Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through , since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.

Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God.

Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above (Question 14, Article 12); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God.

On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."

I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the names of God (Question 13, Article 2).

Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).

Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God.

Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (Article 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature."

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomen personae non sit ponendum in divinis.

Dicit enim dionysius, in principio de div. Nom.

Universaliter non est audendum aliquid dicere nec cogitare de supersubstantiali occulta divinitate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa.

Sed nomen personae non exprimitur nobis in sacra Scriptura novi vel veteris testamenti. Ergo non est nomine personae utendum in divinis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, boetius dicit, in libro de duab. Natur., nomen personae videtur traductum ex his personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque homines repraesentabant; persona enim dicta est a personando, quia concavitate ipsa maior necesse est ut volvatur sonus. Graeci vero has personas prosopa vocant, ab eo quod ponantur in facie, atque ante oculos obtegant vultum.

Sed hoc non potest competere in divinis, nisi forte secundum metaphoram. Ergo nomen personae non dicitur de deo nisi metaphorice.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis persona est hypostasis.

Sed nomen hypostasis non videtur deo competere, cum, secundum boetium, significet id quod subiicitur accidentibus, quae in deo non sunt.

Hieronymus etiam dicit quod in hoc nomine hypostasis, venenum latet sub melle.

Ergo hoc nomen persona non est dicendum de deo.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, a quocumque removetur definitio, et definitum. Sed definitio personae supra posita non videtur deo competere.

Tum quia ratio importat discursivam cognitionem, quae non competit deo, ut supra ostensum est, et sic deus non potest dici rationalis naturae. Tum etiam quia deus dici non potest individua substantia, cum principium individuationis sit materia, deus autem immaterialis est; neque etiam accidentibus substat, ut substantia dici possit.

Nomen ergo personae deo attribui non debet.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur in symbolo Athanasii, alia est persona patris, alia filii, alia spiritus sancti.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Unde, cum omne illud quod est perfectionis, deo sit attribuendum, eo quod eius essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem; conveniens est ut hoc nomen persona de deo dicatur.

Non tamen eodem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo; sicut et alia nomina quae, creaturis a nobis imposita, deo attribuuntur; sicut supra ostensum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet nomen personae in Scriptura veteris vel novi testamenti non inveniatur dictum de deo, tamen id quod nomen significat, multipliciter in sacra Scriptura invenitur assertum de deo; scilicet quod est maxime per se ens, et perfectissime intelligens. Si autem oporteret de deo dici solum illa, secundum vocem, quae sacra Scriptura de deo tradit, sequeretur quod nunquam in alia lingua posset aliquis loqui de deo, nisi in illa in qua primo tradita est Scriptura veteris vel novi testamenti. Ad inveniendum autem nova nomina, antiquam fidem de deo significantia, coegit necessitas disputandi cum haereticis. Nec haec novitas vitanda est, cum non sit profana, utpote a Scripturarum sensu non discordans, docet autem apostolus profanas vocum novitates vitare, I ad Tim. Ult..

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis hoc nomen persona non conveniat deo quantum ad id a quo impositum est nomen, tamen quantum ad id ad quod significandum imponitur, maxime deo convenit.

Quia enim in comoediis et tragoediis repraesentabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc nomen persona ad significandum aliquos dignitatem habentes. Unde consueverunt dici personae in ecclesiis, quae habent aliquam dignitatem.

Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente.

Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est.

Sed dignitas divinae naturae excedit omnem dignitatem, et secundum hoc maxime competit deo nomen personae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen hypostasis non competit deo quantum ad id a quo est impositum nomen, cum non substet accidentibus, competit autem ei quantum ad id, quod est impositum ad significandum rem subsistentem.

Hieronymus autem dicit sub hoc nomine venenum latere, quia antequam significatio huius nominis esset plene nota apud Latinos, haeretici per hoc nomen simplices decipiebant, ut confiterentur plures essentias, sicut confitentur plures hypostases; propter hoc quod nomen substantiae, cui respondet in Graeco nomen hypostasis, communiter accipitur apud nos pro essentia.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod deus potest dici rationalis naturae, secundum quod ratio non importat discursum, sed communiter intellectualem naturam. Individuum autem deo competere non potest quantum ad hoc quod individuationis principium est materia, sed solum secundum quod importat incommunicabilitatem. Substantia vero convenit deo, secundum quod significat existere per se.

Quidam tamen dicunt quod definitio superius a boetio data, non est definitio personae secundum quod personas in deo dicimus.

Propter quod Ricardus de sancto victore, corrigere volens hanc definitionem, dixit quod persona, secundum quod de deo dicitur, est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia.