Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rm. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (Article 2, ad 3). But "whatever God does in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity move man's will.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing---that it be subject to the Divine power.

Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a deo. Omne enim agens cui resisti non potest, ex necessitate movet. Sed deo, cum sit infinitae virtutis, resisti non potest, unde dicitur Rom. IX, voluntati eius quis resistit? ergo deus ex necessitate movet voluntatem.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, voluntas ex necessitate movetur in illa quae naturaliter vult, ut dictum est.

Sed hoc est unicuique rei naturale, quod deus in ea operatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra faustum.

Ergo voluntas ex necessitate vult omne illud ad quod a deo movetur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, possibile est quo posito non sequitur impossibile.

Sequitur autem impossibile, si ponatur quod voluntas non velit hoc ad quod deus eam movet, quia secundum hoc, operatio dei esset inefficax. Non ergo est possibile voluntatem non velle hoc ad quod deus eam movet. Ergo necesse est eam hoc velle.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui.

Non ergo ex necessitate movet voluntatem eius.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dionysius dicit, IV cap. De div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare.

Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem, ita quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus contingenter. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas divina non solum se extendit ut aliquid fiat per rem quam movet, sed ut etiam eo modo fiat quo congruit naturae ipsius.

Et ideo magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit; quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod naturale est unicuique quod deus operatur in ipso ut sit ei naturale, sic enim unicuique convenit aliquid, secundum quod deus vult quod ei conveniat. Non autem vult quod quidquid operatur in rebus, sit eis naturale, puta quod mortui resurgant. Sed hoc vult unicuique esse naturale, quod potestati divinae subdatur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, si deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid, incompossibile est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur. Non tamen est impossibile simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod voluntas a deo ex necessitate moveatur.