in God that which is besides Paternity is the Father.

             On the contrary it is evident that Father is also a relative term. If then through Paternity being relative the Person must contain something besides Paternity, for the same reason beside being Father the Person must contain something that is not relative.

             3. Augustine says (ibid.) that in no sense can the Father be referred to himself, but whatsoever is said of him is in relation to the Son. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.

             4. One may reply that what the Father is besides the relation is the essence.

             On the contrary whatsoever is in a relative besides the relation is referred to the other thing by that relation, as may be seen from the examples which he gives: thus man is related to servant by the relationship of dominion. Now the essence in God is not related, since it neither begets nor is begotten. Therefore this cannot be said of the essence but of the subject of the relation, which subject begets or is begotten.

             5. A thing is considered in itself before we refer it to another. Now nothing is constituted by that which comes after it in our consideration of it. Therefore the hypostasis of the Father is not constituted by its relation to something else.

             6. In God hypostases are more perfect than in us. But in us properties neither constitute nor distinguish hypostases, but are signs of distinction in hypostases already constituted. Therefore neither in God do the relations which are properties constitute or distinguish the hypostases.

             7. Logically the generating hypostasis precedes generation, since the generator is understood to be the principle of generation: and logically generation precedes Paternity, since relations follow actions or passions (Metaph. v). Therefore logically the hypostasis of the Father precedes Paternity, and consequently is not constituted by it, as neither is the hypostasis of the Son by Filiation.

             8. No form is constituted or distinctive outside its own genus; thus whiteness constitutes and distinguishes a white from a black thing in point of quality: likewise length constitutes and differentiates a thing in point of quantity. Therefore neither is relation constitutive or distinctive outside the genus of relation. But a hypostasis belongs to the genus of substance. Therefore relation neither constitutes nor distinguishes the hypostasis.

             9. In God relation is the divine essence: wherefore if it constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis, this is either quâ the divine substance or quâ relation. Not, however, quâ divine essence, because since this is common to the three Persons it cannot be the principle of their distinction: nor again quâ relation, because relation does not signify anything self-subsistent 'which is the meaning of the word hypostasis,' but merely reference to another. Therefore relation nowise distinguishes or constitutes the hypostasis.

             10. In God nothing constitutes or distinguishes itself. Now the relations are themselves the hypostases: for just as Godhead and God do not differ, so neither do Paternity and Father. Therefore the relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases.

             11. One should not ask how two things are distinct unless they have something in common which is distinguished by something added in each of them: thus animal is common to man and horse, and is distinguished as rational and irrational by the addition of differences: wherefore we may ask how man and horse differ. Whereas things which have nothing in common so as to be distinguished in the foregoing manner are distinct by themselves and not by any distinguishing principle. Now two divine hypostases have nothing common but the essence, and this is not in any way distinguished by relations. Therefore it should be said not that the hypostases are distinguished by the relations, but that they are distinct by themselves.

             12. Nothing causes what it presupposes. But relation presupposes distinction, since thereby one thing is referred to another, and otherness implies distinction. Therefore relation cannot be a principle of distinction.

             13. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 15) says that in the angels the hypostases are distinguished by quality alone, and in God by origin alone. Now origin differs logically from relation, as generation from Paternity. Therefore the hypostases are distinguished not by relation but by origin.

             14. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 7) the divine hypostases are distinguished by their properties. Now it is the property of the Father that he begot the Son, according to Augustine, and of the Son that he is born of the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by generation and birth. But these denote origin, therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by origin and not by relation.

             15. There are some relations in God which neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, such as equality and likeness. Therefore neither do the other relations, such as Paternity and Filiation, constitute and distinguish the hypostases.

             On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now multitude in the Trinity arises from constituted and distinct hypostases. Therefore relation alone constitutes the Persons and hypostases.

             Moreover things are distinguished only by what is not predicated of them in common. Now the relations alone are predicated of the divine Persons severally and not in common according to Augustine (De Trin. v, 8). Therefore the Persons and hypostases in God are distinguished by the relations alone.

             I answer that there are two opinions on this question. The first is that in God relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases but show that they are constituted and distinct. In order to elucidate the point it must be observed that this word hypostasis denotes an individual substance, one to wit that cannot be predicated of several. Hence genera and species in the predicament of substance, such as man or animal, cannot be called hypostases, since they are predicated of several: whereas Socrates and Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only. Accordingly if, as Jews and pagans assert, there is no Trinity in God, there is no need to ask what constitutes or distinguishes the hypostasis since this is nothing but the divine essence: because by his very essence God is something undivided in itself, and distinct from all things that are not God. Seeing, however, that the Catholic Faith teaches that there is one essence in three Persons, it is inconceivable that the divine essence distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in God: because we understand the Godhead as constituting God, and as common to the three Persons and therefore as predicated of several subjects and not as an incommunicable hypostasis. In like manner nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the Persons, since what is predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential. Wherefore that which constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis in the divine Persons must be that which before anything else is not predicated of several but exclusively of one. Now there are two things that fulfil this condition, relation and origin, and generation and Paternity (or birth and Filiation), which although they are really but one thing in God, differ nevertheless logically and in their mode of signification. Logically the first of these is origin, for relation seemingly follows origin. Wherefore this opinion holds that the divine hypostases are constituted and distinguished by their origin, and this is indicated when we say A is from B, and from B is A: and that the relations of Paternity and Filiation logically follow the constitution and distinction of the Persons, and indicate the constitution and distinction of the hypostases. Thus the fact that one is called Father shows that another originates from him: and the fact that one is called Son shows that he originates from another. Nor does it follow from this opinion that the divine hypostases, if not distinguished by their relations, are distinguished by something absolute, since the origins themselves imply relation: seeing that as father denotes relationship to a son, so does begetter to one begotten.

