Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of science.

Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science.

I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.

Now as stated above (Article 4), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.

Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.

Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (Article 4, ad 2,3).

Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (1, Question 1, Article 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae sunt fidei possint esse scita. Ea enim quae non sciuntur videntur esse ignorata, quia ignorantia scientiae opponitur. Sed ea quae sunt fidei non sunt ignorata, horum enim ignorantia ad infidelitatem pertinet, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, ignorans feci in incredulitate mea.

Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, scientia per rationes acquiritur. Sed ad ea quae sunt fidei a sacris auctoribus rationes inducuntur.

Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ea quae demonstrative probantur sunt scita, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Sed quaedam quae in fide continentur sunt demonstrative probata a philosophis, sicut deum esse, et deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi.

Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, opinio plus distat a scientia quam fides, cum fides dicatur esse media inter opinionem et scientiam.

Sed opinio et scientia possunt esse aliquo modo de eodem, ut dicitur in I poster..

Ergo etiam fides et scientia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem.

Ea ergo de quibus est fides agnitionem non habent.

Sed ea quae sunt scita habent agnitionem.

Ergo de his quae sunt scita non potest esse fides.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod omnis scientia habetur per aliqua principia per se nota, et per consequens visa. Et ideo oportet quaecumque sunt scita aliquo modo esse visa. Non autem est possibile quod idem ab eodem sit creditum et visum, sicut supra dictum est.

Unde etiam impossibile est quod ab eodem idem sit scitum et creditum. Potest tamen contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno, sit creditum ab alio.

Ea enim quae de trinitate credimus nos visuros speramus, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem, quam quidem visionem iam Angeli habent, unde quod nos credimus illi vident. Et similiter potest contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viae, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit. Id tamen quod communiter omnibus hominibus proponitur ut credendum est communiter non scitum. Et ista sunt quae simpliciter fidei subsunt.

Et ideo fides et scientia non sunt de eodem.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infideles eorum quae sunt fidei ignorantiam habent, quia nec vident aut sciunt ea in seipsis, nec cognoscunt ea esse credibilia. Sed per hunc modum fideles habent eorum notitiam, non quasi demonstrative, sed inquantum per lumen fidei videntur esse credenda, ut dictum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes quae inducuntur a sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur.

Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, sicut dionysius dicit, II cap. De div. Nom..

Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est, ut in principio operis dictum est.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae demonstrative probari possunt inter credenda numerantur, non quia de ipsis sit simpliciter fides apud omnes, sed quia praeexiguntur ad ea quae sunt fidei, et oportet ea saltem per fidem praesupponi ab his qui horum demonstrationem non habent.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, a diversis hominibus de eodem omnino potest haberi scientia et opinio, sicut et nunc dictum est de scientia et fide.

Sed ab uno et eodem potest quidem haberi fides et scientia de eodem secundum quid, scilicet subiecto, sed non secundum idem, potest enim esse quod de una et eadem re aliquis aliquid sciat et aliquid aliud opinetur; et similiter de deo potest aliquis demonstrative scire quod sit unus, et credere quod sit trinus.

Sed de eodem secundum idem non potest esse simul in uno homine scientia nec cum opinione nec cum fide, alia tamen et alia ratione. Scientia enim cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem, quia de ratione scientiae est quod id quod scitur existimetur esse impossibile aliter se habere; de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod quis existimat, existimet possibile aliter se habere. Sed id quod fide tenetur, propter fidei certitudinem, existimatur etiam impossibile aliter se habere, sed ea ratione non potest simul idem et secundum idem esse scitum et creditum, quia scitum est visum et creditum est non visum, ut dictum est.