Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungenerate.”

But as, I know not how or why, they hate and abhor the truth, they give Him indeed the name of “Son,” but in order to avoid the testimony which this word would give to the community of essence, they separate the word from the sense included in the name, and concede to the Only-begotten the name of “Son” as an empty thing, vouchsafing to Him only the mere sound of the word. That what I say is true, and that I am not taking a false aim at the adversaries’ mark, may be clearly learnt from the actual attacks they make upon the truth. Such are those arguments which are brought forward by them to establish their blasphemy, that we are taught by the divine Scriptures many names of the Only-begotten—a stone, an axe, a rock, a foundation, bread, a vine, a door, a way, a shepherd, a fountain, a tree, resurrection, a teacher, light, and many such names. But we may not piously use any of these names of the Lord, understanding it according to its immediate sense. For surely it would be a most absurd thing to think that what is incorporeal and immaterial, simple, and without figure, should be fashioned according to the apparent senses of these names, whatever they may be, so that when we hear of an axe we should think of a particular figure of iron, or when we hear of light, of the light in the sky, or of a vine, of that which grows by the planting of shoots, or of any one of the other names, as its ordinary use suggests to us to think; but we transfer the sense of these names to what better becomes the Divine nature, and form some other conception, and if we do designate Him thus, it is not as being any of these things, according to the definition of His nature, but as being called these things while He is conceived by means of the names employed as something else than the things themselves. But if such names are indeed truly predicated of the Only-begotten God, without including the declaration of His nature, they say that, as a consequence, neither should we admit the signification of “Son,” as it is understood according to the prevailing use, as expressive of nature, but should find some sense of this word also, different from that which is ordinary and obvious. These, and others like these, are their philosophical arguments to establish that the Son is not what He is and is called. Our argument was hastening to a different goal, namely to show that Eunomius’ new discourse is false and inconsistent, and argues neither with the truth nor with itself. Since, however, the arguments which we employ to attack their doctrine are brought into the discussion as a sort of support for their blasphemy548    The meaning of this seems to be that the Anomœan party make the same charge of “inconsistency” against the orthodox, which Gregory makes against Eunomius, basing that charge on the fact that the title “Son” is not interpreted in the same figurative way as the other titles recited. Gregory accordingly proceeds to show why the name of “Son” stands on a different level from those titles, and is to be treated in a different way., it may be well first briefly to discuss his point, and then to proceed to the orderly examination of his writings.

What can we say, then, to such things without relevance? That while, as they say, the names which Scripture applies to the Only-begotten are many, we assert that none of the other names is closely connected with the reference to Him that begat Him. For we do not employ the name “Stone,” or “Resurrection,” or “Shepherd,” or “Light,” or any of the rest, as we do the name “Son of the Father,” with a reference to the God of all. It is possible to make a twofold division of the signification of the Divine names, as it were by a scientific rule: for to one class belongs the indication of His lofty and unspeakable glory; the other class indicates the variety of the providential dispensation: so that, as we suppose, if that which received His benefits did not exist, neither would those words be applied with respect to them549    ἐπ᾽ ἀυτῶν: perhaps “with reference to man,” the plural being employed here to denote the race of men, spoken of in the preceding clause collectively as τὸ εὐεργετόυμενον which indicate His bounty. All those on the other hand, that express the attributes of God, are applied suitably and properly to the Only-begotten God, apart from the objects of the dispensation. But that we may set forth this doctrine clearly, we will examine the names themselves. The Lord would not have been called a vine, save for the planting of those who are rooted in Him, nor a shepherd, had not the sheep of the house of Israel been lost, nor a physician, save for the sake of them that were sick, nor would He have received for Himself the rest of these names, had He not made the titles appropriate, in a manner advantageous with regard to those who were benefited by Him, by some action of His providence. What need is there to mention individual instances, and to lengthen our argument upon points that are acknowledged? On the other hand, He is certainly called “Son,” and “Right Hand,” and “Only-begotten,” and “Word,” and “Wisdom,” and “Power,” and all other such relative names, as being named