Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

Then they discover in His being a certain shortness in the way of deficiency, though they do not tell us by what method they measure that which is devoid of quantity and size: they are able to find out exactly by how much the size of the Only-begotten falls short of perfection, and therefore has to be classed with the inferior and imperfect: much else they lay down, partly by open assertion, partly by underhand inference: all the time making their confession of the Son and the Spirit a mere exercise-ground for their unbelieving spirit. How, then, can we fail to pity them more even than the condemned Jews, when views never ventured upon by the latter are inferred by the former? He who makes the being of the Son and of the Spirit comparatively less, seems, so far as words go perhaps, to commit but a slight profanity: but if one were to test his view stringently it will be found the height of blasphemy. Let us look into this, then, and let indulgence be shown me, if, for the sake of doctrine, and to place in a clear light the lie which they have demonstrated, I advance into an exposition of our own conception of the truth.

Now the ultimate division of all being is into the Intelligible and the Sensible. The Sensible world is called by the Apostle broadly “that which is seen.” For as all body has colour, and the sight apprehends this, he calls this world by the rough and ready name of “that which is seen,” leaving out all the other qualities, which are essentially inherent in its framework. The common term, again, for all the intellectual world, is with the Apostle “that which is not seen61    Colossians i. 16.:” by withdrawing all idea of comprehension by the senses he leads the mind on to the immaterial and intellectual. Reason again divides this “which is not seen” into the uncreate and the created, inferentially comprehending it: the uncreate being that which effects the Creation, the created that which owes its origin and its force to the uncreate. In the Sensible world, then, is found everything that we comprehend by our organs of bodily sense, and in which the differences of qualities involve the idea of more and less, such differences consisting in quantity, quality, and the other properties.

But in the Intelligible world,—that part of it, I mean, which is created,—the idea of such differences as are perceived in the Sensible cannot find a place: another method, then, is devised for discovering the degrees of greater and less. The fountain, the origin, the supply of every good is regarded as being in the world that is uncreate, and the whole creation inclines to that, and touches and shares the Highest Existence only by virtue of its part in the First Good: therefore it follows from this participation in the highest blessings varying in degree according to the amount of freedom in the will that each possesses, that the greater and less in this creation is disclosed according to the proportion of this tendency in each62    i.e. according as each inclines more or less to the First Good.. Created intelligible nature stands on the borderline between good and the reverse, so as to be capable of either, and to incline at pleasure to the things of its choice, as we learn from Scripture; so that we can say of it that it is more or less in the heights of excellence only in proportion to its removal from the evil and its approach to the good. Whereas63    uncreate intelligible nature is far removed from such distinctions. This was the impregnable position that Athanasius had taken up. To admit that the Son is less than the Father, and the Spirit less than the Son, is to admit the law of emanation such as hitherto conceived, that is, the gradual and successive degradation of God’s substance; which had conducted oriental heretics as well as the Neoplatonists to a sort of pantheistic polytheism. Arius had indeed tried to resist this tendency so far as to bring back divinity to the Supreme Being; but it was at the expense of the divinity of the Son, Who was with him just as much a created Intermediate between God and man, as one of the Æons: and Aetius and Eunomius treated the Holy Ghost also as their master had treated the Son. But Arianism tended at once to Judaism and, in making creatures adorable, to Greek polytheism. There was only one way of cutting short the phantasmagoria of divine emanations, without having recourse to the contradictory hypothesis of Arius: and that was to reject the law of emanation, as hitherto accepted, altogether. Far from admitting that the Supreme Being is always weakening and degrading Himself in that which emanates from Him, Athanasius lays down the principle that He produces within Himself nothing but what is perfect, and first, and divine: and all that is not perfect is a work of the Divine Will, which draws it out of nothing (i.e. creates it), and not out of the Divine Substance. This was the crowning result of the teaching of Alexandria and Origen. See Denys (De la Philosophie d’Origene, p. 432, Paris, 1884). uncreate intelligible nature is far removed from such distinctions: it does not possess the good by acquisition, or participate only in the goodness of some good which lies above it: in its own essence it is good, and is conceived as such: it is a source of good, it is simple, uniform, incomposite, even by the confession of our adversaries. But it has distinction within itself in keeping with the majesty of its own nature, but not conceived of with regard to quantity, as Eunomius supposes: (indeed the man who introduces the notion of less of good into any of the things believed to be in the Holy Trinity must admit thereby some admixture of the opposite quality in that which fails of the good: and it is blasphemous to imagine this in the case either of the Only-begotten, or of the Holy Spirit): we regard it as consummately perfect and incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear distinctions within itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: as possessing invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but differentiated by the unique character of each Person. This peculiarity contemplated in each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: the Father, for instance, is uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generated any more than He was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him and the Son, and the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father. This is peculiar and uncommunicable, being not seen in the other Persons. The Son in His uncreatedness touches the Father and the Spirit, but as the Son and the Only-begotten He has a character which is not that of the Almighty or of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit by the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son and Father, but is distinguished from them by His own tokens. His most peculiar characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the Father and the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate64    But He is not begotten. Athanasian Creed., nor as only-begotten: this it is that constitutes His chief peculiarity. Joined to the Father by His uncreatedness, He is disjoined from Him again by not being ‘Father.’ United to the Son by the bond of uncreatedness, and of deriving His existence from the Supreme, He is parted again from Him by the characteristic of not being the Only-begotten of the Father, and of having been manifested by means of the Son Himself. Again, as the creation was effected by the Only-begotten, in order to secure that the Spirit should not be considered to have something in common with this creation because of His having been manifested by means of the Son, He is distinguished from it by His unchangeableness, and independence of all external goodness. The creation does not possess in its nature this unchangeableness, as the Scripture says in the description of the fall of the morning star, the mysteries on which subject are revealed by our Lord to His disciples: “I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven65    Luke x. 18..” But the very attributes which part Him from the creation constitute His relationship to the Father and the Son. All that is incapable of degenerating has one and the same definition of “unchangeable.”

