An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.

 An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.

 Chapter II.— Concerning things utterable and things unutterable, and things knowable and thing unknowable.

 Chapter III.— Proof that there is a God.

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the nature of Deity: that it is incomprehensible.

 Chapter V.— Proof that God is one and not many.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the Word and the Son of God: a reasoned proof.

 Chapter VII.— Concerning the Holy Spirit, a reasoned proof.

 Chapter VIII.— Concerning the Holy Trinity.

 Chapter IX.— Concerning what is affirmed about God.

 Chapter X.— Concerning divine union and separation.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning what is affirmed about God as though He had body.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning the Same.

 The Deity being incomprehensible is also assuredly nameless. Therefore since we know not His essence, let us not seek for a name for His essence. For

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the place of God: and that the Deity alone is uncircumscribed.

 Chapter XIV.— The properties of the divine nature.

 Book II.

 Chapter II.— Concerning the creation.

 Chapter III.— Concerning angels.

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the devil and demons.

 Chapter V.— Concerning the visible creation.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the Heaven.

 Chapter VII.— Concerning light, fire, the luminaries, sun, moon and stars.

 Chapter VIII.— Concerning air and winds.

 These then are the winds : Cæcias, or Meses, arises in the region where the sun rises in summer. Subsolanus, where the sun rises at the equinoxes. Eur

 Chapter IX.— Concerning the waters.

 The Ægean Sea is received by the Hellespont, which ends at Abydos and Sestus: next, the Propontis, which ends at Chalcedon and Byzantium: here are the

 Chapter X.— Concerning earth and its products.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning Paradise.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning Man.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning Pleasures.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning Pain.

 Chapter XV.— Concerning Fear.

 Chapter XVI.— Concerning Anger.

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning Imagination.

 Chapter XVIII.— Concerning Sensation.

 Chapter XIX.— Concerning Thought.

 Chapter XX.— Concerning Memory.

 Chapter XXI.— Concerning Conception and Articulation.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning Passion and Energy.

 Chapter XXIII.— Concerning Energy.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning what is Voluntary and what is Involuntary.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning what is in our own power, that is, concerning Free-will .

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning Events .

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will.

 Chapter XXVIII.— Concerning what is not in our hands.

 Chapter XXIX.— Concerning Providence.

 Chapter XXX.— Concerning Prescience and Predestination.

 Book III.

 Chapter II. — Concerning the manner in which the Word was conceived, and concerning His divine incarnation.

 Chapter III.— Concerning Christ’s two natures, in opposition to those who hold that He has only one .

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the manner of the Mutual Communication .

 Chapter V.— Concerning the number of the Natures.

 Chapter VI.— That in one of its subsistences the divine nature is united in its entirety to the human nature, in its entirety and not only part to par

 Chapter VII.— Concerning the one compound subsistence of God the Word.

 Chapter VIII.— In reply to those who ask whether the natures of the Lord are brought under a continuous or a discontinuous quantity

 Chapter IX.— In reply to the question whether there is Nature that has no Subsistence.

 Chapter X.— Concerning the Trisagium (“the Thrice Holy”).

 Chapter XI.— Concerning the Nature as viewed in Species and in Individual, and concerning the difference between Union and Incarnation: and how this i

 Chapter XII.— That the holy Virgin is the Mother of God: an argument directed against the Nestorians.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the properties of the two Natures.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning the volitions and free-will of our Lord Jesus Christ.

 Chapter XV.— Concerning the energies in our Lord Jesus Christ.

 Chapter XVI.— In reply to those who say “If man has two natures and two energies, Christ must be held to have three natures and as many energies.”

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning the deification of the nature of our Lord’s flesh and of His will.

 Chapter XVIII.— Further concerning volitions and free-wills: minds, too, and knowledges and wisdoms.

 Chapter XIX.— Concerning the theandric energy.

 Chapter XX.— Concerning the natural and innocent passions .

 Chapter XXI.— Concerning ignorance and servitude.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning His growth.

 Chapter XXIII.— Concerning His Fear.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning our Lord’s Praying.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning the Appropriation.

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning the Passion of our Lord’s body, and the Impassibility of His divinity.

