Chapter 31

Those things are equivocal which have a common name, but which differ in their definition or description. The term dog, for example, is an equivocal one, because it means both the land-dog and the sea-dog. The land-dog, however, has one definition, while the sea-dog has another, because one is one nature and the other is another. Now, equivocals are described as follows: those things are equivocal which have only their name in common, while the statement of the substances signified by the name is diverse. Take ‘statement’ here as meaning definition or description; and take ‘by the name as showing that the definitions of the name are diverse, for which reason the things are equivocal. Take, for example, the land-dog and the sea-dog. These are equivocal because of their name—dog. For, should anyone wish to give the definition of the land-dog and of the sea-dog, he will, in so far as each one of them is called a dog, give one definition of dog to the land one and another to the sea one. Nevertheless, it is possible for these to have a common definition as well as a common name. Thus, both are called animals and admit of the definition of the animal. In the name of animal, however, they are not equivocal, but univocal. Moreover, in the case of equivocal things one must ask three questions, namely: whether it is equivocal, in how many senses it is taken, and which meaning is in question.

Although the ancients were of the opinion that likeness arose in four ways from quality alone, the more recent have thought that primarily and summarily it arises both from substance and quality. There is likeness in substance, as when we say that men are like angels, implying that they are equal to them, even though in their qualities men and angels do differ from each other very much. And in the same way we speak of horses, swans, and the like. However, since this likeness sometimes appears as without variance and sometimes with some variance, the heretics who made the Son to be inferior would say that He was like the Father, and thus by the ambiguity of the term they would lead astray more simple folk. It is for this very reason that Basil the Great says: cIf the “without variance” be added, then I, too, accept it. So much, then, for likeness in substance. Likeness in quality is not just in this quality or that, but in every quality—that is to say, in shape, form, color, skill, virtue, and whatever else is included in the nature of quality.

Now, this likeness has a fourfold division. Thus, it may be in one species and one quality, as when we say that things of the same species are like each other. For instance, we say that the Ethiopians are like each other in their being black, and again, that swans are alike in their being white. And so, these last are like each other in two ways, both in substance and appearance, that is to say, color. Or likeness may be in different species that have one and the same quality, as, for example, white and black pepper are like each other in quality. Or it will be in the same species with different qualities, as, for example, the pigeon is like the dove in its being white, and purple, and black, and in other things which they may have in common. But the quality of these last is different. A fourth kind of likeness is the appearance which is in the image and its original, as it would be with the picture of an animal and the live animal. In this way, too, they say that we are like God. Nevertheless, anyone who considers the matter carefully will discover how very great a difference there is. For the former have nothing else in common but their name and form, while man has that which is most important in him in common with God, namely, goodness, and wisdom, or even power. Yet, man is not absolutely like God, because God has these things by nature and we have them by adoption—each in a different way. And so, not only is the difference between God and man infinite, but also that between individual men proportionately. Likeness, therefore, is like the relation of things which are derivative and relative.

[17] {Περὶ ὁμωνύμων.} Ὁμώνυμα μέν εἰσι τὰ τῷ ὀνόματι κοινωνοῦντα, τῷ δὲ ὁρισμῷ ἢ τῇ ὑπογραφῇ διαφέροντα. Οἷον τὸ κύων ὄνομα ὁμώνυμόν ἐστι, δηλοῖ δὲ τὸν χερσαῖον καὶ τὸν θαλάσσιον κύνα: ἕτερον δὲ ὁρισμὸν ἔχει ὁ χερσαῖος καὶ ἕτερον ὁ θαλάσσιος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἑτέρα φύσις καὶ ἑτέρα. Ὑπογράφουσι δὲ τὰ ὁμώνυμα οὕτως: Ὁμώνυμά εἰσιν, ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος. Λόγον ἐνταῦθα τὸν ὁρισμὸν εἶπε καὶ τὴν ὑπογραφήν: κατὰ τοὔνομα δὲ εἶπε δηλῶν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος, καθ' ὃν γίνονται ὁμώνυμα. Οἷον ὁ χερσαῖος καὶ ὁ θαλάσσιος κύων κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυνός εἰσιν ὁμώνυμοι: εἰ γὰρ θελήσει τις τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ χερσαίου κυνὸς ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τοῦ θαλασσίου, καθ' ὃ κύων καλεῖται ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν, ἄλλον ὁρισμὸν ἀποδίδωσι τῷ χερσαίῳ καὶ τῷ θαλασσίῳ ἕτερον. Ἐνδέχεται δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πάλιν καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι: ζῷα γὰρ λέγονται ἀμφότερα καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ζῴου δέχονται, ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσι κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ζῴου ὁμώνυμοι ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συνώνυμοι. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνύμων τρία δεῖ ζητεῖν: εἰ ἔστι τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ κατὰ πόσων σημαινομένων φέρεται καὶ περὶ ποίου σημαινομένου ἡ ἐρώτησις γέγονεν.