Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

But this man of science still declares that varied works have energies as varied to produce them. Either he knows not yet the nature of the Divine energy, as taught by Scripture,—‘All things were made by the word of His command,’—or else he is blind to the differences of existing things. He utters for our benefit these inconsiderate statements, and lays down the law about divine doctrines, as if he had never yet heard that anything that is merely asserted,—where no entirely undeniable and plain statement is made about the matter in hand, and where the asserter says on his own responsibility that which a cautious listener cannot assent to,—is no better than a telling of dreams or of stories over wine. Little then as this dictum of his fits facts, nevertheless,—like one who is deluded by a dream into thinking that he sees one of the objects of his waking efforts, and who grasps eagerly at this phantom and with eyes deceived by this visionary desire thinks that he holds it,—he with this dreamlike outline of doctrines before him imagines that his words possess force, and insists upon their truth, and essays by them to prove all the rest. It is worth while to give the passage. “These being so, and maintaining an unbroken connexion in their relation to each other, it seems fitting for those who make their investigation according to the order germane to the subject, and who do not insist on mixing and confusing all together, in case of a discussion being raised about Being, to prove what is in course of demonstration, and to settle the points in debate, by the primary energies and those attached to the Beings, and again to explain by the Being when the energies are in question.” I think the actual phrases of his impiety are enough to prove how absurd is this teaching. If any one had to give a description of the way some disease mars a human countenance, he would explain it better by actually unbandaging the patient, and there would be then no need of words when the eye had seen how he looked. So some mental eye might discern the hideous mutilation wrought by this heresy: its mere perusal might remove the veil. But since it is necessary, in order to make the latent mischief of this teaching clear to the many, to put the finger of demonstration upon it, I will again repeat each word. “This being so.” What does this dreamer mean? What is ‘this?’ How has it been stated? “The Father’s being is alone proper and in the highest degree supreme; consequently the next being is dependent, and the third more dependent still.” In such words he lays down the law. But why? Is it because an energy accompanies the first being, of which the effect and work, the Only-begotten, is circumscribed by the sphere of this producing cause? Or because these Beings are to be thought of as of greater or less extent, the smaller included within and surrounded by the larger, like casks put one inside the other, inasmuch as he detects degrees of size within Beings that are illimitable? Or because differences of products imply differences of producers, as if it were impossible that different effects should be produced by similar energies? Well, there is no one whose mental faculties are so steeped in sleep as to acquiesce directly after hearing such statements in the following assertion, “these being so, and maintaining an unbroken connexion in their relation to one another.” It is equal madness to say such things, and to hear them without any questioning. They are placed in a ‘series’ and ‘an unalterable relation to each other,’ and yet they are parted from each other by an essential unlikeness! Either, as our own doctrine insists, they are united in being, and then they really preserve an unalterable relation to each other; or else they stand apart in essential unlikeness, as he fancies. But what series, what relationship that is unalterable can exist with alien entities? And how can they present that ‘order germane to the matter’ which according to him is to rule the investigation? Now if he had an eye only on the doctrine of the truth, and if the order in which he counts the differences was only that of the attributes which Faith sees in the Holy Trinity,—an order so ‘natural’ and ‘germane’ that the Persons cannot be confounded, being divided as Persons, though united in their being—then he would not have been classed at all amongst our enemies, for he would mean the very same doctrine that we teach. But, as it is, he is looking in the very contrary direction, and he makes the order which he fancies there quite inconceivable. There is all the difference in the world between the accomplishment of an act of the will, and that of a mechanical law of nature. Heat is inherent in fire, splendour in the sunbeam, fluidity in water, downward tendency in a stone, and so on. But if a man builds a house, or seeks an office, or puts to sea with a cargo, or attempts anything else which requires forethought and preparation to succeed, we cannot say in such a case that there is properly a rank or order inherent in his operations: their order in each case will result as an after consequence of the motive which guided his choice, or the utility of that which he achieves. Well, then; since this heresy parts the Son from any essential relationship with the Father, and adopts the same view of the Spirit as estranged from any union with the Father or the Son, and since also it affirms throughout that the Son is the work of the Father, and the Spirit the work of the Son, and that these works are the results of a purpose, not of nature, what grounds has he for declaring that this work of a will is an ‘order inherent in the matter,’ and what is the drift of this teaching, which makes the Almighty the manufacturer of such a nature as this in the Son and the Holy Spirit, where transcendent beings are made such as to be inferior the one to the other? If such is really his meaning, why did he not clearly state the grounds he has for presuming in the case of the Deity, that smallness of result will be evidence of all the greater power? But who really could ever allow that a cause that is great and powerful is to be looked for in this smallness of results? As if God was unable to establish His own perfection in anything that comes from Him106    ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ.! And how can he attribute to the Deity the highest prerogative of supremacy while he exhibits His power as thus falling short of His will? Eunomius certainly seems to mean that perfection was not even proposed as the aim of God’s work, for fear the honour and glory of One to Whom homage is due for His superiority might be thereby lessened. And yet is there any one so narrow-minded as to reckon the Blessed Deity Himself as not free from the passion of envy? What plausible reason, then, is left why the Supreme Deity should have constituted such an ‘order’ in the case of the Son and the Spirit? “But I did not mean that ‘order’ to come from Him,” he rejoins. But whence else, if the beings to which this ‘order’ is connatural are not essentially related to each other? But perhaps he calls the inferiority itself of the being of the Son and of the Spirit this ‘connatural order.’ But I would beg of him to tell me the reason of this very thing, viz., why the Son is inferior on the score of being, when both this being and energy are to be discovered in the same characteristics and attributes. If on the other hand there is not to be the same107    Reading αὑτὸς; instead of Oehler’s αὐτὸς. definition of being and energy, and each is to signify something different, why does he introduce a demonstration of the thing in question by means of that which is quite different from it? It would be, in that case, just as if, when it was debated with regard to man’s own being whether he were a risible animal, or one capable of being taught to read, some one was to adduce the building of a house or ship on the part of a mason or a shipwright as a settling of the question, insisting on the skilful syllogism that we know beings by operations, and a house and a ship are operations of man. Do we then learn, most simple sir, by such premisses, that man is risible as well as broad-nailed? Some one might well retort; ‘whether man possesses motion and energy was not the question: it was, what is the energizing principle itself; and that I fail to learn from your way of deciding the question.’ Indeed, if we wanted to know something about the nature of the wind, you would not give a satisfactory answer by pointing to a heap of sand or chaff raised by the wind, or to dust which it scattered: for the account to be given of the wind is quite different: and these illustrations of yours would be foreign to the subject. What ground, then, has he for attempting to explain beings by their energies, and making the definition of an entity out of the resultants of that entity.

Let us observe, too, what sort of work of the Father it is by which the Father’s being, according to him, is to be comprehended. The Son most certainly, he will say, if he says as usual. But this Son of yours, most learned sir, is commensurate in your scheme only with the energy which produced Him, and indicates that alone, while the Object of our search still keeps in the dark, if, as you yourself confess, this energy is only one amongst the things which ‘follow108    only one thing amongst the things which follow, &c. The Latin translation is manifestly wrong here, “si recte a te assertum est, iis etiam quæ ad primam substantiam sequuntur aliquam operationem inesse.” The Greek is εἴπερ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν παρεπομένων τις εἶναι τῇ πρώτη οὐσία μεμαρτύρηται’ the first being. This energy, as you say, extends itself into the work which it produces, but it does not reveal therein even its own nature, but only so much of it as we can get a glimpse of in that work. All the resources of a smith are not set in motion to make a gimlet; the skill of that artisan only operates so far as is adequate to form that tool, though it could fashion a large variety of other tools. Thus the limit of the energy is to be found in the work which it produces. But the question now is not about the amount of the energy, but about the being of that which has put forth the energy. In the same way, if he asserts that he can perceive the nature of the Only-begotten in the Spirit (Whom he styles the work of an energy which ‘follows’ the Son), his assertion has no foundation; for here again the energy, while it extends itself into its work, does not reveal therein the nature either of itself or of the agent who exerts it.

But let us yield in this; grant him that beings are known in their energies. The First being is known through His work; and this Second being is revealed in the work proceeding from Him. But what, my learned friend, is to show this Third being? No such work of this Third is to be found. If you insist that these beings are perceived by their energies, you must confess that the Spirit’s nature is imperceptible; you cannot infer His nature from any energy put forth by Him to carry on the continuity. Show some substantiated work of the Spirit, through which you think you have detected the being of the Spirit, or all your cobweb will collapse at the touch of Reason. If the being is known by the subsequent energy, and substantiated energy of the Spirit there is none, such as ye say the Father shows in the Son, and the Son in the Spirit, then the nature of the Spirit must be confessed unknowable and not be apprehended through these; there is no energy conceived of in connexion with a substance to show even a side glimpse of it. But if the Spirit eludes apprehension, how by means of that which is itself imperceptible can the more exalted being be perceived? If the Son’s work, that is, the Spirit according to them, is unknowable, the Son Himself can never be known; He will be involved in the obscurity of that which gives evidence of Him: and if the being of the Son in this way is hidden, how can the being who is most properly such and most supreme be brought to light by means of the being which is itself hidden; this obscurity of the Spirit is transmitted by retrogression109    κατὰ ἀνάλυοιν. So Plutarch, ii. 76 E. and see above (cap. 25, note 6.). through the Son to the Father; so that in this view, even by our adversaries’ confession, the unknowableness of the Fathers being is clearly demonstrated. How, then, can this man, be his eye ever so ‘keen to see unsubstantial entities,’ discern the nature of the unseen and incomprehensible by means of itself; and how can he command us to grasp the beings by means of their works, and their works again from them?

ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς οὗτος τῶν « παρηλλαγμένων ἔργων παρηλλαγμένας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας » ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνεται, ἢ τὸ εἶδος τῆς θείας ἐνεργείας μήπω μαθών, ὅ φησιν ἡ γραφή, ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ προστάγματος πάντα γεγένηται, ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γεγονότων διαφορὰν ἀμβλυώττων. καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ἀπερισκέπτως φθεγγόμενος περὶ θείων δογμάτων νομοθετεῖ, οὔπω τάχα τινὸς ἀκηκοώς, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀποφαντικῶς λεγόμενον, ἐὰν μὴ καθόλου τὸ ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ὁμολογούμενον περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου πράγματος ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἄν τις τῶν ἐπεσκεμμένων συνθοῖτο, περὶ τούτων κατ' ἐξουσίαν ὁ δογματίζων λέγῃ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῶν ὀνείρους ἢ μύθους παρὰ πότον διηγουμένων. καὶ τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀναρμοστίας, καθάπερ οἱ δι' ἐνυπνίου φαντασίας τῶν καθ' ὕπαρ σπουδαζομένων ὁρᾶν τι νομίσαντες προθύμως ἔχονται τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπιθυμίας διὰ τῆς ἠπατημένης ὄψεως ἀναπειθούσης ἔχειν οἴονται, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τῆς ὀνειρώδους ταύτης τῶν δογμάτων ἀνατυπώσεως ἰσχύειν αὐτῷ φαντασθεὶς τὰ εἰρημένα ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν διαβεβαιοῦται καὶ δι' αὐτῶν κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὰ ὑπόλοιπα. ἄξιον δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν παραθέσθαι τὴν λέξιν ἔχουσαν οὕτως.
« Οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀπαράβατον διατηρούντων, προσήκει δήπου τοὺς κατὰ τὴν συμφυῆ τοῖς πράγμασι τάξιν τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιουμένους καὶ μὴ φύρειν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ συγχεῖν βιαζομένους, εἰ μὲν περὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις κινοῖτό τις ἀμφισβήτησις, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ προσεχῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργειῶν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν δεικνυμένων τὴν πίστιν καὶ τῶν ἀμφιβαλλομένων τὴν διάλυσιν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἀμφιβολίαν διαλύειν ἐκ τῶν οὐσιῶν ». ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἀρκεῖν ἡγοῦμαι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀτοπίας τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὰ τὰ ῥήματα τῆς ἀσεβείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ τὸ λελωβημένον ἐκ πάθους πρόσωπον ὑπογράφων τῷ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιδείξειεν ἀπογυμνώσας τῶν προκαλυμμάτων τὴν νόσον, ὡς μηδὲν δεῖσθαι λόγῳ μαθεῖν τοὺς τὸ φαινόμενον βλέποντας, οὕτως ἡγοῦμαι τὸ εἰδεχθὲς τοῦτο καὶ περικεκομμένον τοῦ αἱρετικοῦ δόγματος ἱκανῶς φανεροῦσθαι τοῖς διορατικοῖς τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ μόνης τῆς ἀναγνώσεως ἐκκαλυπτόμενον. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ χρὴ καθάπερ τινὰ δάκτυλον ἐπὶ τὰ σαθρὰ τοῦ δόγματος τὸν δεικτικὸν λόγον ἐπάγοντα φανερωτέραν τοῖς πολλοῖς καταστῆσαι τὴν ἐγκειμένην λώβην τῷ δόγματι, πάλιν ἐφεξῆς τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀναλήψομαι.
