Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.

Objection 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the 1, Question 118, Article 2. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.

Objection 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books

In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.

But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him."

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature," according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath."

Reply to Objection 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.

Reply to Objection 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.

Reply to Objection 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non traducatur ad alios per originem.

Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, filius non portabit iniquitatem patris.

Portaret autem, si ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum per originem aliquod peccatum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum.

Sed anima rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem, ut in primo ostensum est.

Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem traduci potest.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo minus semen potest inficere animam.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III ethic., quod propter naturam turpes nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam.

Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque peccatum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit.

Quod non potest intelligi per modum imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, invidia diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum.

Restat ergo quod per originem a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod secundum fidem catholicam est tenendum quod primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad baptismum, tanquam ab aliqua infectione culpae abluendi.

Contrarium autem est haeresis pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris.

Ad investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt.

Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur.

Alii vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter non sit culpae subiectum.

Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III ethic., nullus improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur.

Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo.

Porphyrius etiam dicit quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.

Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale.

Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, eramus natura filii irae.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive. Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens.

Et ideo magis inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam determinata est ad personam.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se.

Sed si consideretur prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.