The Stromata, or Miscellanies

 Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.

 Chapter II.—Objection to the Number of Extracts from Philosophical Writings in These Books Anticipated and Answered.

 Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.

 Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.

 Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.

 Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.

 Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.

 Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.

 Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.

 Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.

 Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?

 Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.

 Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.

 Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.

 Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.

 Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.

 Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”

 Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”

 Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.

 Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.

 Chapter XXI.—The Jewish Institutions and Laws of Far Higher Antiquity Than the Philosophy of the Greeks.

 Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.

 Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.

 Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.

 Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.

 Chapter XXVI.—Moses Rightly Called a Divine Legislator, And, Though Inferior to Christ, Far Superior to the Great Legislators of the Greeks, Minos and

 Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.

 Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.

 Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.

 Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.

 Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.

 Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.

 Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.

 Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.

 Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.

 Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.

 Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.

 Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.

 Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.

 Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.

 Chapter XII.—Twofold Faith.

 Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.

 Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.

 Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.

 Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.

 Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.

 Chapter XVIII.—The Mosaic Law the Fountain of All Ethics, and the Source from Which the Greeks Drew Theirs.

 Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.

 Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.

 Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.

 Chapter XXII.—Plato’s Opinion, that the Chief Good Consists in Assimilation to God, and Its Agreement with Scripture.

 Chapter XXIII.—On Marriage.

 Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.

 Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.

 Caput III.—Quatenus Plato Aliique E Veteribus Præiverint Marcionitis Aliisque Hæreticis, Qui a Nuptiis Ideo Abstinent Quia Creaturam Malam Existimant

 Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.

 Caput V.—Duo Genera Hæreticorum Notat: Prius Illorum Qui Omnia Omnibus Licere Pronuntiant, Quos Refutat.

 Caput VI.—Secundum Genus Hæreticorum Aggreditur, Illorum Scilicet Qui Ex Impia de Deo Omnium Conditore Sententia, Continentiam Exercent.

 Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.

 Caput VIII.—Loca S. Scripturæ Ab Hæreticis in Vituperium Matrimonii Adducta Explicat Et Primo Verba Apostoli Romans 6:14, Ab Hæreticorum Perversa Int

 Caput IX.—Dictum Christi ad Salomen Exponit, Quod Tanquam in Vituperium Nuptiarum Prolatum Hæretici Allegabant.

 Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.

 Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.

 Caput XII.—Verba Apostoli 1 Cor. vii. 5, 39, 40, Aliaque S. Scripturæ Loca Eodem Spectantia Explicat.

 Caput XIII.—Julii Cassiani Hæretici Verbis Respondet Item Loco Quem Ex Evangelio Apocrypho Idem Adduxerat.

 Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.

 Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.

 Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.

 Caput XVII.—Qui Nuptias Et Generationem Malas Asserunt, II Et Dei Creationem Et Ipsam Evangelii Dispensationem Vituperant.

 Caput XVIII.—Duas Extremas Opiniones Esse Vitandas: Primam Illorum Qui Creatoris Odio a Nuptiis Abstinent Alteram Illorum Qui Hinc Occasionem Arripiu

 Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.

 Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.

 Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.

 Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.

 Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.

 Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.

 Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.

 Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.

 Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.

 Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.

 Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.

 Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.

 Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.

 Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.

 Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.

 Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.

 Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.

 Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.

 Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.

 Chapter XX.—A Good Wife.

 Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.

 Chapter XXII.—The True Gnostic Does Good, Not from Fear of Punishment or Hope of Reward, But Only for the Sake of Good Itself.

 Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.

 Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.

 Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.

 Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.

 Book V. Chap. I.—On Faith.

 Chap. II.—On Hope.

 Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.

 Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.

 Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.

 Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.

 Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.

 Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.

 Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.

 Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.

 Chapter XI.—Abstraction from Material Things Necessary in Order to Attain to the True Knowledge of God.

 Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.

 Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.

 Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.

 Book VI. Chapter I.—Plan.

 Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.

 Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.

 Chapter IV.—The Greeks Drew Many of Their Philosophical Tenets from the Egyptian and Indian Gymnosophists.

 Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.

 Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.

 Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.

 Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.

 Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.

 Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.

 Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.

 Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.

 Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.

 Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.

 Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.

 Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.

 Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.

 Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.

 Book VII. Chapter I.—The Gnostic a True Worshipper of God, and Unjustly Calumniated by Unbelievers as an Atheist.

 Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.

 Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.

 Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.

 Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.

 Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.

 Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.

 Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.

 Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.

 Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.

 Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.

 Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.

 Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.

 Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.

 Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.

 Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.

 Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.

 Chapter XVIII—The Distinction Between Clean and Unclean Animals in the Law Symbolical of the Distinction Between the Church, and Jews, and Heretics.

 Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.

 Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.

 Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.

 Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.

 Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.

 Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.

 Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.

 Chapter VIII.—The Method of Classifying Things and Names.

 Chapter IX.—On the Different Kinds of Cause.

Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.

The Gnostic is such, that he is subject only to the affections that exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger, thirst, and the like. But in the case of the Saviour, it were ludicrous [to suppose] that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order to its duration. For He ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape (δοκήσει). But He was entirely impassible (ἀπαθής); inaccessible to any movement of feeling—either pleasure or pain. While the apostles, having most gnostically mastered, through the Lord’s teaching, anger and fear, and lust, were not liable even to such of the movements of feeling, as seem good, courage, zeal, joy, desire, through a steady condition of mind, not changing a whit; but ever continuing unvarying in a state of training after the resurrection of the Lord.

And should it be granted that the affections specified above, when produced rationally, are good, yet they are nevertheless inadmissible in the case of the perfect man, who is incapable of exercising courage: for neither does he meet what inspires fear, as he regards none of the things that occur in life as to be dreaded; nor can aught dislodge him from this—the love he has towards God. Nor does he need cheerfulness of mind; for he does not fall into pain, being persuaded that all things happen well. Nor is he angry; for there is nothing to move him to anger, seeing he ever loves God, and is entirely turned towards Him alone, and therefore hates none of God’s creatures. No more does he envy; for nothing is wanting to him, that is requisite to assimilation, in order that he may be excellent and good. Nor does he consequently love any one with this common affection, but loves the Creator in the creatures. Nor, consequently, does he fall into any desire and eagerness; nor does he want, as far as respects his soul, aught appertaining to others, now that he associates through love with the Beloved One, to whom he is allied by free choice, and by the habit which results from training, approaches closer to Him, and is blessed through the abundance of good things.

So that on these accounts he is compelled to become like his Teacher in impassibility. For the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind is seen1497    Adopting the various reading καθ᾽ ὄ, and the conjecture ὁρᾶται, instead of καθ᾽ ὄν and ὁράσει in the text, as suggested by Sylburgius.    Luke xix. 26. in man alone. Thus also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as respects his soul. And, on the other hand, God is like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the mind by which we are characterized. Consequently, also, those who sin against man are unholy and impious. For it were ridiculous to say that the gnostic and perfect man must not eradicate anger and courage, inasmuch as without these he will not struggle against circumstances, or abide what is terrible. But if we take from him desire, he will be quite overwhelmed by troubles, and therefore depart from this life very basely. Unless possessed of it, as some suppose, he will not conceive a desire for what is like the excellent and the good. If, then, all alliance with what is good is accompanied with desire, how, it is said, does he remain impassible who desires what is excellent?

But these people know not, as appears, the divinity of love. For love is not desire on the part of him who loves; but is a relation of affection, restoring the Gnostic to the unity of the faith,—independent of time and place. But he who by love is already in the midst of that in which he is destined to be, and has anticipated hope by knowledge, does not desire anything, having, as far as possible, the very thing desired. Accordingly, as to be expected, he continues in the exercise of gnostic love, in the one unvarying state.

Nor will he, therefore, eagerly desire to be assimilated to what is beautiful, possessing, as he does, beauty by love. What more need of courage and of desire to him, who has obtained the affinity to the impassible God which arises from love, and by love has enrolled himself among the friends of God?

