Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showing the relation of “generate” and “ungenerate,” as involving no opposition in sense1007    The composer of the analysis seems to have been slightly confused by the discussion on the nature of contradictory opposition., but presenting an opposition and contradiction admitting of no middle term, he ends the book.

But I feel that my argument is running away with me, for it does not remain in the regular course, but, like some hot-blooded and spirited colt, is carried away by the blasphemies of our opponents to range over the absurdities of their system. Accordingly we must restrain it when it would run wild beyond the bounds of moderation in demonstration of absurd consequences. But the kindly reader will doubtless pardon what we have said, not imputing the absurdity that emerges from our investigation to us, but to those who laid down such mischievous premises. We must, however, now transfer our attention to another of his statements. For he says that our God also is composite, in that while we suppose the Light to be common, we yet separate the one Light from the other by certain special attributes and various differences. For that is none the less composite which, while united by one common nature, is yet separated by certain differences and conjunctions of peculiarities1008    It is not clear how far the preceding sentences are an exact reproduction of Eunomius: they are probably a summary of his argument.. To this our answer is short and easily dismissed. For what he brings as matter of accusation against our doctrines we acknowledge against ourselves, if he is not found to establish the same position by his own words. Let us just consider what he has written. He calls the Lord “true” Light, and the Father Light “unapproachable.” Accordingly, by thus naming each, he also acknowledges their community in respect to light. But as titles are applied to things because they fit them, as he has often insisted, we do not conceive that the name of “light” is used of the Divine Nature barely, apart from some meaning, but rather that it is predicated by virtue of some underlying reality. Accordingly, by the use of a common name, they recognize the identity of the objects signified, since they have already declared that the natures of those things which have the same name cannot be different. Since, then, the meaning of “Light” is one and the same, the addition of “unapproachable” and “true,” according to the language of heresy, separates the common nature by specific differences, so that the Light of the Father is conceived as one thing, and the Light of the Son as another, separated one from the other by special properties. Let him, then, either overthrow his own positions to avoid making out by his statements that the Deity is composite, or let him abstain from charging against us what he may see contained in his own language. For our statement does not hereby violate the simplicity of the Godhead, since community and specific difference are not essence, so that the conjunction of these should render the subject composite1009    Oehler’s punctuation seems rather to obscure the sense.. But on the one side the essence by itself remains whatever it is in nature, being what it is, while, on the other, every one possessed of reason would say that these—community and specific difference—were among the accompanying conceptions and attributes: since even in us men there may be discerned some community with the Divine Nature, but Divinity is not the more on that account humanity, or humanity Divinity. For while we believe that God is good, we also find this character predicated of men in Scripture. But the special signification in each case establishes a distinction in the community arising from the use of the homonymous term. For He Who is the fountain of goodness is named from it; but he who has some share of goodness also partakes in the name, and God is not for this reason composite, that He shares with men the title of “good.” From these considerations it must obviously be allowed that the idea of community is one thing, and that of essence another, and we are not on that account any the more to maintain composition or multiplicity of parts in that simple Nature which has nothing to do with quantity, because some of the attributes we contemplate in It are either regarded as special, or have a sort of common significance.