together with the Father in a certain relative conjunction. For He is called the “Power of God,” and the “Right Hand of God,” and the “Wisdom of God,” and the “Son and Only-begotten of the Father,” and the “Word with God,” and so of the rest. Thus, it follows from what we have stated, that in each of the names we are to contemplate some suitable sense appropriate to the subject, so that we may not miss the right understanding of them, and go astray from the doctrine of godliness. As, then, we transfer each of the other terms to that sense in which they may be applied to God, and reject in their case the immediate sense, so as not to understand material light, or a trodden way, or the bread which is produced by husbandry, or the word that is expressed by speech, but, instead of these, all those thoughts which present to us the magnitude of the power of the Word of God,—so, if one were to reject the ordinary and natural sense of the word “Son,” by which we learn that He is of the same essence as Him that begat Him, he will of course transfer the name to some more divine interpretation. For since the change to the more glorious meaning which has been made in each of the other terms has adapted them to set forth the Divine power, it surely follows that the significance of this name also should be transferred to what is loftier. But what more Divine sense could we find in the appellation of “Son,” if we were to reject, according to our adversaries’ view, the natural relation to Him that begat Him? I presume no one is so daring in impiety as to think that, in speech concerning the Divine nature, what is humble and mean is more appropriate than what is lofty and great. If they can discover, therefore, any sense of more exalted character than this, so that to be of the nature of the Father seems a thing unworthy to conceive of the Only-begotten, let them tell us whether they know, in their secret wisdom, anything more exalted than the nature of the Father, that, in raising the Only-begotten God to this level, they should lift Him also above His relation to the Father. But if the majesty of the Divine nature transcends all height, and excels every power that calls forth our wonder, what idea remains that can carry the meaning of the name “Son” to something greater still? Since it is acknowledged, therefore, that every significant phrase employed of the Only-begotten, even if the name be derived from the ordinary use of our lower life, is properly applied to Him with a difference of sense in the direction of greater majesty, and if it is shown that we can find no more noble conception of the title “Son” than that which presents to us the reality of His relationship to Him that begat Him, I think that we need spend no more time on this topic, as our argument has sufficiently shown that it is not proper to interpret the title of “Son” in like manner with the other names.

But we must bring back our enquiry once more to the book. It does not become the same persons “not to refuse” (for I will use their own words) “to call Him that is generated a ‘product of generation,’ since both the generated essence itself and the appellation of Son make such a relation of words appropriate,” and again to change the names which naturally belong to Him into metaphorical interpretations: so that one of two things has befallen them,—either their first attack has failed, and it is in vain that they fly to “natural order” to establish the necessity of calling Him that is generated a “product of generation”; or, if this argument holds good, they will find their second argument brought to nought by what they have already established. For the person who is called a “product of generation” because He is generated, cannot, for the very same reason, be possibly called a “product of making,” or a “product of creation.” For the sense of the several terms differs very widely, and one who uses his phrases advisedly ought to employ words with due regard to the subject, that we may not, by improperly interchanging the sense of our phrases, fall into any confusion of ideas. Hence we call that which is wrought out by a craft the work of the craftsman, and call him who is begotten by a man that man’s son; and no sane person would call the work a son, or the son a work; for that is the language of one who confuses and obscures the true sense by an erroneous use of names. It follows that we must truly affirm of the Only-begotten one of these two things,—if He is a Son, that He is not to be called a “product of creation,” and if He is created, that He is alien from the appellation of “Son550    Oehler’s punctuation here seems faulty, and is accordingly not followed.,” just as heaven and sea and earth, and all individual things, being things created, do not assume the name of “Son.” But since Eunomius bears witness that the Only-begotten God is begotten (and the evidence of enemies is of additional value for establishing the truth), he surely testifies also, by saying that He is begotten, to the fact that He is not created. Enough, however, on these points: for though many arguments crowd upon us, we will be content, lest their number lead to disproportion, with those we have already adduced on the subject before us.

Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἢ διότι μισοῦντες τε καὶ ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν υἱὸν μὲν αὐτὸν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς δ' ἂν μὴ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινὸν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης μαρτυρηθείη, τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῷ ὀνόματι σημασίας τὴν φωνὴν χωρίσαντες κενὸν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἀσήμαντον τῷ μονογενεῖ καταλείπουσι, μόνον αὐτῷ τὸν ψόφον τῆς φωνῆς χαριζόμενοι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ οὐ παραστοχάζομαι τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, φανερῶς ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν κατεπιχειροῦσι τῆς ἀληθείας μαθεῖν. τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ κατασκευῇ τῆς βλασφημίας προφέρεται, « ὅτι πολλὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὀνόματα παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λίθον ἀξίνην πέτραν θεμέλιον ἄρτον ἄμπελον θύραν ὁδὸν ποιμένα πηγὴν ξύλον ἀνάστασιν διδάσκαλον φῶς καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων κατὰ τὴν πρόχειρον σημασίαν εὐσεβές ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου νοοῦντας λέγειν. ἦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων τὸ ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ἄϋλον ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον ταῖς ἐμφαινομέναις τισὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίαις διαμορφοῦσθαι νομίζειν, ὥστε ἀξίνην ἀκούσαντας τὸ τοιόνδε σχῆμα τοῦ σιδήρου νοεῖν ἢ φῶς τὸ ἐναέριον ἢ ἄμπελον τὴν ἐκ φυτείας κλημάτων ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καθὼς ἡ συνήθεια νοεῖν ὑποτίθεται: ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ θεοπρεπέστερον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων μετενεγκόντες ἐμφάσεις ἄλλο τι νοοῦμεν, κἂν οὕτω κατονομάζωμεν, οὐχ ὡς ὄντα τι τούτων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὡς ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν λεγομένων νοούμενον. εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιλέγεται τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ καὶ τῆς φύσεως οὐ περιέχει τὴν ἔνδειξιν, ἀκόλουθον εἶναι » λέγουσι « μηδὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ σημαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν ἐπικρατοῦσαν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐρμηνείαν παραλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκειν τινὰ σημασίαν καὶ ταύτης τῆς φωνῆς ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν κοινήν τε καὶ πρόχειρον ». ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφοῦσι πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὅπερ ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον μὲν ἦν σπεύδων ὁ λόγος, τὴν πρόσφατον τοῦ Εὐνομίου λογογραφίαν δεῖξαι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀσύστατον καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὔτε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συμφωνοῦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δι' ὧν κατηγοροῦμεν τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν οἷόν τις συνηγορία τῆς βλασφημίας ἐπεισήχθη τῷ λόγῳ, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι περὶ τούτου πρότερον ἐν ὀλίγῳ διαλαβεῖν, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐπανελθεῖν.