Having stated thus much as a preface we are in a position to discuss the rest of our adversaries’ teaching. “It necessarily follows,” he says in his system of the Son and the Spirit, “that the Beings are relatively greater and less.” Let us then inquire what is the meaning of this necessity of difference. Does it arise from a comparison formed from measuring them one with another in some material way, or from viewing them on the spiritual ground of more or less of moral excellence, or on that of pure being? But in the case of this last it has been shown by competent thinkers that it is impossible to conceive of any difference whatever, if one abstracts being from attributes and properties, and looks at it according to its bare definition. Again, to conceive of this difference as consisting in the case of the Only-begotten and the Spirit in the intensity or abatement of moral excellence, and in consequence to hint that their nature admits of change in either direction, so as to be equally capable of opposites, and to be placed in a borderland between moral beauty and its opposite—that is gross profanity. A man who thinks this will be proving that their nature is one thing in itself, and becomes something else by virtue of its participation in this beauty or its opposite: as happens with iron for example: if it is approached some time to the fire, it assumes the quality of heat while remaining iron: if it is put in snow or ice, it changes its quality to the mastering influence, and lets the snow’s coldness pass into its pores.

Now just as we cannot name the material of the iron from the quality now to be observed upon it (for we do not give the name of fire or ice to that which is tempered with either of these), so the moment we grant the view of these heretics, that in the case66    τῆς ζωοποιοῦ δυνάμεως. of the Life-giving Power good does not reside in It essentially, but is imparted to it only, it will become impossible to call it properly good: such a conception of it will compel us to regard it as something different, as not eternally exhibiting the good, as not in itself to be classed amongst genuine goods, but as such that the good is at times not in it, and is at times not likely to be in it. If these existences become good only by sharing in a something superior to themselves, it is plain that before this participation they were not good, and if, being other than good, they were then coloured by the influence of good they must certainly, if again isolated from this, be considered other than good: so that, if this heresy prevails, the Divine Nature cannot be apprehended as transmissive of good, but rather as itself needing goodness: for how can one impart to another that which he does not himself possess? If it is in a state of perfection, no abatement of that can be conceived, and it is absurd to talk of less of perfection. If on the other hand its participation of good is an imperfect one, and this is what they mean by ‘less,’ mark the consequence that anything in that state can never help an inferior, but will be busied in satisfying its own want: so that, according to them, Providence is a fiction, and so is the judgment and the Dispensation of the Only-begotten, and all the other works believed to be done, and still doing by Him: for He will necessarily be employed in taking care of His own good, and must abandon the supervision of the Universe67    τοῦ παντὸς. It is worth while to mention, once for all, the distinction in the names used by the Stoics for the world, which had long since passed from them into the common parlance. Including the Empty, the world is called τὸ πᾶν, without it, ὅλον (τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα frequently occurs with the Stoics). The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor immaterial, since it consists of both..

