Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms.

Let us, if you please, examine his irrefragable syllogisms, and his subtle transpositions141    Transpositions of the terms in his own false premises;τῶν σοφισμάτων ἀντιστροφὰς. The same as “the professional twisting of premisses,” and “the hooking backward and forward and twisting of premisses” below. The terms Father and ᾽Αγέννητος are transposed or twisted into each other’s place in this ‘irrefragable syllogism.’ It is ‘a reductio ad absurdum’ thus:—   Father means ᾽Αγέννητος (Basil’s premiss),   ∴ ᾽Αγέννητος means Father.   The fallacy of Eunomius consists in making ‘Father’ universal in his own premiss, when it was only particular in Basil’s. “᾽Αγέννητος means the whole contents of the word Father,” which therefore cannot mean having generated a son. It is a False Conversion.   This Conversion or ἀντιοτροφὴ is illustrated in Aristotle’s Analytics, Prior. I. iii. 3. It is legitimate thus:—   Some B is A   ∴ Some A is (some) B. of the terms in his own false premisses, by which he hopes to shake that argument; though, indeed, I fear lest the miserable quibbling in what he says may in a measure raise a prejudice also against the remarks that would correct it. When striplings challenge to a fight, men get more blame for pugnaciousness in closing with such foes, than honour for their show of victory. Nevertheless, what we want to say is this. We think, indeed, that the things said by him, with that well-known elocution now familiar to us, only for the sake of being insolent, are better buried in silence and oblivion; they may suit him; but to us they afford only an exercise for much-enduring patience. Nor would it be proper, I think, to insert his ridiculous expressions in the midst of our own serious controversy, and so to make this zeal for the truth evaporate in coarse, vulgar laughter; for indeed to be within hearing, and to remain unmoved, is an impossibility, when he says with such sublime and magnificient verbosity, “Where additional words amount to additional blasphemy, it is by half as much more tranquillizing to be silent than to speak.” Let those laugh at these expressions who know which of them are fit to be believed, and which only to be laughed at; while we scrutinize the keenness of those syllogisms with which he tries to tear our system to pieces.

He says, “If ‘Father’ is the same in meaning as ‘Ungenerate,’ and words which have the same meaning naturally have in every respect the same force, and Ungenerate signifies by their confession that God comes from nothing, it follows necessarily that Father signifies the fact of God being of none, and not the having generated the Son.” Now what is this logical necessity which prevents the having generated a Son being signified by the title “Father,” if so be that that same title does in itself express to us as well the absence of beginning in the Father? If, indeed, the one idea was totally destructive of the other, it would certainly follow, from the very nature of contradictories142    κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων φύσιν. If ᾽Αγέννητος means not having a son, then to affirm ‘God is always ᾽Αγέννητος’ is even to deny (its logical contradictory) ‘God once had a Son.’, that the affirming of the one would involve the denial of the other. But if there is nothing in the world to prevent the same Existence from being Father and also Ungenerate, when we try to think, under this title of Father, of the quality of not having been generated as one of the ideas implied in it, what necessity prevents the relation to a Son being any longer marked by the word Father? Other names which express mutual relationship are not always confined to those ideas of relationship; for instance, we call the emperor143    τὸν βασιλέα. autocrat and masterless, and we call the same the ruler of his subjects; and, while it is quite true that the word emperor signifies also the being masterless, it is not therefore necessary that this word, because signifying autocratic and unruled, must cease to imply the having power over inferiors; the word emperor, in fact, is midway between these two conceptions, and at one time indicates masterlessness, at another the ruling over lower orders. In the case before us, then, if there is some other Father conceivable besides the Father of Our Lord, let these men who boast of their profound wisdom show him to us, and then we will agree with him that the idea of the Ungenerate cannot be represented by the title “Father.” But if the First Father has no cause transcending His own state, and the subsistence of the Son is invariably implied in the title of Father, why do they try to scare us, as if we were children, with these professional twistings of premisses, endeavouring to persuade or rather to decoy us into the belief that, if the property of not having been generated is acknowledged in the title of Father, we must sever from the Father any relation with the Son.

Despising, then, this silly superficial attempt of theirs, let us manfully own our belief in that which they adduce as a monstrous absurdity, viz., that not only does the ‘Father’ mean the same as Ungenerate and that this last property establishes the Father as being of none, but also that the word ‘Father’ introduces with itself the notion of the Only-begotten, as a relative bound to it. Now the following passage, which is to be found in the treatise of our Teacher, has been removed from the context by this clever and invincible controversialist; for, by suppressing that part which was added by Basil by way of safeguard, he thought he would make his own reply a much easier task. The passage runs thus verbatim. “For my part I should be inclined to say that this title of the Ungenerate, however readily it may seem to fall in with our own ideas, yet, as nowhere found in Scripture, and as forming the alphabet of Eunomius’ blasphemy, may very well be suppressed, when we have the word Father meaning the same thing, in addition to144    πρὸς τῷ. Cod. Ven., surely better than the common πρὸς τὸ, which Oehler has in his text. its introducing with itself, as a relative bound to it, the notion of the Son.” This generous champion of the truth, with innate good feeling145    ἐλευθερία; late Greek, for ἐλευθεριότης, has suppressed this sentence which was added by way of safeguard, I mean, “in addition to introducing with itself, as a relative bound to it, the notion of the Son;” after this garbling, he comes to close quarters with what remains, and having severed the connection of the living whole146    “the living whole.” σώματος: this is the radical meaning of σῶμα, and also the classical. Viger. (Idiom. p. 143 note) distinguishes four meanings under this. 1. Safety. 2. Individuality. 3. Living presence. 4. Life: and adduces instances of each from the Attic orators., and thus made it, as he thinks, a more yielding and assailable victim of his logic, he misleads his own party with the frigid and feeble paralogism, that “that which has a common meaning, in one single point, with something else retains that community of meaning in every possible point;” and with this he takes their shallow intelligences by storm. For while we have only affirmed that the word Father in a certain signification yields the same meaning as Ungenerate, this man makes the coincidence of meanings complete in every point, quite at variance therein with the common acceptation of either word; and so he reduces the matter to an absurdity, pretending that this word Father can no longer denote any relation to the Son, if the idea of not having been generated is conveyed by it. It is just as if some one, after having acquired two ideas about a loaf,—one, that it is made of flour, the other, that it is food to the consumer—were to contend with the person who told him this, using against him the same kind of fallacy as Eunomius does, viz., that ‘the being made of flour is one thing, but the being food is another; if, then, it is granted that the loaf is made of flour, this quality in it can no longer strictly be called food.’ Such is the thought in Eunomius’ syllogism; “if the not having been generated is implied by the word Father, this word can no longer convey the idea of having generated the Son.” But I think it is time that we, in our turn, applied to this argument of his that magnificently rounded period of his own (already quoted). In reply to such words, it would be suitable to say that he would have more claim to be considered in his sober senses, if he had put the limit to such argumentative safeguards at absolute silence. For “where additional words amount to additional blasphemy,” or, rather, indicate that he has utterly lost his reason, it is not only “by half as much more,” but by the whole as much more “tranquillizing to be silent than to speak.”

But perhaps a man would be more easily led into the true view by personal illustrations; so let us leave this looking backwards and forwards and this twisting of false premisses147    τὸ κατηγκυλωμένον τῆς τῶν συφισμάτων πλοκῆς. See c. 38, note 7. The false premisses in the syllogisms have been—   1. Father (partly) means ᾽Αγέννητος   Things which mean the same in part, mean the same in all (false premiss).   ∴ Father means ᾽Αγέννητος (false).   2. Father means ᾽Αγέννητος (false).   ᾽Αγέννητος does not mean ‘having a Son.’   ∴ Father does not mean ‘having a Son’ (false)., and discuss the matter in a less learned and more popular way. Your father, Eunomius, was certainly a human being; but the same person was also the author of your being. Did you, then, ever use in his case too this clever quibble which you have employed; so that your own ‘father,’ when once he receives the true definition of his being, can no longer mean, because of being a ‘man,’ any relationship to yourself; ‘for he must be one of two things, either a man, or Eunomius’ father?’—Well, then, you must not use the names of intimate relationship otherwise than in accordance with that intimate meaning. Yet, though you would indict for libel any one who contemptuously scoffed against yourself, by means of such an alteration of meanings, are you not afraid to scoff against God; and are you safe when you laugh at these mysteries of our faith? As ‘your father’ indicates relationship to yourself, and at the same time humanity is not excluded by that term, and as no one in his sober senses instead of styling him who begat you ‘your father’ would render his description by the word ‘man,’ or, reversely, if asked for his genus and answering ‘man,’ would assert that that answer prevented him from being your father; so in the contemplation of the Almighty a reverent mind would not deny that by the title of Father is meant that He is without generation, as well as that in another meaning it represents His relationship to the Son. Nevertheless Eunomius, in open contempt of truth, does assert that the title cannot mean the ‘having begotten a son’ any longer, when once the word has conveyed to us the idea of ‘never having been generated.’

