Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above (Question 84, Article 1; Question 65, Article 1). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), "shame is not a virtue," both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "penance consists in deploring past sins": moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Mt. 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Objection 2; Question 84, Article 10, ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (Question 84, Article 9) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 84, Article 1, ad 1; Articles 2,3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poenitentia non sit virtus.

Poenitentia enim est quoddam sacramentum aliis sacramentis connumeratum, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Sed nullum aliud sacramentorum est virtus. Ergo neque poenitentia est virtus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV ethic., verecundia non est virtus, tum quia est passio habens corporalem immutationem; tum etiam quia non est dispositio perfecti, cum sit de turpi acto, quod non habet locum in homine virtuoso.

Sed similiter poenitentia est quaedam passio habens corporalem immutationem, scilicet ploratum, sicut Gregorius dicit quod poenitere est peccata praeterita plangere.

Est etiam de turpibus factis, scilicet de peccatis, quae non habent locum in homine virtuoso. Ergo poenitentia non est virtus.

Argumentum 3

Nullus est stultus eorum qui sunt secundum virtutem.

Sed stultum videtur dolere de commisso praeterito, quod non potest non esse, quod tamen pertinet ad poenitentiam. Ergo poenitentia non est virtus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum, quia legislator intendit cives facere virtuosos, ut dicitur in II ethic.. Sed praeceptum divinae legis est de poenitentia, secundum illud Matth. III, poenitentiam agite, etc..

Ergo poenitentia est virtus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, poenitere est de aliquo a se prius facto dolere.

Dictum est autem supra quod dolor vel tristitia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod est passio quaedam appetitus sensitivi. Et quantum ad hoc, poenitentia non est virtus, sed passio alio modo, secundum quod consistit in voluntate. Et hoc modo est cum quadam electione. Quae quidem si sit recta, necesse est quod sit actus virtutis, dicitur enim in II ethic. Quod virtus est habitus electivus secundum rationem rectam.

Pertinet autem ad rationem rectam quod aliquis doleat de quo dolendum est. Quod quidem observatur in poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, nam poenitens assumit moderatum dolorem de peccatis praeteritis, cum intentione removendi ea. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, vel est virtus, vel actus virtutis.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in sacramento poenitentiae materialiter se habent actus humani, quod non contingit in baptismo vel confirmatione. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium alicuius actus, potius poenitentia est virtus, vel cum virtute, quam baptismus vel confirmatio.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia, secundum quod est passio, non est virtus, ut dictum est.

Sic autem habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Est autem virtus secundum quod habet ex parte voluntatis electionem rectam. Quod tamen magis potest dici de poenitentia quam de verecundia. Nam verecundia respicit turpe factum ut praesens, poenitentia vero respicit turpe factum ut praeteritum. Est autem contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis in praesenti habeat turpe factum, de quo oporteat eum verecundari. Non autem est contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis prius commiserit turpia facta, de quibus oporteat eum poenitere, cum ex vitioso fiat aliquis virtuosus.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dolere de eo quod prius factum est cum hac intentione conandi ad hoc quod factum non fuerit, esset stultum. Hoc autem non intendit poenitens, sed dolor eius est displicentia seu reprobatio facti praeteriti cum intentione removendi sequelam ipsius, scilicet offensam dei et reatum poenae.

Et hoc non est stultum.