We must therefore rescue the gnostic and perfect man from all passion of the soul. For knowledge (gnosis) produces practice, and practice habit or disposition; and such a state as this produces impassibility, not moderation of passion. And the complete eradication of desire reaps as its fruit impassibility. But the Gnostic does not share either in those affections that are commonly celebrated as good, that is, the good things of the affections which are allied to the passions: such, I mean, as gladness, which is allied to pleasure; and dejection, for this is conjoined with pain; and caution, for it is subject to fear. Nor yet does he share in high spirit, for it takes its place alongside of wrath; although some say that these are no longer evil, but already good. For it is impossible that he who has been once made perfect by love, and feasts eternally and insatiably on the boundless joy of contemplation, should delight in small and grovelling things. For what rational cause remains any more to the man who has gained “the light inaccessible,”1498    1 Tim. vi. 16.    [Τῶν κατεπειγόντων γνῶσις. This definition must be borne in mind. It destroys all pretences that anything belonging to the faith, i.e., dogma, might belong to an esoteric system.] for revering to the good things of the world? Although not yet true as to time and place, yet by that gnostic love through which the inheritance and perfect restitution follow, the giver of the reward makes good by deeds what the Gnostic, by gnostic choice, had grasped by anticipation through love.

For by going away to the Lord, for the love he bears Him, though his tabernacle be visible on earth, he does not withdraw himself from life. For that is not permitted to him. But he has withdrawn his soul from the passions. For that is granted to him. And on the other hand he lives, having put to death his lusts, and no longer makes use of the body, but allows it the use of necessaries, that he may not give cause for dissolution.

How, then, has he any more need of fortitude, who is not in the midst of dangers, being not present, but already wholly with the object of love? And what necessity for self-restraint to him who has not need of it? For to have such desires, as require self-restraint in order to their control, is characteristic of one who is not yet pure, but subject to passion. Now, fortitude is assumed by reason of fear and cowardice. For it were no longer seemly that the friend of God, whom “God hath fore-ordained before the foundation of the world”1499    Eph. i. 4, 5.    Luke xx. 36. to be enrolled in the highest “adoption,” should fall into pleasures or fears, and be occupied in the repression of the passions. For I venture to assert, that as he is predestinated through what he shall do, and what he shall obtain, so also has he predestinated himself by reason of what he knew and whom he loved; not having the future indistinct, as the multitude live, conjecturing it, but having grasped by gnostic faith what is hidden from others. And through love, the future is for him already present. For he has believed, through prophecy and the advent, on God who lies not. And what he believes he possesses, and keeps hold of the promise. And He who hath promised is truth. And through the trustworthiness of Him who has promised, he has firmly laid hold of the end of the promise by knowledge. And he, who knows the sure comprehension of the future which there is in the circumstances, in which he is placed, by love goes to meet the future. So he, that is persuaded that he will obtain the things that are really good, will not pray to obtain what is here, but that he may always cling to the faith which hits the mark and succeeds. And besides, he will pray that as many as possible may become like him, to the glory of God, which is perfected through knowledge. For he who is made like the Saviour is also devoted to saving; performing unerringly the commandments as far as the human nature may admit of the image. And this is to worship God by deeds and knowledge of the true righteousness. The Lord will not wait for the voice of this man in prayer. “Ask,” He says, “and I will do it; think, and I will give.”1500    Quoted afterwards, chap. xii., and book vii. chap. ii.    Ps. xxiv. 3–6.

For, in fine, it is impossible that the immutable should assume firmness and consistency in the mutable. But the ruling faculty being in perpetual change, and therefore unstable, the force of habit is not maintained. For how can he who is perpetually changed by external occurrences and accidents, ever possess habit and disposition, and in a word, grasp of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)? Further, also, the philosophers regard the virtues as habits, dispositions, and sciences. And as knowledge (gnosis) is not born with men, but is acquired,1501    The text has ἐπίμικτος, which on account of its harshness has been rejected by the authorities for ἐπίκτητος.    Heb. i. 3. and the acquiring of it in its elements demands application, and training, and progress; and then from incessant practice it passes into a habit; so, when perfected in the mystic habit, it abides, being infallible through love. For not only has he apprehended the first Cause, and the Cause produced by it, and is sure about them, possessing firmly firm and irrefragable and immoveable reasons; but also respecting what is good and what is evil, and respecting all production, and to speak comprehensively, respecting all about which the Lord has spoken, he has learned, from the truth itself, the most exact truth from the foundation of the world to the end. Not preferring to the truth itself what appears plausible, or, according to Hellenic reasoning, necessary; but what has been spoken by the Lord he accepts as clear and evident, though concealed from others; and he has already received the knowledge of all things. And the oracles we possess give their utterances respecting what exists, as it is; and respecting what is future, as it shall be; and respecting what is past, as it was.