Let us add the following illustration of the absurdity of his assertions. It is one that all must be familiar with, even mere children who are being introduced under a grammar-tutor to the study of words. Who, I say, does not know that some nouns are absolute and out of all relation, others express some relationship. Of these last, again, there are some which incline, according to the speaker’s wish, either way; they have a simple intention in themselves, but can be turned so as to become nouns of relation. I will not linger amongst examples foreign to our subject. I will explain from the words of our Faith itself.

God is called Father and King and other names innumerable in Scripture. Of these names one part can be pronounced absolutely, i.e. simply as they are, and no more: viz.. “imperishable,” “everlasting,” “immortal,” and so on. Each of these, without our bringing in another thought, contains in itself a complete thought about the Deity. Others express only relative usefulness; thus, Helper, Champion, Rescuer, and other words of that meaning; if you remove thence the idea of one in need of the help, all the force expressed by the word is gone. Some, on the other hand, as we have said, are both absolute, and are also amongst the words of relation; ‘God,’ for instance, and ‘good,’ and many other such. In these the thought does not continue always within the absolute. The Universal God often becomes the property of him who calls upon Him; as the Saints teach us, when they make that independent Being their own. ‘The Lord God is Holy;’ so far there is no relation; but when one adds the Lord Our God, and so appropriates the meaning in a relation towards oneself, then one causes the word to be no longer thought of absolutely. Again; “Abba, Father” is the cry of the Spirit; it is an utterance free from any partial reference. But we are bidden to call the Father in heaven, ‘Our Father;’ this is the relative use of the word. A man who makes the Universal Deity his own, does not dim His supreme dignity; and in the same way there is nothing to prevent us, when we point out the Father and Him who comes from Him, the Firstborn before all creation, from signifying by that title of Father at one and the same time the having begotten that Son, and also the not being from any more transcendent Cause. For he who speaks of the First Father means Him who is presupposed before all existence, Whose is the beyond148    ἐνεδείξατο, οὗ τὸ ἐπέκεινα. This is the reading of the Turin Cod., and preferable to that of the Paris edition.. This is He, Who has nothing previous to Himself to behold, no end in which He shall cease. Whichever way we look, He is equally existing there for ever; He transcends the limit of any end, the idea of any beginning, by the infinitude of His life; whatever be His title, eternity must be implied with it.

But Eunomius, versed as he is in the contemplation of that which eludes thought, rejects this view of unscientific minds; he will not admit a double meaning in the word ‘Father,’ the one, that from Him are all things and in the front of all things the Only-begotten Son, the other, that He Himself has no superior Cause. He may scorn the statement; but we will brave his mocking laugh, and repeat what we have said already, that the ‘Father’ is the same as that Ungenerate One, and both signifies the having begotten the Son, and represents the being from nothing.

But Eunomius, contending with this statement of ours, says (the very contrary now of what he said before), “If God is Father because He has begotten the Son, and ‘Father’ has the same meaning as Ungenerate, God is Ungenerate because He has begotten the Son, but before He begat Him He was not Ungenerate.” Observe his method of turning round; how he pulls his first quibble to pieces, and turns it into the very opposite, thinking even so to entrap us in a conclusion from which there is no escape. His first syllogism presented the following absurdity, “If ‘Father’ means the coming from nothing, then necessarily it will no longer indicate the having begotten the Son.” But this last syllogism, by turning (a premiss) into its contrary, threatens our faith with another absurdity. How, then, does he pull to pieces his former conclusion149    The first syllogism was—   ‘Father’ means the ‘coming from nothing;’   (‘Coming from nothing’ does not mean ‘begetting a Son’)   ∴ Father does not mean begetting a Son.   He “pulls to pieces” this conclusion by taking its logical ‘contrary’ as the first premiss of his second syllogism; thus—   Father means begetting a Son;   (Father means ᾽Αγέννητος)   ∴ ᾽Αγέννητος means begetting a Son.   From which it follows that before that begetting the Almighty was not ᾽Αγέννητος   The conclusion of the last syllogism also involves the contrary of the 2nd premiss of the first.   It is to be noticed that both syllogisms are aimed at Basil’s doctrine, ‘Father’ means ‘coming from nothing.’ Eunomius strives to show that, in both, such a premiss leads to an absurdity. But Gregory ridicules both for contradicting each other.? “If He is ‘Father’ because He has begotten a Son.” His first syllogism gave us nothing like that; on the contrary, its logical inference purported to show that if the Father’s not having been generated was meant by the word Father, that word could not mean as well the having begotten a Son150    τὸ μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι. The negative, absent in Oehler, is recovered from the Turin Cod.. Thus his first syllogism contained no intimation whatever that God was Father because He had begotten a Son. I fail to understand what this argumentative and shrewdly professional reversal means.

But let us look to the thought in it below the words. ‘If God is Ungenerate because He has begotten a Son, He was not Ungenerate before He begat Him.’ The answer to that is plain; it consists in the simple statement of the Truth that ‘the word Father means both the having begotten a Son, and also that the Begetter is not to be thought of as Himself coming from any cause.’ If you look at the effect, the Person of the Son is revealed in the word Father; if you look for a previous Cause, the absence of any beginning in the Begetter is shown by that word. In saying that ‘Before He begat a Son, the Almighty was not Ungenerate,’ this pamphleteer lays himself open to a double charge; i.e. of misrepresentation of us, and of insult to the Faith. He attacks, as if there was no mistake about it, something which our Teacher never said, neither do we now assert, viz., that the Almighty became in process of time a Father, having been something else before. Moreover in ridiculing the absurdity of this fancied doctrine of ours, he proclaims his own wildness as to doctrine. Assuming that the Almighty was once something else, and then by an advance became entitled to be called Father, he would have it that before this He was not Ungenerate either, since Ungeneracy is implied in the idea of Father. The folly of this hardly needs to be pointed out; it will be abundantly clear to anyone who reflects. If the Almighty was something else before He became Father, what will the champions of this theory say, if they were asked in what state they propose to contemplate Him? What name are they going to give Him in that stage of existence; child, infant, babe, or youth? Will they blush at such flagrant absurdity, and say nothing like that, and concede that He was perfect from the first? Then how can He be perfect, while as yet unable to become Father? Or will they not deprive Him of this power, but say only that it was not fitting that there should be Fatherhood simultaneously with His existence. But if it was not good nor fitting that He should be from the very beginning Father of such a Son, how did He go on to acquire that which was not good?

But, as it is, it is good and fitting to God’s majesty that He should become Father of such a Son. So they will make out that at the beginning He had no share in this good thing, and as long as He did not have this Son they must assert (may God forgive me for saying it!) that He had no Wisdom, nor Power, nor Truth, nor any of the other glories which from various points of view the Only-begotten Son is and is called.

But let all this fall on the heads of those who started it. We will return whence we digressed. He says, “if God is Father because of having begotten a Son, and if Father means the being Ungenerate, then God was not this last, before He begat.” Now if he could speak here as it is customary to speak about human life, where it is inconceivable that any should acquire possession of many accomplishments all at once, instead of winning each of the objects sought after in a certain order and sequence of time—if I say we could reason like that in the case of the Almighty, so that we could say He possessed His Ungeneracy at one time, and after that acquired His power, and then His imperishability, and then His Wisdom, and advancing so became Father, and after that Just and then Everlasting, and so came into all that enters into the philosophical conception of Him, in a certain sequence—then it would not be so manifestly absurd to think that one of His names has precedence of another name, and to talk of His being first Ungenerate, and after that having become Father.

As it is, however, no one is so earth-bound in imagination, so uninitiated in the sublimities of our Faith, as to fail, when once he has apprehended the Cause of the universe, to embrace in one collective and compact whole all the attributes which piety can give to God; and to conceive instead of a primal and a later attribute, and of another in between, supervening in a certain sequence. It is not possible, in fact, to traverse in thought one amongst those attributes and then reach another, be it a reality or a conception, which is to transcend the first in antiquity. Every name of God, every sublime conception of Him, every utterance or idea that harmonizes with our general ideas with regard to Him, is linked in closest union with its fellow; all such conceptions are massed together in our understanding into one collective and compact whole namely, His Fatherhood, and Ungeneracy, and Power, and Imperishability, and Goodness, and Authority, and everything else. You cannot take one of these and separate it in thought from the rest by any interval of time, as if it preceded or followed something else; no sublime or adorable attribute in Him can be discovered, which is not simultaneously expressed in His everlastingness. Just, then, as we cannot say that God was ever not good, or powerful, or imperishable, or immortal, in the same way it is a blasphemy not to attribute to Him Fatherhood always, and to say that that came later. He Who is truly Father is always Father; if eternity was not included in this confession, and if a foolishly preconceived idea curtailed and checked retrospectively our conception of the Father, true Fatherhood could no longer be properly predicated of Him, because that preconceived idea about the Son would cancel the continuity and eternity of His Fatherhood. How could that which He is now called be thought of something which came into existence subsequent to these other attributes? If being first Ungenerate He then became Father, and received that name, He was not always altogether what He is now called. But that which the God now existing is He always is; He does not become worse or better by any addition, He does not become altered by taking something from another source. He is always identical with Himself. If, then, He was not Father at first, He was not Father afterwards. But if He is confessed to be Father (now), I will recur to the same argument, that, if He is so now, He always was so; and that if He always was, He always will be. The Father therefore is always Father; and seeing that the Son must always be thought of along with the Father (for the title of father cannot be justified unless there is a son to make it true), all that we contemplate in the Father is to be observed also in the Son. “All that the Father hath is the Son’s; and all that is the Son’s the Father hath.” The words are, ‘The Father hath that which is the Son’s151    John xvi. 15. Oehler conjectures these words (῎Εχει ὁ πατὴρ) are to be repeated; and thus obtains a good sense, which the common reading, ὁ πατὴρ εἶπον, does not give.,’ and so a carping critic will have no authority for finding in the contents of the word “all” the ungeneracy of the Son, when it is said that the Son has all that the Father has, nor on the other hand the generation of the Father, when all that is the Son’s is to be observed in the Father. For the Son has all the things of the Father; but He is not Father: and again, all the things of the Son are to be observed in the Father, but He is not a Son.