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the fact that the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from the soul and the body, even at our Lord’s death, and that

 Chapter XXVIII.— Concerning Corruption and Destruction.

 Chapter XXIX.— Concerning the Descent to Hades.

 Book IV.

 Chapter II.— Concerning the sitting at the right hand of the Father.

 Chapter III.— In reply to those who say “If Christ has two natures, either ye do service to the creature in worshipping created nature, or ye say that

 Chapter IV.— Why it was the Son of God, and not the Father or the Spirit, that became man: and what having became man He achieved.

 Chapter V.— In reply to those who ask if Christ’s subsistence is create or uncreate.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the question, when Christ was called.

 Chapter VII.— In answer to those who enquire whether the holy Mother of God bore two natures, and whether two natures hung upon the Cross.

 Chapter VIII.— How the Only-begotten Son of God is called first-born.

 Translation absent

 Chapter IX.— Concerning Faith and Baptism.

 Chapter X.— Concerning Faith.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning the Cross and here further concerning Faith.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning Worship towards the East.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the holy and immaculate Mysteries of the Lord.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning our Lord’s genealogy and concerning the holy Mother of God .

 Chapter XV.— Concerning the honour due to the Saints and their remains.

 Chapter XVI.— Concerning Images .

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning Scripture .

 Chapter XVIII.— Regarding the things said concerning Christ.

 Chapter XIX.— That God is not the cause of evils.

 Chapter XX.— That there are not two Kingdoms.

 Chapter XXI.— The purpose for which God in His foreknowledge created persons who would sin and not repent.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning the law of God and the law of sin.

 Chapter XXIII.— Against the Jews on the question of the Sabbath.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning Virginity.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning the Circumcision.

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning the Antichrist .

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the Resurrection.

Chapter XVIII.—Further concerning volitions and free-wills: minds, too, and knowledges and wisdoms.

When we say that Christ is perfect God780    Against the Apollinarians and the Monotheletes. Cf. Max., ut supra, II. p. 151. and perfect man, we assuredly attribute to Him all the properties natural to both the Father and mother. For He became man in order that that which was overcome might overcome. For He Who was omnipotent did not in His omnipotent authority and might lack the power to rescue man out of the hands of the tyrant. But the tyrant would have had a ground of complaint if, after he had overcome man, God should have used force against him. Wherefore God in His pity and love for man wished to reveal fallen man himself as conqueror, and became man to restore like with like.

But that man is a rational and intelligent animal, no one will deny. How, then, could He have become man if He took on Himself flesh without soul, or soul without mind? For that is not man. Again, what benefit would His becoming man have been to us if He Who suffered first was not saved, nor renewed and strengthened by the union with divinity? For that which is not assumed is not remedied. He, therefore, assumed the whole man, even the fairest part of him, which had become diseased, in order that He might bestow salvation on the whole. And, indeed, there could never exist a mind that had not wisdom and was destitute of knowledge. For if it has not energy or motion, it is utterly reduced to nothingness.

Therefore, God the Word781    Greg. Naz., Carm. sen. adv. Apollin., Epist. ad Cled., and elsewhere., wishing to restore that which was in His own image, became man. But what is that which was in His own image, unless mind? So He gave up the better and assumed the worse. For mind782    See also ch. 6 above, and Gregory’s lines against the Apollinarians. is in the border-land between God and flesh, for it dwells indeed in fellowship with the flesh, and is, moreover, the image of God. Mind, then, mingles with mind, and mind holds a place midway between the pureness of God and the denseness of flesh. For if the Lord assumed a soul without mind, He assumed the soul of an irrational animal.

But if the Evangelist said that the Word was made flesh783    St. John i. 14., note that in the Holy Scripture sometimes a man is spoken of as a soul, as, for example, with seventy-five souls came Jacob into Egypt784    Gen. xlvi. 27, ap. LXX.; Acts vii. 14.: and sometimes a man is spoken of as flesh, as, for example, All flesh shall see the salvation of God785    Is. xl. 5; St. Luke iii. 6.. And accordingly the Lord did not become flesh without soul or mind, but man. He says, indeed, Himself, Why seek ye to kill Me, a Man that hath told you the truth786    St. John viii. 40.? He, therefore, assumed flesh animated with the spirit of reason and mind, a spirit that holds sway over the flesh but is itself under the dominion of the divinity of the Word.

So, then, He had by nature, both as God and as man, the power of will. But His human will was obedient and subordinate to His divine will, not being guided by its own inclination, but willing those things which the divine will willed. For it was with the permission of the divine will that He suffered by nature what was proper to Him787    Sophron., Epist. Synod.. For when He prayed that He might escape the death, it was with His divine will naturally willing and permitting it that He did so pray and agonize and fear, and again when His divine will willed that His human will should choose the death, the passion became voluntary to Him788    See Cyril, In Joann., ch. x.. For it was not as God only, but also as man, that He voluntarily surrendered Himself to the death. And thus He bestowed on us also courage in the face of death. So, indeed, He said before His saving passion, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me789    St. Matt. xxvi. 39; St. Luke xxii. 22.,” manifestly as though He were to drink the cup as man and not as God. It was as man, then, that He wished the cup to pass from Him: but these are the words of natural timidity. Nevertheless, He said, not My will, that is to say, not in so far as I am of a different essence from Thee, but Thy will be done790    Ibid, that is to say, My will and Thy will, in so far as I am of the same essence as Thou. Now these are the words of a brave heart. For the Spirit of the Lord, since He truly became man in His good pleasure, on first testing its natural weakness was sensible of the natural fellow-suffering involved in its separation from the body, but being strengthened by the divine will it again grew bold in the face of death. For since He was Himself wholly God although also man, and wholly man although also God, He Himself as man subjected in Himself and by Himself His human nature to God and the Father, and became obedient to the Father, thus making Himself the most excellent type and example for us.

Of His own free-will, moreover, He exercised His divine and human will. For free-will is assuredly implanted in every rational nature. For to what end would it possess reason, if it could not reason at its own free-will? For the Creator hath implanted even in the unreasoning brutes natural appetite to compel them to sustain their own nature. For devoid of reason, as they are, they cannot guide their natural appetite but are guided by it. And so, as soon as the appetite for anything has sprung up, straightway arises also the impulse for action. And thus they do not win praise or happiness for pursuing virtue, nor punishment for doing evil. But the rational nature, although it does possess a natural appetite, can guide and train it by reason wherever the laws of nature are observed. For the advantage of reason consists in this, the free-will, by which we mean natural activity in a rational subject. Wherefore in pursuing virtue it wins praise and happiness, and in pursuing vice it wins punishment.

So that the soul791    Max.,Dial. cum Pyrrh.; Greg. Naz., Ep. 1, ad Cledon. of the Lord being moved of its own free-will willed, but willed of its free-will those things which His divine will willed it to will. For the flesh was not moved at a sign from the Word, as Moses and all the holy men were moved at a sign from heaven. But He Himself, Who was one and yet both God and man, willed according to both His divine and His human will. Wherefore it was not in inclination but rather in natural power that the two wills of the Lord differed from one another. For His divine will was without beginning and all-effecting, as having power that kept pace with it, and free from passion; while His human will had a beginning in time, and itself endured the natural and innocent passions, and was not naturally omnipotent. But yet it was omnipotent because it truly and naturally had its origin in the God-Word.

Ἔτι περὶ θελημάτων καὶ αὐτεξουσίων νοῶν τε καὶ γνώσεων καὶ σοφιῶν

Θεὸν τέλειον καὶ ἄνθρωπον τέλειον λέγοντες τὸν Χριστὸν πάντως πάντα δώσομεν τά τε τοῦ πατρὸς φυσικὰ τά τε τῆς μητρός: γέγονε γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα τὸ νικηθὲν νικήσῃ. Οὐκ ἀδύνατος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τὰ πάντα δυνάμενος καὶ τῇ παντοδυνάμῳ αὐτοῦ ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ἐξελέσθαι τοῦ τυραννοῦντος τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἦν ἐγκλήματος τῷ τυραννοῦντι ὑπόθεσις ἄνθρωπον νικήσαντι καὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ βιασθέντι. Αὐτὸν οὖν τὸν πεσόντα νικητὴν ἀναδεῖξαι βουληθεὶς ὁ συμπαθὴς θεὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπος γίνεται τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνακαλούμενος.

Ὅτι δὲ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ. Πῶς οὖν ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, εἰ σάρκα ἄψυχον ἢ ψυχὴν ἄνουν ἀνέλαβεν; Οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνθρωπος. Τί δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἀπωνάμεθα τοῦ πρωτοπαθήσαντος μὴ σεσωσμένου μηδὲ τῇ συναφείᾳ τῆς θεότητος ἀνακεκαινισμένου τε καὶ νενευρωμένου; «Τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον». Ἀναλαμβάνει τοίνυν ὅλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ τούτου κάλλιστον ὑπὸ ἀρρωστίαν πεσόν, ἵνα ὅλῳ τὴν σωτηρίαν χαρίσηται. Νοῦς δὲ ἄσοφος ἐστερημένος τε γνώσεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ: εἰ γὰρ ἀνενέργητος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος πάντως. Τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνακαινίσαι βουλόμενος ὁ θεὸς λόγος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος. Τί δὲ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς; Τὸ κρεῖττον οὖν παρεὶς τὸ χεῖρον ἀνέλαβε; Νοῦς γὰρ ἐν μεταιχμίῳ ἐστὶ θεοῦ καὶ σαρκός, τῆς μὲν ὡς σύνοικος, τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ ὡς εἰκών. Νοῦς οὖν νοῒ μίγνυται, καὶ μεσιτεύει νοῦς θεοῦ καθαρότητι καὶ σαρκὸς παχύτητι: εἰ γὰρ ψυχὴν ἄνουν ὁ κύριος ἀνέλαβεν, ἀλόγου ζῴου ψυχὴν ἀνέλαβεν.

Εἰ δέ, ὅτι σάρκα γεγενῆσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἔφη ὁ εὐαγγελιστής, ἰστέον ὡς παρὰ τῇ ἁγίᾳ γραφῇ ποτὲ μὲν ψυχὴ λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς τὸ «ἐν ἑβδομήκοντα πέντε ψυχαῖς εἰσῆλθεν Ἰακὼβ εἰς Αἴγυπτον», ποτὲ δὲ σὰρξ ὡς τὸ« ὄψεται πᾶσα σὰρξ τὸ σωτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ». Οὐ σὰρξ τοίνυν ἄψυχος οὐδὲ ἄνους, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν ὁ κύριος. Φησὶ γοῦν αὐτός: «Τί με δέρεις ἄνθρωπον, ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑμῖν λελάληκα;» Ἀνέλαβε τοίνυν σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ, ἡγεμονικῇ μὲν τῆς σαρκός, ἡγεμονευομένῃ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου θεότητος.

Εἶχε μὲν οὖν φυσικῶς καὶ ὡς θεὸς καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος τὸ θέλειν, εἵπετο δὲ καὶ ὑπετάσσετο τῷ αὐτοῦ θελήματι μὴ κινούμενον γνώμῃ ἰδίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα θέλον, ἃ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ ἤθελε θέλημα. Παραχωρούσης γὰρ τῆς θείας θελήσεως ἔπασχε τὰ ἴδια φυσικῶς. Ὅτε μὲν γὰρ παρῃτεῖτο τὸν θάνατον, φυσικῶς τῆς θείας αὐτοῦ θελησάσης θελήσεως καὶ παραχωρησάσης παρῃτήσατο τὸν θάνατον, ἠγωνίασέ τε καὶ ἐδειλίασε. Καὶ ὅτε ἤθελεν ἡ θεία αὐτοῦ θέλησις αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αὐτοῦ θέλησιν τὸν θάνατον, ἑκούσιον αὐτῇ τὸ πάθος ἐγίνετο: οὐ γὰρ καθὸ θεὸς μόνον ἑκουσίως ἑαυτὸν παρέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος. Ὅθεν τὴν κατὰ τοῦ θανάτου τόλμαν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐχαρίσατο. Οὕτω γοῦν πρὸ τοῦ σωτηρίου πάθους φησί: «Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν, παρελθέτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο»: δηλονότι ὡς ἄνθρωπος τὸ ποτήριον πίνειν ἔμελλεν, οὐ γὰρ ὡς θεός. Ὡς ἄνθρωπος τοίνυν θέλει τὸ ποτήριον παρελθεῖν: ταῦτα τῆς φυσικῆς δειλίας τὰ ῥήματα. «Πλὴν μὴ τὸ ἐμὸν γινέσθω θέλημα» ἤτοι καθ' ὅ σου ἑτεροούσιός εἰμι, «ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν» ἤτοι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ σόν, καθ' ὅ σου πέφυκα ὁμοούσιος: ταῦτα τῆς εὐτολμίας τὰ ῥήματα. Πρότερον γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀσθενείας πειραθεῖσα κατ' αἴσθησιν τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ χωρισμῷ τοῦ σώματος καὶ φυσικὴν συμπάθειαν παθοῦσα ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπου γενομένου κατ' εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ, αὖθις τῷ θείῳ νευρωθεῖσα θελήματι τοῦ θανάτου καταθαρρύνεται. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅλος ἦν θεὸς μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅλος ἄνθρωπος μετὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ θεότητος, αὐτὸς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ὑπέταξε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ τύπον ἡμῖν ἑαυτὸν ἄριστον καὶ ὑπογραμμὸν διδοὺς καὶ ὑπήκοος τῷ πατρὶ γέγονεν.