If, then, this surmise is to have its way, namely, that our Lord is not perfected in every kind of good, it is very easy to see the conclusion of the blasphemy. This being so, our faith is vain, and our preaching vain; our hopes, which take their substance from our faith, are unsubstantial. Why are they baptized into Christ68    Τί γὰρ βαπτίζονται εἰς Χριστὸν. This throws some light on the much discussed passage, ‘Why are these baptized for the dead?’ Gregory at all events seems here to take it to mean, ‘Why are they baptized in the name of a dead Christ?’ as he is adopting partially S. Paul’s words, 1 Cor. xv. 29; as well as Heb. xi. 1 above., if He has no power of goodness of His own? God forgive me for saying it! Why do they believe in the Holy Ghost, if the same account is given of Him? How are they regenerate69    ἀναγεννῶνται by baptism from their mortal birth, if the regenerating Power does not possess in its own nature infallibility and independence? How can their ‘vile body’ be changed, while they think that He who is to change it Himself needs change, i.e. another to change Him? For as long as a nature is in defect as regards the good, the superior existence exerts upon this inferior one a ceaseless attraction towards itself: and this craving for more will never stop: it will be stretching out to something not yet grasped: the subject of this deficiency will be always demanding a supply, always altering into the grander nature, and yet will never touch perfection, because it cannot find a goal to grasp, and cease its impulse upward. The First Good is in its nature infinite, and so it follows of necessity that the participation in the enjoyment of it will be infinite also, for more will be always being grasped, and yet something beyond that which has been grasped will always be discovered, and this search will never overtake its Object, because its fund is as inexhaustible as the growth of that which participates in it is ceaseless70    Cf. Gregory’s theory of human perfection; De anima et Resurrectione, p. 229, 230. ‘The All-creating Wisdom fashioned these souls, these receptacles with free wills, as vessels as it were, for this very purpose, that there should be some capacities able to receive His blessings, and become continually larger with the inpouring of the stream. Such are the wonders that the participation in the Divine blessings works; it makes him into whom they come larger and more capacious.…The fountain of blessings wells up unceasingly, and the partaker’s nature, finding nothing superfluous and without a use in that which it receives, makes the whole influx an enlargement of its own proportions.…It is likely, therefore, that this bulk will mount to a magnitude wherein no limit checks the growth..

Such, then, are the blasphemies which emerge from their making differences between the Persons as to the good. If on the other hand the degrees of more or less are to be understood in this case in some material sense, the absurdity of this surmise will be obvious at once, without examination in detail. Ideas of quality and distance, weight and figure, and all that goes to complete the notion of a body, will perforce be introduced along with such a surmise into the view of the Divine Nature: and where a compound is assumed, there the dissolution also of that compound must be admitted. A teaching so monstrous, which dares to discover a smaller and a larger in what is sizeless and not concrete lands us in these and suchlike conclusions, a few samples only of which are here indicated: nor indeed would it be easy to unveil all the mischief that lurks beneath it. Still the shocking absurdity that results from their blasphemous premiss will be clear from this brief notice. We now proceed to their next position, after a short defining and confirmation of our own doctrine. For an inspired testimony is a sure test of the truth of any doctrine: and so it seems to me that ours may be well guaranteed by a quotation from the divine words.

In the division of all existing things, then, we find these distinctions. There is, as appealing to our perceptions, the Sensible world: and there is, beyond this, the world which the mind, led on by objects of sense, can view: I mean the Intelligible: and in this we detect again a further distinction into the Created and the Uncreate: to the latter of which we have defined the Holy Trinity to belong, to the former all that can exist or can be thought of after that. But in order that this statement may not be left without a proof, but may be confirmed by Scripture, we will add that our Lord was not created, but came forth from the Father, as the Word with His own lips attests in the Gospel, in a manner of birth or of proceeding ineffable and mysterious: and what truer witness could be found than this constant declaration of our Lord all through the Gospel, that the Very Father was a father, not a creator, of Himself, and that He was not a work of God, but Son of God? Just as when He wished to name His connexion with humanity according to the flesh, He called that phase of his being Son of Man, indicating thereby His kinship according to the nature of the flesh with her from whom He was born, so also by the title of Son he expresses His true and real relationship to the Almighty, by that name of Son showing this natural connexion: no matter if there are some who, for the contradiction of the truth, do take literally and without any explanation, words used with a hidden meaning in the dark form of parable, and adduce the expression ‘created,’ put into the mouth of Wisdom by the author of the Proverbs71    Proverbs viii. 22 (LXX). For another discussion of this passage, see Book II. ch. 10 (beginning) with note., to support their perverted views. They say, in fact, that “the Lord created me” is a proof that our Lord is a creature, as if the Only-begotten Himself in that word confessed it. But we need not heed such an argument. They do not give reasons why we must refer that text to our Lord at all: neither will they be able to show that the idea of the word in the Hebrew leads to this and no other meaning, seeing that the other translators have rendered it by “possessed” or “constituted:” nor, finally, even if this was the idea in the original text, would its real meaning be so plain and on the surface: for these proverbial discourses do not show their aim at once, but rather conceal it, revealing it only by an indirect import, and we may judge of the obscurity of this particular passage from its context where he says, “When He set His throne upon the winds72    Proverbs viii. 27 (LXX).,” and all the similar expressions. What is God’s throne? Is it material or ideal? What are the winds? Are they these winds so familiar to us, which the natural philosophers tell us are formed from vapours and exhalations: or are they to be understood in another way not familiar to man, when they are called the bases of His throne? What is this throne of the immaterial, incomprehensible, and formless Deity? Who could possibly understand all this in a literal sense?

