ARTICLE I

IS THERE PROCESSION IN GOD?

Sum. Th. I, Q. xxvii: C.G. IV, ii

THE first point of inquiry is whether there be processions in the divine Persons: and seemingly there are not.

             1. Whatsoever proceeds from a thing is separated from it. But the divine Persons are not separated from one another: thus the Son says (Jo. xiv, 10): I am in the Father and the Father in me: and the same applies to the Holy Ghost, namely that he is in the Father and the Son and vice versa. Therefore in God one Person proceeds not from another.

             2. Nothing savouring of motion, even as nothing pertaining to matter should be attributed to God in its proper sense. Now procession denotes motion. Therefore it cannot be attributed to God in its proper sense.

             3. Whatsoever proceeds is logically prior to its procession, since it is the subject thereof. Now in God nothing that proceeds can be prior to its procession: for the divine essence does not proceed as neither is it begotten; and relation is not prior to procession, but contrariwise as we have already stated (Q. viii, A. 3). Therefore procession is impossible in God.

             4. Even as that which proceeds is from something so also is it to something. But that which proceeds to something is not self-subsistent. Therefore seeing that the divine Persons are self-subsistent it would seem incompetent for them to proceed.

             5. Inasmuch as the more excellent creatures are more like to God, that which is found in the lower creatures and not in the higher is not found in God: for instance, dimensive quantity, matter and so forth. Now procession is to be found in the lower creatures, where one individual engenders another of the same species: whereas this does not obtain in the higher creatures. Neither therefore in God is procession to be found.

             6. We should by no means attribute to God anything that is derogatory to his dignity. Now God's dignity consists chiefly in his being the first cause of existence, and not deriving existence from anything else: which would seem incompatible with procession, since whatsoever proceeds derives its existence in some way from another. Therefore it must not be said that anything proceeds in God.

             7. A person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity. But it does not savour of dignity that one receive from another (which is implied by procession). Therefore procession should not be ascribed to the divine persons as though it were a personal property.

             8. A thing is in some way the cause of that which proceeds from it. But one divine Person cannot be the cause of another: not an intrinsic cause, i.e. formal or material, since in God there is no composition of form and matter; nor extrinsic, since one Person dwells within the other. Hence there is no procession in God.

             9. Whatsoever proceeds issues from another as from its principium. Now one (divine) Person cannot be described as the principium of another: for seeing that principium connotes that which is principiated, we should have to say that some divine Person is principiated, and this seemingly is peculiar to creatures. Hence there is no procession in God.

             10. The word principium would seem to indicate priority: whereas according to Athanasius there is no priority or posterity in God. Therefore one Person is not the principium of another, and one should not be described as proceeding from the other.

             11. Every principium is operative or productive. Now one Person is not productive or operative of another, else in God there would be something made or created. Therefore a divine Person has no principium and does not proceed.

             12. If B proceeds from A, B must have something in common with A and communicated to it by A; and also something proper whereby it is distinguished from A; since nothing proceeds from itself. Now wherever there is something and something else there is composition. Therefore wherever there is procession there is composition. But there is no composition in God: and consequently neither is there procession.

             13. That which proceeds from another receives something from it: and whatsoever receives something is of a needy nature: for if it needed not it would not receive: for which reason in natural things receptivity is ascribed to matter. Therefore whatsoever proceeds is by nature needy. But in God there is no such thing as need for he is supremely perfect. Therefore there is no procession in God.

             14. To this it will be replied that the recipient is imperfect when it exists before receiving, and when having received it is in possession and no longer needy. Now the Son and the Holy Ghost receive indeed from the Father, but they do not exist before receiving: and thus they are not in need.

             On the contrary every creature is needy by nature, and yet it does not exist before receiving existence from God. Therefore the fact of not existing before receiving does not disprove need.

             15. Whatsoever has a thing only by receiving it from another, considered in itself lacks that thing: thus air considered in itself lacks light which it receives from something else. If then the Son and the Holy Ghost have being only through receiving it from the Father (which must be the case if they proceed from the Father) it follows of necessity that considered in themselves they do not exist. Now that which considered in itself is nothing, if it receive being from another, must necessarily come from nothing and consequently must be a creature. If then the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father they must be creatures; and this is the blasphemy of Arius. Therefore there is no procession in God.

             16. That which proceeds from another proceeds that it may come into existence: and that which proceeds that it may exist did not always exist: thus if a thing proceeds to a place it was not always in that place. But the divine Persons are eternal. Therefore no divine Person proceeds.

             17. The principle whence a thing proceeds exercises a certain authority over that which proceeds from it as from a principle. If then one divine Person proceeds from another, for instance, the Son and the Holy Ghost from the Father, there must be in the Father some authority over the Son and the Holy Ghost: and thus, since authority is a kind of dignity there will be a dignity in the Father that is not in the Son and the Holy Ghost, and consequently there will be inequality in the divine Persons: and this is contrary to the saying of Athanasius (Symb.) that in the Trinity there is neither priority nor posteriority, neither greater nor lesser: but all three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another. Therefore there is no procession in the divine Persons.