« Οὕτω δέ », φησί, « τούτων ἐχόντων ». τί λέγει ὁ ἐνυπνιαστής; ποίων τούτων καὶ πῶς ἐχόντων; ὅτι « μόνη κυρία καὶ ἀνωτάτω » τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ οὐσία, ἄκυρος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον πάντως ἡ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἀκυροτέρα ἡ τρίτη; ταῦτα γὰρ οἷς εἶπεν ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἢ ὅτι παρεπομένης τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐνεργείας τινός, ἧς ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ « ἔργον » ὁ μονογενής ἐστιν υἱός, τῷ μέτρῳ τῆς ὑποστησαμένης αὐτὸν ἐνεργείας ἐνδεδεμένος; ἢ ὅτι ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους αἱ οὐσίαι νοοῦνται διὰ τὸ ἐγκεῖσθαί πως ἀλλήλαις καὶ περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς εὐρυχωροτέρας τὴν ἥσσονα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κάδων συμβαίνει τῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐντιθεμένων, καθ' ὃ μείζους τε καὶ ἐλάττους ἐνορᾷ τὰς οὐσίας τὰς οὐδενὶ πέρατι καὶ ὅρῳ περιειλημμένας; ἢ ὅτι τῶν δημιουργημάτων αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ τὴν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἑτερότητα συνεμφαίνουσιν, ὡς ἀμήχανον ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν διαφόρους τὰς δημιουργίας συνίστασθαι; ἆρ' οὖν ἔστι τις τοσούτῳ κώματι κατεχόμενος τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθητήρια, ὥστε ἀκούσας τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων εὐθὺς συνθέσθαι τῷ διαβεβαιουμένῳ ὅτι « οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀπαράβατον διατηρούντων »; τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶμαι παραπληξίας εἶναι λέγειν τε τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ λεγόντων ἀκούειν ἀνεξετάστως, ὅτι εἱρμῷ τινι διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως εὐθύνεται τὰ διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀνομοιότητος ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διεσχισμένα. ἢ γὰρ ἥνωται διὰ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον καὶ οὕτως « ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀπαράβατον διατηρήσει », ἢ ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀλλοτριότητος, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος οἴεται. καὶ τίς εὑρεθήσεται « καθ' εἱρμὸν σχέσις » ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχουσιν « ἡ συντηροῦσα τὸ ἀπαράβατον »; τίς δὲ « ἡ συμφυὴς τῶν πραγμάτων τάξις », καθ' ἣν ποιεῖσθαι νομοθετεῖ τὴν ἐξέτασιν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ δόγμα τῆς ἀληθείας ἑώρα καὶ μόνῃ τῇ τάξει κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τριάδι πεπιστευμένων πραγμάτων τὴν διαφορὰν ἐλογίζετο, « τῆς συμφυοῦς » ταύτης, ὥς φησι, « τάξεως » ἀσύγχυτον ποιουμένης τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων κρίσιν, ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ διῃρῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως λόγον οἴεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν πάντως ἐν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἐτέτακτο, ταῦτα λέγων, ὧν καὶ ἡμεῖς προϊστάμεθα.
Νυνὶ δὲ ἅπας ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον βλέπων ἄπορον εἶναι κατασκευάζει τῆς ἐνταῦθα νοηθείσης αὐτῷ τάξεως τὴν κατανόησιν. πλεῖστον γὰρ δήπου διενήνοχε τῶν τε ἐκ προβουλεύσεως καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἐκ φυσικῆς τινος ἀνάγκης ἀποβαινόντων τὸ πέρας. συμφυής ἐστι τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ λαμπηδὼν τῇ ἀκτῖνι καὶ τὸ ῥέειν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῷ λίθῳ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω φορὰ καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. εἰ δέ τις οἰκίαν ἐδομήσατο ἢ μετῆλθεν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἐμπορίαν ἐστείλατο ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐκ προβουλεύσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς κατορθουμένων μετεχειρίσατο, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτου κυρίως λέγειν ὅτι « συμφυής » τις τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένοις ἔπεστι τάξις: κατὰ γὰρ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ προαιρουμένου καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐπιτελουμένου πράγματος ἡ τάξις παρὰ τῶν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνεργούντων ἐπάγεται. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἐπειδὴ ἀποσχίζει τῆς φυσικῆς οἰκειότητος τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὁ τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγος, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος οἴεται, ὡς ἀπεξενωμένου τῆς τε πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἑνώσεως, ἐν παντὶ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ κατασκευάζεται τὸ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, ἔργον δὲ πάλιν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἔργα προαιρέσεως, οὐ φύσεως ἀποτελέσματα, πῶς οὗτος τὸ τοῦ θελήματος ἔργον « συμφυῆ » τινα τάξιν πραγμάτων εἶναι ὁρίζεται, οὐκ οἶδα τί νοῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ὡς ταύτην τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων τὴν φύσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου δημιουργήσαντος καὶ τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς τῶν οὐσιῶν τοιοῦτον εἶναι ποιήσαντος, ὥστε ὑποχειρίως ἔχειν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον; καὶ εἰ ταῦτα νοεῖ, διὰ τί τὸ εἰρημένον οὐ διεσάφησε, κατὰ τίνα λόγον προεπινοεῖται ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ γινώσκειν; ὡς ἐν τῇ βραχύτητι τῶν ἔργων μείζονος ἐπιδειχθησομένης αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως; καὶ τίς τούτῳ συνθήσεται, τῷ μεγάλην αἰτίαν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι βραχύτητι; ἀλλ' ὡς οὖν οὐ δυναμένου τὸ τέλειον ἐν πᾶσι τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ συνυποστῆσαι; καὶ πῶς αὐτῷ συμμαρτυρεῖ τὸ « ἀνώτατόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον », εἴπερ ἐλάττονα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐπιδείξει τὴν δύναμιν; ἢ οὐδὲ προτεθεῖσθαι λέγει τὸν τοῦ τελείου λόγον τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐγγενέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ πάντως ἡ τιμὴ καὶ ἡ δόξα τοῦ διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τιμωμένου κατασμικρύνηται. καὶ τίς οὕτως ἄθλιος ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν θείαν τε καὶ μακαρίαν φύσιν καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φθόνον πάθους ὑπολογίζεσθαι; ποία οὖν εὐπρεπὴς αἰτία τοῦ ταῦτα οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος διατετάχθαι;
Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖθεν, φησίν. πόθεν οὖν ἄλλοθεν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οἰκείως ἔχουσιν « ἡ συμφυὴς » αὐτοῖς « τάξις » ἐνθεωρεῖται; ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ ὑφειμένον τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τὸ συμφυὲς ὀνομάζει τῆς τάξεως. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου δέομαι τὴν αἰτίαν μαθεῖν, δι' ἣν ὁ υἱὸς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἠλάττωται, τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς γνωρίσμασί τε καὶ ἰδιώμασιν εὑρισκομένων. εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διάφορον ἐφ' ἑκατέρου τὸ σημαινόμενον, πῶς διὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων αἱ ἀποδείξεις τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἐπάγονται; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, πολυπραγμονουμένης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας καὶ ζητουμένου εἰ γελαστικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ γραμματικῆς δεκτικόν, εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προτεθέντος παραλαμβάνοι οἰκίας ἢ πλοίου κατασκευήν, ἣν ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἐτεκτήνατο, ἔπειτα ἰσχυρίζοιτο τῷ σοφῷ τούτῳ λόγῳ, ὅτι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τὰς οὐσίας γνωρίζομεν, ἐνέργεια δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ οἰκία καὶ τὸ πλοῖον. ἐκ τούτων ἄρα καταλαμβάνομεν τὸ πλατυώνυχον καὶ γελαστικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἁπλούστατε; ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, φαίη τις ἄν, τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστιν, εἴ τινα κίνησιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τί ποτε κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν: ὃ πολλοῦ δέω μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως. καὶ γὰρ εἰ περὶ ἀνέμου τι μαθεῖν ἐβουλόμην, οὐκ ἂν ψάμμου σωρείαν ἐξ ἀνέμου συστᾶσαν ἢ ἀχύρου θημῶνα ἢ κόνεως διάχυσιν δείξας ἐντελῆ ἂν τοῦ ζητουμένου τὸν λόγον ἀπέδωκας. ἕτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀνέμου ὁ λόγος καὶ ἄλλα ταῦτα τὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου δεικνύμενα. πῶς οὖν οὗτος ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τὰς οὐσίας δείκνυσι καὶ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκ τῶν γενομένων παρὰ τοῦ ὄντος παρίστησιν;
