ARTICLE III

OF THE ORDER BETWEEN PROCESSION AND RELATION IN GOD

Sum. Th. I, Q. xlii, A. 3.

THE third point of inquiry concerns the order between procession and relation in God: and it would seem that in God procession logically precedes relation.

             1. The Master (I., D. 27) says that the Father is Father from eternity because from eternity he begot the Son. Now begot indicates procession and Father indicates relation. Therefore logically procession precedes relation in God.

             2. The Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that relations result from action or quantity. But it is plain that the divine relations do not arise from quantity: therefore in our way of thinking they arise from action. Now processions in the divine Persons are designated after the manner of divine actions. Therefore the divine processions logically precede the relations.

             3. The absolute precedes the relative, even as unity precedes number. Now actions are more akin to the absolute than relations are. Therefore logically they precede.

             4. A thing is said to be relative in relation to something else. Now there cannot be something else where there is no distinction. Therefore relation presupposes distinction. But in God distinction in the divine Persons is according to origin, inasmuch as one Person proceeds from another. Therefore in God the processions precede logically the relations.

             5. Logically every procession precedes its term. Now filiation which is the relation of the Son is the term of nativity which is his procession. Therefore the Son's procession precedes filiation. But filiation and paternity not only in nature and time but also logically are simultaneous: because the one relative cannot be understood without the other. Therefore the Son's nativity and a fortiori generation which is the act of the Father logically precede paternity: and consequently the processions in God simply precede the relations logically.

             On the contrary logically person precedes personal action. Now the divine relations constitute the Persons, while the processions are personal actions as it were. Therefore the relations precede the processions logically.

             Again procession must needs be from one thing to another, for just as nothing brings itself into being according to Augustine (De Trin. i, 1) so nothing proceeds from itself: wherefore in God procession postulates distinction. But there is no distinction in God except by the relations. Therefore in God procession presupposes relation.

             I answer that there is no order without distinction: hence where there is no real but only logical distinction there can be only a logical order. Now in God there is no real distinction except between the Persons and opposite relations: wherefore in God there is not real order except as regards the Persons between whom, according to Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv), there is order of nature inasmuch as one is from another, not one before another. Now in God processions and relations are not really but only logically distinct. Wherefore Augustine says that it is proper to the Father to beget the Son: whereby he gives us to understand that to beget the Son is the personal property of the Father; nor is there any other property besides paternity that is the personal property of the Father. Consequently we are not to look for real order but only for logical order between the divine processions and relations. Now just as in God relation and procession are in reality the same thing and do not differ except logically; even so relation itself, although but one in reality is in our way of thinking manifold. For we consider relation as constituting the Person: and yet it does not do this quâ relation: which is clear from the fact that in man relations do not constitute persons, since relations are accidents, while person is something subsistent in the genus of substance; and substance cannot be constituted by an accident. But in God relation constitutes a Person inasmuch as it is a divine relation: because it is identical with the divine essence, since in God there cannot be any accidents: wherefore relation being in reality the divine essence can constitute a divine hypostasis. Consequently the consideration of a relation as constituting a divine Person differs from the consideration of a relation quâ relation. Wherefore there is nothing to prevent relation from presupposing procession if we consider relation from the one point of view, whereas the contrary obtains if we consider it from the other point of view. Accordingly we conclude that if we consider relation as such it presupposes procession logically, whereas if we consider it as constituting a Person, the relation that constitutes the Person from whom there is a procession precedes that procession logically: thus paternity as constituting the Person of the Father logically precedes generation. On the other hand the relation that constitutes the proceeding Person, even considered as constituting that Person, is logically posterior to the procession, as filiation is posterior to nativity: and this because the proceeding Person is considered as the term of the procession.

             Reply to the First Objection. The Master is speaking of paternity considered as a relation: and the same answer applies to the Second and Third Objections.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. In things where relations are accidents relation must presuppose distinction: but in God the relations constitute three distinct Persons.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. If we consider paternity and filiation as relations the one cannot be understood without the other: and in this sense we say that relations follow the processions in the logical order.

             The remaining two objections consider the relations as constituting the Persons.