             On the contrary the Son says (Jo. viii, 42): From God I proceeded and came.

             Again it is stated (Jo. xv, 26) that the Spirit of truth proceedeth from the Father. Therefore there is procession in the divine Persons.

             I answer that in us intellectual knowledge originates in the imagination and senses which do not transcend continuous matter. For this reason we take the terms that apply to continuous matter and transfer them to whatsoever we grasp with the intellect. Take, for instance, the word distance which is applied first to place and is afterwards transferred to any difference of forms: wherefore all contraries of any genus whatsoever are said to be the most distant, although distance is applied first of all to ubiety, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). In like manner the term procession was first employed to signify that local movement whereby a thing passes from one place through intermediate places to an extreme place in an ordinate manner: and thence it is transferred to denote the order between any two things one of which issues from or succeeds the other. Hence we apply the word procession to all kinds of movement: for instance, we say that a body proceeds from whiteness to blackness, or from a great to a small quantity or from non-being to being, and vice versa: and in like manner we use the word procession to indicate the emanation of one thing from another; thus we say that the ray proceeds from the sun, and the operation or even the thing produced from the operator; thus the thing made by a craftsman is said to proceed from him, and the thing generated from the generator, and in a general way we designate any such order as a procession. Now operation is twofold. There is an operation that passes from the operator into something extrinsic, as heating passes from fire into wood: this operation is not a perfection of the operator but of the thing operated, since the fire gains nothing by heating, whereas the thing heated acquires heat. Another operation does not pass into something outside but remains in the operator, such as understanding, sensation, willing and the like. These operations are perfections of the operator: for the intellect is not perfect except by understanding actually, and the senses except by sensing actually. The first kind of operation is common to animate and inanimate beings: whereas the second is proper to animate beings: wherefore, if we take movement in a wide sense for any kind of operation--as the Philosopher takes it (De Anima iii), where it is stated that sensation and understanding are a kind of movement--not indeed the movement which is the act of an imperfect thing (Phys. iii, 1) but that which is the act of a perfect thing--it would seem proper to animate beings; and this is what is meant when we speak of a thing being the cause of its own movement. Because whenever we observe that a thing operates of itself and in itself in any way whatever we say that it lives: and in this sense Plato (Tim.) says that the first mover moves itself. In respect of both kinds of operation procession is found in creatures. In regard to the first kind we say that the thing generated proceeds from the generator and the thing made from the maker. With regard to the second kind we say that words proceed from the speaker, and love from the lover. And we attribute both kinds of operation to God, when we say that he creates, preserves and governs all things. Nor by this do we signify that any perfection accrues to God by such operation, but rather that the creature acquires perfection from the divine perfection. We attribute the other kind of operation to God when we describe him as understanding and willing whereby we indicate his perfection. For he were not perfect did he not understand and will actually: and for this reason we acknowledge him to be living. In respect of either operation we attribute procession to God. As regards the first we speak of divine wisdom or goodness as proceeding to creatures, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), and of creatures as proceeding from God. As regards the second we acknowledge in God a procession of word and love; and this is the procession of the Son from the Father (for the Son is the Father's word) and of the Holy Ghost who is his love and life-giving breath (spiritus). Hence Athanasius in a discourse pronounced in the Council of Nicea says that the Arians through maintaining that the Son and Holy Ghost are not consubstantial with the Father, seemed in consequence to say that God is not a living and intelligent being, but dead and unintelligent.

             Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the procession that is an operation passing into something extrinsic. But the divine Persons do not proceed thus; and their procession partakes rather of the nature of an immanent operation: since that which proceeds in this way is not distant from that whence it proceeds: even so the human word is in the mind of the speaker and not distant from him.

             Reply to the Second Objection. The procession attributed to the divine Persons is not a local movement, but one that indicates order of emanation.

             Reply to the Third Objection. That which proceeds by local movement must precede its procession since it is the subject thereof: but that which proceeds in the order of origin is the term of the procession. Hence if it be composed of matter and form and comes into being by generation, the matter precedes the procession as subject, while the form or even the composite follows logically the procession as term: as when fire proceeds from fire by generation. But when that which proceeds is not composite but a pure form; or again if it come into being by creation the term of which is the whole substance, then that which proceeds in no way precedes the procession but on the contrary: thus the creature is not conceived as existing before creation, nor brightness as preceding its emission from the sun, nor the Word as preceding his procession from the Father.

             Reply to the Fourth Objection. In so far as procession may denote order of origin, a thing may proceed as self-subsistent and without relation to another thing: although by local movement a thing does not proceed so as to subsist in itself simply, but so as to be in a place. Such procession, however, is not in God.