If, then, all that is the Father’s is in the Only-begotten, and He is in the Father, and the Fatherhood is not dissociated from the ‘not having been generated,’ I for my part cannot see what there is to think of in connexion with the Father, by Himself, that is parted by any interval so as to precede our apprehension of the Son. Therefore we may boldly encounter the difficulties started in that quibbling syllogism; we may despise it as a mere scare to frighten children, and still assert that God is Holy, and Immortal, and Father, and Ungenerate, and Everlasting, and everything all at once; and that, if it could be supposed possible that you could withhold one of these attributes which devotion assigns to Him, all would be destroyed along with that one. Nothing, therefore, in Him is older or younger; else He would be found to be older or younger than Himself. If God is not all His attributes always, but something in Him is, and something else only becoming, following some order of sequence (we must remember God is not a compound; whatever He is is the whole of Him), and if according to this heresy He is first Ungenerate and afterwards becomes Father, then, seeing that we cannot think of Him in connexion with a heaping together of qualities, there is no alternative but that the whole of Him must be both older and younger than the whole of Him, the former by virtue of His Ungeneracy, the latter by virtue of His Fatherhood. But if, as the prophet says of God152    Psalm cii. 27., He “is the same,” it is idle to say that before He begat He was not Himself Ungenerate; we cannot find either of these names, the Father and the Ungenerate One, parted from the other; the two ideas rise together, suggested by each other, in the thoughts of the devout reasoner. God is Father from everlasting, and everlasting Father, and every other term that devotion assigns to Him is given in a like sense, the mensuration and the flow of time having no place, as we have said, in the Eternal.

Let us now see the remaining results of his expertness in dealing with words; results, which he himself truly says, are at once ridiculous and lamentable. Truly one must laugh outright at what he says, if a deep lament for the error that steeps his soul were not more fitting. Whereas Father, as we teach, includes, according to one of its meanings, the idea of the Ungenerate, he transfers the full signification of the word Father to that of the Ungenerate, and declares “If Father is the same as Ungenerate, it is allowable for us to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the Ungenerate of the Son is Ungenerate; for as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so reversely the Father is Ungenerate of the Son.” After this a feeling of admiration for our friend’s adroitness steals over me, with the conviction that the many-sided subtlety of his theological training is quite beyond the capacity of most. What our Teacher said was embraced in one short sentence, to the effect that it was possible that by the title ‘Father’ the Ungeneracy could be signified; but Eunomius’ words depend for their number not on the variety of the thoughts, but on the way that anything within the circuit of similar names can be turned about153    ἐν τῇ περιόδῳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων.. As the cattle that run blindfold round to turn the mill remain with all their travel in the same spot, so does he go round and round the same topic, and never leaves it. Once he said, ridiculing us, that ‘Father’ does not signify the having begotten, but the being from nothing. Again he wove a similar dilemma, “If Father signifies Ungeneracy, before He begat He was not ungenerate.” Then a third time he resorts to the same trick. “It is allowable for us to drop Father, and to use Ungenerate instead;” and then directly he repeats the logic so often vomited. “For as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so reversely the Father is Ungenerate of the Son.” How often he returns to his vomit; how often he blurts it out again! Shall we not, then, annoy most people, if we drag about our argument in company with this foolish display of words? It would be perhaps more decent to be silent in a case like this; still, lest any one should think that we decline discussion because we are weak in pleas, we will answer thus to what he has said. ‘You have no authority, Eunomius, for calling the Father the Ungenerate of the Son, even though the title Father does signify that the Begetter was from no cause Himself. For as, to take the example already cited, when we hear the word ‘Emperor’ we understand two things, both that the one who is pre-eminent in authority is subject to none, and also that he controls his inferiors, so the title Father supplies us with two ideas about the Deity, one relating to His Son, the other to His being dependent on no preconceivable cause. As, then, in the case of ‘Emperor’ we cannot say that because the two things are signified by that term, viz., the ruling over subjects and the not having any to take precedence of him, there is any justification for speaking of the ‘Unruled of subjects,’ instead of the ‘Ruler of the nation,’ or allowing so much, that we may use such a juxtaposition of words, in imitation of king of a nation, as kingless of a nation, in the same way when ‘Father’ indicates a Son, and also represents the idea of the Ungenerate, we may not unduly transfer this latter meaning, so as to attach this idea of the Ungenerate fast to a paternal relationship, and absurdly say ‘the Ungenerate is Ungenerate of the Son.’

He treads on the ground of truth, he thinks, after such utterances; he has exposed the absurdity of his adversaries’ position; how boastfully he cries, “And what sane thinker, pray, ever yet wanted the natural thought to be suppressed, and welcomed the paradoxical?” No sane thinker, most accomplished sir; and therefore our argument neither, which teaches that while the term Ungenerate does suit our thoughts, and we ought to guard it in our hearts intact, yet the term Father is an adequate substitute for the one which you have perverted, and leads the mind in that direction. Remember the words which you yourself quoted; Basil did not ‘want the natural thought to be suppressed, and welcome the paradoxical,’ as you phrase it; but he advised us to avoid all danger by suppressing the mere word Ungenerate, that is, the expression in so many syllables, as one which had been evilly interpreted, and besides was not to be found in Scripture; as for its meaning he declares that it does most completely suit our thoughts.

Thus far for our statement. But this reviler of all quibblers, who completely arms his own argument with the truth, and arraigns our sins in logic, does not blush in any of his arguing on doctrines to indulge in very pretty quibbles; on a par with those exquisite jokes which are cracked to make people laugh at dessert. Reflect on the weight of reasoning displayed in that complicated syllogism; which I will now again repeat. “If ‘Father’ is the same as Ungenerate, it is allowable for us to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the Ungenerate is Ungenerate of the Son; for as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so, reversely, the Father is Ungenerate of the Son.” Well, this is very like another case such as the following. Suppose some one were to state the right and sound view about Adam; namely, that it mattered not whether we called him “father of mankind” or “the first man formed by God” (for both mean the same thing), and then some one else, belonging to Eunomius’ school of reasoners, were to pounce upon this statement, and make the same complication out of it, viz.: If “first man formed by God” and “father of mankind” are the same things, it is allowable for us to drop the word “father” and use “first formed” instead; and say that Adam was the “first formed,” instead of the “father,” of Abel; for as the first formed was the father of a son, so, reversely, that father is the first formed of that son. If this had been said in a tavern, what laughter and applause would have broken from the tippling circle over so fine and exquisite a joke! These are the arguments on which our learned theologian leans; when he assails our doctrine, he really needs himself a tutor and a stick to teach him that all the things which are predicated of some one do not necessarily, in their meaning, have respect to one single object; as is plain from the aforesaid instance of Abel and Adam. That one and the same Adam is Abel’s father and also God’s handiwork is a truth; nevertheless it does not follow that, because he is both, he is both with respect to Abel. So the designation of the Almighty as Father has both the special meaning of that word, i.e., the having begotten a son, and also that of there being no preconceivable cause of the Very Father; nevertheless it does not follow that when we mention the Son we must speak of the Ungenerate, instead of the Father, of that Son; nor, on the other hand, if the absence of beginning remains unexpressed in reference to the Son, that we must banish from our thoughts about God that attribute of Ungeneracy. But he discards the usual acceptations, and like an actor in comedy, makes a joke of the whole subject, and by dint of the oddity of his quibbles makes the questions of our faith ridiculous. Again I must repeat his words: “If Father is the same as Ungenerate, it is allowable for us to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the Ungenerate is Ungenerate of the Son; for as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so, reversely, the Father is Ungenerate of the Son.” But let us turn the laugh against him, by reversing his quibble; thus: If Father is not the same as Ungenerate, the Son of the Father will not be Son of the Ungenerate; for having relation to the Father only, he will be altogether alien in nature to that which is other than Father, and does not suit that idea; so that, if the Father is something other than the Ungenerate, and the title Father does not comprehend that meaning, the Son, being One, cannot be distributed between these two relationships, and be at the same time Son both of the Father and of the Ungenerate; and, as before it was an acknowledged absurdity to speak of the Deity as Ungenerate of the Son, so in this converse proposition it will be found an absurdity just as great to call the Only-begotten Son of the Ungenerate. So that he must choose one of two things; either the Father is the same as the Ungenerate (which is necessary in order that the Son of the Father may be Son of the Ungenerate as well); and then our doctrine has been ridiculed by him without reason; or, the Father is something different to the Ungenerate, and the Son of the Father is alienated from all relationship to the Ungenerate. But then, if it is thus to hold that the Only-begotten is not the Son of the Ungenerate, logic inevitably points to a “generated Father;” for that which exists, but does not exist without generation, must have a generated substance. If, then, the Father, being according to these men other than Ungenerate, is therefore generated, where is their much talked of Ungeneracy? Where is that basis and foundation of their heretical castle-building? The Ungenerate, which they thought just now that they grasped, has eluded them, and vanished quite beneath the action of a few barren syllogisms; their would-be demonstration of the Unlikeness, like a mere dream about something, slips away at the touch of criticism, and takes its flight along with this Ungenerate.