But let us pass on, if it seems good, to another of his statements, and dismiss the nonsense that comes between. He who laboriously reiterates against our argument the Aristotelian division of existent things, has elaborated “genera,” and “species,” and “differentiæ,” and “individuals,” and advanced all the technical language of the categories for the injury of our doctrines. Let us pass by all this, and turn our discourse to deal with his heavy and irresistible argument. For having braced his argument with Demosthenic fervour, he has started up to our view as a second Pæanian of Oltiseris1010    That is, a new Demosthenes, with a difference. Demosthenes’ native place was the Attic deme of Pæania. Eunomius, according to S. Gregory, was born at Oltiseris (see p. 38, note 6, sup.)., imitating that orator’s severity in his struggle with us. I will transcribe the language of our author word for word. “Yes,” he says, “but if, as the generate is contrary to the ungenerate, the Generate Light be equally inferior to the Ungenerate Light, the one will be found to be1011    Reading γενήσεται light, the other darkness.” Let him who has the leisure learn from his words how pungent is his mode of dealing with this opposition, and how exactly it hits the mark. But I would beg this imitator of our words either to say what we have said, or to make his imitation of it as close as may be, or else, if he deals with our argument according to his own education and ability, to speak in his own person and not in ours. For I hope that no one will so miss our meaning as to suppose that, while “generate” is contradictory in sense to “ungenerate,” one is a diminution of the other. For the difference between contradictories is not one of greater or less intensity, but rests its opposition upon their being mutually exclusive in their signification: as, for example, we say that a man is asleep or not asleep, sitting or not sitting, that he was or was not, and all the rest after the same model, where the denial of one is the assertion of its contradictory. As, then, to live is not a diminution of not living, but its complete opposite, even so we conceived having been generated not as a diminution of not having been generated, but as an opposite and contradictory not admitting of any middle term, so that which is expressed by the one has nothing whatever to do with that which is expressed by the other in the way of less or more. Let him therefore who says that one of two contradictories is defective as compared with the other, speak in his own person, not in ours. For our homely language says that things which correspond to contradictories differ from one another even as their originals do. So that, even if Eunomius discerns in the Light the same divergence as in the generate compared with the Ungenerate, I will re-assert my statement, that as in the one case the one member of the contradiction has nothing in common with its opposite, so if “light” be placed on the same side as one of the two contradictories, the remaining place in the figure must of course be assigned to “darkness,” the necessity of the antithesis arranging the term of light over against its opposite, in accordance with the analogy of the previous contradictory terms “generate” and “ungenerate.” Such is the clumsy answer which we, who as our disparaging author says, have attempted to write without logical training, deliver in our rustic dialect to our new Pæanian. But to see how he contended with this contradiction, advancing against us those hot and fire-breathing words of his with Demosthenic intensity, let those who like to have a laugh study the treatise of our orator itself. For our pen is not very hard to rouse to confute the notions of impiety, but is quite unsuited to the task of ridiculing the ignorance of untutored minds.