εἶτα βραχύτητά τινα τῇ οὐσίᾳ κατ' ἐλάττωσιν ἐνθεωροῦσιν, οὐκ οἶδα τίνι μεθόδῳ τὸν ἄποσόν τε καὶ ἀμεγέθη τῇ ἑαυτῶν ὑπολήψει παραμετρήσαντες καὶ εὑρεῖν δυνηθέντες, πόσον ἐνδεῖ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ μονογενοῦς θεοῦ πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν, οὗ μὴ προσόντος ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ τε καὶ ἀτελεῖ θεωρεῖται. καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὁμολογοῦντες τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ λανθάνον κατασκευάζοντες, ἐμμελέτημα τῆς πονηρίας αὐτῶν τὴν ὁμολογίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐποιήσαντο. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐλεεινότεροι τῆς Ἰουδαϊκῆς κατακρίσεως, εἴπερ τὰ μηδέποτε παρ' ἐκείνων τετολμημένα προδήλως οὕτω παρὰ τούτων κατασκευάζεται; ὁ γὰρ ἐλαττῶν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι, μικρὸν ἀσεβεῖν ἴσως δοκεῖ: εἰ δέ τις ἀκριβῶς τὸν λόγον κατεξετάσειεν, εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον βλασφημῶν ἐλεγχθήσεται. οὑτωσὶ δὲ σκοπήσωμεν: καί μοι συγκεχωρήσθω διδασκαλίας χάριν καὶ σαφηνείας τοῦ παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κατασκευαζομένου ψεύδους ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπολήψεων τὸν λόγον προάγοντι.
Πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἀνωτάτω διαίρεσις εἴς τε τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν τομὴν ἔχει. καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ φύσις γενικῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποστόλου ὁρατὴ κατωνόμασται: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν χρώματι, τούτου δὲ ἡ ὅρασις τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἔχει, καταλιπὼν τὰς ὑπολοίπους ποιότητας, ὅσαι οὐσιωδῶς συμπεφύκασιν, ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁρατὴν προσηγόρευσε. τῆς δὲ νοητῆς φύσεως πάσης ὄνομα μὲν κοινόν ἐστι, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, τὸ ἀόρατον: τῇ γὰρ ὑπεξαιρέσει τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσώματόν τε καὶ νοητὸν χειραγωγεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν. ὁ δὲ λόγος εἰς δύο τέμνει καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἔννοιαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄκτιστος ἡ δὲ κτιστὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας καταλαμβάνεται, ἄκτιστος μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ τῆς κτίσεως, κτιστὴ δὲ ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ εἶναι ἔχουσα. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐστι πάντα, ὅσα διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος αἰσθητηρίων καταλαμβάνομεν, ἐφ' ὧν αἱ τῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοραὶ τὸν τοῦ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος ἐπιδέχονται λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἰδιότητας τῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν τούτοις θεωρουμένης.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, τῆς ἐν τῇ κτίσει λέγω, ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος τῆς διαφορᾶς λόγος, οἷος ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατελήφθη, χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, ἕτερος δέ τις εὑρίσκεται τρόπος τὴν τοῦ μείζονος πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον διαφορὰν ἐξευρίσκων. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χορηγία ἐν τῇ ἀκτίστῳ θεωρεῖται φύσει, πᾶσα δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο νένευκεν ἡ κτίσις, διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ τῆς ὑψηλῆς φύσεως ἐφαπτομένη τε καὶ μετέχουσα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς τῶν ὑψηλῶν μετουσίας τῶν μὲν πλειόνως τῶν δὲ ἐλαττόνως κατὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς προαιρέσεως μεταλαμβανόντων, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐν τῇ κτίσει γνωρίζεται ἀναλόγως τῆς ἑκάστου ὁρμῆς. τῆς γὰρ φύσεως τῆς ἐν τῇ κτίσει νοουμένης ἐν μεθορίῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἑστώσης, ὡς δεκτικὴν ἑκατέρων εἶναι κατ' ἐξουσίαν, τοῖς κατὰ γνώμην προσκλινομένην, καθὼς παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς μεμαθήκαμεν, πρὸς λόγον τῆς τε τῶν χειρόνων ἀποστάσεως καὶ τοῦ προσεγγισμοῦ τῶν καλῶν τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγειν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπερέχοντι χώραν ἔχει. ἡ δὲ ἄκτιστος φύσις τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης διαφορᾶς πόρρωθεν ἄπεστιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἐπίκτητον ἔχουσα τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ὑπερκειμένου τινὸς καλοῦ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δεχομένη, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν οὖσα καὶ ἀγαθὸν νοουμένη καὶ ἀγαθοῦ πηγὴ ἁπλῆ τε καὶ μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἡμῖν μαρτυρουμένη. διαφορὰν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἔχει τῷ μεγαλείῳ τῆς φύσεως πρέπουσαν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον θεωρουμένην, ὡς ὁ Εὐνόμιος οἴεται: ὁ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔννοιαν ἐλαττῶν ἔν τινι τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τριάδι πεπιστευμένων μεμίχθαι τι τῆς ἐναντίας ἕξεως τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑστερουμένῳ πάντως παρασκευάσει, ὅπερ οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος εὐσεβές ἐστι λογίζεσθαι: ἀλλ' ἐν ἄκρᾳ τῇ τελειότητι καὶ ἐν ἀκαταλήπτῳ τῇ ὑπεροχῇ θεωρουμένη, τοῖς ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἑκάστῃ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιώμασιν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ διακεκριμένην τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει, ἐν μὲν τῇ κατὰ τὸ ἄκτιστον κοινωνίᾳ τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχουσα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐξαιρέτοις τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἑκάστου τὸ ἀκοινώνητον.
Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθεωρουμένη ἑκάστῃ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιότης τρανῶς καὶ καθαρῶς τὸ ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου διΐστησιν. οἷον ὁ πατὴρ ἄκτιστος εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀγέννητος: οὔτε γὰρ γεγέννηται οὔτε ἔκτισται: τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ἄκτιστον κοινὸν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν υἱόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγέννητος καὶ πατήρ: τοῦτο ἴδιόν τε καὶ ἀκοινώνητον, ὅπερ ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ὑπολοίπων καταλαμβάνεται. ὁ δὲ υἱὸς κατὰ τὸ ἄκτιστον τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι συναπτόμενος ἐν τῷ υἱὸς καὶ μονογενὴς εἶναί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ ἰδιάζον ἔχει, ὅπερ οὔτε τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ οὔτε τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ἐστί. τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ τῆς φύσεως τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχον πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα τοῖς ἰδίοις πάλιν γνωρίσμασιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν διακρίνεται. γνώρισμα γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἰδιαίτατον τὸ μηδὲν ἐκείνων εἶναι, ἅπερ ἰδίως τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ὁ λόγος ἐνεθεώρησε. τὸ γὰρ μήτε ἀγεννήτως εἶναι μήτε μονογενῶς, εἶναι δὲ ὅλως, τὴν ἐξαίρετον αὐτοῦ ἰδιότητα πρὸς τὰ προειρημένα παρίστησιν. τῷ γὰρ πατρὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄκτιστον συναπτόμενον πάλιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τῷ μὴ πατὴρ εἶναι καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος διαχωρίζεται. τῆς δὲ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν κατὰ τὸ ἄκτιστον συναφείας [καὶ ἐν τῷ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἔχειν] ἀφίσταται πάλιν τῷ ἰδιάζοντι, ἐν τῷ μήτε μονογενῶς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστῆναι καὶ ἐν τῷ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ πεφηνέναι. πάλιν δὲ τῆς κτίσεως διὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσης, ὡς ἂν μὴ κοινότητά τινα πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν νομισθῇ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πεφηνέναι, ἐν τῷ ἀτρέπτῳ καὶ ἀναλλοιώτῳ καὶ ἀπροσδεεῖ τῆς ἑτέρωθεν ἀγαθότητος διακρίνεται τὸ πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως. τὸ γὰρ ἄτρεπτον ἡ κτίσις ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐκ ἔχει, καθώς φησιν ἡ γραφὴ τοῦ ἑωσφόρου τὴν πτῶσιν διηγουμένη, περὶ οὗ καὶ ὁ κύριος ἀποκαλύπτων τοῖς μαθηταῖς τὰ μυστήρια ἔλεγεν: Ἐθεώρουν τὸν σατανᾶν ὡς ἀστραπὴν πεσόντα ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. δι' ὧν δὲ τῆς κτίσεως ἀφίσταται, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τε καὶ υἱὸν ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα. εἷς γὰρ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεπιδέκτων τοῦ χείρονος ὁ τοῦ ἀτρέπτου καὶ ἀναλλοιώτου λόγος.