In scientific matters, as being alone possessed of scientific knowledge, he will hold the preeminence, and will discourse on the discussion respecting the good, ever intent on intellectual objects, tracing out his procedure in human affairs from the archetypes above; as navigators direct the ship according to the star; prepared to hold himself in readiness for every suitable action; accustomed to despise all difficulties and dangers when it is necessary to undergo them; never doing anything precipitate or incongruous either to himself or the common weal; foreseeing; and inflexible by pleasures both of waking hours and of dreams. For, accustomed to spare living and frugality, he is moderate, active, and grave; requiring few necessaries for life; occupying himself with nothing superfluous. But desiring not even these things as chief, but by reason of fellowship in life, as necessary for his sojourn in life, as far as necessary.

Τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ γνωστικός, ὡς μόνοις τοῖς διὰ τὴν [δια]μονὴν τοῦ σώματος γινομένοις πάθεσι περιπίπτειν, οἷον πείνῃ, δίψει καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σωτῆρος τὸ σῶμα ἀπαιτεῖν ὡς σῶμα τὰς ἀναγκαίας ὑπηρεσίας εἰς διαμονήν, γέλως ἂν εἴη· ἔφαγεν γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχόμενον ἁγίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἄλλως περὶ αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν ὑπεισέλθοι, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει ὕστερον δοκήσει τινὲς αὐτὸν πεφανερῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον· αὐτὸς δὲ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν, εἰς ὃν οὐδὲν παρεισδύεται κίνημα παθητικὸν οὔτε ἡδονὴ οὔτε λύπη. οἱ δὲ ἀπόστολοι ὀργῆς καὶ φόβου καὶ ἐπιθυμίας διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας γνωστικώτερον κρατήσαντες καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀγαθὰ τῶν παθητικῶν κινημάτων, οἷον θάρσος, ζῆλον, χαράν, εὐθυμίαν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰ ἀνεδέξαντο, ἐμπέδῳ τινὶ τῆς διανοίας καταστάσει μηδὲ καθ' ὁτιοῦν μεταβαλλόμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἕξει ἀσκήσεως ἀεὶ μένοντες ἀναλλοίωτοι μετά γε τὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἀνάστασιν. κἂν γὰρ μετὰ λόγου γινόμενα τὰ προειρημένα ἀγαθά τις ἐκδέχηται, ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἐπὶ τοῦ τελείου οὐ παραδεκτέον, ὃς οὔτε θαρσεῖν ἔχει (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν δεινοῖς γίνεται, μηδὲν δεινὸν ἡγούμενος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οὐδὲ ἀποστῆσαί τι καὶ τούτου αὐτὸν τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀγάπης δύναται), οὔτε εὐθυμίας χρεία ἐστίν (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς λύπην ἐμπίπτει, πάντα καλῶς γίνεσθαι πεπεισμένος) οὐδὲ μὴν θυμοῦται (οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ τι συγκινήσει αὐτὸν πρὸς θυμόν, ἀγαπῶντα ἀεὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ μόνῳ ὅλον τετραμμένον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲν τῶν κτισμάτων τοῦ θεοῦ μεμισηκότα)· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ζηλοῖ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδεῖ τι αὐτῷ πρὸς ἐξομοίωσιν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι· οὐδὲ ἄρα φιλεῖ τινα τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην φιλίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κτίστην διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων). οὔτ' οὖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀρέξει τινὶ περιπίπτει