Chapter 48

Those things are generically the same which fall in the same category, as, for example, all things under substance— and in the same way with the other nine categories. One must know that in all there are ten categories, or most general genera, to which every absolute term is referred. They are as follows: (1) substance, as, for example, stone; (2)

quantity, as, for example, two, three; (3) relation, as, for example, father, son; (4) quality, as, for example, white, black; (5) place, as, for example, in Damascus, and this is indicative of place; (6) time, as, for example, yesterday, tomorrow, and this is indicative of time; (7) state, as, for example, to be wearing a cloak; (8) position, as for example, to be standing, to be sitting; (9) action, as, for example, to burn; (10) passion, as, for example, to be burnt.

Those things are generically different which fall into different categories. Now, man and horse are generically the same, because they both belong to the category of substance; but man and knowledge are generically different, because man belongs to category of substance, while knowledge belongs to that of quality.

Those things are specifically the same which belong to the same species and agree in their essence. Peter, for instance, and Paul both belong to the same species, that of man. On the other hand, those things are specifically different which differ in species, that is, in their essence, as, for example, man and horse. The holy Fathers, however, use ‘generically the same’ and ‘specifically the same’ for the same things, namely, for things which are consubstantial, that is to say, are hypostases belonging to the same species.

Things are hypostatically the same when two natures are united in one hypostasis and have one compound hypostasis and one person, as in the case of soul and body. Those things are hypostatically and numerically different which, by the combination of their accidents, have set apart as distinct the peculiarity of their own hypostasis, or, in other words, those things which differ from one another in their accidents and have their existence individually. An example would be the individuals Peter and Paul, for the latter is one and the former another.

[34] {Ἔτι περὶ ὁμογενῶν καὶ ὁμοειδῶν ἑτερογενῶν τε καὶ ἑτεροειδῶν καὶ ὁμοϋποστάτων καὶ ἀριθμῷ διαφερόντων.} Ὁμογενῆ εἰσιν, ὅσα ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κατηγορίαν τάσσονται, οἷον ὅσα εἰσὶν ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐννέα κατηγοριῶν: δεῖ γὰρ γινώσκειν, ὡς δέκα εἰσὶν αἱ πᾶσαι κατηγορίαι ἤτοι τὰ γενικώτατα γένη, ὑφ' ἃς ἀναφέρεται πᾶσα φωνὴ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη. Εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται: αʹ οὐσία οἷον λίθος: βʹ ποσὸν οἷον δύο, τρία: γʹ πρός τι οἷον πατήρ, υἱός: δʹ ποιὸν οἷον λευκόν, μέλαν: εʹ ποῦ οἷον ἐν Δαμασκῷ, τοῦτο δὲ τόπου ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν: Ϛʹ ποτέ, χθές, αὔριον: τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν: ζʹ ἔχειν οἷον ἱμάτιον φορεῖν: ηʹ κεῖσθαι οἷον ἵστασθαι, καθέζεσθαι: θʹ ποιεῖν οἷον καίειν: ιʹ πάσχειν οἷον καίεσθαι. Ἑτερογενῆ δέ εἰσιν, ὅσα ὑπ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν εἰσί: καὶ ὁμογενῆ μὲν οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος, ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότερα, ἑτερογενῆ δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπιστήμη: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ὑπὸ τὴν ποιότητα. Ὁμοειδῆ εἰσιν, ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τάσσονται καὶ κοινωνοῦσι τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας οἷον Πέτρος, Παῦλος: ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὑφ' ἓν εἶδός εἰσι, τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ἑτεροειδῆ δέ εἰσιν, ὅσα τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἤγουν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος. Οἱ δὲ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὁμογενῆ καὶ ὁμοειδῆ ταὐτὸν λέγουσι τὰ ὁμοούσια ἤγουν τὰς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ὑποστάσεις. Ὁμοϋπόστατά εἰσιν, ὅτε δύο φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει ἑνωθῶσι καὶ μίαν σχῶσιν ὑπόστασιν σύνθετον καὶ ἓν πρόσωπον ὡς ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα. Ἑτεροϋπόστατα δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ διαφέροντα, ὅσα τῇ συμπλοκῇ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς οἰκείας ὑποστάσεως ἀφωρίσαντο ἤγουν ὅσα τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ τὴν ἀνὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἔχουσιν ὕπαρξιν οἷον τὰ ἄτομα Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος: ἄλλος γάρ ἐστιν οὗτος καὶ ἄλλος ἐκεῖνος.