Ἀλλ' αἰσθάνομαι ὑπατακτοῦντος τοῦ λόγου: οὐ γὰρ ἐπιμένει τῷ καθήκοντι δρόμῳ, κατὰ τοὺς θερμούς τε καὶ θυμώδεις τῶν πώλων ταῖς τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν βλασφημίαις συνεκφερόμενος πρὸς τὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἄτοπα. οὐκοῦν καθεκτέον αὐτὸν πέρα τοῦ μέτρου πρὸς κατασκευὴν τῶν ἀτόπων ἀφηνιάζοντα. συγγνώσεται δὲ πάντως ὁ εὐγνώμων ἀκροατὴς ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οὐχ ἡμῖν τὴν ἀνακύπτουσαν ἐκ τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἀτοπίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰς πονηρὰς ὑποτιθεμένοις ἀρχὰς λογιζόμενος. ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων μετακτέον τὴν θεωρίαν. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι « καὶ σύνθετον ἡμῖν τὸν θεὸν ἀπεργάζεται τῷ κοινὸν μὲν ὑποθέσθαι τὸ φῶς, ἰδιότησι δέ τισι καὶ ποικίλαις διαφοραῖς θατέρου χωρίζειν θάτερον. σύνθετον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ κοινότητι μιᾷ συνενηνεγμένον, διαφοραῖς δέ τισι καὶ συνδρομαῖς ἰδιωμάτων χωριζόμενον ». πρὸς ταῦτα δὲ βραχὺς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος καὶ εὐαπάλλακτος. ὃ γὰρ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπεγκαλεῖ δόγμασιν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευάζει λόγων, καθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ ἔγκλημα. σκεψώμεθα γὰρ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένα. φῶς ἀληθινὸν ὀνομάζει τὸν κύριον, ἀπρόσιτον δὲ φῶς τὸν πατέρα. οὐκοῦν τὴν κατὰ τὸ φῶς κοινωνίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησεν, οὕτως ὀνομάσας ἑκάτερον. τῶν δὲ προσηγοριῶν προσφυῶς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφηρμοσμένων, καθὼς πολλαχῇ διωρίσατο, οὐ ψιλὴν νοοῦμεν τοῦ φωτὸς τὴν φωνὴν δίχα τινὸς διανοίας ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λέγεσθαι, ἀλλά τινος ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι. οὐκοῦν τῇ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνίᾳ καὶ τὴν τῶν σημαινομένων ὁμολογοῦσι ταὐτότητα, ἐπείπερ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα τὰ αὐτά, τούτων ἀπεφήναντο μηδὲ τὰς φύσεις ἑτέρως ἔχειν. ἑνὸς τοίνυν ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ φῶς σημαινομένου ἡ τοῦ ἀπροσίτου καὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ προσθήκη κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγον τὸ κοινὸν διορίζει τοῖς ἰδιάζουσιν, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς φῶς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοηθῆναι, τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διακρινόμενα. ἢ τοίνυν ἀνατρεψάτω τὰ ἴδια, ἵνα μὴ σύνθετον δι' ὧν λέγει κατασκευάσῃ τὸ θεῖον, ἢ μηδὲ ἡμῶν ταῦτα κατηγορείτω, ἅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις βλέπει λόγοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ τὴν ἁπλότητα διὰ τούτων ὁ λόγος λυμαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ κοινότης τε καὶ ἰδιότης οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε τὴν συνδρομὴν τούτων σύνθετον ἀποδεικνύειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οὐσία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὅ τι ποτὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ διαμένει, ἐκεῖνο οὖσα ὅπερ ἐστί: ταῦτα δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν νοουμένων τε καὶ θεωρουμένων εἶναι πᾶς τις ἂν εἴποι διανοίας μετέχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔστι τι κοινὸν τῆς θείας φύσεως κατανοῆσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρωπότης τὸ θεῖον ἢ θεότης ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι πιστεύοντες οἴδαμεν καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς τεταγμένον. ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας κοινότητα τὸ ἰδιάζον ἐφ' ἑκατέρου τῆς σημασίας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πηγὴ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ὢν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὀνομάζεται, ὁ δὲ μετέχων τῆς ἀγαθότητος συμμετέχει καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος: καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο σύνθετος ὁ θεός, ὅτι κοινωνεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προσηγορίας. οὐκοῦν φανερῶς ἐκ τούτων ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι ἄλλος ὁ τῆς κοινότητος καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγος, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον διὰ τοῦτο σύνθεσίς τις καὶ πολυμέρεια περὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν τε καὶ ἄποσον κατασκευάζεται φύσιν, εἴ τι τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων ἢ ἐν ἰδιότητι βλέποιτο ἢ κατὰ κοινοῦ τινος τὴν σημασίαν ἔχοι.
Ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἕτερον, εἰ δοκεῖ, τῶν εἰρημένων μετέλθωμεν τὸν διὰ μέσου λῆρον χαίρειν ἐάσαντες, ᾧ φιλοπόνως τὴν Ἀριστοτελικὴν τῶν ὄντων διαίρεσιν ἐπιθρυλῶν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ ἐξείργασται γένη καὶ εἴδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ ἄτομα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις τεχνολογίαν ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν ἡμετέρων δογμάτων προεχειρίσατο. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐάσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ δυσανταγώνιστον αὐτοῦ τῷ λόγῳ μετέλθωμεν. Δημοσθενικῷ γὰρ θυμῷ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον τονώσας ἄλλος τις ἡμῖν ἐξ Ὀλτισήριδος Παιανιεὺς ἀναπέφηνε, τὸ δριμὺ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμῶν ἀγῶνι μιμούμενος. ἐκθήσομαι δὲ κατὰ λέξιν αὐτὰ τοῦ λογογράφου τὰ ῥήματα. « ναί », φησίν, « ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἐναντίως ἔχοντος κατ' ἴσον ὑποβαίνοι τὸ γεννητὸν φῶς πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον φῶς, τὸ μὲν γενήσεται φῶς, τὸ δὲ σκότος ». τὸ μὲν οὖν ὀξὺ καὶ εὔστοχον τῆς πρὸς τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ἀπαντήσεως, ὅτῳ σχολή, διὰ τῶν ἐκείνου μαθέτω λόγων. ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑποκριτὴν ἀξιώσαιμ' ἂν ἢ τὰ ἡμέτερα λέγειν (ἢ ὡς ἐγγυτάτω προσάγειν τοῦ λόγου τὴν μίμησιν), ἢ καθὼς πεπαίδευται καὶ δύναται κεχρημένον τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἡμῶν διαλέγεσθαι. μήποτε γὰρ οὕτω παραχθείη τῶν ἡμετέρων μηδείς, ὥστε τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἐναντίως κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἔχοντος ὑπόβασιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον οἴεσθαι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀντικείμενον οὐκ ἐν ὑφέσει τὴν διαφοράν, ἀλλ' ἐν παντελεῖ τῇ κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀλλοτριώσει τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἔχει, οἷον καθεύδειν τινὰ λέγομεν ἢ μὴ καθεύδειν, καθῆσθαι ἢ μὴ καθῆσθαι, γεγεννῆσθαι ἢ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι, τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον: ὧν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρσις θέσις τοῦ ἀντικειμένου γίνεται. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ζῆν οὐχὶ ὕφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ παντελὴς ἐναντίωσις, οὕτω τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι οὐχ ὕφεσιν τοῦ μὴ γεννηθέντος ἐνοήσαμεν, ἀλλ' ἀντίθεσίν τινα καὶ ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἀμεσίτευτον, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ σημαινόμενον μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κοινωνεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον μήτε ἐν ὀλίγῳ μήτε ἐν πλείονι. ὁ τοίνυν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου νοούμενον ὑποβαίνειν πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγων ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προαγέτω προσώπου τὸν λόγον. ὁ γὰρ ἡμέτερος ἰδιωτισμὸς τὰ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἀναλογοῦντα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον τοῖς πρωτοτύποις καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ λέγει διΐστασθαι. ὥστε εἰ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ τὴν αὐτὴν παραλλαγὴν ἣν τῷ γεννητῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἐνορᾷ ὁ Εὐνόμιος, τὸν ἡμέτερον ἐπαναλήψομαι λόγον, ὅτι ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἕτερον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μέρος ἀκοινώνητον πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον μένει, οὕτως εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ μέρει τῶν ἀντιθέτων τὸ φῶς συναρμοσθείη, τὸ λειπόμενον συζυγὲς τῷ σκότῳ πάντως ἀναδειχθήσεται, τῆς ἀντιθετικῆς ἀνάγκης ἀναλόγως τοῖς προάγουσι καὶ τὸν τοῦ φωτὸς λόγον πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον διαστελλούσης. ταῦτα ἡμεῖς οἱ « δίχα λογικῆς ἐντρεχείας ἐπιχειροῦντες τῷ γράφειν », καθώς φησιν ὁ διαβάλλων ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τὸν νέον Παιανιέα διὰ τῆς ἐπιχωρίου γλώττης ὑπαγροικίζομεν. πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ταύτην διηγωνίσατο τοὺς θερμοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ πῦρ πνέοντας λόγους κατὰ τὴν Δημοσθενικὴν εὐτονίαν καθ' ἡμῶν προβαλλόμενος, ὅσοις καθ' ἡδονήν ἐστι τὸ γελᾶν, αὐτοῖς ἐπερχέσθωσαν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις τῷ ῥήτορι. τὸ γὰρ ἡμέτερον πρὸς μὲν ἔλεγχον τῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας δογμάτων οὐ λίαν δυσκίνητον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κωμῳδεῖν τὴν ἀμαθίαν τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων παντελῶς ἐστιν ἀνεπιτήδειον.