Thus it is that whenever a falsehood is welcomed in preference to the truth, it may indeed flourish for a little through the illusion which it creates, but it will soon collapse; its own methods of proof will dissolve it. But we bring this forward only to raise a smile at the very pretty revenge we might take on their Unlikeness. We must now resume the main thread of our discourse.

ἢ βούλει καὶ τοὺς ἀφύκτους συλλογισμοὺς καὶ τὰς ποικίλας τῶν σοφισμάτων ἀναστροφάς, δι' ὧν ἐλέγχειν οἴεται τὸν λόγον, ἐπισκεψώμεθα; ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ τὸ μικροπρεπές τε καὶ γλίσχρον τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπον τινὰ συνδιαβάλῃ καὶ τὸν εὐθύνοντα λόγον. τὸ γὰρ μειρακίοις εἰς ἅμιλλαν προκαλουμένοις συμπλέκεσθαι πλέονα ψόγον ἐκ τοῦ προσφιλονικεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἤπερ ἐκ τοῦ νενικηκέναι δοκεῖν φέρει τοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν ἔπαινον. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστί. τὰ γὰρ ἐφ' ὕβρει ῥηθέντα μετὰ τῆς συνήθους καλλιφωνίας ἐκείνης ὡς αὐτῷ τε λέγειν προσήκοντα καὶ ἡμῖν εἰς γυμνάσιον μακροθυμίας προκείμενα σιωπῆς ἄξια καὶ λήθης ποιούμεθα: οὐ γὰρ εὐπρεπὲς οἶμαι τὰ καταγέλαστα τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτῷ τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν σπουδαζομένοις ἐνσπείροντας εἰς ἀκόσμους τε καὶ δημώδεις γέλωτας τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας διαλύειν σπουδήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἀκροάσει τούτων διαμεῖναι ἀγέλαστον, ἐὰν ἀκούσωμεν λέγοντος ἐκ τῆς ὑψηλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ μεγαλοφυοῦς εὐγλωττίας: « ᾧ γὰρ ἡ προσθήκη τῶν λόγων εἰς προσθήκην τελεῖ βλασφημίας, τούτῳ τὸ σιγᾶν ἡμίσει μέρει τοῦ λαλεῖν ἐστι κουφότερον. ἀλλὰ » ταῦτα μὲν γελάσθω παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὅ τι μὲν ἀποδοχῆς ἐστιν ἄξιον, ὅ τι δὲ γέλωτος: ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ δριμὺ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, οἷς τὸν ἡμέτερον περισύρει λόγον, σκοπήσωμεν.
« Εἰ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ », φησί, « τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ταὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, τὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα δύναμιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ταὐτὸν πάντως καὶ σημαίνειν πέφυκε, σημαίνει δὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι τὸν θεόν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ πατὴρ σημαίνει τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι τὸν θεόν, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱόν ». ἐκ ποίας ἀνάγκης, εἰπέ, τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς οὐκέτι σημαίνεται, ἐὰν ἡ αὐτὴ προσηγορία καὶ τὸ ἄναρχον ἡμῖν τοῦ πατρὸς δι' ἑαυτῆς παραστήσῃ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναιρετικὸν ἦν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων φύσιν, ἀναγκαίως ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς θέσις τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ λοιποῦ κατεσκεύαζεν. εἰ δὲ τὸ κωλύον ἐστὶν οὐδὲν τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα εἶναι καὶ ἀγέννητον, ἐὰν διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς κλήσεως κατά τινα διάνοιαν καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἐννοήσωμεν, τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσιν διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς μηκέτι γνωρίζεσθαι; οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσα τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίαν ἔχει καὶ διὰ πάντων ταῖς ἐννοίαις συμφέρεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοκράτορα καὶ ἀδέσποτον τὸν βασιλέα καλοῦμεν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τῶν ὑποχειρίων ἡγούμενον, καὶ οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως φωνὴ σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον, οὔτε ἐπάναγκες εἶναί φαμεν, εἰ τὸ αὐτοκρατές τε καὶ ἄναρχον διὰ ταύτης τῆς φωνῆς σημανθείη, μηκέτι τὸ κατὰ τῶν ὑπηκόων κράτος διὰ τῆς βασιλείας σημαίνεσθαι: μέσον γὰρ ἑκατέρων τῶν ὑπολήψεων ὂν τῆς βασιλείας τὸ ὄνομα πῆ μὲν τὸ ἀδέσποτον, πῆ δὲ τὸ ἀρχικὸν τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐνδείκνυται. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν, εἰ μὲν ἔστι τις τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ κυρίου πατὴρ προεπινοούμενος ἕτερος, δειξάτωσαν οἱ τὴν ἀπόρρητον αὐχοῦντες σοφίαν, καὶ τότε συνθησόμεθα μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας παρίστασθαι. εἰ δὲ ὁ πρῶτος πατὴρ αἰτίαν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συστάσεως ὑπερκειμένην οὐκ ἔχει, τῷ δὲ πατρὶ συνυπακούεται πάντως καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἡ ὑπόστασις, τί μορμολύττονται ἡμᾶς ταῖς τεχνικαῖς ταύταις τῶν σοφισμάτων διαπλοκαῖς πείθειν, μᾶλλον δὲ φενακίζειν βουλόμενοι, εἰ τὸ ἀγέννητον τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας ὁμολογηθείη τῆς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσεως τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποσχίζειν τὴν ἔννοιαν;
Ἀλλὰ διαπτύσαντες τὴν παιδιώδη ταύτην καὶ ἐπιπόλαιον αὐτῶν ἐπιχείρησιν τὸ ὡς ἄτοπον παρ' ἐκείνων προφερόμενον ἀνδρικῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὅτι καὶ ταὐτὸν σημαίνει τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα, καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι τὸν πατέρα παρίστησι, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὴν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἔννοιαν συνημμένως διὰ τῆς σχέσεως μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ συνεισάγει. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτην προσκειμένην τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὴν ῥῆσιν ὁ δεινός τε καὶ ἄμαχος οὗτος ἀγωνιστὴς τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐξέκλεψε, τῇ ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἀσφαλῶς εἰρημένων ἐξευμαρίζων ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ῥηθεὶς λόγος οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔχει: ”Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου προσηγορίαν, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα δοκῇ ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἡμῶν συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς οὐδαμοῦ τῆς γραφῆς κειμένην καὶ πρῶτον στοιχεῖον οὖσαν τῆς βλασφημίας αὐτῶν, σιωπᾶσθαι ἂν δικαίως ἀξίαν εἶναι φήσαιμι, τῆς πατρὸς φωνῆς ἴσον δυναμένης τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔννοιαν συνημμένως ἑαυτῇ διὰ τῆς σχέσεως συνεισάγειν.„ ὁ δὲ γενναῖος οὗτος τῆς ἀληθείας πρωταγωνιστὴς τὸ μὲν ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκεν τῷ λόγῳ προσκείμενον, λέγω δὲ τὸ „καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔννοιαν συνημμένως ἑαυτῇ διὰ τῆς σχέσεως συνεισάγειν”, τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς συγγενοῦς ἐλευθερίας ὑφείλετο, καὶ διακλέψας τῶν γεγραμμένων τὸν λόγον τοῖς ὑπολοίποις συμπλέκεται καὶ ἀκρωτηριάσας τὸν εἱρμὸν τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὡς ᾤετο σαθρότερον ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀντίρρησιν εὐεπίβατον καταστήσας, ψυχρῷ καὶ ἀδρανεῖ τῷ σοφίσματι τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτὸν παρακρούεται, τὸ κατά τι κοινωνοῦν καὶ διὰ πάντων τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον κοινωνίαν ἔχειν κατασκευάζων καὶ τούτῳ τὴν ἐπιπόλαιον ἀκοὴν συναρπάζων. ἡμῶν γὰρ κατά τι σημαινόμενον τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εἰρηκότων φωνὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου σημασίαν παρέχεσθαι, οὗτος τὴν παντελῆ τοῦ σημαινομένου μετάληψιν ἀπὸ τῆς συνήθους τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεως ποιησάμενος εἰς ἄτοπον δῆθεν ἐκβάλλει τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκέτι τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσιν τῆς προσηγορίας ταύτης ἐνδεικνυμένης, εἰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου νόημα διὰ τούτου σημαίνοιτο. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις δύο ἐννοίας περὶ τοῦ ἄρτου μαθών, ὅτι τε ἀπὸ σίτου συνέστηκε καὶ ὅτι τροφὴ τῷ χρωμένῳ γίνεται, μάχοιτο πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα τῷ ὁμοίῳ τρόπῳ τῶν σοφισμάτων κατ' αὐτοῦ χρώμενος, ὅτι ἄλλος λόγος ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ σίτου συστάσεως καὶ ὁ τῆς τροφῆς πάλιν ἕτερος. εἰ οὖν δοθείη τὸ ἐκ τοῦ σίτου εἶναι τὸν ἄρτον, οὐκέτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ τροφὴ κυρίως ὀνομασθήσεται. τοιαύτη τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἡ διάνοια. « εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγέννητον », φησίν, « ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας σημαίνεται, οὐκέτι τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη παρίστησιν ». ἀλλ' εὔκαιρον ἴσως τὴν σεμνὴν ἐκείνην τοῦ κώλου περίοδον καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπαχθῆναι τῷ λεγομένῳ: « πρέπει γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις πάντως τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πλέον ἂν ἔσχε πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν σωφρονεῖν, εἰ παντελεῖ σιωπῇ ταύτην ὥριζε τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. ᾧ γὰρ ἡ προσθήκη τῶν λόγων εἰς προσθήκην τελεῖ βλασφημίας, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας, τούτῳ τὸ σιγᾶν οὐχ ἡμίσει μέρει, ἀλλὰ τῷ παντὶ τοῦ λαλεῖν ἐστι κουφότερον ».