Εἶτα κἀκεῖνο σκοπήσωμεν, τί « τὸ » « ἔργον » τοῦ πατρός, δι' οὗ καταλαμβάνεσθαι λέγει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος; τὸν υἱὸν λέξει πάντως, εἴπερ τὰ συνήθη λέγοι. ἀλλ' οὗτος, ὦ σοφώτατε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον « τῇ ἐργασαμένῃ αὐτὸν ἐνεργείᾳ παραμετρούμενος » ἐκείνην δεικνύει μόνην, τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἀδήλῳ μένει, εἴπερ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν παρεπομένων τις εἶναι τῇ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ καὶ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαρτύρηται. αὕτη γὰρ τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτῆς ἀποτελεσθέντι συμπαρεκτείνεται, καθὼς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, οὐ δὲ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἥτις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ « τὸ » ποσὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἐνθεωρεῖται τῷ ἔργῳ. ὡς γὰρ οὐ πᾶσα ἡ τοῦ χαλκεύοντος δύναμις συγκινηθεῖσα τὸ τρύπανον ἐξειργάσατο, ἀλλ' ὅσον σύμμετρον ἦν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σκεύους ἀπεργασίαν, τοσοῦτον ἡ τέχνη διὰ τοῦ χειρουργοῦντος ἐνήργησε, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ κατεργάσασθαι δυνατῶς ἔχουσα, οὕτω τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐν ἑαυτῷ δείκνυσιν ὁ παρ' ἐκείνης γενόμενος. τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον οὐχὶ τὸ ποσόν ἐστι τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος ἡ οὐσία. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ εἰ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος (ὅπερ ἔργον ὀνομάζει τῆς τῷ υἱῷ παρεπομένης ἐνεργείας) κατειληφέναι λέγοι τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν φύσιν, οὐδεμίαν σύστασιν ὁ λόγος ἔχει, πάλιν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἐνεργείας μὲν τῷ ἀποτελέσματι συμπαρεκτεινομένης, τὴν δὲ φύσιν ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος διὰ τοῦ κατεργασθέντος οὐ δεικνυούσης.
Ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δεδόσθω ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τὰς οὐσίας γινώσκεσθαι. οὐκοῦν ἡ πρώτη οὐσία διὰ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔργου γνωρίζεται καὶ τὴν δευτέραν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἔργον τὸ παρ' αὐτῆς γενόμενον δείκνυσι. τὴν τρίτην τοίνυν εἰπέ, ὦ σοφώτατε, τί τὸ δεικνύον ἐστί, μηδενὸς ἔργου τοιούτου τῆς τρίτης οὐσίας θεωρουμένου. εἰ γὰρ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, αἱ οὐσίαι καταλαμβάνονται, ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος φύσιν ὁμολογήσεις, οὐκ ἔχων κατὰ τὸ προσεχὲς τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν καὶ τούτου παραστησάμενος δι' ἐκείνης τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος φύσιν ἀναλογίσασθαι. ἢ τοίνυν δεῖξόν τι οὐσιῶδες ἔργον τοῦ πνεύματος, δι' οὗ κατειληφέναι φῂς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πνεύματος, ἢ ὅλος ὑμῖν ὁ ἱστὸς τῆς ἀράχνης τῇ ἐπαφῇ τοῦ λόγου περιρρυήσεται. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς προσεχοῦς ἐνεργείας ἡ οὐσία γνωρίζεται κατὰ τὸν ὑμέτερον λόγον, ἐνέργεια δὲ οὐσιώδης τοῦ πνεύματος οὐδεμία, καθάπερ τοῦ πατρὸς μὲν τὸν υἱόν, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμά φατε, ἀνεπίγνωστος πάντως ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος φύσις καὶ ἀκατάληπτος διὰ τούτων συνωμολόγηται, μηδεμιᾶς αὐτὴν ἐνεργείας τῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν νοουμένης παραδηλούσης. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο διαπέφευγε τὴν κατάληψιν, πῶς διὰ τοῦ μὴ κατειλημμένου ἡ ὑπερκειμένη οὐσία καταλαμβάνεται; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖται τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ ἔργον, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥς φασι, τὸ πνεῦμα, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἐπιγνωσθείη πάντως, τῇ ἀδηλίᾳ τοῦ τεκμηριοῦντος συσκιαζόμενος: καὶ εἰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἡ οὐσία τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ διαλανθάνει, πῶς διὰ τῆς λανθανούσης « ἡ ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτη » φανερωθήσεται, τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἀδηλίας κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα διαδοθείσης; ὡς ἐκ τούτων σαφῶς ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν μαρτυρίας τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι πάντη τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν. πόθεν οὖν ὁ ὀξυδερκὴς οὗτος ὁ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα βλέπων τὴν τῶν ἀφανῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταλήπτων φύσιν δι' ἀλλήλων αὐτός τε βλέπει καὶ ἡμῖν ἐγκελεύεται, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τὰς οὐσίας καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ἔργα λέγων καταλαμβάνεσθαι;