Τούτων δὲ ἡμῖν οὕτω προειρημένων καιρὸς ἂν εἴη λοιπὸν καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐναντίων κατεξετάσαι λόγον. « ἀνάγκη » φησὶ « μείζους τε καὶ ἐλάττους τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι » ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος τεχνολογίᾳ. σκοπήσωμεν τοίνυν κατὰ τίνα διάνοιαν ἐπινοεῖ τῆς τοιαύτης διαφορᾶς τὴν ἀνάγκην, πότερον σωματικῆς τινος γενομένης τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν παραμετρουμένων συγκρίσεως ἢ κατὰ τὸ νοητὸν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπερβάλλοντι καὶ ἐνδέοντι θεωρουμένης ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτήν. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἐδείχθη παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφεῖν εἰδότων μηδεμίαν δύνασθαι διαφορὰν ἐννοῆσαι, ἐάν τις αὐτὴν ψιλώσας καὶ ἀπογυμνώσας τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων ποιοτήτων τε καὶ ἰδιωμάτων αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐξετάζῃ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον. ἐπιτάσει δὲ καὶ ὑφέσει τῆς ἀρετῆς τὴν τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ἐννοεῖν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεταπτωτὴν ἀναγκαίως ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ὑποτίθεσθαι ὡς δεκτικὴν οὖσαν ἐπ' ἴσης τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἐν μεθορίῳ καλοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου κειμένην, τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀσεβείας ἐστίν. ἄλλο γάρ τι εἶναι αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον καὶ ἄλλο τι γίνεσθαι τῇ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος ὁ ταῦτα λέγων κατασκευάσει. οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ σιδήρου συμβαίνει, ὃς ἐπὶ πλέον μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς καθομιλήσας τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ θερμοῦ ὑποδύεται, μένων ἐν τῷ σίδηρος εἶναι, εἰ δὲ ἐν χιόνι γένοιτο ἢ κρυστάλλῳ, μεταβάλλει πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν τὴν ποιότητα, τὸ ψυχρὸν τῆς χιόνος τοῖς ἰδίοις μορίοις ἀναδεξάμενος. Ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθεωρουμένης τῷ σιδήρῳ ποιότητος τὴν ὕλην προσαγορεύομεν (οὐ γὰρ πῦρ αὐτὸν ἢ κρύσταλλον ὀνομάζομεν τὸν ἑνὶ τούτων πεποιωμένον), οὕτως εἰ δοθείη κατὰ τὸν τῶν ἀσεβῶν λόγον ἐπὶ τῆς ζωοποιοῦ δυνάμεως μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐκ μετουσίας προσγίνεσθαι, οὐκέτι ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προσηγορίας κυρίως ὀνομασθήσεται, ἀλλά τι ἕτερον ἐννοεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόληψις ἀναγκάσει, ὡς μήτε ἀϊδίως αὐτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι μήτε αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ ποτὲ μὴ ὂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποτὲ μὴ ἐσόμενον. εἰ γὰρ τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ κρείττονος ἀγαθὰ γίνεται, δῆλον ὅτι πρὸ τῆς μετουσίας τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἦν, καὶ εἰ ἄλλο τι ὄντα τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπεχρώσθη, πάντως κἂν μονωθῇ τούτου, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοηθήσεται: καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο κρατήσῃ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἀγαθῶν παρεκτικὴ ἡ θεία φύσις καταληφθήσεται ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ προσδεομένη τοῦ ἀγαθύνοντος. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἑτέρῳ παράσχοι τὸ ὃ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχει; εἰ μὲν οὖν τελείως ἔχει, οὐδεμίαν ὕφεσιν ἐπὶ τῆς τελειότητος ἐννοήσομεν, καὶ μάταιος ὁ κατασκευάζων ἐν τῷ τελείῳ τὸ ἔλαττον. εἰ δὲ ἀτελὴς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσία νομίζεται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔλαττον λέγουσι, σκόπησον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, ὅτι τὸ οὕτως ἔχον οὐχὶ τὸ ὑποδεέστερον εὐεργετήσει, ἀλλ' ὅπως τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐνδέον ἀναπληρώσῃ τὴν σπουδὴν ἕξει: ὥστε ψευδὴς κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς προνοίας ὁ λόγος καὶ τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας καὶ πάντων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς γεγενῆσθαι καὶ εἰσαεὶ γίνεσθαι πεπιστευμένων, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιμελείᾳ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀσχολουμένου καὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιστασίαν διαφιέντος.
Εἰ γὰρ αὕτη κρατήσειεν ἡ ὑπόνοια, τὸ μὴ τετελειῶσθαι τὸν κύριον ἐν παντὶ ἀγαθῷ, οὐκέτι δύσκολον συνιδεῖν, εἰς ὅ τι καταστρέφει ἡ βλασφημία. ὄντως γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ματαία μὲν ἡ πίστις, κενὸν δὲ τὸ κήρυγμα, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αἱ ἐλπίδες, αἳ διὰ τῆς πίστεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσι. τί γὰρ βαπτίζονται εἰς Χριστόν, ᾧ μὴ ἰδία δύναμις ἀγαθωσύνης; ἀπίτω δὲ τοῦ στόματός μου τὸ βλάσφημον. τί δὲ πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τούτου λογίζονται; πῶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς φθαρτῆς γεννήσεως διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἀναγεννῶνται, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀναγεννώσης αὐτοὺς δυνάμεως τὸ ἄπτωτον καὶ τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς φυσικῶς καθὼς οἴονται κεκτημένης; πῶς δὲ μετασχηματίζεται τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως αὐτῶν, ὅταν αὐτὸν τὸν μετασχηματίζοντα τῆς πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἀλλοιώσεως ἐπιδεῖσθαι νομίζωσιν, ἄλλου πάλιν τοῦ καὶ αὐτὸν μετασχηματίζοντος προσδεόμενον; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι ᾖ, διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου ἄπαυστόν τινα πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τὴν ὁλκὴν τοῖς ὑποδεεστέροις φυσικῶς ἐντιθέντος, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ἔφεσις στήσεται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μήπω ληφθὲν ὑπερτεινομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως πάντοτε τὸ ἐλαττούμενον τοῦ πλέονος ὀρεχθήσεται καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἀλλοιωθήσεται καὶ οὐδέποτε πρὸς τὸ τέλειον φθάσει, τῷ μὴ εὑρίσκειν τὸ πέρας, οὗ δραξάμενον στήσεται τῆς ἀνόδου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἄπειρον τῇ φύσει τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, ἄπειρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ ἡ μετουσία τοῦ ἀπολαύοντος, ἐσαεὶ τὸ πλέον καταλαμβάνουσα καὶ πάντοτε εὑρίσκουσα τοῦ καταληφθέντος τὸ περισσότερον καὶ μηδέποτε παρισωθῆναι αὐτῷ δυναμένη, τῷ μήτε τὸ μετεχόμενον περατοῦσθαι μήτε τὸ διὰ τῆς μετουσίας ἐπαυξανόμενον ἵστασθαι.
Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διαφορᾶς ἀνακύπτοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὰ βλάσφημα. εἰ δὲ κατά τινα σωματικὴν ὑπόληψιν τὸ « μεῖζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον » ἐπ' αὐτῶν θεωροῦσιν, αὐτόθεν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄτοπον, κἂν μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζηται. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα ποιότητάς τινας καὶ διαστάσεις ὄγκους τε καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα δι' ὧν συμπληροῦται ὁ τοῦ σώματος λόγος, ταῖς ὑπονοίαις ταύταις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως συνεισάγεσθαι. ὅπου δὲ τὸ σύνθετον λέγεται, πάντως ἐκεῖ συνομολογεῖται καὶ ἡ τοῦ συνθέτου διάλυσις. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τῆς τοῦ δόγματος ἀτοπίας τῆς τὸ ἔλαττον καὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον ἐν τοῖς ἀμεγέθεσι καὶ ἀσυγκρίτοις ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμώσης ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάζεται, ὡς ὀλίγα ἐκ πολλῶν ὁ λόγος ὑπέδειξεν: οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔκολον πάντα τὸν ἐγκεκρυμμένον τῷ δόγματι δόλον διακαλύψαι τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ δι' ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡ ἀτοπία τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῆς βλασφημίας ἀναφαινομένων ἐπιδειχθήσεται. ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς τοῦ λόγου προέλθωμεν, μικρῶν ἔτι πρὸς σύστασιν τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος προσδιορισθέντων. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀσφαλὲς τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπὶ παντὸς δόγματος ἡ θεόπνευστός ἐστι μαρτυρία, καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι τῇ παραθέσει τῶν θείων καὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον πιστώσασθαι.
