Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For Ambrose says on Lk. 1:32: "The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time." Now this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time.

Objection 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said above (Question 10, Article 2). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent.

Objection 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things.

On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: "He is my God and I will glorify Him," and further on, "Almighty is His name." Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.

I answer that, As was said above (Question 2, Article 1; Question 10, Article 1) in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of matter and form.

And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence.

Reply to Objection 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man.

Reply to Objection 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same similitudes.

It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the 1, Question 45. Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create itself.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God's creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima christi habuit omnipotentiam.

Dicit enim Ambrosius, super Luc., potentiam quam dei filius naturaliter habet, homo erat ex tempore accepturus.

Sed hoc praecipue videtur esse secundum animam, quae est potior pars hominis. Cum ergo filius dei ab aeterno omnipotentiam habuerit, videtur quod anima christi ex tempore omnipotentiam acceperit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut potentia dei est infinita, sic et eius scientia.

Sed anima christi habet omnium scientiam eorum quae scit deus quodammodo, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo etiam habet omnem potentiam. Et ita est omnipotens.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, anima christi habet omnem scientiam. Sed scientiarum quaedam est practica, quaedam speculativa. Ergo habet eorum quae scit scientiam practicam, ut scilicet sciat facere ea quae scit.

Et sic videtur quod omnia facere possit.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est, quod proprium est dei, non potest alicui creaturae convenire. Sed proprium est dei esse omnipotentem, secundum illud exodi XV, iste deus meus, et glorificabo eum; et postea subditur, omnipotens nomen eius.

Ergo anima christi, cum sit creatura, non habet omnipotentiam.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mysterio incarnationis ita facta est unio in persona quod tamen remansit distinctio naturarum, utraque scilicet natura retinente id quod sibi est proprium. Potentia autem activa cuiuslibet rei sequitur formam ipsius, quae est principium agendi. Forma autem vel est ipsa natura rei, sicut in simplicibus, vel est constituens ipsam rei naturam, sicut in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma. Unde manifestum est quod potentia activa cuiuslibet rei consequitur naturam ipsius. Et per hunc modum omnipotentia consequenter se habet ad divinam naturam.

Quia enim natura divina est ipsum esse dei incircumscriptum, ut patet per dionysium, V cap. De div. Nom., inde est quod habet potentiam activam respectu omnium quae possunt habere rationem entis, quod est habere omnipotentiam, sicut et quaelibet alia res habet potentiam activam respectu eorum ad quae se extendit perfectio suae naturae, sicut calidum ad calefaciendum. Cum igitur anima christi sit pars humanae naturae, impossibile est quod habeat omnipotentiam.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo accepit ex tempore omnipotentiam quam filius dei habuit ab aeterno, per ipsam unionem personae, ex qua factum est ut, sicut homo dicitur deus, ita dicatur omnipotens, non quasi sit alia omnipotentia hominis quam filii dei sicut nec alia deitas; sed eo quod est una persona dei et hominis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratio est de scientia, et de potentia activa, sicut quidam dicunt.

Nam potentia activa consequitur ipsam naturam rei, eo quod actio consideratur ut egrediens ab agente. Scientia autem non semper habetur per ipsam essentiam scientis, sed potest haberi per assimilationem scientis ad res scitas secundum similitudines susceptas. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficere. Quia sicut aliquis potest cognoscere per similitudinem susceptam ab alio, ita etiam potest agere per formam ab alio susceptam, sicut aqua vel ferrum calefacit per calorem susceptum ab igne. Non igitur per hoc prohibetur quin, sicut anima christi per similitudines omnium rerum sibi a deo inditas potest omnia cognoscere, ita per easdem similitudines possit ea facere.

Est ergo ulterius considerandum quod id quod a superiori natura in inferiori recipitur, habetur per inferiorem modum, non enim calor in eadem perfectione et virtute recipitur ab aqua qua est in igne. Quia igitur anima christi inferioris naturae est quam divina natura, similitudines rerum non recipiuntur in ipsa anima christi secundum eandem perfectionem et virtutem secundum quam sunt in natura divina. Et inde est quod scientia animae christi est inferior scientia divina, quantum ad modum cognoscendi, quia deus perfectius cognoscit quam anima christi; et etiam quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia anima christi non cognoscit omnes res quas deus potest facere, quae tamen deus cognoscit scientia simplicis intelligentiae; licet cognoscat omnia praesentia, praeterita et futura, quae deus cognoscit scientia visionis. Et similiter similitudines rerum animae christi inditae non adaequant virtutem divinam in agendo, ut scilicet possint omnia agere quae deus potest; vel etiam eo modo agere sicut deus agit, qui agit per virtutem infinitam, cuius creatura non est capax. Nulla autem res est ad cuius cognitionem aliqualiter habendam requiratur virtus infinita, licet aliquis modus cognoscendi sit virtutis infinitae, quaedam tamen sunt quae non possunt fieri nisi a virtute infinita sicut creatio et alia huiusmodi, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt.

Et ideo anima christi, cum sit creatura et virtutis finitae, potest quidem omnia cognoscere, sed non per omnem modum, non autem potest omnia facere, quod pertinet ad rationem omnipotentiae et inter cetera, manifestum est quod non potest creare seipsam.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod anima christi habuit et scientiam practicam et speculativam, non tamen oportet quod omnium illorum habeat scientiam practicam quorum habuit scientiam speculativam.

Ad scientiam enim speculativam habendam sufficit sola conformitas vel assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam, ad scientiam autem practicam requiritur quod formae rerum quae sunt in intellectu sint factivae. Plus autem est habere formam et imprimere formam habitam in alterum, quam solum habere formam, sicut plus est lucere et illuminare quam solum lucere. Et inde est quod anima christi habet quidem speculativam scientiam creandi, scit enim qualiter deus creat, sed non habet huius modi scientiam practicam, quia non habet scientiam creationis factivam.