Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (Article 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.

Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.

I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas de sui ratione non habeat quod sit circa magnum honorem. Propria enim materia magnanimitatis est honor, ut dictum est.

Sed magnum et parvum accidunt honori. Ergo de ratione magnanimitatis non est quod sit circa magnum honorem.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut magnanimitas est circa honores, ita mansuetudo est circa iras. Sed non est de ratione mansuetudinis quod sit circa magnas iras, vel circa parvas. Ergo etiam non est de ratione magnanimitatis quod sit circa magnos honores.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, parvus honor minus distat a magno honore quam exhonoratio. Sed magnanimus bene se habet circa exhonorationes.

Ergo etiam et circa parvos honores.

Non ergo est solum circa honores magnos.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II ethic., quod magnanimitas est circa magnos honores.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VII physic., virtus est perfectio quaedam. Et intelligitur esse perfectio potentiae, ad cuius ultimum pertinet, ut patet in I de caelo.

Perfectio autem potentiae non attenditur in qualicumque operatione, sed in operatione quae habet aliquam magnitudinem aut difficultatem, quaelibet enim potentia, quantumcumque imperfecta, potest in aliquam operationem modicam et debilem.

Et ideo ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut sic circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II ethic..

Difficile autem et magnum, quae ad idem pertinent, in actu virtutis potest attendi dupliciter.

Uno modo, ex parte rationis, inquantum scilicet difficile est medium rationis adinvenire et in aliqua materia statuere. Et ista difficultas sola invenitur in actu virtutum intellectualium, et etiam in actu iustitiae. Alia autem est difficultas ex parte materiae, quae de se repugnantiam habere potest ad modum rationis qui est circa eam ponendus. Et ista difficultas praecipue attenditur in aliis virtutibus moralibus, quae sunt circa passiones, quia passiones pugnant contra rationem, ut dionysius dicit, IV cap. De div. Nom..

Circa quas considerandum est quod quaedam passiones sunt quae habent magnam vim resistendi rationi principaliter ex parte passionis, quaedam vero principaliter ex parte rerum quae sunt obiecta passionum. Passiones autem non habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi nisi fuerint vehementes, eo quod appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt passiones, naturaliter subditur rationi.

Et ideo virtutes quae sunt circa huiusmodi passiones non ponuntur nisi circa id quod est magnum in ipsis passionibus, sicut fortitudo est circa maximos timores et audacias, temperantia est circa maximarum delectationum concupiscentias, et similiter mansuetudo est circa maximas iras. Passiones autem quaedam habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi ex ipsis rebus exterioribus quae sunt passionum obiecta, sicut amor vel cupiditas pecuniae seu honoris. Et in istis oportet esse virtutem non solum circa id quod est maximum in eis, sed etiam circa mediocria vel minora, quia res exterius existentes, etiam si sint parvae, sunt multum appetibiles, utpote necessariae ad hominis vitam. Et ideo circa appetitum pecuniarum sunt duae virtutes, una quidem circa mediocres et moderatas, scilicet liberalitas; alia autem circa magnas pecunias, scilicet magnificentia.

Similiter etiam et circa honores sunt duae virtutes. Una quidem circa mediocres honores, quae innominata est, nominatur tamen ex suis extremis, quae sunt philotimia, idest amor honoris, et aphilotimia, idest sine amore honoris; laudatur enim quandoque qui amat honorem, quandoque autem qui non curat de honore, prout scilicet utrumque moderate fieri potest. Circa magnos autem honores est magnanimitas. Et ideo dicendum est quod propria materia magnanimitatis est magnus honor, et ad ea tendit magnanimus quae sunt magno honore digna.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnum et parvum per accidens se habent ad honorem secundum se consideratum, sed magnam differentiam faciunt secundum quod comparantur ad rationem, cuius modum in usu honoris observari oportet, qui multo difficilius observatur in magnis honoribus quam in parvis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod in ira et in aliis materiis non habet difficultatem notabilem nisi illud quod est maximum, circa quod solum oportet esse virtutem. Alia autem ratio est de divitiis et honoribus, quae sunt res extra animam existentes.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui bene utitur magnis, multo magis potest bene uti parvis. Magnanimitas ergo attendit magnos honores sicut quibus est dignus, vel etiam sicut minores his quibus est dignus, quia scilicet virtus non potest sufficienter honorari ab homine, cui debetur honor a deo. Et ideo non extollitur ex magnis honoribus, quia non reputat eos supra se, sed magis eos contemnit. Et multo magis moderatos aut parvos. Et similiter etiam dehonorationibus non frangitur, sed eas contemnit, utpote quas reputat sibi indigne afferri.