Τάχα ἄν τις αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν προσαγάγοιτο πρὸς τὴν τῶν λεγομένων ἀλήθειαν. καὶ δὴ καταλιπόντες τὸ κατηγκυλωμένον τῆς τῶν σοφισμάτων πλοκῆς ἰδιωτικώτερόν τε καὶ κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου διαλεξώμεθα. ὁ σὸς πατήρ, ὦ Εὐνόμιε, πάντως ἄνθρωπος ἦν, ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ σοὶ τοῦ εἶναι γέγονεν αἴτιος. ἆρ' οὖν ἐχρήσω ποτὲ τῷ σοφῷ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε τὸν πατέρα τὸν σόν, εἰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως ὁρισμὸν δέχοιτο, διὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι μηκέτι δύνασθαι τὴν πρὸς σὲ σχέσιν ἀποσημαίνειν; χρῆναι γὰρ πάντως τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ Εὐνομίου πατέρα. εἶτα σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἔξεστι μὴ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῆς σημασίας προφέρεσθαι τὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ κἂν ὕβρεως γράψαιό τινα τὸν χλευαστικῶς εἰς σὲ διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλαγῆς διαπαίζοντα, θεοῦ δὲ καταπαίζων οὐ φρίττεις καὶ διαγελῶν τὰ δόγματα τῶν μυστηρίων ἀκινδύνως γελᾷς; ὡς γὰρ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ καὶ τὴν πρὸς σὲ δείκνυσιν οἰκειότητα καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι οὐδὲν διὰ τούτου κωλύεται, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις τῶν σωφρονούντων ἀντὶ τοῦ πατέρα σου προσειπεῖν τὸν γεννήσαντα, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοίη, ἢ πάλιν περὶ τοῦ γένους ἐρωτηθεὶς καὶ ὁμολογήσας τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, κωλύεσθαι λέγοι διὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ταύτης τὸ καὶ σὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι πατέρα, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ὁ μὲν εὐσεβὴς καὶ τὸ ἀγεννήτως αὐτὸν εἶναι σημαίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἀρνήσεται, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν οἰκειότητα καθ' ἕτερον ἐνδείκνυσθαι σημαινόμενον: ὁ δὲ καταγελῶν τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκέτι τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίαν λέγει σημαίνειν, ἐὰν καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν εἶναι διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς φωνῆς διδασκώμεθα.
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἔλεγχον τῆς τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀτοπίας συμπαραλάβωμεν, ὅπερ οὐδένα φημὶ οὐδὲ τῶν κομιδῇ νηπίων ὑπὸ γραμματιστῇ καὶ παιδαγωγῷ πρὸς τὴν ὀνοματικὴν τεχνολογίαν ἐναγόμενον ἀγνοεῖν. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἀπόλυτά τε καὶ ἄσχετα, τὰ δὲ πρός τινα σχέσιν ὠνομασμένα ἐστίν; αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πάλιν ἔστιν ἃ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χρωμένων βούλησιν ἐπιρρεπῶς πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἔχει, ἃ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν μὲν λεγόμενα τὴν ἁπλῆν ἐνδείκνυται δύναμιν, μετατιθέμενα δὲ πολλάκις τῶν πρός τι γίνεται. καὶ ἵνα μὴ τοῖς πόρρω τῶν προκειμένων ὑποδείγμασι χρώμενος ἐπιμηκύνω τὸν λόγον, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν δογμάτων ὃ λέγω σαφηνισθήσεται. ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ καὶ βασιλεὺς λέγεται καὶ μυρίοις ὀνόμασιν ἄλλοις παρὰ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς ὀνομάζεται. ἔστι τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς οὕτως ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεμνημένον ἀπολύτως εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄφθαρτος αἰώνιος ἀθάνατος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον: ταῦτα γάρ, κἂν μηδὲν ἕτερον συνυπακούηται νόημα, ἀπηρτισμένην τινὰ περὶ θεοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς περιγράφει. ἕτερα δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ πρός τι χρήσιμον ἀποσημαίνει μόνον ὡς βοηθὸς καὶ ὑπερασπιστὴς καὶ ἀντιλήπτωρ καὶ ὅσα τῆς τοιαύτης σημασίας εὑρίσκεται, ὧν ἐὰν ὑφέλῃς τὸ τῆς βοηθείας δεόμενον, ἤργησεν ἡ ἐμφαινομένη τῷ ὀνόματι δύναμις. ἔστι δέ τινα, καθὼς προείρηται, καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρός τι λεγόμενα οἷον τὸ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. οὐ γὰρ μέχρι παντὸς ἐν τῷ ἀπολύτῳ τούτων διαμένει ἡ ἔννοια. ὁ γὰρ καθόλου θεὸς ἴδιος τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου πολλάκις γίνεται, καθὼς ἔστι τῶν ἁγίων ἀκούειν ἰδιοποιουμένων τὴν ἀδέσποτον φύσιν. Ἅγιος κύριος ὁ θεός, ἕως τούτου τὸ ἄσχετον. ἀλλ' ὁ προσθεὶς τὸ ἡμῶν, οὐκέτι ἔδωκεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν σχέσει τὸ σημαινόμενον οἰκειώσας. πάλιν Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ, τὸ πνεῦμα βοᾷ: αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς μερικῆς σχέσεως ἀπολελυμένη φωνή. ἀλλὰ καὶ πατέρα ἡμῶν τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καλεῖν προσετάχθημεν: αὕτη πάλιν ἡ σχετικὴ σημασία. ὥσπερ τοίνυν τὸν καθόλου θεὸν ἑαυτοῦ τις ποιησάμενος οὐδὲν τὴν ἐπὶ πάντων ἀξίαν ἠμαύρωσεν, οὕτως οὐδέν ἐστι κώλυμα τὸν πατέρα [καὶ] τὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸν πάσης κτίσεως πρωτότοκον ἀναδείξαντα ὁμοῦ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας ὑπερκειμένης εἶναι διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἑρμηνεύειν φωνῆς. ὁ γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον πατέρα εἰπὼν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς προεπινοούμενον ἐνεδείξατο, οὗ τὸ ἐπέκεινα [οὗτος ἐκεῖνός] « οὐκ » ἔστιν ... οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἴδῃ οὐδὲ εἰς ὅ τι πέρας μεθ' ἑαυτὸν καταλήξῃ, ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν ἐπίσης ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ τέλους ὅρον καὶ ἀρχῆς ἔννοιαν τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ τῆς ζωῆς διαβαίνων πάσῃ προσηγορίᾳ συνυπακουόμενον ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀΐδιον.
Ἀλλ' οὐ δέχεται τὸν ἰδιωτισμὸν τοῦτον ὁ πολὺς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀλήπτων θεωρίαις Εὐνόμιος οὐδὲ διπλοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον τίθεται, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὸ πάντων τὸν υἱὸν « τὸν » μονογενῆ, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα, σημαίνεσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μηδεμίαν αὐτὸν ὑπερκειμένην αἰτίαν ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐκεῖνος διαπτύῃ τὸν λόγον, ἡμεῖς παρ' οὐδὲν τὸν γέλωτα τὸν χλευαστικὸν ποιησάμενοι θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινούμεθα ὅπερ εἰρήκαμεν ἤδη, ὅτι καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ καὶ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι παρίστησιν.
Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐπαγωνίζεται τοῖς εἰρημένοις καί φησι (καὶ μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀναστρέφει πάλιν ὁ λόγος): « εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός ἐστι πατήρ, κατὰ ταὐτὸν δὲ σημαινόμενον πατήρ ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, διὰ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, πρὶν δὲ γεννῆσαι τοῦτον οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος ». ἴδωμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς αὐτοῦ λόγον, πῶς πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀναλύων τὴν τοῦ προτέρου σοφίσματος σύνθεσιν πάλιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τούτου ταῖς ἀφύκτοις ἀνάγκαις περιστοιχίζεται. ὁ πρότερος εἶχε συλλογισμὸς τοῦτο τὸ ἄτοπον: εἰ ὁ πατὴρ σημαίνει τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι τὸν θεόν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν οὐκέτι ἐνδείξεται. οὗτος διὰ τῆς πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀναστροφῆς ἑτέραν ἡμῖν ἀτοπίαν κατὰ τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος ἐπαγγέλλεται. τίς οὖν ἡ τοῦ ἐκεῖ δειχθέντος ἀνάλυσις; « εἰ διὰ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι », φησί, « τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός ἐστι πατήρ ». τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὁ πρότερος συλλογισμὸς οὐ παρέστησεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι, εἰ τὸ ἀγέννητον διὰ τοῦ πατρὸς σημανθείη, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσιν σημαίνειν ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ δῆθεν ἐδείκνυεν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν εἶναι πατέρα, διότι γεγέννηκε τὸν υἱόν, οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ προτέρου σοφίσματος κατασκευὴ διωρίσατο. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἀναστρεφόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τε καὶ τεχνικῆς ἀγχινοίας, οὔπω συνίημι.
Πλὴν ἀλλὰ σκοπήσωμεν τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων διάνοιαν. « εἰ διὰ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, πρὶν δὲ γεννῆσαι, τοῦτον οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος ». πάλιν ἕτοιμος πρὸς τὸ εἰρημένον καὶ ἁπλοῦς τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ λόγος, ὅτι καὶ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνδείκνυται κλῆσις, καθὼς ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις προαποδέδεικται, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας νοεῖσθαί τινος τὸν γεννήσαντα. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ βλέπῃς, ἡ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑπόστασις διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας γνωρίζεται: ἐὰν δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξετάζῃς, ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς κλῆσις τὸ ἄναρχον τοῦ τὸν υἱὸν γεγεννηκότος ἐνδείκνυται. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅτι « πρὶν γεννῆσαι τὸν υἱὸν οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος » ὁ θεὸς διπλῆν φέρει τὴν κατηγορίαν τῷ λογογράφῳ, τῆς τε καθ' ἡμῶν συκοφαντίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ τοῦ δόγματος ὕβρεως: τό τε γὰρ μήτε παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ῥηθὲν μήτε μὴν παρ' ἡμῶν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον διασύρει καὶ τὸν θεόν φησιν ὕστερόν ποτε γεγενῆσθαι πατέρα, ἄλλο τι ὄντα πρότερον δηλαδὴ καὶ οὐ πατέρα. δι' ὧν γὰρ τὸ ἄτοπον δῆθεν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου καταχλευάζει, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ δόγμα παρανομίαν βοᾷ. ὡς γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον ἔχων ὅτι πρότερον ἄλλο τι ὢν μετὰ ταῦτα κατὰ προκοπὴν ἐγένετό τε καὶ ὠνομάσθη πατήρ, τοῦτό φησιν ὅτι πρὶν γεννῆσαι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κληθῆναι πατήρ, οὐδὲ ἀγέννητος ἦν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀγεννησία τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐννοίᾳ γνωρίζεται. τοῦτο ὅσην ἔχει τὴν ἄνοιαν, οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν τοῦ ἐλέγχοντος: ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ παρίστησι τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι πατήρ, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ προστάται τοῦ δόγματος; ἐν ποίᾳ καταστάσει θεωρεῖσθαι φήσουσι; τί ὄνομα τῇ τότε διαγωγῇ, παῖς νήπιον βρέφος μειράκιον; ἢ τούτων μὲν ἐροῦσιν οὐδὲν τὸ περιφανὲς ἴσως τῆς ἀτοπίας ἐρυθριῶντες, τέλειον δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι οὐκ ἀπαρνήσονται; εἶτα πῶς τέλειος ὁ μήπω πατὴρ εἶναι δυνάμενος; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἰσχύειν οὐκ ἀφαιρήσονται, φήσουσι δὲ μὴ πρέπειν ὁμοῦ τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα εἶναι; καὶ εἰ μὴ καλὸν μηδὲ πρέπον αὐτῷ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι πατέρα τοιούτου παιδός, πῶς προϊὼν τὸ μὴ καλὸν ἐπεκτήσατο; ἀλλὰ καλόν ἐστι νῦν καὶ τῇ μεγαλειότητι τοῦ θεοῦ πρέπον τὸ τοιούτου γενέσθαι πατέρα. οὐκοῦν ἀμέτοχον αὐτὸν τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶναι κατασκευάσουσι, καὶ ἕως οὐκ εἶχε τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός (ἵλεως δὲ εἴη τῷ λόγῳ ὁ θεός) μήτε σοφίαν ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐροῦσι μήτε δύναμιν μήτε ἀλήθειαν μήτε ζωὴν μήτε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπινοίας ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός ἐστί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεται.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς κεφαλὴν τῶν αἰτίων τραπείη, ἡμῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν. « εἰ διὰ τὸ γεγεννηκέναι », φησίν, « πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ τὸ ἀγέννητον σημαίνει, πρὶν γεννῆσαι οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος ». ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων λέγοι συνήθειαν, ἐφ' ὧν ἀμήχανόν ἐστι πλειόνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἕξιν κατὰ ταὐτόν τινα κτήσασθαι, μὴ κατά τινα χρόνου τάξιν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν ἕκαστον τῶν σπουδαζομένων ἀναλαμβάνοντα_εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἔδει λογίζεσθαι, ὡς νῦν μὲν τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἔχειν, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ προσλαμβάνειν τὴν δύναμιν, εἶτα τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν, εἶτα τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ προϊόντα πατέρα γίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν δίκαιον καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀΐδιον καὶ πάντα, ὅσα περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται, διά τινος ἀκολουθίας προσκτᾶσθαι, οὐ σφόδρα ἦν ἄτοπον ἴσως ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου προτερεύειν τῶν περὶ τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάτων οἴεσθαι καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἀγέννητον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πατέρα γεγενῆσθαι λέγειν. νυνὶ δὲ τίς οὕτω ταπεινὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τῆς τῶν θείων δογμάτων μεγαλοφυΐας ἀμύητος, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν ὄντων εἰς νοῦν λαβὼν μὴ πάντων κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀθρόαν καὶ συγκεκροτημένην τῶν περὶ τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβῶς νοουμένων ἀναλαβεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕστερον, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρχάς, ἕτερον δέ τι διὰ μέσου κατά τινα τάξεως ἀκολουθίαν προσγεγενῆσθαι νομίζειν; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἕν τι τῷ λογισμῷ διαβάντα τῶν περὶ τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβῶς λεγομένων ἐντυχεῖν ἑτέρῳ πράγματι ἢ νοήματι, ὃ τῆς τοῦ ῥηθέντος ἀρχαιότητος ὑπεραρθῆναι δυνήσεται, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὄνομα θεῖον καὶ πᾶν μεγαλοπρεπὲς νόημα καὶ πᾶσα γλῶσσα καὶ ὑπόληψις ταῖς περὶ θεοῦ ἐννοίαις ἁρμόζουσα συνήρτηται πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν καὶ ἥνωται, καὶ πᾶσαι κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀθρόαι καὶ συγκεκροτημέναι μετ' ἀλλήλων αἱ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις καταλαμβάνονται, ἡ πατρότης ἡ ἀγεννησία ἡ δύναμις ἡ ἀφθαρσία ἡ ἀγαθότης ἡ ἐξουσία τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. οὐ γὰρ διῃρημένως τούτων ἕκαστον τῶν λοιπῶν ἀποτετμημένον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατά τι χρονικὸν διάστημα νοεῖται, ὡς προτερεῦον ἑτέρου ἢ ἐφεπόμενον, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἂν εὑρεθῇ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ εὐσεβὲς ὄνομα, τῇ ἀϊδιότητι τοῦ θεοῦ συνεμφαίνεται. ὡς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δυνατὸν ἢ ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἀθάνατον, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀσεβές ἐστι μὴ ἀεὶ αὐτῷ προσμαρτυρεῖν τὴν πατρότητα, ἀλλ' ὕστερον προσγεγενῆσθαι λέγειν. ὁ γὰρ ἀληθῶς πατὴρ ἀεὶ πατήρ: εἰ δὲ μὴ προσείη τὸ ἀεὶ τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ, ἀλλά τις ἔννοια κατὰ τὸ μάταιον προεπινοουμένη ἀποτέμοι καὶ κολοβώσειεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἔννοιαν, οὐκέτι τὸ ἀληθῶς πατὴρ εἶναι κυρίως ὁμολογηθήσεται, τῆς ἐννοίας ἐκείνης τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προεπινοουμένης παραγραφομένης τὸ ἀΐδιον καὶ διηνεκὲς τῆς πατρότητος. πῶς γὰρ δυνατὸν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτά ποτε γενόμενον νοεῖσθαι ὃ νῦν λέγεται; εἰ οὖν πρῶτον ἀγέννητος ὢν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγένετο καὶ ὠνομάσθη πατήρ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν πάντως ὃ νῦν ὀνομάζεται: ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὃ νῦν ἐστι, καὶ ἀεί ἐστιν, οὔτε χείρων οὔτε βελτίων ἐκ προσθήκης γινόμενος οὔτε τι ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀλλοιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ἀεί. εἰ μὲν « οὖν » οὐκ ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πατήρ, οὐδὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγένετο. εἰ δὲ ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι πατήρ, πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐπαναλήψομαι, ὅτι ὃ νῦν ἐστι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν, καὶ εἰ ἀεὶ ἦν, καὶ εἰς ἀεὶ ἔσται. οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ πατὴρ ὁ πατήρ: τῷ δὲ πατρὶ συνεπινοουμένου πάντως καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ (οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι δυνατὸν βεβαιωθῆναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν κλῆσιν, μὴ υἱοῦ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐπαληθεύοντος), καὶ τὰ « ἐν » τῷ πατρὶ θεωρούμενα πάντα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καθορᾶται. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πάντα ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει. ὁ πατήρ, εἶπον, τὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἐξείη τῷ συκοφάντῃ συμπεριλαμβάνειν ἐπηρεαστικῶς πως πᾶσι καὶ τὸ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ λέγειν πάντα τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἔχειν, ἢ πάλιν τὸ γεννητὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐν τῷ τὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πάντα ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καθορᾶσθαι. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει ὁ υἱός, οὐχὶ πατήρ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν τὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πάντα ἐν τῷ πατρὶ θεωρεῖται, οὐχὶ υἱός ἐστιν.
Εἰ οὖν ἐν τῷ μονογενεῖ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς πάντα, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῷ πατρί, ἡ δὲ πατρότης τῆς ἀγεννησίας οὐ διατέτμηται, τί πρὸ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐννοίας κεχωρισμένως ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατά τι διάστημα περὶ τὸν πατέρα νοεῖσθαι δύναται; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐ συνορῶ. οὐκοῦν ἀφόβως ἔστιν ἐπιθαρσήσαντας τοῖς προφερομένοις διὰ τοῦ σοφίσματος ἡμῖν ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι, καὶ μηδὲν πτοηθέντας τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τὴν μορμόνα τὴν ἐπὶ καταπλήξει τῶν παίδων σεσοφισμένην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἅγιος καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ πατὴρ καὶ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐστί: κἂν ἕν τι τῶν εὐσεβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων καθ' ὑπόθεσιν μὴ εἶναι δῷς, τὰ πάντα τῷ ἑνὶ συνανῄρηται: οὐ γὰρ ἔστι δυνατόν, ἐὰν μὴ ἀθάνατος ᾖ, τὰ λοιπὰ εἶναι, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους εἴρηται, καθόλου νοεῖσθαι. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸν οὔτε προγενέστερον οὔτε νεώτερον, ἢ οὕτως ἀνευρεθήσεται πρεσβύτερος αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερος. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντοτε πάντα ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ κατά τινα τάξιν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν τὸ μέν τί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ γίνεται (σύνθεσις δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ, ὅλος ἐστί), κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγον πρότερον ἀγέννητος ὢν μετὰ ταῦτα γίνεται πατήρ, οὐδεμιᾶς σωρείας ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ αὐτὸν νοουμένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὅλος αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ὅλου πρεσβύτερός τε καὶ μεταγενέστερος γίνεται, κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀγέννητον ἑαυτοῦ προτερεύων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἔννοιαν ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος δεύτερος. εἰ δὲ καθώς φησι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ προφήτης ὅτι ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, μάταιος ὁ λέγων ὅτι πρὶν γεννῆσαι οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος, ὅτι οὐδέτερον τούτων χωρὶς τοῦ ἑτέρου εὑρίσκεται, οὔτε τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ ὄνομα οὔτε τοῦ ἀγεννήτου, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ τὰ δύο καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων ταῖς διανοίαις τῶν εὐσεβῶς λογιζομένων ἐγγίνεται τὰ νοήματα. καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀϊδίου πατὴρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ ἀΐδιος, καὶ πάντα ὅσα εὐσεβῶς λέγεται κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὀνομάζεται, τῆς χρονικῆς ταύτης καθὼς ἔφαμεν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τάξεως ἐπὶ τῆς προαιωνίου φύσεως ἀργούσης.
Ἴδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εὐστροφίας, ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς « γελοῖά τε ἅμα καὶ ἐλεεινά » φησιν εἶναι, καλῶς τοῦτο λέγων. πλατὺς γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ γέλως, μᾶλλον δὲ πολὺς ὁ θρῆνος ἐπὶ τῇ κατεχούσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπάτῃ. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κατά τι σημαινόμενον ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου περιείληφεν ἔννοιαν, ὡς ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος, μεταλαβὼν τὴν κυρίαν τοῦ πατρὸς σημασίαν εἰς τὸ ἀγέννητον μόνον τάδε φησίν: « εἰ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἀγέννητος ἢ πατήρ, ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καταλιποῦσι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φωνήν, μεταλαβοῦσι δὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰπεῖν: ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ πατήρ, οὕτως ἔμπαλιν υἱοῦ ἀγέννητος ὁ πατήρ ». ἔπεισί μοι λοιπὸν θαυμάζειν τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς εὐμηχανίας, καὶ τὸ πολύτροπον αὐτοῦ καὶ ποικίλον τῆς εἰς τὰ δόγματα παιδιᾶς ὑπὲρ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εἶναι δύναμιν οἴεσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰρημένον παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ἡμῶν εἷς λόγος ἐν βραχεῖ τὴν περιγραφὴν ἔχων, τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίας τὴν ἀγεννησίαν σημαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τούτου τοσαῦτα, ὧν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν νενοημένων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ περιόδῳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων. καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὴν μύλην κεκαλυμμένοις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς περιθέοντες ἐν πολλῇ τῇ ὁδοιπορίᾳ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν μένουσι τόπον, οὕτως ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρέφεται καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀφίσταται. εἶπεν ἅπαξ ἐπιχλευάζων, ὅτι οὐ τὸ γεννῆσαι σημαίνει ὁ πατήρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ οὐδενὸς εἶναι. πάλιν τὸ ὅμοιον ἔπλεξεν: « εἰ πατὴρ τὸ ἀγέννητον σημαίνει, πρὶν γεννῆσαι οὐκ ἦν ἀγέννητος ». εἶτα ἐκ τρίτου ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπανέρχεται: « ἔξεστι γάρ », φησί, « μεταλαβοῦσι τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰπεῖν: ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος ». καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπανέλαβεν ὃ πολλάκις ἐξήμεσε καί φησιν: « ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ πατήρ, οὕτως ἔμπαλιν υἱοῦ ἀγέννητος ὁ πατήρ ». ὢ ποσάκις ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον ἐπανέδραμε, ποσάκις ἐπανέλαβε, ποσάκις ἐξέβλυσεν. ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς γενησόμεθα τῇ ματαιότητι τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ προφερομένων καὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον συμπερισύροντες;
Καὶ ἴσως τὸ σιωπᾶν ἦν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁρμοδιώτερον: ἀλλ' ἵνα μή τις τῇ περὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον ἀσθενείᾳ καθυφιέναι νομίσῃ τὸν λόγον, ταῦτα τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀποκρινούμεθα. οὐκ ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν « υἱοῦ ἀγέννητον » τὸν πατέρα, κἂν ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς κλῆσις τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας εἶναι τὸν γεγεννηκότα σημαίνῃ. ὥσπερ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἡμῖν ὑπόδειγμα τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀξίαν ἀκούσαντες δύο ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐνοήσαμεν, τό τε ὑποτετάχθαι μηδενὶ τὸν κατ' ἐξουσίαν προέχοντα, καὶ τὸ τῶν ὑποχειρίων κρατεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορία διπλῆν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν σημασίαν παρέχεται, τήν τε πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν νοουμένην « σχέσιν » καὶ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς αὐτὸν ἐξῆφθαι προεπινοουμένης αἰτίας. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ βασιλέως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι εἰ τὰ δύο διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς προσηγορίας σημαίνεται, τό τε κρατεῖν τῶν ὑποχειρίων καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸν προηγούμενον, ἔξεστι μὴ ἄρχοντα τοῦ ἔθνους, ἀλλ' ἀβασίλευτον τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων προσαγορεύειν, οὐδὲ συντιθέντας τὸ τοιοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ὥσπερ βασιλεὺς ἔθνους λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ ἀβασίλευτος τοῦ ἔθνους ὀνομασθήσεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς τόν τε υἱὸν ἐνδεικνυμένης καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου ἔννοιαν παριστώσης οὐκ ἔξεστι μετατιθέντας παρὰ τὸ δέον τὴν σημασίαν τῇ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν οἰκειότητι γελοίως προσκολλᾶν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦ « υἱοῦ ἀγέννητος ὁ ἀγέννητος ».
Ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὡς ἐπιβὰς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διελέγξας τῶν ἀντιτεταγμένων τὸ ἄτοπον οἷα μεγαλαυχούμενος φθέγγεται. « καὶ τίς πώποτε », φησί, « σωφρονῶν σιωπᾶσθαι τὴν φυσικὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδικαίωσε, τὴν δὲ παράνοιαν ἐτίμησεν »; οὐδείς, ὦ σοφώτατε, οὔκουν οὐδὲ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ὁ εἰπὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου προσηγορίαν ταῖς ἐννοίαις συμβαίνειν καὶ δεῖν ταύτην ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἀκίνητον, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς διαστραφείσης παρ' ὑμῶν φωνῆς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορίαν ἱκανὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνην ἄγειν τὴν ἔννοιαν. μνήσθητι γὰρ ὧν αὐτὸς παρέθου ῥημάτων, ὅτι οὐχὶ « σιωπᾶσθαι τὴν φυσικὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδικαίωσε, τὴν δὲ παράνοιαν », ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζεις, « ἐτίμησεν »: ἀλλὰ τὴν προσηγορίαν μόνην τοῦ ἀγεννήτου, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὴν ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς προφοράν, ὡς κακῶς ἐξειλημμένην καὶ ἅμα μηδὲ παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς εἰρημένην ἀκινδύνως σιωπᾶν συμβουλεύει, τὸ δὲ σημαινόμενον καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἡμῶν συμβαίνειν φησίν.
Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα. ὁ δὲ τοὺς σοφιστὰς διαβάλλων καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καθοπλίζων τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πλημμελημάτων κατηγορῶν οὐκ ἐρυθριᾷ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν δογμάτων λόγοις διὰ σοφισμάτων ἀστεϊζόμενος καὶ μιμούμενος τοὺς ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις διὰ κομψευμάτων τινῶν ἐφελκομένους τὸν γέλωτα. θεᾶσθε γὰρ τὸ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ λελογισμένον τῆς τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ συμπλοκῆς: τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ πάλιν ἐπιμνησθήσομαι. « εἰ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἀγέννητος ἢ πατήρ, ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καταλιποῦσι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φωνήν, μεταλαβοῦσι δὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰπεῖν: ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ πατήρ, οὕτως ἔμπαλιν υἱοῦ ἀγέννητος ὁ πατήρ. παραπλήσιον γὰρ τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ». ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τὸν Ἀδὰμ ὀρθῷ καὶ ὑγιαίνοντι λόγῳ μηδὲν διαφέρειν λέγοι ἢ πατέρα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἢ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πεπλάσθαι λέγειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ δι' ἑκατέρων σημαίνεσθαι), εἶτά τις τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν διαλεκτικῶν ἐφαλλόμενος τοῖς εἰρημένοις μιμοῖτο τὴν τοιαύτην πλοκήν, ὅτι εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πεπλάσθαι λέγειν ἢ πατέρα τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐξέσται καταλιποῦσι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φωνήν, μεταλαβοῦσι δὲ τὸ πρωτόπλαστον εἰπεῖν: ὁ Ἀδὰμ τοῦ Ἄβελ οὐχὶ πατήρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρωτόπλαστος: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πρωτόπλαστος υἱοῦ πατήρ, οὕτω τὸ ἔμπαλιν υἱοῦ πρωτόπλαστος ὁ πατήρ_εἰ ταῦτα ἐν καπηλείῳ λέγοιτο, πόσον ἂν οἴει κρότον καὶ γέλωτα παρὰ τῶν διακωθωνιζομένων ῥαγῆναι, ἐπικαγχαζόντων τῇ κομψείᾳ τοῦ παρευρέματος; τοιούτοις ὁ σοφὸς θεολόγος ἰσχυρίζεται καθ' ἡμῶν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ κατατρέχει τοῦ δόγματος, παιδαγωγοῦ τινος ὄντως καὶ βακτηρίας δεόμενος, ὡς ἂν διδαχθείη ὅτι οὐ πάντα ὅσα κατά τινος κατηγορεῖται πρὸς ἓν πάντως τὸ σημαινόμενον βλέπει, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ῥηθέντος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸν Ἄβελ καὶ τὸν Ἀδὰμ ὑποδείγματος δείκνυται. τὸν γὰρ Ἀδὰμ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ Ἄβελ καὶ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ λέγειν ἀληθές ἐστιν: οὐ μὴν ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀμφότερα, ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ τὰ δύο. οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς προσηγορία δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ τὸ ἰδίως ὑπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φωνῆς σημαινόμενον, τὸ γεγεννηκέναι λέγω τὸν υἱόν, ἐνδείκνυται δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν αἰτίαν προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀληθῶς πατρός: οὐ μὴν ἐπάναγκες, ὅταν τοῦ υἱοῦ μνησθῶμεν, μὴ πατέρα υἱοῦ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀγέννητον υἱοῦ προσαγορεύειν: οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν εἰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ σχέσιν τὸ ἄναρχον σιωπηθείη, ἐκβάλλειν τῆς διανοίας ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον. ἀλλ' ἀπωθεῖται τὴν τοιαύτην χρῆσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ κατὰ τοὺς μίμους τῶν γελοίων διαχλευάζει τὸν λόγον τῷ ἀλλοκότῳ τῶν σοφισμάτων γελωτοποιῶν ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι.
Πάλιν γὰρ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθέντων ἐπιμνησθήσομαι. « εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἀγέννητος ἢ πατήρ, ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καταλιποῦσι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φωνήν, μεταλαβοῦσι δὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰπεῖν: ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγέννητος υἱοῦ πατήρ, οὕτως ἔμπαλιν υἱοῦ ἀγέννητος ὁ πατήρ ». ἀλλ' ἀντιγελάσωμεν εἰ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμεῖς, εἰς τοὐναντίον αὐτῷ περιαγαγόντες τὸ σόφισμα. εἰ οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ, ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς υἱὸς οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου υἱός. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πατέρα μόνον τὴν σχέσιν ἔχων ἀλλοτρίως πάντως ἕξει κατὰ τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ἄλλο τι ὄντα καὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς μὴ συμβαίνοντα: ὥστε εἰ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οὐ περιλαμβάνει τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ προσηγορία καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὸ σημαινόμενον, οὐ δύναται εἷς ὢν ὁ υἱὸς εἰς δύο πραγμάτων σχέσεις καταμερίζεσθαι, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶναι τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου υἱός: καὶ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐνομίσθη υἱοῦ ἀγέννητον τὸν θεὸν λέγειν, οὕτω πάντως καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι τὸ ἴσον ἄτοπον εὑρεθήσεται τοῦ ἀγεννήτου υἱὸν « τὸν » μονογενῆ λέγειν: ὥστε τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ὁ πατήρ, ἵνα ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς υἱὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου υἱὸς ᾖ, καὶ μάτην ἡμῶν διεχλευάσθη ὁ λόγος, ἢ εἰ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὸ ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ, ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς υἱὸς τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον σχέσεως ἠλλοτρίωται. καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο κρατήσῃ, μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ, γεννητὸν αὐτῷ πάντως ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῦ λόγου τὸν πατέρα ἐνδείξεται: τὸ γὰρ ὂν μὲν μὴ ἀγεννήτως δὲ ὂν γεννητὴν πάντως ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ οὖν γεννητὸς ὁ πατὴρ κατ' ἐκείνους ἄλλο τι ὢν παρὰ τὸν ἀγέννητον, ποῦ ἡ πολυθρύλητος ἀγεννησία ἐκείνη; ποῦ ἡ κρηπὶς καὶ ἡ ὑποβάθρα τῆς αἱρετικῆς πυργοποιΐας; οἴχεται καὶ ἠφάνισται διὰ τοῦ γλίσχρου τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐκ τῶν κατέχειν τέως δοκούντων διολισθῆσαν τῆς λαβῆς τὸ ἀγέννητον, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνομοίου κατασκευὴ καθάπερ τι ὄναρ διαρρυεῖσα τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἐπαφὴν διαπέφευγε τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ συναποπτᾶσα. οὕτως ὅταν τι ψεῦδος ᾖ πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμώμενον, κἂν πρὸς ὀλίγον διὰ τῆς ἀπάτης ἀνθήσῃ, ταχέως περὶ ἑαυτὸ καταρρεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις κατασκευαῖς διαλύεται.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὅσον ἐπιμειδιᾶσαι τῇ κομψείᾳ τῆς τοῦ ἀνομοίου ἀνταποδόσεως, καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν προενήνεκται. καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη πάλιν ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τὸν λόγον.