Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.

Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as stated above (1.2, Question 55, Article 4). Now Chrysostom says : "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher assigns to games the virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness."

I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (1.2, Question 25, Article 2; 1.2, Question 31, Article 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.

Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.

Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).

Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. .

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."

Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters."

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ludis non possit esse aliqua virtus.

Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de offic., dominus ait, vae, vobis qui ridetis, quia flebitis. Non solum ergo profusos, sed etiam omnes iocos declinandos arbitror.

Sed illud quod potest virtuose fieri, non est totaliter declinandum. Non ergo circa ludos potest esse virtus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtus est quam deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra habitum est.

Sed chrysostomus dicit, non dat deus ludere, sed diabolus.

Audi quid ludentes passi sunt, sedit populus manducare et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere.

Ergo circa ludos non potest esse virtus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in X ethic., quod operationes ludi non ordinantur in aliquid aliud.

Sed ad virtutem requiritur ut propter aliquid eligens operetur, sicut patet per philosophum, in II ethic..

Ergo circa ludos non potest esse aliqua virtus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II musicae, volo tandem tibi parcas, nam sapientem decet interdum remittere aciem rebus agendis intentam.

Sed ista remissio animi a rebus agendis fit per ludicra verba et facta. Ergo his uti interdum ad sapientem et virtuosum pertinet.

Philosophus etiam ponit virtutem eutrapeliae circa ludos, quam nos possumus dicere iucunditatem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut homo indiget corporali quiete ad corporis refocillationem, quod non potest continue laborare, propter hoc quod habet finitam virtutem, quae determinatis laboribus proportionatur; ita etiam est ex parte animae, cuius etiam est virtus finita ad determinatas operationes proportionata, et ideo, quando ultra modum suum in aliquas operationes se extendit, laborat, et ex hoc fatigatur, praesertim quia in operationibus animae simul etiam laborat corpus, inquantum scilicet anima, etiam intellectiva, utitur viribus per organa corporea operantibus. Sunt autem bona sensibilia connaturalia homini. Et ideo, quando anima supra sensibilia elevatur operibus rationis intenta, nascitur exinde quaedam fatigatio animalis, sive homo intendat operibus rationis practicae, sive speculativae.

Magis tamen si operibus contemplationis intendat, quia per hoc magis a sensibilibus elevatur, quamvis forte in aliquibus operibus exterioribus rationis practicae maior labor corporis consistat.

In utrisque tamen tanto aliquis magis animaliter fatigatur, quanto vehementius operibus rationis intendat. Sicut autem fatigatio corporalis solvitur per corporis quietem, ita etiam oportet quod fatigatio animalis solvatur per animae quietem.

Quies autem animae est delectatio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur.

Et ideo oportet remedium contra fatigationem animalem adhibere per aliquam delectationem, intermissa intentione ad insistendum studio rationis.

Sicut in collationibus patrum legitur quod beatus evangelista ioannes, cum quidam scandalizarentur quod eum cum suis discipulis ludentem invenerunt, dicitur mandasse uni eorum, qui arcum gerebat, ut sagittam traheret. Quod cum pluries fecisset, quaesivit utrum hoc continue facere posset. Qui respondit quod, si hoc continue faceret, arcus frangeretur. Unde beatus ioannes subintulit quod similiter animus hominis frangeretur, si nunquam a sua intentione relaxaretur.

Huiusmodi autem dicta vel facta, in quibus non quaeritur nisi delectatio animalis, vocantur ludicra vel iocosa. Et ideo necesse est talibus interdum uti, quasi ad quandam animae quietem.

Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., quod in huius vitae conversatione quaedam requies cum ludo habetur, et ideo oportet interdum aliquibus talibus uti. Circa quae tamen tria videntur praecipue esse cavenda. Quorum primum et principale est quod praedicta delectatio non quaeratur in aliquibus operationibus vel verbis turpibus vel nocivis.

Unde tullius dicit, in I de offic., quod unum genus iocandi est illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum.

Aliud autem attendendum est, ne totaliter gravitas animae resolvatur.

Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., caveamus ne, dum relaxare animum volumus, solvamus omnem harmoniam, quasi concentum quendam bonorum operum.

Et tullius dicit, in I de offic., quod sicut pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit aliena; sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat.

Tertio autem est attendendum, sicut et in omnibus aliis humanis actibus, ut congruat personae et tempori et loco, et secundum alias circumstantias debite ordinetur, ut scilicet sit et tempore et homine dignus, ut tullius dicit, ibidem.

Huiusmodi autem secundum regulam rationis ordinantur. Habitus autem secundum rationem operans est virtus moralis. Et ideo circa ludos potest esse aliqua virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Et dicitur aliquis eutrapelus a bona versione, quia scilicet bene convertit aliqua dicta vel facta in solatium. Et inquantum per hanc virtutem homo refrenatur ab immoderantia ludorum, sub modestia continetur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iocosa debent congruere negotiis et personis. Unde et tullius dicit, in I rhet., quod quando auditores sunt defatigati, non est inutile ab aliqua re nova aut ridicula oratorem incipere, si tamen rei dignitas non adimit iocandi facultatem.

Doctrina autem sacra maximis rebus intendit, secundum illud Prov. VIII, audite, quoniam de rebus magnis locutura sum.

Unde Ambrosius non excludit universaliter iocum a conversatione humana, sed a doctrina sacra. Unde praemittit, licet interdum honesta ioca ac suavia sint, tamen ab ecclesiastica abhorrent regula, quoniam quae in Scripturis sanctis non reperimus, ea quem ad modum usurpare possumus?

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud chrysostomi est intelligendum de illis qui inordinate ludis utuntur, et praecipue eorum qui finem in delectatione ludi constituunt, sicut de quibusdam dicitur Sap. XV, aestimaverunt esse ludum vitam nostram.

Contra quod dicit tullius, in I de offic., non ita generati a natura sumus ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, sed ad severitatem potius, et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsae operationes ludi, secundum suam speciem, non ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Sed delectatio quae in talibus actibus habetur, ordinatur ad quandam animae recreationem et quietem. Et secundum hoc, si moderate fiat, licet uti ludo. Unde tullius dicit, in I de offic., ludo et ioco uti quidem licet, sed, sicut somno et quietibus ceteris, tunc cum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus.