The Fount of Knowledge I: The Philosophical Chapters

 Preface

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 4 (variant)

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 6 (variant)

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapters 9-10 (variants)

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 The term subject is taken in two ways: as subject of existence and as subject of predication. We have a subject of existence in such a case as that of

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 Chapter 31

 Chapter 32

 Chapter 33

 Chapter 34

 Chapter 35

 Chapter 36

 Chapter 37

 Chapter 38

 Chapter 39

 Chapter 40

 Chapter 41

 Chapter 42

 Chapter 43

 Chapter 44

 Chapter 45

 Chapter 46

 Substance, then, is a most general genus. The body is a species of substance, and genus of the animate. The animate is a species of body, and genus of

 Chapter 48

 Chapter 49

 Chapter 50

 Chapter 51

 Chapter 52

 Chapter 53

 Chapter 54

 Chapter 55

 Chapter 56

 Chapter 57

 Chapter 58

 Chapter 59

 Chapter 60

 Chapter 61

 Chapter 62

 Chapter 63

 Chapter 64

 Chapter 65

 Chapter 67 [!]

 Chapter 66 [!]

 Chapter 68

 Explanation of Expressions

Chapter 52

One should know that action and passion, or the active and passive potencies, come under quality, but that which acts and which is acted upon is some substance acting in a certain way. To act, then, is to have within oneself a cause of action, whereas to be acted upon is to have in oneself and in another the cause of being acted upon, as with the creator and the creature. Thus, the creator has in himself the cause of creation, whereas on the other hand, the creature has in the creator the principle of creation and in its own self the suitability of being acted upon. By creator we here mean the artisan, such, for example, as the carpenter. And by creature we mean the matter subjected to the artisan, such, for example, as wood, for this last is subjected to the carpenter.

Of the things which come under action and passion some are said simply to make and to be made, as in the case of the practical arts, such as wood-working, metal-working, and the like. With these the thing made endures even after the maker has ceased making. Thus, when the builder has finished building, that which has been built by him endures. Other things one is said to do, in which case that which is done does not last after the doer has ceased doing. Thus, when the flute-player has stopped playing, the flute-playing does not keep on, but stops entirely. In the case of other things one is said to consider, as in the practice of astronomy and geometry, and in thinking, and the like. Then, again, there are those other kinds which are observed in such inanimate beings as fire, stone, wood, and so forth. The first of all these concern rational beings, whereas the very last kind concerns the inanimate and irrational beings. For the inanimate being does not act as the animate beings do, but as a body approaching a body.

This category has two properties. The first is that it admits of contrariety, for to heat is the contrary of to cool. The second is that it admits of more and less, for it is possible to heat more and to cool less; similarly, with being heated and being cooled.

Activity and passivity, then, are observed in all the categories: in substance, begetting and being begotten; in quantity, counting and being counted; in relation, doubling and being doubled; in quality, whitening and being whitened; in position, seating and being seated; in state, carrying and being carried; in place, containing and being contained; in time, containing and being contained in present, past, and future time.

[39] {Περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.} Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις ἤγουν ἡ ποιητικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἡ παθητικὴ ὑπὸ τὴν ποιότητά εἰσι, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν οὐσία τίς ἐστι τοιῶσδε ἐνεργοῦσα ἢ πάσχουσα. Ποιεῖν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐνεργείας, πάσχειν δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔχειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πάσχειν ὡς ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ τὸ δημιουργούμενον: ὁ μὲν γὰρ δημιουργὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς δημιουργίας, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ἐν μὲν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς δημιουργίας, ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῆς παθήσεως. Δημιουργὸν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὸν τεχνίτην λέγομεν οἷον τέκτονα, δημιουργούμενον δὲ τὴν ὕλην τὴν ὑποκειμένην τῷ τεχνίτῃ οἷον τὴν ξυλήν: αὕτη γὰρ ὑπόκειται τῷ τέκτονι. Τοῦ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς λέγονται ποιεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν τεχνῶν οἷον τεκτονικῆς, χαλκευτικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ μετὰ τὸ παύσασθαι τὸν ποιοῦντα διαμένει τὸ ποίημα: τοῦ γὰρ οἰκοδόμου παυσαμένου τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν διαμένει τὸ οἰκοδομηθέν: _τὸ δὲ λέγεται πράττειν, ἐφ' ὧν οὐ διαμένει τὸ πραττόμενον παυσαμένου τοῦ πράττοντος: παυσαμένου γὰρ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ οὐ διαμένει ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυται ἡ αὔλησις: _τὸ δὲ λέγεται θεωρεῖν ὡς τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν, γεωμετρεῖν, νοεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ θεωρούμενα εἴδη ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οἷον πυρί, λίθῳ, ξύλῳ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα ἐπὶ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσι, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ ἀλόγων: οὐ καθὸ γὰρ ἔμψυχον ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ καθὸ σῶμα πλησιάζον σώματι. Δύο δὲ ἔχει ἴδια: πρῶτον τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἐναντιότητα, τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τοῦ ψύχειν: δεύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μᾶλλον θερμαίνειν καὶ ἧττον ψύχειν, ὁμοίως καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ ψύχεσθαι. Ἐν πάσαις οὖν ταῖς κατηγορίαις θεωρεῖται τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν: ἐν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρός τι διπλασιάζειν καὶ διπλασιάζεσθαι, ἐν τῇ ποιότητι λευκαίνειν καὶ λευκαίνεσθαι, ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι καθίζειν καὶ καθέζεσθαι, ἐν τῷ ἔχειν φορεῖν καὶ φορεῖσθαι, ἐν τῇ ποῦ περιέχειν καὶ περιέχεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ποτὲ περιέχεσθαι καὶ περιέχειν ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ παρεληλυθότι καὶ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ.