Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.

Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.

Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.

On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.

I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated (Article 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.

Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in deo.

Dicitur enim Act. XVII, in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus.

Sed non omnia in deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, omnia sunt in deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, videtur quod non omnia in deo sint vita.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera relig., substantia vivens est melior qualibet substantia non vivente.

Si igitur ea quae in seipsis non vivunt, in deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res in deo quam in seipsis.

Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in seipsis sint in actu, in deo vero in potentia.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, sicut sciuntur a deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita mala, et ea quae deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo omnia sunt vita in deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in deo, inquantum sunt scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, quod factum est, in ipso vita erat.

Sed omnia praeter deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in deo sunt vita.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vivere dei est eius intelligere. In deo autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in deo ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita eius.

Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae in deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae dicuntur esse in deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a deo. Alio modo dicuntur res esse in deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in deo per proprias rationes, quae non sunt aliud in deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, prout sic in deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo loquendi, in deo non sunt motus, sed vita.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse divinum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis.

Propter quod et Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem materialis est homo per participationem.

Sed quia de ratione rerum naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse materiale, quod non habent in mente divina.

Sicut domus nobilius esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet mala sint in dei scientia, inquantum sub dei scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in deo sicut creata a deo vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in deo, cognoscuntur enim a deo per rationes bonorum.

Unde non potest dici quod mala sint vita in deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus sunt, possunt dici esse vita in deo, secundum quod vivere nominat intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a deo, non autem secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis.