An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.

 An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.

 Chapter II.— Concerning things utterable and things unutterable, and things knowable and thing unknowable.

 Chapter III.— Proof that there is a God.

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the nature of Deity: that it is incomprehensible.

 Chapter V.— Proof that God is one and not many.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the Word and the Son of God: a reasoned proof.

 Chapter VII.— Concerning the Holy Spirit, a reasoned proof.

 Chapter VIII.— Concerning the Holy Trinity.

 Chapter IX.— Concerning what is affirmed about God.

 Chapter X.— Concerning divine union and separation.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning what is affirmed about God as though He had body.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning the Same.

 The Deity being incomprehensible is also assuredly nameless. Therefore since we know not His essence, let us not seek for a name for His essence. For

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the place of God: and that the Deity alone is uncircumscribed.

 Chapter XIV.— The properties of the divine nature.

 Book II.

 Chapter II.— Concerning the creation.

 Chapter III.— Concerning angels.

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the devil and demons.

 Chapter V.— Concerning the visible creation.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the Heaven.

 Chapter VII.— Concerning light, fire, the luminaries, sun, moon and stars.

 Chapter VIII.— Concerning air and winds.

 These then are the winds : Cæcias, or Meses, arises in the region where the sun rises in summer. Subsolanus, where the sun rises at the equinoxes. Eur

 Chapter IX.— Concerning the waters.

 The Ægean Sea is received by the Hellespont, which ends at Abydos and Sestus: next, the Propontis, which ends at Chalcedon and Byzantium: here are the

 Chapter X.— Concerning earth and its products.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning Paradise.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning Man.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning Pleasures.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning Pain.

 Chapter XV.— Concerning Fear.

 Chapter XVI.— Concerning Anger.

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning Imagination.

 Chapter XVIII.— Concerning Sensation.

 Chapter XIX.— Concerning Thought.

 Chapter XX.— Concerning Memory.

 Chapter XXI.— Concerning Conception and Articulation.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning Passion and Energy.

 Chapter XXIII.— Concerning Energy.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning what is Voluntary and what is Involuntary.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning what is in our own power, that is, concerning Free-will .

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning Events .

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will.

 Chapter XXVIII.— Concerning what is not in our hands.

 Chapter XXIX.— Concerning Providence.

 Chapter XXX.— Concerning Prescience and Predestination.

 Book III.

 Chapter II. — Concerning the manner in which the Word was conceived, and concerning His divine incarnation.

 Chapter III.— Concerning Christ’s two natures, in opposition to those who hold that He has only one .

 Chapter IV.— Concerning the manner of the Mutual Communication .

 Chapter V.— Concerning the number of the Natures.

 Chapter VI.— That in one of its subsistences the divine nature is united in its entirety to the human nature, in its entirety and not only part to par

 Chapter VII.— Concerning the one compound subsistence of God the Word.

 Chapter VIII.— In reply to those who ask whether the natures of the Lord are brought under a continuous or a discontinuous quantity

 Chapter IX.— In reply to the question whether there is Nature that has no Subsistence.

 Chapter X.— Concerning the Trisagium (“the Thrice Holy”).

 Chapter XI.— Concerning the Nature as viewed in Species and in Individual, and concerning the difference between Union and Incarnation: and how this i

 Chapter XII.— That the holy Virgin is the Mother of God: an argument directed against the Nestorians.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the properties of the two Natures.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning the volitions and free-will of our Lord Jesus Christ.

 Chapter XV.— Concerning the energies in our Lord Jesus Christ.

 Chapter XVI.— In reply to those who say “If man has two natures and two energies, Christ must be held to have three natures and as many energies.”

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning the deification of the nature of our Lord’s flesh and of His will.

 Chapter XVIII.— Further concerning volitions and free-wills: minds, too, and knowledges and wisdoms.

 Chapter XIX.— Concerning the theandric energy.

 Chapter XX.— Concerning the natural and innocent passions .

 Chapter XXI.— Concerning ignorance and servitude.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning His growth.

 Chapter XXIII.— Concerning His Fear.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning our Lord’s Praying.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning the Appropriation.

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning the Passion of our Lord’s body, and the Impassibility of His divinity.

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the fact that the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from the soul and the body, even at our Lord’s death, and that

 Chapter XXVIII.— Concerning Corruption and Destruction.

 Chapter XXIX.— Concerning the Descent to Hades.

 Book IV.

 Chapter II.— Concerning the sitting at the right hand of the Father.

 Chapter III.— In reply to those who say “If Christ has two natures, either ye do service to the creature in worshipping created nature, or ye say that

 Chapter IV.— Why it was the Son of God, and not the Father or the Spirit, that became man: and what having became man He achieved.

 Chapter V.— In reply to those who ask if Christ’s subsistence is create or uncreate.

 Chapter VI.— Concerning the question, when Christ was called.

 Chapter VII.— In answer to those who enquire whether the holy Mother of God bore two natures, and whether two natures hung upon the Cross.

 Chapter VIII.— How the Only-begotten Son of God is called first-born.

 Translation absent

 Chapter IX.— Concerning Faith and Baptism.

 Chapter X.— Concerning Faith.

 Chapter XI.— Concerning the Cross and here further concerning Faith.

 Chapter XII.— Concerning Worship towards the East.

 Chapter XIII.— Concerning the holy and immaculate Mysteries of the Lord.

 Chapter XIV.— Concerning our Lord’s genealogy and concerning the holy Mother of God .

 Chapter XV.— Concerning the honour due to the Saints and their remains.

 Chapter XVI.— Concerning Images .

 Chapter XVII.— Concerning Scripture .

 Chapter XVIII.— Regarding the things said concerning Christ.

 Chapter XIX.— That God is not the cause of evils.

 Chapter XX.— That there are not two Kingdoms.

 Chapter XXI.— The purpose for which God in His foreknowledge created persons who would sin and not repent.

 Chapter XXII.— Concerning the law of God and the law of sin.

 Chapter XXIII.— Against the Jews on the question of the Sabbath.

 Chapter XXIV.— Concerning Virginity.

 Chapter XXV.— Concerning the Circumcision.

 Chapter XXVI.— Concerning the Antichrist .

 Chapter XXVII.— Concerning the Resurrection.

Chapter XXVII.—Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will.

We hold, therefore, that free-will477    This is supplied by Combefis from Nemesius. comes on the scene at the same moment as reason, and that change and alteration are congenital to all that is produced. For all that is produced is also subject to change478    Nemes., ch. 41.. For those things must be subject to change whose production has its origin in change. And change consists in being brought into being out of nothing, and in transforming a substratum of matter into something different. Inanimate things, then, and things without reason undergo the aforementioned bodily changes, while the changes of things endowed with reason depend on choice. For reason consists of a speculative and a practical part. The speculative part is the contemplation of the nature of things, and the practical consists in deliberation and defines the true reason for what is to be done. The speculative side is called mind or wisdom, and the practical side is called reason or prudence. Every one, then, who deliberates does so in the belief that the choice of what is to be done lies in his hands, that he may choose what seems best as the result of his deliberation, and having chosen may act upon it. And if this is so, free-will must necessarily be very closely related to reason. For either man is an irrational being, or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts and endowed with free-will. Hence also creatures without reason do not enjoy free-will: for nature leads them rather than they nature, and so they do not oppose the natural appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs after anything they rush headlong after it. But man, being rational, leads nature rather than nature him, and so when he desires aught he has the power to curb his appetite or to indulge it as he pleases. Hence also creatures devoid of reason are the subjects neither of praise nor blame, while man is the subject of both praise and blame479    This sentence is omitted in Basil and some mss..

Note also that the angels, being rational, are endowed with free-will, and, inasmuch as they are created, are liable to change. This in fact is made plain by the devil who, although made good by the Creator, became of his own free-will the inventor of evil, and by the powers who revolted with him480    Nemesius speaks of this at greater length., that is the demons, and by the other troops of angels who abode in goodness.

Διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιοι γεγόναμεν

Φαμὲν τοίνυν εὐθέως τῷ λογικῷ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Πᾶν γὰρ γεννητὸν καὶ τρεπτόν ἐστιν. Ὧν γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτα τρεπτὰ εἶναι. Τροπὴ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραχθῆναι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα καὶ ἄλογα τρέπονται κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας σωματικὰς ἀλλοιώσεις, τὰ δὲ λογικὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: τοῦ γὰρ λογικοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, θεωρητικὸν μὲν τὸ κατανοοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν σοφίαν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν φρόνησιν. Πᾶς οὖν ὁ βουλευόμενος ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως οὔσης τῶν πρακτῶν βουλεύεται, ἵνα τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἕληται καὶ ἑλόμενος πράξῃ: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον: ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικόν, ἢ λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὔκ εἰσιν αὐτεξούσια: ἄγονται γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἤπερ ἄγουσι: διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγουσι τῇ φυσικῇ ὀρέξει, ἀλλ', ἅμα ὀρεχθῶσί τινος, ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος λογικὸς ὢν ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται: διὸ καὶ ὀρεγόμενος, εἴπερ ἐθέλοι, ἐξουσίαν ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀναχαιτίσαι ἢ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ. Ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλογα οὐδὲ ἐπαινεῖται οὐδὲ ψέγεται, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ψέγεται.

Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι λογικοὶ ὄντες αὐτεξούσιοι ὑπάρχουσι καὶ ὡς κτιστοὶ καὶ τρεπτοί. Καὶ ἔδειξεν ὁ μὲν διάβολος ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενόμενος, αὐτεξουσίως δὲ τῆς κακίας εὑρετὴς γεγονώς, καὶ αἱ σὺν αὐτῷ ἀποστατήσασαι δυνάμεις ἤγουν οἱ δαίμονες, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τάγματα τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ διαμείναντα.