οὔτε ἐνδεής ἐστι κατά γε τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἄλλων τινός, συνὼν ἤδη δι' ἀγάπης τῷ ἐραστῷ, ᾧ δὴ ᾠκείωται κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν, καὶ τῇ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἕξει τούτῳ προσεχέστερον συνεγγίζων, μακάριος ὢν διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν περιουσίαν, ὥστε ἕνεκά γε τούτων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι βιάζεται τῷ διδασκάλῳ εἰς ἀπάθειαν· νοερὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, καθ' ὃ ὁ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονισμὸς ὁρᾶται ἐν μόνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ᾗ καὶ θεοειδὴς καὶ θεοείκελος ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὅ τε αὖ θεὸς ἀνθρωποειδής· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάστου ὁ νοῦς, ᾧ χαρακτηριζόμεθα. παρ' ὃ καὶ οἱ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀνόσιοί τε καὶ ἀσεβεῖς. λῆρος γὰρ καὶ τὸ φάσκειν τὸν γνωστικὸν καὶ τέλειον μὴ δεῖν ἀφαιρεῖν θυμοῦ καὶ θάρσους, ὡς μὴ καὶ ἄνευ τούτων κατεξαναστησομένου τῶν περιστάσεων οὐδ' ὑπομενοῦντος τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ', εἰ καὶ τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἀφέλοιμεν αὐτοῦ, ὡς πάντως ὑπὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν συγχεθησομένου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κάκιστα ἀπαλλάξοντος. τοῦ τε ζήλου εἰ μὴ μετείη αὐτῷ, ᾗ τισιν ἔδοξεν, οὐκ ἂν τῶν ὁμοίων τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἔργων ἔφεσιν λάβοι. εἰ γοῦν ἡ πᾶσα οἰκείωσις ἡ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ μετ' ὀρέξεως γίνεται, πῶς ἀπαθὴς μένει, φασίν, ὁ τῶν καλῶν ὀρεγόμενος; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἴσασιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀγάπης· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔτι ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαπῶντος ἡ ἀγάπη, στερκτικὴ δὲ οἰκείωσις, εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως ἀποκαθεστακυῖα τὸν γνωστικόν, χρόνου καὶ τόπου μὴ προσδεόμενον. ὃ δ' ἐν οἷς ἔσται, δι' ἀγάπης ἤδη γενόμενος, τὴν ἐλπίδα προειληφὼς διὰ τῆς γνώσεως, οὐδὲ ὀρέγεταί τινος, ἔχων ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτὸ τὸ ὀρεκτόν. εἰκότως τοίνυν ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ἕξει μένει τῇ ἀμεταβόλῳ γνωστικῶς ἀγαπῶν, οὐδ' ἄρα ζηλώσει ἐξομοιωθῆναι τοῖς καλοῖς [τὸ] εἶναι δι' ἀγάπης ἔχων τοῦ κάλλους. θάρσους τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τίς ἔτι τούτῳ χρεία, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγάπης οἰκείωσιν πρὸς τὸν ἀπαθῆ θεὸν ἀπειληφότι καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης ἑαυτὸν εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἐγγεγραφότι; ἐξαιρετέον ἄρα τὸν γνωστικὸν ἡμῖν καὶ τέλειον ἀπὸ παντὸς ψυχικοῦ πάθους· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις συνάσκησιν, ἡ συνάσκησις δὲ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν, ἡ κατάστασις δὲ ἡ τοιάδε ἀπάθειαν ἐργάζεται, οὐ μετριοπάθειαν· ἀπάθειαν γὰρ καρποῦται παντελὴς τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐκκοπή. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκείνων τῶν θρυλουμένων ἀγαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν παρακειμένων τοῖς πάθεσιν παθητικῶν ἀγαθῶν, μετα λαμβάνει ὁ γνωστικός, οἷον εὐφροσύνης λέγω (ἥτις παράκειται τῇ ἡδονῇ) καὶ κατηφείας (αὕτη γὰρ τῇ λύπῃ παρέζευκται) καὶ εὐλαβείας (ὑπέσταλκεν γὰρ τῷ φόβῳ), ἀλλ' οὐδὲ θυμοῦ (παρὰ τὴν ὀργὴν οὗτος τέτακται), κἂν λέγωσί τινες μηκέτ' εἶναι ταῦτα κακά, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἀγαθά. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἅπαξ τελειωθέντα δι' ἀγάπης καὶ τὴν ἀπλήρωτον τῆς θεωρίας εὐφροσύνην ἀιδίως καὶ ἀκορέστως ἑστιώμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ χαμαιζήλοις ἔτι τέρπεσθαι· τίς γὰρ ὑπολείπεται ἔτι τούτῳ εὔλογος αἰτία ἐπὶ τὰ κοσμικὰ παλινδρομεῖν ἀγαθὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπρόσιτον ἀπειληφότι φῶς, κἂν μηδέπω κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ γνωστικῇ ἀγάπῃ, δι' ἣν καὶ ἡ κληρονομία καὶ ἡ παντελὴς ἕπεται ἀποκατάστασις, βεβαιοῦντος δι' ἔργων τοῦ μισθαποδότου, ὃ διὰ τοῦ ἑλέσθαι γνωστικῶς διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης φθάσας προείληφεν ὁ γνωστικός; ἦ γὰρ οὐχί, ἀποδημῶν πρὸς τὸν κύριον δι' ἀγάπην τὴν πρὸς αὐτόν, κἂν τὸ σκῆνος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ γῆς θεωρῆται, ἑαυτὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐξάγει τοῦ βίου (οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτέτραπται αὐτῷ), ἐξήγαγεν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν παθῶν (συγκεχώρηται γὰρ αὐτῷ) ζῇ τε αὖ νεκρώσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐκέτι συγχρῆται τῷ σώματι, μόνον δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπιτρέπει χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, ἵνα μὴ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς διαλύσεως παράσχῃ; Πῶς οὖν ἔτι τούτῳ τῆς ἀνδρείας χρεία, μὴ γινομένῳ ἐν δεινοῖς, τῷ γε μὴ παρόντι, ὅλως δὲ ἤδη συνόντι τῷ ἐραστῷ; τίς δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνης ἀνάγκη μὴ χρῄζοντι αὐτῆς; τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν τοιαύτας ἐπιθυμίας, ὡς σωφροσύνης δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἐγκράτειαν, οὐδέπω καθαροῦ, ἀλλ' ἐμπαθοῦς, ἀνδρεία τε διὰ φόβον καὶ δειλίαν παραλαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρέπον ἔτι τὸν φίλον τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ἐγκαταλεγῆναι υἱοθεσίαν, ἡδοναῖς ἢ φόβοις περιπίπτειν καὶ περὶ τὴν καταστολὴν ἀπασχολεῖσθαι τῶν παθῶν. τολμήσας γὰρ φήσαιμ' ἄν· καθάπερ προωρισμένως κεῖται δι' ὧν πράξει καὶ οὗ τεύξεται, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς προορίσας ἔχει δι' ὧν ἔγνω ὃν ἠγάπησεν, οὐκ ἔχων δυστέκμαρτον τὸ μέλλον, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ στοχαζόμενοι βιοῦσιν, ἀπειληφὼς δὲ διὰ πίστεως γνωστικῆς, ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄδηλον. κἄστιν αὐτῷ δι' ἀγάπην ἐνεστὸς ἤδη τὸ μέλλον· πεπίστευκεν γὰρ διά τε τῆς προφητείας διά τε τῆς παρουσίας τῷ μὴ ψευδομένῳ θεῷ καί, ὃ πεπί στευκεν, ἔχει καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας (ἀλήθεια δὲ ὁ ἐπαγγειλάμενος) καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας διὰ τῆς ἀξιοπιστίας τοῦ ἐπαγγειλαμένου κατ' ἐπιστήμην βεβαίως ἀπείληφεν. ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐν οἷς ἐστι κατάστασιν βεβαίαν τῶν μελλόντων κατάληψιν εἰδὼς δι' ἀγάπης προαπαντᾷ τῷ μέλλοντι. αὐτίκα οὐδὲ εὔξεται τυχεῖν τῶν τῇδε ὁ τεύξεσθαι πεπεισμένος τῶν ὄντως ἀγαθῶν, ἔχεσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ τῆς ἐπηβόλου καὶ κατορθωτικῆς πίστεως. καὶ πρὸς τοῖσδε παμπόλλους ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίους αὐτῷ γενέσθαι εὔξεται, εἰς δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἣ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν τελειοῦται· σωτήριος γάρ τις ὁ τῷ σωτῆρι ἐξομοιούμενος, εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει χωρῆσαι τὴν εἰκόνα θέμις, ἀπαραβάτως τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς κατορθῶν· τὸ δ' ἔστι ἔχει θρῃσκεύειν τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς ὄντως δικαιοσύνης, ἔργων τε καὶ γνώσεως· τούτου φωνὴν κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν οὐκ ἀναμένει κύριος, αἴτησαι λέγων καὶ ποιήσω· ἐννοήθητι καὶ δώσω. Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν τῷ τρεπομένῳ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν πῆξιν καὶ σύστασιν, ἐν τροπῇ δὲ τῇ συνεχεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀστάτου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ γινομένου, ἡ ἑκτικὴ δύναμις οὐ σῴζεται. ὃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑπεισιόντων καὶ προσπιπτόντων ἀεὶ μεταβάλλεται, πῶς ἄν ποτε ἐν ἕξει καὶ διαθέσει καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν ἐπιστήμης κατοχῇ γένοιτ' ἄν; καίτοι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἐπιστήμας οἴονται. ὡς δὲ οὐ συγγεννᾶται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητός ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις καὶ προσοχῆς μὲν δεῖται κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάθησις αὐτῆς ἐκθρέψεώς τε καὶ αὐξήσεως, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀδιαλείπτου μελέτης εἰς ἕξιν ἔρχεται, οὕτως ἐν ἕξει τελειωθεῖσα τῇ μυστικῇ ἀμετάπτωτος δι' ἀγάπην μένει· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγεν[ν]ημένον αἴτιον κατείληφεν καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐμπέδως ἔχει, μονίμως μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καὶ ἀκινήτους λόγους κεκτημένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ κακῶν περί τε γενέσεως ἁπάσης καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν, περὶ ὧν ἐλάλησεν ὁ κύριος, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐκ καταβολῆς κόσμου εἰς τέλος ἀλήθειαν παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχει τῆς ἀληθείας μαθών, οὐκ, εἴ πού τι φανείη πιθανὸν ἢ κατὰ λόγον Ἑλληνικὸν ἀναγκαστικόν, πρὸ αὐτῆς αἱρούμενος τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ δὲ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ κυρίου σαφῆ καὶ πρόδηλα ἔχει λαβών. κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾖ ἔτι κεκρυμμένα, ἤδη περὶ πάντων εἴληφε τὴν γνῶσιν. τὰ λόγια δὲ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν θεσπίζει περί τε τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, περί τε τῶν μελλόντων ὡς ἔσται, περί τε τῶν γεγονότων ὡς ἐγένετο. ἔν [τε] τοῖς ἐπιστημονικοῖς, μόνος ὢν ἐπιστήμων, κρατιστεύσει καὶ τὸν περὶ τἀγαθοῦ λόγον πρεσβεύσει, τοῖς νοητοῖς προσκείμενος ἀεί, ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἄνωθεν τῶν ἀρχετύπων τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια αὑτοῦ διοίκησιν ἀπογραφόμενος, καθάπερ οἱ πλοϊζόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄστρον τὴν ναῦν κατευθύνοντες, πρὸς πᾶσαν καθήκουσαν πρᾶξιν ἑτοίμως ἔχειν παρεσκευασμένος, πάντα τὰ ὀχληρὰ καὶ δεινὰ εἰθισμένος ὑπερορᾶν, ὅταν ὑπομεῖναι δέῃ, μηδὲν προπετὲς μηδὲ ἀσύμφωνον μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε τοῖς κοινοῖς ποτε ἐπιτελῶν, προορατικὸς ὢν καὶ ἄκαμπτος ἡδοναῖς ταῖς τε ὕπαρ ταῖς τε δι' ὀνειράτων· διαίτῃ γὰρ λιτῇ καὶ αὐταρκείᾳ συνειθισμένος σωφρονικῶς, εὐσταλὴς μετὰ σεμνότητος ὑπάρχει, ὀλίγων τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς τὸ διαζῆν δεόμενος, μηδὲν περιττὸν πραγματευόμενος, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ταῦτα ὡς προηγούμενα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον κοινωνίας ὡς ἀναγκαῖα τῇ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιδημίᾳ, εἰς ὅσον ἀνάγκη, προσιέμενος· προηγουμένη γὰρ αὐτῷ ἡ γνῶσις.