             Nevertheless this opinion seemingly is void of foundation. For a thing may be understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is constituted by humanity, and Socrates by 'socrateity': or it may be taken for the way as it were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then that a thing's origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation. Consequently it cannot be said that the hypostasis of the Son is constituted by its nativity, except in so far as we take its nativity as terminating in something whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted. Now the relation in which nativity terminates is filiation. Therefore the hypostasis of the Son must be formally constituted and distinguished by Filiation and not by its origin: nor by the relation implied in the origin, since the relation implied in the origin like the origin itself denotes something not as yet subsistent in the nature but as tending thereto. And since all hypostases of the same nature have the same constitutive and distinguishing principle, it follows that in like manner on the part of the Father we must understand that the hypostasis of the Father is constituted and distinguished by Paternity, and not by active generation nor by the relation implied thereby.

             This is the second opinion, namely that the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons and hypostases: and it may be explained as follows. As already proved, Paternity is the same as the divine essence: and likewise the Father is the same as God: wherefore Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes God. And just as Paternity, although it is the divine essence, is not common as the essence is: even so although the Father is the very same thing as God, he is not common as God is, but proper. Accordingly God the Father as God is something common as having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other Persons. Hence he is a hypostasis, which signifies that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others: so that Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes the hypostasis.

             Reply to the First Objection. The divine Persons are something besides a relation: this is the essence which is not spoken of relatively. This is what Augustine means to say as may be seen by studying his words carefully.

             Hence we grant the Second and Third Objections.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although relation is not attributed to the essence as though it were a form, it is attributed to it as identical with it. For even if we do not say that the essence begets or is related, we do say that it is a generation and relation. However, relative terms are predicated of the essential names in the concrete even by way of information: thus we say that God begets God, and that God is related to God, inasmuch as relation and essence are understood as having a common supposit, as we have shown: although the essential names themselves are not distinct. Wherefore apart from the relative terms the essential names are understood in the concrete, since through the relations they have a relative signification.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. In lower things hypostases are distinct in essence, so that the properties which result from the essence cannot be the principle of distinction, but are signs thereof. But the divine hypostases are nowise distinct in essence: wherefore the properties must be the principle of this distinction.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Two things are requisite to constitute a hypostasis. First it must be self-subsistent and undivided in itself: secondly it must be distinct from other hypostases of the same nature. If, however, there be no other hypostases of the same nature it will still be a hypostasis, even as Adam when there were not as yet other hypostases in human nature. Hence the generating hypostasis must always be presupposed to generation, in so far as it is self-subsistent and undivided in itself, but not as distinct from other hypostases of the same nature, if other hypostases of the same nature originate solely by this kind of generation: thus Adam was not distinct from other hypostases of the same nature before the formation of the woman from his rib, and the birth of his children. But in God the hypostases are not multiplied except by the procession of the other Persons from one. Wherefore we understand the Person of the Father as subsistent before we understand him as begetting, and not as distinct from the other hypostases of the same nature which do not proceed unless we presuppose this generation. And although the divine relations constitute the hypostases and thus make them subsistent, they do this inasmuch as they are the divine essence: because a relation as such neither has nor can give subsistence, for this belongs to a substance alone. On the other hand the relations as such distinguish, for it is as such that they are mutually opposed. It follows then that the relation of Paternity, inasmuch as it constitutes the hypostasis of the Father (which it does as identical with the divine substance) is presupposed to generation, but inasmuch as it distinguishes, generation is presupposed to Paternity. As regards the Son there is no further difficulty: because birth logically precedes the hypostasis of the one born, for we conceive it as the way to it: since generation is the way to substance.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. As we have already stated in God relation is something besides relation; for it is God's very substance in reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely relative.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. As already stated relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis: while as identical with the divine essence it constitutes the hypostasis, and does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. In God the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is neither accident nor matter: they differ only in their manner of signification, inasmuch as we understand the Godhead as constituting God and God as having Godhead: the same applies to Paternity and the Father, for though they are really the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although in God nothing is really common save the one essence, there is a logical community in the divine Persons in the fact that each is a supposit of the essence. This community is indicated in all concrete essential names, that signify the supposit in general: for instance, God is one who has the Godhead. Accordingly it is logically common to the three Persons to be a supposit of the divine nature, although the three Persons are not one supposit, but three: even as Socrates and Plato are two men although it is logically common to them to be a man. Now a difference is sought not only in things that have something real in common, but even in those that have something in common logically.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Relation presupposes the distinction of the other genera such as substance and quantity; and sometimes also of action and passion: whereas it does not presuppose but causes the distinction arising from towardness: thus the relation of doublepresupposes the relation of great and small, whereas it does not presuppose but causes the relation of 2 to 1. In God, however, there is no other than relative distinction.

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Richard says that the Persons are distinct by their origin, inasmuch as they are distinguished by relations of origin.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine uses the words begot the Son and is the Father as having the same meaning: wherefore he sometimes speaks of origin instead of relation.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The relations of equality and likeness cannot cause a distinction of Persons in God, rather do they presuppose it. Likeness is sameness of quality in things that differ, and equality is sameness of quantity in things that are distinct. Thus it is clear that distinction of supposits is presupposed to both likeness and equality.