Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that there is not in the sacraments a power of causing grace. For the power of causing grace is a spiritual power. But a spiritual power cannot be in a body; neither as proper to it, because power flows from a thing's essence and consequently cannot transcend it; nor as derived from something else, because that which is received into anything follows the mode of the recipient. Therefore in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Objection 2: Further, whatever exists is reducible to some kind of being and some degree of good. But there is no assignable kind of being to which such a power can belong; as anyone may see by running. through them all. Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither is it one of the goods of least account, since sacraments are necessary for salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, such as are the powers of the soul, which are natural powers; nor is it one of the greater goods, for it is neither grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Objection 3: Further, if there be such a power in the sacraments, its presence there must be due to nothing less than a creative act of God. But it seems unbecoming that so excellent a being created by God should cease to exist as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing cannot be in several. But several things concur in the completion of a sacrament, namely, words and things: while in one sacrament there can be but one power. Therefore it seems that there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): "Whence hath water so great power, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" And Bede says that "Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the waters by the contact of His most pure body."

I answer that, Those who hold that the sacraments do not cause grace save by a certain coincidence, deny the sacraments any power that is itself productive of the sacramental effect, and hold that the Divine power assists the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects. Now such power is proportionate to the instrument: and consequently it stands in comparison to the complete and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above (Article 1), does not work save as moved by the principal agent, which works of itself. And therefore the power of the principal agent exists in nature completely and perfectly: whereas the instrumental power has a being that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.

Reply to Objection 1: A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject, after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived by the senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God unto the production of a spiritual effect.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as motion, through being an imperfect act, is not properly in a genus, but is reducible to a genus of perfect act, for instance, alteration to the genus of quality: so, instrumental power, properly speaking, is not in any genus, but is reducible to a genus and species of perfect act.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as an instrumental power accrues to an instrument through its being moved by the principal agent, so does a sacrament receive spiritual power from Christ's blessing and from the action of the minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus of Turin, Serm. xii): "Nor should you marvel, if we say that water, a corporeal substance, achieves the cleansing of the soul. It does indeed, and penetrates every secret hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and clear as it is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so that it permeates into the very principles of life and searches the inner-most recesses of the heart."

Reply to Objection 4: Just as the one same power of the principal agent is instrumentally in all the instruments that are ordained unto the production of an effect, forasmuch as they are one as being so ordained: so also the one same sacramental power is in both words and things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form one sacrament.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sacramentis non sit aliqua virtus gratiae causativa. Virtus enim gratiae causativa est virtus spiritualis. Sed in corpore non potest esse virtus spiritualis, neque ita quod sit propria ei, quia virtus fluit ab essentia rei, et ita non potest eam transcendere; neque ita quod recipiat eam ab alio, quia quod recipitur ab aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Ergo in sacramentis non potest esse aliqua virtus gratiae causativa.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, omne quod est, reducitur ad aliquod genus entis, et ad aliquem gradum boni. Sed non est dare in quo genere entis sit talis virtus, ut patet discurrenti per singula. Nec etiam potest reduci ad aliquem gradum bonorum, neque enim est inter minima bona, quia sacramenta sunt de necessitate salutis; neque etiam inter media bona, cuiusmodi sunt potentiae animae, quae sunt quaedam potentiae naturales; neque inter maxima bona, quia nec est gratia nec virtus mentis. Ergo videtur quod in sacramentis nulla sit virtus gratiae causativa.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, si talis virtus est in sacramentis, non causatur in eis nisi per creationem a deo. Sed inconveniens videtur quod tam nobilis creatura statim esse desinat sacramento perfecto. Ergo videtur quod nulla virtus sit in sacramentis ad gratiam causandam.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, idem non potest esse in diversis. Sed ad sacramenta concurrunt diversa, scilicet verba et res, unius autem sacramenti non potest esse nisi una virtus.

Ergo videtur quod in sacramentis nulla sit virtus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quae tanta vis aquae ut corpus tangat et cor abluat? et beda dicit quod dominus tactu suae mundissimae carnis vim regenerativam contulit aquis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod illi qui ponunt quod sacramenta non causant gratiam nisi per quandam concomitantiam, ponunt quod in sacramento non sit aliqua virtus quae operetur ad sacramenti effectum, est tamen virtus divina sacramento coassistens, quae sacramentalem effectum operatur.

Sed ponendo quod sacramentum est instrumentalis causa gratiae, necesse est simul ponere quod in sacramento sit quaedam virtus instrumentalis ad inducendum sacramentalem effectum. Et haec quidem virtus proportionatur instrumento. Unde comparatur ad virtutem absolutam et perfectam alicuius rei sicut comparatur instrumentum ad agens principale. Instrumentum enim, ut dictum est, non operatur nisi inquantum est motum a principali agente, quod per se operatur. Et ideo virtus principalis agentis habet permanens et completum esse in natura, virtus autem instrumentalis habet esse transiens ex uno in aliud, et incompletum; sicut et motus est actus imperfectus ab agente in patiens.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus spiritualis non potest esse in re corporea per modum virtutis permanentis et completae, sicut ratio probat. Nihil tamen prohibet in corpore esse virtutem spiritualem instrumentalem, inquantum scilicet corpus potest moveri ab aliqua substantia spirituali ad aliquem effectum spiritualem inducendum; sicut etiam in ipsa voce sensibili est quaedam vis spiritualis ad excitandum intellectum hominis, inquantum procedit a conceptione mentis. Et hoc modo vis spiritualis est in sacramentis, inquantum ordinantur a deo ad effectum spiritualem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut motus, eo quod est actus imperfectus, non proprie est in aliquo genere, sed reducitur ad genus actus perfecti, sicut alteratio ad qualitatem, ita virtus instrumentalis non est, proprie loquendo, in aliquo genere, sed reducitur ad genus et speciem virtutis perfectae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut virtus instrumentalis acquiritur instrumento ex hoc ipso quod movetur ab agente principali, ita et sacramentum consequitur spiritualem virtutem ex benedictione christi et applicatione ministri ad usum sacramenti.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de epiphania, nec mirum quod aquam, hoc est substantiam corporalem, ad purificandam animam dicimus pervenire. Pervenit plane, et penetrat conscientiae universa latibula. Quamvis enim ipsa sit subtilis et tenuis, benedictione tamen christi subtilior, occultas vitae causas ad secreta mentis subtili rore pertransit.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut eadem vis principalis agentis instrumentaliter invenitur in omnibus instrumentis ordinatis ad effectum, prout sunt quodam ordine unum; ita etiam eadem vis sacramentalis invenitur in verbis et rebus, prout ex verbis et rebus perficitur unum sacramentum.