Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh"---no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul.

Objection 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, "with Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But "God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul.

Objection 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Mt. 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and Jn. 10:18: "I have power to lay down My soul ." But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): "My soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made man," as Is. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.

Reply to Objection 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius dei animam non assumpserit.

Ioannes enim, incarnationis mysterium tradens, dixit, verbum caro factum est, nulla facta de anima mentione. Non autem dicitur caro factum eo quod sit in carnem conversum, sed quia carnem assumpsit.

Non ergo videtur assumpsisse animam.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, anima necessaria est corpori ad hoc quod per eam vivificetur. Sed ad hoc non fuit necessaria corpori christi, ut videtur, quia ipsum dei verbum est, de quo in Psalmo, domine, apud te est fons vitae.

Superfluum igitur fuisset animam adesse, verbo praesente.

Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I de caelo.

Ergo videtur quod filius dei animam non assumpsit.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur natura communis, quae est species humana.

In domino autem iesu christo non est communem speciem accipere, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro.

Non igitur assumpsit animam.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone christiano non eos audiamus qui solum corpus humanum dicunt esse susceptum a verbo dei; et sic audiunt quod dictum est, verbum caro factum est, ut negent illum hominem vel animam, vel aliquid hominis habuisse nisi carnem solam.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, opinio primo fuit Arii, et postea Apollinaris, quod filius dei solam carnem assumpserit, absque anima, ponentes quod verbum fuerit carni loco animae. Ex quo sequebatur quod in christo non fuerunt duae naturae, sed una tantum, ex anima enim et carne una natura humana constituitur.

Sed haec positio stare non potest, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia repugnat auctoritati Scripturae, in qua dominus de sua anima facit mentionem, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam.

Sed ad hoc respondebat Apollinaris quod in his verbis anima metaphorice sumitur, per quem modum in veteri testamento dei anima commemoratur, Isaiae I, calendas vestras et solemnitates odivit anima mea.

Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., evangelistae in evangelica narratione narrant quod miratus est iesus, et iratus, et contristatus, et quod esuriit. Quae quidem ita demonstrant eum veram animam habuisse, sicut ex hoc quod comedit et dormivit et fatigatus est, demonstratur habuisse verum corpus humanum. Alioquin, si et haec ad metaphoram referantur, cum similia legantur in veteri testamento de deo, peribit fides evangelicae narrationis. Aliud est enim quod prophetice nuntiatur in figuris, aliud quod secundum rerum proprietatem ab evangelistis historice scribitur.

Secundo, derogat praedictus error utilitati incarnationis, quae est liberatio hominis.

Ut enim argumentatur Augustinus, in libro contra felicianum, si, accepta carne, filius dei animam omisit, aut, innoxiam sciens, medicinae indigentem non credidit; aut, a se alienam putans, redemptionis beneficio non donavit; aut, ex toto insanabilem iudicans, curare nequivit; aut ut vilem, et quae nullis usibus apta videretur, abiecit. Horum duo blasphemiam important in deum.

Quomodo enim dicetur omnipotens, si curare non potuit desperatam? aut quomodo omnium deus, si non ipse fecit animam nostram? duobus vero aliis, in uno animae causa nescitur, in altero meritum non tenetur. Aut intelligere causam putandus est animae qui eam, ad accipiendum legem habitu insitae rationis instructam, a peccato voluntariae transgressionis nititur separare? aut quomodo eius generositatem novit qui ignobilitatis vitio dicit despectam? si originem attendas, pretiosior est animae substantia, si transgressionis culpam, propter intelligentiam peior est causa.

Ego autem christum et perfectam sapientiam scio, et piissimam esse non dubito, quorum primo, meliorem et prudentiae capacem non despexit; secundo, eam quae magis fuerat vulnerata, suscepit.

Tertio vero, haec positio est contra ipsam incarnationis veritatem.

Caro enim et ceterae partes hominis per animam speciem sortiuntur. Unde, recedente anima, non est os aut caro nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, II de anima et VII metaphys..

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum dicitur, verbum caro factum est, caro ponitur pro toto homine, ac si diceret, verbum homo factum est, sicut Isaiae XL dicitur, videbit omnis caro salutare dei nostri.

Ideo autem totus homo per carnem significatur, quia, ut dicitur in auctoritate inducta, quia per carnem filius dei visibilis apparuit, unde subditur et vidimus gloriam eius.

Vel ideo quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest.

In tota illa unitate susceptionis principale verbum est, extrema autem atque ultima caro. Volens itaque evangelista commendare pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis dei, verbum et carnem nominavit, omittens animam, quae est verbo inferior, carne praestantior.

Rationabile etiam fuit ut nominaret carnem, quae, propter hoc quod magis distat a verbo, minus assumptibilis videbatur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est fons vitae sicut prima causa vitae effectiva.

Sed anima est principium vitae corpori tanquam forma ipsius.

Forma autem est effectus agentis. Unde ex praesentia verbi magis concludi posset quod corpus esset animatum, sicut ex praesentia ignis concludi potest quod corpus cui ignis adhaeret, sit calidum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est inconveniens, immo necessarium dicere quod in christo fuit natura quae constituitur per animam corpori advenientem.

Damascenus autem negat in domino iesu christo esse communem speciem quasi aliquid tertium resultans ex unione divinitatis et humanitatis.