Αὐτεξουσίως δὲ ἤθελε τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ θελήματι: πάσῃ γὰρ λογικῇ φύσει πάντως ἐμπέφυκε τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα. Εἰς τί γὰρ ἕξει τὸ λογικὸν μὴ αὐτεξουσίως λογιζομένη; Τὴν μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις δημιουργὸς ἐνέσπειρε πρὸς σύστασιν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως αὐτὰ ἄγουσαν: λόγου γὰρ ἀμοιροῦντα οὐ δύναται ἄγειν, ἀλλ' ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ὀρέξεως. Ὅθεν ἅμα ἡ ὄρεξις γένηται, εὐθέως καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ὁρμή: οὐ γὰρ λόγῳ ἢ βουλῇ ἢ σκέψει ἢ κρίσει κέχρηται. Ὅθεν οὔτε ὡς ἀρετὴν μετιόντα ἐπαινεῖται καὶ μακαρίζεται οὔτε ὡς κακίαν πράττοντα κολάζεται. Ἡ δὲ λογικὴ φύσις ἔχει μὲν τὴν φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν κινουμένην, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀγομένην τε καὶ ῥυθμιζομένην ἐπὶ τῶν φυλασσόντων τὸ κατὰ φύσιν: τοῦ γὰρ λόγου τὸ προτέρημα τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἡ αὐτεξούσιος θέλησις, ἥντινα φυσικὴν ἐν τῷ λογικῷ φαμεν κίνησιν. Διὸ καὶ ὡς ἀρετὴν μετιοῦσα ἐπαινεῖται καὶ μακαρίζεται καὶ ὡς κακίαν μετιοῦσα κολάζεται.

Ὥστε ἤθελε μὲν αὐτεξουσίως κινουμένη ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ψυχή, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα αὐτεξουσίως ἤθελεν, ἃ ἡ θεία αὐτοῦ θέλησις ἤθελε θέλειν αὐτήν: οὐ γὰρ νεύματι τοῦ λόγου ἡ σὰρξ ἐκινεῖτο (καὶ Μωσῆς γὰρ καὶ πάντες οἱ ἅγιοι νεύματι θείῳ ἐκινοῦντο), ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτὸς εἷς ὢν θεός τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος κατά τε τὴν θείαν καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἤθελε θέλησιν. Διὸ οὐ γνώμῃ, φυσικῇ δὲ μᾶλλον δυνάμει αἱ δύο τοῦ κυρίου θελήσεις διέφερον ἀλλήλων. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία αὐτοῦ θέλησις ἄναρχός τε ἦν καὶ παντουργός, ἑπομένην ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀπαθής, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη αὐτοῦ θέλησις ἀπὸ χρόνου τε ἤρξατο καὶ αὐτὴ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἀδιάβλητα πάθη ὑπέμεινε καὶ φυσικῶς οὐ παντοδύναμος ἦν, ὡς δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἀληθῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γενομένη καὶ παντοδύναμος.