             Reply to the Fifth Objection. In intellectual substances which are the most noble creatures there is also procession according to the operations of the intellect and will: and in this respect the image of the Trinity is in them. In them, however, word and love are not subsistent persons, because their understanding and willing are not their substance, and this is proper to God: hence in God word and love proceed as subsistent Persons, but not in intellectual creatures.

             Reply to the Sixth Objection. It would be derogatory to God's dignity to originate from something essentially diverse, for this is proper to the creature: but to originate from that which is consubstantial pertains to the divine perfection. For there would not be perfection in the Godhead unless its understanding and willing were actual: and this being the case we must acknowledge in God the procession of word and love.

             Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although receiving does not in itself connote perfection, it does imply perfection on the part of the one from whom something is received: and especially in the divine Persons who receive the fulness of the Godhead.

             Reply to the Eighth Objection. Seldom or never do the Latin doctors employ the word cause to indicate the origin of the divine Persons; both because with us cause connotes effect, wherefore lest we be forced to say that the Son and Holy Ghost are made, we do not say that the Father is their cause; and because with us the word cause signifies something essentially diverse, for we describe as a cause that whence something different follows; and again because the pagan philosophers apply the word causeto God to denote his relation to creatures: for they say that God is the first cause and that creatures are caused by him. Hence lest anyone think that the Son and the Holy Ghost should be reckoned among creatures differing essentially from God, we avoid the word cause when we speak of God. On the other hand the Greeks employ the word cause more absolutely when speaking of God, and indicate origin only thereby: wherefore they apply the word cause to the divine Persons. For an expression may be objectionable in Latin whereas in Greek it is admissible on account of a peculiarity of idiom. And if in speaking of God we admit the use of the word causein Greek it does not follow that it has the same sense as when applied to creatures, and as divided by philosophers into four kinds.

             Reply to the Ninth Objection. Of all the terms relating to origin, the word principle is most appropriate to God. For since we are unable to comprehend the things of God it is better for us to indicate them by means of general terms which have an indefinite meaning, than to employ special words that have a definite signification. Wherefore the name He who is (Exod. iii, 13, 14) is said to be most appropriate, seeing that according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 9) it signifies the boundless sea of substance. Now just as cause is a more general term than element which denotes something primary and simple in the genus of material cause, so is principle a more general term than cause; thus the first part of movement or of a line is called a principium but not a cause. From this it is clear that a principium may be something that is not essentially distinct, as a point in relation to a line; whereas a cause cannot, especially if we speak of an originating, i.e. an efficient, cause. Now though the Father is called the principium of the Son and the Holy Ghost, it does not seem right to say without qualification that the Son or Holy Ghost is principiated, although the Greeks use the expression, which may be allowed to pass if understood aright. Nevertheless we must avoid using words that seem to imply subjection, lest they be attributed to the Son or the Holy Ghost and we fall into the error of the Arians. Thus Hilary (De Trin. vii) while granting that the Father is greater than the Son on account of his pre-eminence as origin, denies that the Son is less than the Father since he received equality of essence from him. Likewise we must not stress such terms as subjection and principiation in the Son, although we employ the words authority and principium in speaking of the Father.

             Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the word principium is derived from priority, it is employed to signify not priority but origin: even as the word lapis is not employed to denote the hurt done to the foot, although it is thought that this is its derivation. Thus although the Father is not prior to the Son he is his principium.

             Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Not every principium is operative or productive: for in neither way is a point the principium of a line.

             Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the Son there is something common to the Father, namely the essence; and something whereby he is distinguished from the Father, namely the relation. Yet there is not composition, because the relation is really the essence, as we have explained in previous discussions (Q. viii, A. 2).

             Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The recipient before receiving is in need, since he receives in order to supply his need: but after receiving he no longer needs, since he has what he needed. If then there be something that does not exist before receiving, and is always in the state of having received, it is by no means in need. Now the Son receives not from the Father as though he previously lacked and afterwards received, but he receives his very being from the Father. Hence it does not follow that he is in need.

             Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The creature receives from God a certain existence which would not continue unless God preserved it: wherefore even after it has received existence, it needs the divine action to preserve it in being and consequently is of a needy nature. On the other hand the Son receives from the Father identically the same being and identically the same nature as that of the Father: wherefore he is not of a needy nature.

             Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Son is considered in himself in reference to that which he has absolutely, and this is the essence of the Father: and in this respect he is not nothing, but one with the Father. And if we consider him in reference to the Father, we conceive him as receiving being from the Father: wherefore thus again he is not nothing. Consequently in no sense is the Son nothing. He would, however, be nothing considered in himself if there were anything absolute in him distinct from the Father, as is the case with creatures.

             Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Son does indeed proceed that he may exist: but his procession is eternal (even as the procession of light from the sun is coeval with the sun) wherefore the Son also is eternal.

             Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Authority in the Father is nothing but the relation of principle. Now equality or inequality refer not to relation but to quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4; v, 6). Hence the Son is not unequal to the Father.