Τί τοίνυν ἔστιν εἰπόντας πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος; ὅτι πολλῶν ὄντων, καθὼς κἀκεῖνοί φασι, τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἃ τῷ μονογενεῖ παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἐπιλέγεται, οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων τῇ πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα φαμὲν ἀναφορᾷ τὸ προσφυὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ υἱὸν τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως ἢ λίθον ἢ ἀνάστασιν ἢ ποιμένα ἢ φῶς ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἐπαναφέροντες λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οἷον τέχνῃ τινὶ καὶ κανόνι διχῇ διελέσθαι τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων τὴν σημασίαν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑψηλῆς τε καὶ ἀφράστου δόξης τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ τὸ ποικίλον τῆς προνοητικῆς οἰκονομίας ἐνδείκνυται: ὥστε καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐεργετούμενον εἴη, μηδὲ τὰς φωνὰς ταύτας ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τετάχθαι αἳ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἐνδείκνυνται. ὅσαι δὲ τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἑρμηνεύουσι, καὶ δίχα τῶν οἰκονομουμένων προσφυῶς καὶ κυρίως ἐφαρμόζονται τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ. ὡς δ' ἂν ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐκκαλυφθείη τὸ τοιοῦτον δόγμα, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ θεωρία. οὐκ ἂν ἄμπελος ὠνομάσθη ὁ κύριος, εἰ μὴ τῆς φυτείας χάριν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ῥιζουμένων, οὐδ' ἂν ποιμήν, εἰ μὴ τὰ πρόβατα τοῦ οἴκου Ἰσραὴλ ἀπολώλει, οὐδ' ἰατρός, εἰ μὴ τῶν νοσούντων χάριν, οὐδὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατεδέχετο, μὴ διά τινος προνοητικῆς ἐνεργείας προσφόρως ἐπὶ τῶν εὐεργετουμένων τὰς φωνὰς οἰκειούμενος. τί γὰρ δεῖ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγοντα μηκύνειν ἐν τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις τὸν λόγον; υἱὸς δὲ καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ μονογενὴς καὶ λόγος καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅσα πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐν συζυγίᾳ τινὶ σχετικῇ τῷ πατρὶ πάντως συνονομαζόμενος λέγεται. θεοῦ γὰρ δύναμις ὀνομάζεται καὶ θεοῦ δεξιὰ καὶ θεοῦ σοφία καὶ πατρὸς υἱὸς καὶ μονογενὴς καὶ λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. οὐκοῦν ἀκόλουθον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομάτων κατάλληλόν τινα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐνθεωρεῖν σημασίαν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῷ διαμαρτεῖν τῆς ὀρθῆς διανοίας περὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας πλημμελήσαιμεν λόγον.
Ὥσπερ τοίνυν τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ θεοπρεπὲς μεταλαβόντες ἀθετοῦμεν τὴν πρόχειρον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔννοιαν, ὡς μήτε φῶς ὑλικὸν μήτε πατουμένην ὁδὸν μήτε ἄψυχον λίθον μήτε τὸν ἐκ γεωργίας ἄρτον μήτε τὸν διὰ ῥημάτων λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τούτων ἐκεῖνα ὀνομάζειν ὅσα τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου παρίστησιν, οὕτως εἴ τις ἀθετοίη τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν συνήθη καὶ κατὰ φύσιν σημασίαν, δι' ἧς τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι τοῦ γεγεννηκότος μανθάνομεν, πρός τινα θεοπρεπεστέραν ἑρμηνείαν μεταλήψεται πάντως τὸ ὄνομα. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ ἐνδοξότερον ἡ μετάληψις γινομένη πρὸς τὴν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως ἔνδειξιν ἥρμοσεν, ἀκόλουθον πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τὸ ὑψηλότερον μετενεχθῆναι τὸ σημαινόμενον. τίς ἂν οὖν γένοιτο θεοπρεπεστέρα διάνοια ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας, εἰ ἀθετοῖτο κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡ φυσικὴ πρὸς τὸν γεννήσαντα σχέσις; τάχα γὰρ οὕτως οὐδεὶς πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τολμηρός, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λόγοις τὸ ταπεινὸν καὶ χαμαίζηλον τῶν ὑψηλῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων ἁρμοδιώτερον οἴεσθαι. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τινα ταύτης μεγαλοφυεστέραν διάνοιαν ἐξευρίσκουσιν, ὡς ἀνάξιον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς νοεῖν τὸ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι, εἰπάτωσαν εἴ τι γινώσκουσι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον αὐτῶν σοφίαν τῆς πατρικῆς φύσεως ὑψηλότερον, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ἐπάραντας τῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως αὐτὸν ὑπερᾶραι: εἰ δὲ παντὸς ὕψους ὑπέρκειται καὶ πᾶσαν δύναμιν θαυμαστικὴν ὑπερβαίνει τῆς θείας φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον, τίς ὑπολείπεται λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον φέρων τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ κλήσεως τὴν ἑρμηνείαν; ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται πᾶσαν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς σημαντικὴν λέξιν, κἂν ἐκ τῆς κάτω συνηθείας ὀνομάζηται, πρὸς τὸ μεγαλειότερον ταῖς ἐννοίαις μετατεθεῖσαν κυρίως λέγεσθαι, δείκνυται δὲ μὴ δύνασθαί τινα μεγαλοφυεστέραν ἔννοιαν τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας εὑρεῖν ταύτης, ἣ τὸ γνήσιον πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα παρίστησι, οὐδὲν οἶμαι χρῆναι πλέον ἐπιδιατρίβειν τῷ τόπῳ, ἱκανῶς διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀποδειχθέντος ὅτι οὐ προσήκει καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν λοιπῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν μεθερμηνεύεσθαι.
Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ βιβλίον πάλιν ἐπανακτέον τὴν θεωρίαν. οὐκ ἔστι τῶν αὐτῶν τὸν γεννητὸν « γέννημα λέγειν μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι » (τοῖς γὰρ ἐκείνων χρήσομαι ῥήμασιν), « τῆς γεννηθείσης αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειουμένης σχέσιν », καὶ πάλιν μετατιθέναι τὰς προσφυεῖς ὀνομασίας εἰς τροπικὰς μεταλήψεις: ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τὸ πρότερον τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων αὐτοῖς διαπέπτωκε καὶ μάτην καταφεύγουσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ φύσεως τάξιν εἰς κατασκευὴν τοῦ δεῖν « γέννημα » τὸν γεννηθέντα προσαγορεύειν, ἢ εἰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον λέγεται, ὁ ἕτερος λόγος ὑπὸ τῶν προκατεσκευασμένων διαλυθήσεται. ὁ γὰρ διὰ τὸ γεννηθῆναι « γέννημα » κατ' ἐκείνους λεγόμενος δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο « ποίημα » καὶ « κτίσμα » λέγεσθαι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. πλεῖστον γὰρ δήπου διενήνοχεν ἑκατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ προσήκει τὸν λελογισμένως ταῖς φωναῖς κεχρημένον πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέποντα κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα σύγχυσιν περὶ τὰς ἐννοίας πάθοιμεν, ἀνοικείως τοῖς σημαινομένοις τὰς φωνὰς ἐπαλλάσσοντες. διὰ τοῦτο τεχνίτου μὲν ἔργον τὸ διὰ τῆς τέχνης ἀπεργασθὲν ὀνομάζομεν, υἱὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου φύντα προσαγορεύομεν, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἔργον υἱὸν οὔτε τὸν υἱὸν ἔργον τῶν σωφρονούντων εἴποι τις ἄν: συγχέοντος γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀναθολοῦντος ἐν τῇ πεπλανημένῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσει τὴν ἀληθῆ σημασίαν. ὥστε τῶν δύο τούτων τὸ ἕτερον ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀληθεύειν ἐπάναγκες, εἰ μὲν υἱός ἐστιν, « κτίσμα » μὴ λέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ κτιστός, τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον πάντα κτίσματα ὄντα τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ κλῆσιν οὐχ ὑποδύεται. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ μαρτυρεῖ γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, ἰσχυροτέρα δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας σύστασιν ἡ τῶν ἐχθρῶν μαρτυρία, καὶ τὸ μὴ κτιστὸν εἶναι πάντως διὰ τοῦ τὸ γεννητὸν εἰπεῖν εἶναι συνεμαρτύρησεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα. πολλῶν γὰρ ἡμῖν λόγων ἐπιρρεόντων, ὡς ἂν μὴ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἀμετρίαν ἐκπέσοι, τούτοις περὶ τῶν προτεθέντων ἀρκεσθησόμεθα.