ARTICLE VIII

IS THERE ANY RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND THE CREATURE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 7: Q. xxviii, A. 4: Q. xxxii, A. 2

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there be any relation between God and the creature: and it would seem that there is none.

             1. According to the Philosopher (De Praedic. v) relatives are simultaneous. But creatures cannot be simultaneous with God: since in every way he precedes creatures. Therefore there cannot be any relation between God and a creature.

             2. Things that are related can be compared in some way. But there is no comparison between God and a creature: since things that differ in genus are not comparable with one another, for instance, a number and a line. Therefore there is no relation between God and a creature.

             3. Relative and co-relative belong to the same genus. But God is not in the same genus as the creature. Therefore we cannot predicate a relation between them.

             4. A creature cannot be in opposition to the Creator: because one opposite is not the cause of the other. Now relatives are in opposition to each other. Therefore there cannot be a relation between a creature and God.

             5. Anything of which something new can be predicated, may be said in a sense to become. Consequently if something be said of God in relation to the creature, it follows that in a sense God becomes: which is impossible, seeing that he is unchangeable.

             6. Whatsoever is predicated of a thing is predicated either essentially or accidentally. Now expressions that denote relation to creatures are not predicated of God essentially, since essential predicates are predicated necessarily and always: nor are they predicated accidentally. Therefore such relations can nowise be predicated of God.

             On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, 13) that the Creator is related to the creature as the master to his servant.

             I answer that relation differs from quantity and quality in that quantity and quality are accidents residing in the subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says (De Trin.), signifies something not as adhering to a subject but as passing from it to something else: wherefore de la Porrée said that relations are not adherent but assistant, which is true in a sense as we shall show further on. Now when a thing is attributed to someone as proceeding from him to another this does not argue composition between them, as neither does action imply composition with the agent. And for this reason the Philosopher proves (Phys. v) that there can be no movement in relation: since without any change in the thing that is related to another, the relation can cease for the sole reason that this other is changed. Thus it is clear with regard to action that there is no movement in respect of action except metaphorically and improperly speaking, just as we say that one who passes from inaction into action is changed: and this would not be the case if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject. Hence it is evident that it is not incompatible with a thing's simplicity to have many relations towards other things: indeed the more simple a thing is the greater the number of its concomitant relations: since its power is so much the less limited and consequently its causality so much the more extended. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xvii) that a united force is less confined than a distributed force. Now we must needs admit a relation between a principle and the things which proceed from it; and not only a relation of origin inasmuch as a result springs from its source, but also a relation of distinction, seeing that an effect must needs be distinct from its cause, for nothing is its own cause. Accordingly from God's supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations between creatures and him, inasmuch as he produced creatures distinct from himself and yet somewhat likened to him.

             Reply to the First Objection. Those relatives are naturally simultaneous which have the same reason for their mutual relationship, for instance, father and son, master and servant, double and half. But when there is not the same reason on either side for referring one thing to another, then relatives are not naturally simultaneous, but one naturally precedes the other: as the Philosopher states with regard to sense and the sensible object, knowledge and the thing knowable (De Praed. v). Wherefore it clearly does not follow that God and the creature are naturally simultaneous, since there is not the same reason on either side for one being referred to the other. It is not necessary, however, even in relatives that are naturally simultaneous that the subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only the relations.

             Reply to the Second Objection. Not all the things that are related can be compared to each other, but only those that are related in respect of one quantity or quality, so that one may be described as greater, better, whiter and so on than the other. But different relations can be compared to each other even if they belong to different genera: since things that differ generically differ from one another. And yet although God is not in the same genus as the creature as a thing contained in a genus, he is nevertheless in every genus as the principle of the genus: and for this reason there can be relation between the creature and God as between effect and principle.

             Reply to the Third Objection. The subjects of things mutually related need not be in the same genus, but only the things themselves that are thus related: thus quantity is said to be distinct from quiddity. And yet as we have already said it is not the same with God and creatures as with things differing generically and nowise co-ordinated to one another.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relative opposition differs in two ways from other kinds of opposition. First in the latter one thing is said to be opposite to another inasmuch as it excludes it,--as negation excludes affirmation,--and in this respect is opposed to it: and opposition of privation and habit, and of contrariety includes opposition of contradiction (Metaph. iv). But it is not thus with things that are opposed relatively. For son is not opposed to father by excluding him, but on account of the nature of his relationship to him. Hence follows the second difference: because in other kinds of opposition one of the opposites is always imperfect by reason of the negation attaching to privation and one of the contraries. But this is not necessarily so in relative opposition, indeed it is possible to consider both relatives as perfect, as is especially evident in equiparent relatives and in relatives of origin, for instance, things that are equal to or like one another, father and son. Wherefore relation is more attributable to God than other kinds of opposition. By reason of the first difference relative opposition may be observed between the creature and God, but not any other kind: seeing that it is owing to God that creatures are affirmed rather than excluded; and yet creatures have a certain relationship to God. By reason of the second difference, in the divine Persons (in whom there can be no imperfection) there can be relative opposition and no other, as we shall show further on (Q. viii).

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. To become is to be changed properly speaking: wherefore just as a thing is not changed in respect of a relation except accidentally, to wit through a change in the thing to which the relation is consequent, so neither is a thing said to become in respect of a relation, except accidentally. Thus a body through a change in its quantity becomes equal (to another), yet the change is not essentially connected with equality but is related thereto accidentally. And yet a thing does not need to be changed in order that a relation begin to be predicated of it: but it suffices that a change occur in one of the extremes: since the cause of relationship between two is something inherent in both. Consequently from whichever extreme a change is wrought in that which caused the relationship, the relationship between them ceases. Accordingly from the fact that a change is wrought in the creature, a relation begins to be attributed to God. Hence he cannot be said to become except metaphorically; inasmuch as he is like a thing that becomes, through something new that is said about him: thus we say (Ps. lxxxix, 1): Lord, thou art become our refuge.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. When these relations begin to be ascribed to God on account of some change wrought in creatures, it is evident that the cause of their being attributed to him is on the part of the creature, and that they are predicated of God accidentally. But as Augustine says this does not imply an accident in God, but refers to something outside him and compared to him accidentally: for God's existence does not depend on creatures as neither does the builder's existence depend on the house: wherefore just as it is accidental to the builder that the house exists, so is it accidental to God that the creature exists. For we say that anything without which a thing can exist is accidental to it.