Οὐκοῦν ταύτας ἔγνωμεν ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ὄντων τὰς διαφοράς, πρῶτον τὸ ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν κατάληψιν πρῶτον, τὸ αἰσθητὸν λέγω, μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ διὰ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν χειραγωγίας ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ θεωρούμενον, ὃ δὴ νοητὸν εἶναί φαμεν: καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ πάλιν ἑτέραν διαφορὰν κατελάβομεν εἰς τὸ κτιστὸν καὶ ἄκτιστον διαιρουμένην. καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀκτίστου φύσεως τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα εἶναι διωρισάμεθα, τῆς δὲ κτιστῆς πάντα ὅσα μετ' ἐκείνην λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστι καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ ἀναπόδεικτος ἡμῶν ὁ διορισμὸς ὑπάρχῃ, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῆς γραφῆς μαρτυρίαις ἠσφαλισμένος, τοῦτο τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσθήσομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκτίσθη ὁ κύριος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξῆλθε, καθὼς αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς λόγος αὐτοπροσώπως ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ μαρτύρεται, κατὰ τὸν ἄρρητον ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνεκδιήγητον τῆς γεννήσεως ἤτοι τῆς ἐξόδου τρόπον. καὶ τίς ἂν εὑρεθείη μάρτυς ἀληθέστερος τῆς τοῦ κυρίου φωνῆς, διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εὐαγγελίου πατέρα καὶ οὐχὶ κτίστην ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀποκαλοῦντος πατέρα καὶ οὐχὶ ἔργον θεοῦ ἀλλ' υἱὸν θεοῦ ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζοντος; ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον κοινωνίαν σημαίνων υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ φαινόμενον προσηγόρευσε, δεικνὺς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἧς ἐλήφθη συγγένειαν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ γνησίαν σχέσιν τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τοῦ υἱοῦ διασημαίνει, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οἰκεῖον διὰ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ φωνῆς ἐνδεικνύμενος. κἄν τινες ἐκ τῆς παροιμιώδους ῥήσεως τὰ ἐν παραβολῇ σκοτεινῶς δι' αἰνίγματος εἰρημένα ψιλὰ καὶ ἀνερμήνευτα πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τῆς ἀληθείας προφέροντες τὴν τοῦ ἐκτίσθαι φωνήν, ἣν ἐκ προσώπου τῆς σοφίας ὁ παροιμιαστὴς ἐποιήσατο, εἰς συνηγορίαν τῆς τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν διαστροφῆς προχειρίζωνται, λέγοντες τὸ Κύριος ἔκτισέ με ὁμολογίαν εἶναι τοῦ ἐκτίσθαι τὸν κύριον, ὡς αὐτοῦ τοῦ μονογενοῦς διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἀρνουμένου, ἡμῖν οὐ προσεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ πάντως δεῖν εἰς τὸν κύριον ἀναγαγεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον τὰς ἀποδείξεις παρέχονται: οὔτε τοῦ ῥητοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἑβραίων γραφῆς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον φέρουσαν ἐπιδεῖξαι δυνήσονται, τῶν λοιπῶν ἑρμηνέων τὸ Ἐκτήσατο καὶ Κατέστησεν ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἔκτισεν ἐκδεδωκότων, οὔτε δέ, εἰ οὕτως εἶχεν ἡ λέξις ἐν τῇ πρωτοτύπῳ γραφῇ, πρόχειρος ἂν ἦν καὶ σαφὴς ἡ διάνοια, τῆς παροιμιακῆς διδασκαλίας οὐ προδήλως, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐπικρύψεως τὸν τῶν λεγομένων σκοπὸν ἐνδεικνυμένης διὰ πλαγίας ἐμφάσεως, ὡς ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον συμφράσεως τῶν εἰρημένων πάρεστιν ἐπιγνῶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ δυσθεώρητον, ἐν οἷς φησιν Ἡνίκα ἀφώριζε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θρόνον ἐπ' ἀνέμων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. τίς γὰρ θεοῦ θρόνος, εἴτε ὑλικός τις οὗτος εἴτε νοητός; καὶ τίνες ἄνεμοι, πότερον οἱ συνήθεις οὗτοι καὶ γνώριμοι, οὓς ἐκ τῶν ἀτμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀναθυμιάσεων συνίστασθαι λέγουσιν οἱ ταῦτα φυσιολογοῦντες, εἴτε καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ὑπονοούμενοι, ὃν οὐκ ἐπιγινώσκει ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη συνήθεια, οὕς φησιν ἀντὶ βάσεως τῷ θρόνῳ γίνεσθαι; καὶ τίς καθέδρα τοῦ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀπεριγράπτου καὶ ἀσχηματίστου θεοῦ; καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τίς ἂν ἐκ τῆς συνήθους τῶν ῥημάτων τούτων σημασίας κατανοήσειε;